From pragmatic philosophy to behavioral semiotics

Susan Petrilli - From pragmatic philosophy to behavioral semiotics: Charles W. Morris after Charles S. Peirce. Semiotica. Volume 2004, Issue 148, Pages 277–315. 51 lk

Otsustasin alustada oma kehakeeleartikli kirjutamist ja teha mõned hädavajalikud eellugemised. Morrise ja Peirce'iga seotud käitumissemiootika oleks üks neist hädavajalikest elementidest, sest Morrise definitsioon keelest on üks artikli avapaukudest.

Esimene kasulik tsitaat kõneleb pragmaatikast, ehk märgi mõjust inimesele (Peirce'i tähenduses). Pragmaatika on apparently semantikast ja süntaktikast palju ambioguoossem, kuna sellele on üritatud korduvalt definitsiooni kinnitada (isegi Kanti poolt), aga erinevatelt lähenemistelt. Selles katkendis ilmneb, et pragmaatika on Morrise järgi eesmärgipärane käitumine mida mõjutab reflektsioon. Peirce'i järgi aga tahtlik käitumine suhtes sümbolite intellektuaalse tähendusega. See annab mitteverbaalse käitumise pragmaatikale kindlasti olulise lisatõlgenduse (valmistun ette, et Tim Whartoni teost üle lugema).

In Morris’s description (1970: 10) pragmatism is focused primarily upon one aspect of human behavior: ‘intelligent action, that is, purposive or goal-seeking behavior as influenced by reflection’. This is an aspect he most develops in Signs, language and behavior which is specifically dedicated to the inextricable interrelation between signs and human conduct. For Peirce rational purpose is ‘self-controlled conduct’, that is, ‘conduct controlled by adequate deliberation’. Pragmatism, or as Peirce preferred, pragmaticism, was concerned then with the relation between ‘deliberate conduct’ and ‘the intellectual purport of symbols’ (cf. CP 8.322, 5.442).

Kuigi Morris üritas käitumissemiootikat ümber sõnastada pragmaatika aluseks, oli käitumine tema käsitluses vaid eesmärgipärane käitumine. Mitteverbaalse suhtlemise eksootika peitubki selles, et enamus mitteverbaalseid vihjeid pole eesmärgipärased või tahtlikud. Mis puudutab subjekti ja eesmärk-objekti olemasolu, siis see laheneb iniminteraktsioonis justkui iseenesest; ainult TACSi osas tuleb subjekt-objekt tasandil ringi liikuda.

Although Morris was in accord with Peirce’s description of semiosis as the ‘action of a sign’ (CP 5.473), he limited his concept of action to behavior directed toward a goal. This approach implies the presence of a subject, an organism, its goal-oriented behavior and a goal-object, that is, a ‘final object’ outside semiosis.

Oluline on Morrise raamatus "Signification and Significance" antud terminoloogilise innovatsioonid, mis puudutavad semioosi komponente. Neid on kokku viis:

• Sign or sign vehicle, the object acting as a stimulus for sign behavior;
• Interpreter, any organism acted upon by the sign vehicle. This extension of the concept of interpreter to include any organism whatever, and, therefore, any type of sign behavior beyond the human, implies extending semiotics beyond the social behavior of man and, therefore, beyond the limits established by Saussurean sémiologie;
• Interpretant, the disposition to respond to a certain type of object as the result of a sign stimulus.;
• Signification, the object to which the interpreter responds through an interpretant, that is, the signified object which as such, specifies Morris, cannot function simultaneously as a stimulus. Here, signification replaces what Morris variously calls denotatum (1938) and significatum (1946), while the concepts of interpreter and interpretant remain constant. That the object of signification cannot function as a stimulus does not mean, explains Morris, that what gives itself to direct experience cannot be signified;
• Context, the set of circumstances in which semiosis takes place.

Morriselt pärineb käitumise kategooria, mis jagab käitumise väärtuste järgi seostesse tajumise, manipuleerimise ja vajaduste rahuldamisega. See on aksiomaatiline lähenemine käitumisele, mille kohta tuleks rohkem uurida, enne kui kuskil kasutama hakkan.

In line with his plan to theorize the connection between the value and sign dimensions of behavior, Morris subdivides signification into designative, prescriptive, and appraisive signification, respectively exemplified with the words ‘black’, ‘ought’, and ‘good’; and he subdivides action, following Mead, into perceptual, manipulatory, and consummatory action, where these three types of action and signification correspond to each other in the order indicated.
The study of action is inevitable when passing from sign theory to value theory, if values are
considered in relation to action and preferential behavior and not as absolute, independent entities. Value is studied by Morris in terms of a ‘value situation’ which involves both social and individual values, and is regarded as any situation in which preferential behavior occurs. As such a value situation is inherently relational.
Values are described as objectively relative properties, that is, they are properties of objects (in a wide sense of this term) relative to preferential behavior. Morris classifies them as object, operative, and conceived values in correspondence with the tripartition of signification and action.
The term ‘value’ is used in different contexts to signify different aspects of value situations, that is, situations involving preferential behavior. Morris discusses three usages which he considers as basic. ‘Object value’ is applied to objects and as such is objectively relative, it comes into play in perceptual action. ‘Operative value’ signifies the direction of preferential behavior, it holds wherever there is a direction of preference at choice points as regards objects and behavior and is correlated to manipulatory action. ‘Conceived value’ concerns preferential behavior as accorded to a signified object or situation. Ideally it guides our effective choices and corresponds to consummatory action. Morris specifies that object and operative values do not necessarily involve signs, that is, an object of signification, while, on the contrary, conceived values can only exist as signified values and, therefore, they necessarily do involve signs.

Ülejäänud tekst puudutab suuresti Morrise lisandust semiootikasse: semantika, süntaktika ja pragmaatika lahusust, mida siin lahatakse päris pikalt ja põhjalikult (sh süntaktika osas kritiseeritakse Chomskyt).

According to Morris’s formulation of 1946 (1971[1946]: 365ff), pragmatics studies the effects of signs; semantics studies the significations of signs; syntactics studies the way in which signs are combined to form compound signs.

That's the skinny of it. Neid tsitaate tuleks aeg-ajalt üle lugeda ja mõlgutada, kuidas neid kasutusse saaks panna. Kokkuvõttes lihtne ja huvitav lugemine; andis kasuliku viite Ferruccio Rossi-Landi raamatuni "Between signs and non-signs", milles on (semiootilist) juttu ka sellest, kuidas igasugune käitumine on kommunikatsioon.