Plato 2004. Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. [Book VII]
Platon 1997. Politeia (VII raamat 514a-521b). Tõlkinud Marju Lepajõe. Akadeemia 9. 1819-1828. [DIGAR]
SOCRATES: He would need time to get adjusted, I suppose, if he is going to see the things in the world above. At first, he would see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. From these, it would be easier for him to go on to look at the things in the sky and the sky itself at night, gazing at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day, gazing at the sun and the light of the sun. (Plato 2004: 209, 516a-b)
Ehitub liigitusele kuuenda raamatu lõpus (509e-510a), kus samuti eristatakse kujutiste hulgas kõigepealt varje ja seejärel peegeldusi veekogudes ning siledatel pindadel. Rõhutatud lause Marju Lepajõe tõlkes (Akadeemia 9): "Ja esiteks võiks ta kõige kergemini silmadega eristada varje, ja pärast seda inimeste ja muu kujutisi [εἴδωλα] vees, hiljem alles neid endid" (1997: 1821).
SOCRATES: And if there had been honor, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by; and was best able to remember which usually came earlier, which later, and which simultaneously; and who was thus best able to prophesize the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? (Plato 2004: 210, 516c-d)
Analoogia järgi peaksime me pidama ka siinses elus pakutavat - raha, omandit, tutvusi, au, kuulsust, võimu, jne - mittemilleski, sest mitte miski sellest ei ole niivõrd tõeline kui see, mida pakutakse pärastelus. Tõlkes "auavaldused ja ülistused ja autasud" ja "kas sa arvad, et ta ihaldaks neid tasusid väga ja kadestaks au pälvinuid ja võimukandjaid nonde seas" (1997: 1822).
SOCRATES: This image, my dear Glaucon, must be fitted together as a whole with what we said before. The realm revealed through sight should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the sun's power. And if you think of the upward journey and the seeing it to the sun's power. And if you think of the upward journey and the seeing of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you won't mistake my intentions - since it is what you wanted to hear about. (Plato 2004: 211, 517a-b)
"Niisiis, armas Glaukon," jätkasin, "tuleb kõigele eespool öeldule rakendada sellist võrdpilti tervikuna - elupaik vanglas kujutab nägemise kaudu ilmuvat ala, tule valgus seal - päikese toimeväge [δύναμις]. Kui sa paned ülespoole mineku ja ülal oleva kaemise hinge tõusuteeks mõteldava valda [τόπος νοητός], siis sa ei kaldu kõrvale minugi oletusest - mida sa ju ihkad kuulda. (1997: 1823)
Maailma, milles meie elame, võib võrdsustada selle koopaga; ainult, et tõrvikuvalguse asemel on meil päike, mille ümber me tiirleme. Filosoofia aitab hingel tõusta puhta mõtte maailma ja näha asju mõistusega nii, nagu nad tegelikult on. / Mul tekkis siin küsimus, et mis on tõelisem valgusallikas kui päike? Kesktuli?
[SOCRATES:] Only the god knows whether it is true. But this is how these phenomena seem to me: in the knowable realm, the last thing to be seen is the form of the good, and it is seen only with toil and trouble. Once one has seen it, however, one must infer that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that in the visible realm it produces both light and its source, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding; and that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it. (Plato 2004: 211, 517b-c)
Aga küllap jumal teab, kas see juhtub olema tõele vastav. Mis paistab mulle, paistab sel viisil: tunnetatava vallas on viimasena, ja pingutamisi, nähtav hüve idee [ἰδέα]; kui ta aga on nähtud, peab see viima järelduseni, et just tema on kõigele kõige õige ja hea põhjus, mis nähtavas sünnitab valguse ja selle isanda, ning on mõteldavas käskija, mis valitseb tõde ja mõistust [νοῦς]; ja et see, kes kavatseb tegutseda arukalt - olgu era- või riigiasjades - peab olema teda näinud. (1997: 1823)
Jagatud joone lõpus on hüve vorm, mida saab ainult raske töö ja vaevaga näha. Kui seda on aga nähtud, siis mõistab inimene, et see on kõige selle, mis on kõiges õige või ilus, põhjus: nähtavas maailmas loob see valguse ja päikese; mõtete või vormide maailmas valitseb hüve vorm tõde ja mõistmist. Lepajõe tõlkes on valguse isand, Reeve'il valgus ja selle allikas, Griffithil "valgus ja selle isand, päike" (2000: 223).
SOCRATES: What about when someone, coming from looking at divine things, looks to the evils of human life? Do you think it is surprising that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous, if - while his sight is still dim and he has not yet become accustomed to the darkness around him - he is compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to compete about the shadows of justice, or about the statues of which they are the shadows; and to dispute the way these things are understood by people who have never seen justice itself? (Plato 2004: 211)
"Ent kas arvad, et on imekspandav," jätkasin, "kui keegi, olles tulnud jumalike kaemuste juurest inimlike hädade juurde, käitub sobimatult ja paistab täiesti naeruväärne, kui ta on veel poolpime ja pole kõlbulikult kohanenud ümbritseva pimedusega ja kui talt siis nõutakse kohtumajades või kusagil mujal jagelemist õigluse varjude üle või võrdkujude üle, mis varje heidavad; ja võistlemist selles, mida õigluse all mõistetakse, koos nendega, kes õiglust ennast iial näinud ei ole?" (1997: 1823)
Siin on huvitav, et Sokrates viskab selle hüpoteetilise ränduri, kes on õiglust ennast kui puhast vormi/ideed näinud, otsejoones jagatud joone teise äärmusesse, kus on varjud - mitte isegi peegeldused või loomulikud instantsid õiglusest või õigluse elemendid. Kui võtta arvesse, et ennist seostas ta varje ettekujutusega (imagination), siis sisuliselt ütleb ta siin, et see hüpoteetiline rändur visatakse pimeduses elavate inimeste hulka, kes pole õiglust mitte isegi vilksamisi näinud vaid võib-olla suisa omast tarkusest välja mõelnud või meelevaldselt leiutanud.
SOCRATES: Then the other so-called virtues of the soul do seem to be closely akin to those of the body: they really are not present in it initially, but are added later by habit and practice. The virtue of wisdom, on the other hand, belongs above all, so it seems, to something more divine, which never loses its power, but is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned. Or haven't you ever noticed in people who are said to be bad, but clever, how keen the vision of their little soul is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned toward? This shows that its sight is not inferior, but is forced to serve vice, so that the sharper it sees, the more evils it accomplishes. (Plato 2004: 212, 519e-519a)
"Nüüd, teised hinge voorused (nii nagu neid nimetada tavatsetakse) paistavad olevat lähedased keha voorustele - kuna neid varem hinges tegelikult ei ole, pannakse nad sisse harjumuste kujundamise ja treeninguga - mõtlemise voorus aga, nagu näib, kuulub kindlasti millegi jumalikuma juurde, mis ei kaota küll iialgi toimeväge, aga vastavalt teisalejuhtimisele saab kasulikuks või headtegevaks või ka kasutuks ja hukatust toovaks. Või ei ole sa veel märganud selliseid, kelle kohta öeldakse, et halvad küll, aga targad - kui läbinägev on selle hingekese pilk ja kui teravalt eristab seda, mille poole on pöördunud: nii et sellisel ei ole nägemisvõime vilets, aga ta on sunnitud teenima kurja, ja nõnda valmistab ta sedavõrd rohkem kurja, kuivõrd teravamalt ta näeb?" (1997: 1825)
Selles on jällegi midagi kombitavalt, käegakatsutavalt pütaagorlikku - mõistus on jumala poolt antud ja sisuliselt kõik, mis meid teistest loomadest eristab. Mingid sententsid isegi lähevad nii kaugele, et jumal elab inimese mõistuses: "God dwells in the intellect of the wise man" (Sextus 1818: 194).
SOCRATES: You have forgotten again, my friend, that the law is not concerned with making any one class in the city do outstandingly well, but is contriving to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing the citizens through persuasion or compulsion, and making them share with each other the benefit they can confer on the community. It produces such men in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction each one wants, but to make use of them to bind the city together. (Plato 2004: 213, 519e-520a)
"Sa oled jälle ära unustanud," ütlesin mina, "armas sõber, et seaduse mure ei ole, et mingil ühel [inimeste] liigil [γένος] läheks eriti hästi, vaid ta püüab seada, et see [heaolu] saaks olema polises tervikuna, viies kodanikud omavahel kooskõlla veenmise ja sunniga, pannes nad jagama üksteisega tulu, mida igaüks eraldi on võimeline ühisusele [ϰοινόν] tooma; ja ta ise loob sellised mehed polises, mitte et ta laseks igaühel pöörata sinna, kuhu meeldib, vaid et ta ise saaks neid tarvitada polise kokkuliitmiseks." (1997: 1826)
pLaToN pÜüDiS tEoReEtIlIsElT pÕhJeNdAdA oRjAnDuSlIkU rIiGi SeLlIsT vOrMi, MiS oLeKs KõIgE eNaM vAsTaNuD vAnA-kReEkA aRiStOkRaAtIa KlAsSiHuViDeLe AtEeNa DeMoKrAaTiA kRiIsI pErIoOdIl.
SOCRATES: Is it, then, the mosical training we described before?
GLAUCON: But it is just the counterpart of physical training, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, conveying by harmony a certain harmoniousness of temper, not knowledge; and by rhythm a certain rhythmical quality. Its stories, whether fictional or nearer the truth, cultivated other habits akin to these. (Plato 2004: 216, 522a)
Muusika harmoniseerib: "it used its qualities of harmony and rhythm to give harmony and rhythm to the guardians" (2000: 228).
SOCRATES: That inconsequential matter of distinguishing the numbers one, two, and three. In short, I mean number and calculation. Or isn't it true that every type of craft and knowledge must share in them? (Plato 2004: 216, 522c)
Hellitavalt tähtsusetu küsimus: "The small matter of distinguishing one, two and three" (2000: 229).
SOCRATES: That, then, is what I was trying to express before when I said that some things summon thought, while others do not. I define summoners as those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as do their opposites. Those that do not do this, I said, do not wake up the understanding. (Plato 2004: 219, 524d)
Mul on karvane tunne, et sel teemal võib olla midagi pistmist pütaagorlaste tabeliga, aga praegu ei kujuta ette mis see võiks olla.
SOCRATES: Then it would be appropriate, Glaucon, to prescribe this subject in our legislation and to persuade those who are going to take part in what is most important in the city to go in for calculation and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying with it until they reach the point at which they see the nature of the numbers by means of understanding itself; not like tradesmen and retailers, caring about it for the sake of buying and selling, but for the sake of war and for ease in turning the soul itself around from becoming to truth and being. (Plato 2004: 220, 525b-c)
Siin on analoogne mõte nagu tolles paljutsiteeritud kirjakohas, kus Sokrates soovitab õppida astronoomiat, sest see sunnib inimest vaatama üles (529a) st mõtlema taevakehade liikumise abstraktsele dünaamikale - jällegi, mitte meeliliselt tajutavatest esemetest vaid kui vormidest. Samamoodi tuleb valvureid siin õpetada mõtlema numbritest nii nagu pütaagorlased: mitte kui asjade arvust, vaid arvudest kui sellistest. Griffithil: "until they reach the contemplation of the nature of numbers by means of thought alone" ja "it should be [...] for their very soul's sake" (2000: 233).
SOCRATES: In my opinion, your conception of "higher studies" is a good deal too generous! I mean, if someone were looking at something by leaning his head back and studying ornaments on a ceiling, it seems as though you would say that he is looking at them with his understanding, not with his eyes! Maybe you are right and I am foolish. You see, I just cannot conceive of any subject making the soul look upward except the one that is concerned with what is - and that is invisible. If anyone tries to learn something about perceptible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward, I would say that he never really learns - since there is no knowledge to be had of such things - and that his soul is not looking up but down, whether he does his learning lying on his back on land or on sea! (Plato 2004: 224, 529a-c)
Taevatähtede uurimine iseenesest ei ole veel hinge ülendav pelgalt selle tõttu, et nad on kõrgel ja tuleb üles vaadata. Mõistusega haaratakse seda mis tõeliselt on - ja see on nähtamatu.
SOCRATES: It is probable that as the eyes fasten on astronomical motions, so the ears fasten on harmonic ones, and that these two sciences are somehow akin, as the Pythagoreans say. And we agree, Glaucon. Don't we? (Plato 2004: 225, 530d)
Sfääride muusika.
[SOCRATES:] Instead, I will drop the analogy and say that I do not mean these people, but the ones we just said we were going to question about harmonics. You see, they do the same as the astronomers do. I mean, it is in these audible concordances that they search for numbers, but they do not ascend to problems or investigate which numbers are in concord and which are not, or what the explanation is in each case. (Plato 2004: 226w 513b-c)
Jutt käib väga tõenäoliselt pütaagorlastest ja süüdistus seisneb selles, et nad ei seleta oma arvulisi kooskõlasid mõistlikult.
SOCRATES: It will be satisfactory, then, to do what we did before and call the first section knowledge, the second thought, the third opinion, and the fourth imagination. The last two together we call belief, the other two, understanding. Belief is concerned with becoming; understanding with being. And as being is to becoming, so understanding is to belief; and as understanding is to belief, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imagination. (Plato 2004: 229, 533e-534a)
Arusaadav.
SOCRATES: Well then, as regards the other requirements too, you must suppose that these same natures are to be chosen, since we have to select the most secure, the most courageous, and - as far as possible - the best-looking. In addition, we must look not only for people who have a noble and valiant character, but for those who also have natural qualities conducive to this education of ours. (Plato 2004: 230, 535a-b)
Kogu selle jutu kõrval kuidas meeleline maailm on muutuv ja petlik ning ei saa olla tõese teadmise allikas, vaid sünnitada ainult arvamusi, jne jne on Sokrates inimeste suhtes ikka üsna pinnapealine ja nõuab, et tema filosoof-kuningas oleks tall, dark, and handsome (ta ei ole küll nõudnud, et ta tõmmu oleks, aga ülejäänud kaks on küll tema nõudmised). "We must choose the most steadfast, the bravest and as far as possible the best looking" ja "noble and virile character" (2000: 244).
SOCRATES: We must also look for someone who has a good memory, is persistent, and is wholeheartedly in love with hard work. How else do you suppose he would be willing to carry out such hard physical labors and also complete so much learning and training? (Plato 2004: 231)
Millegi pärast meenus pütaagorlaste ütlus, et ära kunagi aita teisel inimesel koormat seljast võtta, aita ainult koormat selga võtta: "so that it was a precept with them, for the sufferer not to lessen, but rather to add to his burden" (Ritter 1836: 416). Griffithiga olulised erinevused: "a good memory, great resilience and tremendous energy" (2000: 244) - vastupidavuse asemel püsivus, üüratu energia asemel armastus raske töö vastu.
SOCRATES: But too serious for me as the speaker. In any case, let's not forget that in our earlier selection we chose older people, but here that is not permitted. You see, we must not believe Solon when he says that as someone grows older, he is able to learn a lot. On the contrary, he is even less able to learn than to run. It is to young people that all large and frequent labors properly belong. (Plato 2004: 232)
Sokrates kõrvetab vanainimesi nii rängalt. Peab kähku veel õppima nii palju kui võimalik enne, kui liiga vanaks jään, et midagi uut õppida.
SOCRATES: Well, then, do not use compulsion, my very good man, to train the children in these subjects; use play instead. That way you will also be able to see better what each of them is naturally suited for. (Plato 2004: 232, 536e-537a)
Geniaalne! Selle peale ei ole küll mitte keegi varem kunagi tulnud.
0 comments:
Post a Comment