Plato 2004. Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. [Book VI]
SOCRATES: What else but the one that comes next? Since the philosophers are the ones who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects, while those who cannot - those who wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way - are not philosophers, which of the two should be the leaders of a city? (Plato 2004: 176, 484b)
Filosoofid näevad ideid, "mis on igavesed ja muutumatud ning tõese teadmise objektid" (Aleksandrov jt 1947: 185).
SOCRATES: Let's agree that philosophic natures always love the sort of learning that makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is and does not wander around between coming-to-be and decaying. (Plato 2004: 177, 485a-b)
Griffithi (Cambridge'i väljaande) tõlkes: "He is always in love with any learning which helps to reveal that reality which always is, and which is not driven this way and that by becoming and ceasing to be" (2000: 187). Olemine, mis alati on ja ei eksle ringi olema saamise ja olemast lakkamise vahel.
SOCRATES: Then when a person's desires flow toward learning and everything of that sort, they will be concerned, I imagine, with the pleasures that the soul experiences just by itself, and will be indifferent to those that come through the body - if indeed the person is not a counterfeit, but rather a true, philosopher. (Plato 2004: 178, 485d)
Siin on oluline tõlke-erinevus "hinge" ja "vaimu" vahel: "the desires will be concerned with the pleasure of the mind alone, just by itself" (2000: 188). Kreekakeelses originaalis on siiski ψυχῆς, st hing.
SOCRATES: A person like that will be temperate, then, and in no way a lover of money. After all, money and the big expenditures that go along with it are sought for the sake of things that other people may take seriously, but that he does not. (Plato 2004: 178, 485e)
See on minu jaoks oluline koht, sest siin on jällegi taustal kolmetine jaotus hüvedest, mis on head iseenesest või head millegi teise jaoks - seda arutleti teise raamatu alguses. Filosoofil ei ole rahaga midagi pihta hakata, sest sellega saab küll igasuguseid asju osta, aga see mis teda huvitab on hinges endas.
SOCRATES: You should not overlook its sharing in illiberality; for surely petty-mindedness is altogether incompatible with that quality in a soul that is always reaching out to grasp all things as a whole, whether divine or human. (Plato 2004: 178, 486a)
Griffithil "mean-spirited" ja "Small-mindedness" (2000: 188). See arutelu loeb nagu jutt käiks pütaagorlaste füsiognoomiast ja iseloomu-hindamisest. Filosoof ei tohiks olla õel ja väiklane.
SOCRATES: And do you imagine that a thinker who is high-minded enough to look at all time and all being will consider human life to be a very important thing?
GLAUCON: He couldn't possibly.
SOCRATES: Then he won't consider death to be a terrible thing either, will he?
GLAUCON: Not in the least.
SOCRATES: Then a cowardly and illiberal nature could not partake, apparently, in true philosophy. (Plato 2004: 179, 486a-b)
Kui sa oled rännanud ühest paralleeluniversumist teise, matnud maha teise iseenda keha ja võtnud tema koha üle, ei ole surm tõesti miski suurem asi. Kas sama võiks öelda filosoofi kohta, kes sirgeldab liiva sisse geomeetriat ja harrastab palja silmaga taevast vahtides astronoomiat, ei tea...
SOCRATES: Is there any criticism you can find, then, of a pursuit that a person cannot practice adequately unless he is naturally good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and temperance? (Plato 2004: 180, 487a)
Jälle on karvane tunne, et need neli rivistatud asja võiksid olla seotud vastavate voorustega, aga millises järjekorras? Griffithil on need neli isikuomadust "a naturally retentive memory, an aptitude for learning, a willingness to undertake great things, a pleasant nature" (2000: 190).
[ADEIMANTUS:] Yet, when it comes to facts rather than words, he sees that of all those who take up philosophy - not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing, and then drop it, but those who continue in it for a long time - the majority become cranks, not to say completely bad, while the ones who seem best are rendered useless to the city because of the pursuit you recommend. (Plato 2004: 180, 487c-d)
Sokrates võib "tõelistest" filosoofidest ilusa pildi maalida, aga inimesed, kes võtavad filosoofiat tõsiselt, kujunevad tavaliselt veidrikud, kui mitte isegi halvad inimesed. G-l: "the ones who spend much longer on it - turn out to be extremely odd, not to say thoroughly bad" (2000: 190).
Imagine, then, that the following sort of thing happens either on one ship or on many. The shipowner is taller and stronger than everyone else on board. But he is hard of hearing, he is a bit shortsighted, and his knowledge of seafaring is correspondingly deficient. The sailors are quarreling with one another about captaincy. (Plato 2004: 181, 488a-b)
Cambridge'i väljaande joonealune märkus seletab, et see on metafoor Ateena demokraatia jaoks. Ma nüüd mõtlen, kas need omadused siin vastavad muudele kolmikjaotustele. Teadmised meresõidust ilmselgelt (3) filosoofide pärusmaa. See, et laeva omanik on suurem ja tugevam kui teised võib osutada, et ta seisab (1) käsitööliste ja põlluharijate kohal, keda on linnas arvuliselt rohkem. Järele jääb küsida, kas hea kuulmine ja nägemine on (2)?
SOCRATES: So, won't it be reasonable, then, for us to plead in his defense that a real lover of learning naturally strives for wha tis? He does not linger over each of the many things that are believed to be, but keeps on going, without losing or lessening his passion, until he grasps what the nature of each thing itself is with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp a thing of that sort because of its kinship with it. (Plato 2004: 183, 490a-b)
Krüptiline. Kas iga hingeosa on võimeline haarama erinevaid asju? Joonealune märkus käsib vaadata 611e1-612a6, aga ette kiigates ei näe seal midagi erilist asjassepuutuvat (seal räägitakse hinge surematusest).
SOCRATES: The most surprising thing of all to hear is that each one of the things we praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and drag it away from philosophy. I mean courage, temperance, and the other things we mentioned. (Plato 2004: 184, 491b)
Julgusest ja mõõdukusest saan aru, aga kuidas hea mälu või õppimisvõime hinge rüvetavad ja filosoofiast eemale lohistavad?
SOCRATES: Furthermore, in addition to those, all so-called good things also corrupt it and drag it away - beauty, wealth, physical strength, powerful family connections in the city, and all that goes along with these. You understand the general pattern of thing I mean? (Plato 2004: 185, 491c)
Need on siis need nn eksternaalid. Ilu ja füüsiline tugevus on keha omadused; jõukus ja kasulikud perekonnatutvused on nii hinge kui keha suhtes välised.
SOCRATES: When many of them sit together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or any other gathering of a majority in public and, with a loud uproar, object excessively to some of the things that are said or done, then approve excessively of others, shouting and clapping; and [|] when, in addition to these people themselves, the rocks and the surrounding space itself echo and redouble the uproar of their praise or blame. In a situation like that, how do you think - as the saying goes - a young man's heart is affected? How will whatever sort of private education he received hold up for him, and not get swept away by such praise and blame, and go be carried off by the flood wherever it goes, so that he will call the same things beautiful or ugly as these people, practice what they practice, and become like them? (Plato 2004: 185-186, 492b-c)
Rahvamasside suhtumised mõjutavad noori inimesi - mida nad kiidavad heaks või halvaks, mida kiidavad/ülistavad või laidavad/süüdistavad, mida nimetavad ilusaks või koledaks; nii hakkavad nad tegema seda mida teised teevad ja muutuvad teistega sarnaseks. Mind huvitab siin konkreetselt see, kas need neli nimetatud inimeste kohtumispaika vastavad jälle meie kategooriatele: (1) ihalejad teatris; (2) sõdurid kasarmus või laagris; (3) filosoofid kogunemistel? ja (4) õiglus peaks valitsema kohtutes.
[SOCRATES:] It is just as if someone were learning the passions and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he is rearing - how to approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most docile and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what tones of voice soothe or anger it. (Plato 2004: 186, 493b)
(1) passions ja (2) appetites?
SOCRATES: What do you think someone like that will do in such circumstances - especially if he happens to be from a great city where he is rich and noble, and if he is good-looking and tall as well? Won't he be filled with an impractical expectation and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only of the Greeks, but of the barbarians, too? And won't he exalt himself to great heights, as a result, and be brimming with pretension and empty, senslesss pride? (Plato 2004: 188, 494c-d)
Eksternaalid veel kord (seekord ka kehapikkus - Tinderitibinad mõtlevad nagu Sokrates). Griffithil noble asemel "well-born"; impractical expectation'i asemel "impossible ambitions" (200: 198).
SOCRATES: And suppose that, because of his noble nature and his natural affinity for such arguments, he somehow sees the point and is turned around and drawn toward philosophy. What do we suppose those people will do if they believe that they are losing his services and companionship? Is there anything they won't do or say in his regard to prevent him from [|] being persuaded? Or anything they won't do or say in regard to his persuader to prevent him from succeeding, whether it is in private plots or public court cases? (Plato 2004: 188-189, 494d-e)
Sama teema, mis käis korraks läbi esimesest raamatust (vt 343e): suguvõsa kõige lubadustandvamad noormehed ei saa lihtsalt minna ja pühenduda filosoofiale ilma, et kogu suguvõsa ei hakkaks teda tulu mitte-toomise eest kollitama.
SOCRATES: What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and associate with her in a way unworthy of her? What kinds of thoughts and beliefs are we to say they beget? Won't they be what are truly and appropriately called sophisms, since they have nothing genuine or truly wise about them? (Plato 2004: 190, 496a)
Võib-olla on Aleksandrovil jt ikkagi iva. Käsitöölised ja põlluharijad ei vääri haridust?
[SOCRATES:] You see, we won't relax our efforts until we convince him and the others - or at least do something that may benefit them in a later incarnation when, reborn, they happen upon these arguments again. (Plato 2004: 192, 498d)
Vististi esimene mainimine taassünnist: "or give them a bit of a helping hand for that moment in some future life when they find themselves in the same sort of discussion" (2000: 203).
SOCRATES: Ease of learning, good memory, astuteness, and smartness, as you know, and all the other things that go along with them, such as youthful passion and high-mindedness, are rarely willing to grow together simultaneously with a disposition to live an orderly, quiet, and completely stable [|] life. On the contrary, those who possess the former traits are carried by their quick wits wherever chance leads them, and have no stability at all. (Plato 2004: 197-198, 503c-d)
Valvurite hulgas saab olla vähe filosoofe, sest vaimukad ja kirglikud inimesed elavad harva korrapärast, vaikset ja täiesti stabiilset elu.
SOCRATES: Those with stable characters, on the other hand, who do not change easily, whom one would employ because of their greater reliability, and who in battle are not easily moved by fears, act in the same way when it comes to their studies. They are hard to get moving and learn with difficulty, as if they are anesthetized, and are constantly falling asleep and yawning whenever they have to work hard at such things. (Plato 2004: 198, 503c-d)
Meelekindlad inimesed jällegi ei õpi kergesti.
[SOCRATES:] You see, you have often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about, and that it is by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial. (Plato 2004: 199, 505a)
See kraam, mis Platoni viimastes töödes väidetavalt muutub täielikuks teoloogiaks.
SOCRATES: What? Haven't you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are all shameful and ugly things, since the best of them are blind? Do you think that those who have a true belief without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road? (Plato 2004: 201, 506c)
Sama tüüp kes usub hingede taassündi.
SOCRATES: Well, think of it this way. Do hearing and sound need another kind of thing in order for the former to hear and the latter to be heard - a third thing in whose absence the one won't hear or the other be heard? (Plato 2004: 202, 507c-d)
Jah, õhku. Just nagu nägemiseks on vaja valgust on kuulmiseks vaja õhku, mis helilaineid kannaks. Vaakumis on vaikus.
SOCRATES: So it is no insignificant form of yoke, then, that yokes the sense of sight and the power to be seen. In fact, it is more honorable than any that yokes other yoked teams. Provided, of course, that light is not something without honor. (Plato 2004: 203, 507e-508a)
Valgusetundlikkusega inimesed ilmselt nii ei arvaks. E. R. Clay võiks öelda, et valgus on valus.
SOCRATES: Neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be - namely, the eye - is the sun.
GLAUCON: No, it is not.
SOCRATES: But it is, I think, the most sunlike of the sense organs. (Plato 2004: 203, 508a-b)
Siit siis see silm on päikeselaadne kujund, mille Jakob von Uexküll võttis vist Goethelt.
SOCRATES: Well, think about the soul in the same way. When it focuses on something that is illuminated both by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and manifestly possesses understanding. But when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it believes and is dimmed, changes its beliefs this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding. (Plato 2004: 204, 508d)
Kuskilt ammustest lugemistest meenub ähmaselt, et see on üks varajasemaid teadvuseteooriaid: see, millest mõistus mõtleb, on nagu asjale valguse heitmine.
SOCRATES: You must say, then that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And as the cause of knowledge and truth, you must think of it as an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things. But if you are to think correctly, you must think of the good as other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly thought to be sunlike, but wrongly thought to be the sun. (Plato 2004: 204, 508e)
Siin on lõppkokkuvõttes siis analoogia kahe triaadi vahel: (1) värv; (2) nägemine; (3) valgus - (1) tõde; (2) teadmine; (3) hüve vorm. Kolmas vahendab esimest kahte.
SOCRATES: The sun, I think you would say, not only gives visible things the power to be seen but also provides for their coming-to-be, growth, and nourishment - although it is not itself coming to be.
GLAUCON: I would.
SOCRATES: Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their existence and being are also due to it; although the good is not being, but something yet beyond being, superior to it in rank and power. (Plato 2004: 205, 509b)
Teadmise objektid ei võlgne ainult selle, et neid saab teada, hüve vormile, vaid ka oma eksistentsi ja olemise. Millest see topeldus eksisteerimise ja olemise juures? Suhteliselt tühine küsimus, aga praegu on hüve vorm veel teadmise objektide alge, aga edaspidi mujal on ülim hüve kogu oleva algeks.
Socrates's claim ends with the words dunamei huperechontas ("superior in... power"), Glaucon responds with the punning daimonias huperbolês. Hence the joke. (Reeve 2004: 205, jm 37)
OMG! Hüperborea on hüperboolne!
I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, regarding them as known. (Plato 2004: 206, 510c)
(1) paaris ja paaritu; (2) punkt, joon, pindala, keha; (4) täisnurk, teravnurk, nürinurk.
SOCRATES: Also understand, then, that by the other subsection of the intelligible I mean what reason itself grasps by the power of dialectical discussion, treating its hypotheses, not as first principles, but as genuine hypotheses (that is, stepping stones and links in a chain), in order to arrive at what is unhypothetical and the first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion, making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on through forms to forms, and ending in forms. (Plato 2004: 207, 511b-c)
Natuke meenutab Peirce'i süsteemi, milles kolmasus on argument just nagu siin on neljas lõik tollest joonest justkui kolmanda lõigu elementidest koostatud hüpotees.
SOCRATES: You have grasped my meaning most adequately. Join me, then, in taking these four conditions in the soul as corresponding to the four subsections of the line: understanding dealing with the highest, though dealing with the second; assign belief to the third, and imagination to the last. Arrange them in a proportion and consider that each shares in clarity to the degree that the subsection it deals with shares in truth. (Plato 2004: 207, 511d-e)
Naiss: (1) kujutlusvõime; (2) uskumused; (3) mõtlemine; (4) mõistmine.
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