Plato 2004. Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. [Book IX]
SOCRATES: On the other hand, I suppose someone who keepl himself healthy and temperate will awaken his rational element before going to [|] sleep and feast it on fine arguments and investigations, which he has brought to an agreed conclusion within himself. As for the appetitive element, he neither starves nor overfeeds it, so it will slumber and not disturb the best element with its pleasure or pain but will leave it alone, just by itself and pure, to investigate and reach out for the perception of something - whether past, present, or future - that it does not know. He soothes the spirited element in a similar way and does not get angry and fall asleep with his spirit still aroused. And when he has calmed these two elements and stimulated the third, in which wisdom resides, he takes his rest. You know this is the state in which he most readily grasps the truth and in which the visions appearing in his dreams are least lawless. (Plato 2004: 270-271, 571d-572a)
Väga sarnane sellele, kuidas pütaagorlased ennast magama minnes pillimänguga rahustasid ja eilsei ja tänaseid tegemisi meenutuses kordasid ning homseid ette planeerisid. Griffithi tõlkes esineb siin isegi harmoonia mõiste: "will awaken the rational part of himself [...] and so bring himself into a state of harmony with himself" (2000: 286).
SOCRATES: In just the way a city is divided into three classes, the soul of each person is also divided in three. That is the reason I think there is another demonstration.
GLAUCONQ What is it?
SOCRATES: The following. It seems to me that the three also have three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each. The same holds of appetites and kinds of rule. (Plato 2004: 281, 580d)
Kolmed käivad kolmikutes.
SOCRATES: One element, we say, is that with which a person learns; another, that with which he feels anger. As for the third, because it is multiform, we had no one special name for it but named it after the biggest and strongest thing it has in it. I mean we called it The appetitive element because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things that go along with them. We also called it the money-loving element, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money. (Plato 2004: 281, 580e)
Üsna oluline koht, sest siin ilmneb suhe muidu üsna ebamäärases korrelatsioonis seisvate asjadega. Ihaleva hingejao pärusmaa on kehaliste põhivajaduste rahuldamine. Mitte ilma põhjuseta ei nimetata neid sageli hinnanguliselt "madalateks" vajadusteks või isegi kõige vääritumatuteks (basest) - söömine, (alkoholi) joomine ja seks on sellised asjad, millega saab kergesti liiale minna (vt nt Elvis Presley, kes ütles elu lõpus, et söök on ainus asi elus, millest ta mingit rahuldust saab). Raha ei ahnitseta mõistagi raha enda pärast, vaid põhivajaduste rahuldamiseks ja seejärel luksuse nimel.
SOCRATES: What about the spirited element? Don't we say that its whole aim is always mastery, victory, and high repute? (Plato 2004: 282, 581a)
Võim, võit ja maine: "power, victory and reputation" (2000: 297).
SOCRATES: Consider the matter this way: how should we judge things if we want to judge them well? Isn't it by experience, knowledge, and argument? Or could someone have better criteria than these? (Plato 2004: 283, 582a)
Arvasin, et (1) kogemus; (2) mõtisklus; ja (3) arutlus. Aga nii on vaid Griffithi tõlkes: "experience, reflection and reasoning" (2000: 299). Oleks eriti hästi sobinud selle tõttu, et jagatud joonel on reflekteerimine just seal vahepealsel positsioonil.
FLAUCON: No. Honor comes to all of them, provided they accomplish their several aims. For the rich man, too, is honored by many people, as well as are the courageous and the wise one. So, all have experienced what the pleasure of being honored is like. But the pleasure pertaining to the sight of what is cannot be tasted by anyone except the philosopher. (Plato 2004: 283)
Au ja kuulsus ei ole haruldane.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, don't we say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?
GLAUCON: Yes.
SOCRATES: Isn't there also a state of feeling neither enjoyment nor pain?
GLAUCON: There is.
SOCRATES: Isn't it in the middle between these two, a sort of quiet state of the soul where they are concerned? Or wouldn't you describe it that way?
GLAUCON: I would.
SOCRATES: So then do you recall the sorts of things ill people say when they are ill?
GLAUCON: Which ones?
SOCRATES: That nothing is more pleasant than being healthy, but they had not realized it was most pleasant until they fell ill.
GLAUCON: I do remember that.
SOCRATES: Don't you also hear people who are in great pain saying that nothing is more pleasant than the cessation of one's suffering?
GLAUCON: I do.
SOCRATES: And there are many similar circumstances, I presume, in which you see people in pain praising not enjoyment, but freedom from pain, and respite from that sort of thing, as most pleasant. (Plato 2004: 285, 583c-d
Seda mäletan ka nooruses Apoloogia lugemisest. Tõenäoliselt üks neid sagedasemaid asju, mis esineb mitmes dialoogis.
SOCRATES: Do you think there is such a thing in the natural world as an up, a down, and a middle? (Plato 2004: 286, 584d)
Ruumiline vasta algusele, keskkohale ja lõpule: "a top, a bottom and something in between" (2000: 303).
SOCRATES: And isn't foolish and lack of knowledge, in turn, some sort of emptiness related to the state of the soul? (Plato 2004: 287)
Me ütleme, et pea on tühi, mitte hing. G.: "Aren't ignorance and stupidity likewise an empty condition of the soul?" (2000: 303).
SOCRATES: So, those who lack experience of knowledge or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down, apparently, and then back up to the middle state; and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or brought up to it, never filled with what really is, and never tasting any stable or pure pleasure. On the contrary, they are always looking downward like cattle and, with their heads bent over the earth or the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. And, in order to do better than [|] others in these things, they kick and butt with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For they aren't using things that are to fill the part of themselves that is a thing that is, and a leak-proof vessel. (Plato 2004: 288-289, 586a-b)
Inimene, kes teadmiste poole ei pürgi, on looma hingega (Aristotelese jaotust laenates): sööb, situb ja sigib, aga ei mõtle ega mõista.
SOCRATES: Mustn't similar thing happen to someone who succeeds in satisfying the spirited element? Mustn't his love of honor be so colored by envy, his love of victory by violence, and his spiritedness by peevishness, that he pursues the satisfaction of honor, victory, and spiritedness without rational calculation or understanding? (Plato 2004: 289, 586c-d)
Au saadab kadedus, võitu saadab vägivald, mehisust saadab viha. G.: "Love of honour leads to envy, love of victory to violence, and bad temper to anger." (2000: 305)
SOCRATES: By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the one who said that will know what he was saying.
GLAUCON: What sort of image?
SOCRATES: One of those creatures that ancient legends say used to exist. The Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, and the numerous other cases where many different kinds are said to have grown together into one.
GLAUCON: Yes, they do describe such things.
SOCRATES: Well, then, fashion a single species of complex, many-headed beast, with a ring of tame and savage animal heads that it can grow and change at will.
GLAUCON: That's a task for a clever fashioner of images! Still, since language is easier to fashion than wax and the like, consider the fashioning done.
SOCRATES: Now, fashion another single species - of lion - and a single one of human being. But make the first much the largest and the second, second in size.
GLAUCON: That's easier - the fashioning is done.
SOCRATES: Now, join the three in one, so thath that they somehow grow together naturally. [|]
GLAUCON: They are joined.
SOCRATES: Then fashion around the outside the image of one of them, that of the human being, so that to anyone who cannot see what is inside, but sees only the outer shell, it will look like a single creature, a human being. (Plato 2004: 292-293, 588b-d)
Inimese hinges on inimene, lõvi ja paljude peadega koletis.
SOCRATES: And aren't flattery and illiberality condemned because they subject this same spirited element to the moblike beast, allow it to be showered with abuse for the sake of money and the latter's insatiability, and habituate it from youth to be an ape instead of a lion? (Plato 2004:294, 590b)
On sul lõvi või ahvi meelekindlus?
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