The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (4)

Arvatavasti tuleb viitamisel lisada artikli autori ja pealkirja järele just selline lausung: The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (4), December 1972

Randall P. Harrison and Mark L. Knapp, Specia Issue Editors. Towards an Understanding of Nonverbal Communication Systems

Mitteverbaalse suhtlemine ja kommunikatsioonimudelid:

Historically, scholars have long wrestled with "models" for communication which, on one hand, could sort out the most crucial variables, while, on the other hand, capturing the richness and complexity of human interaction. Implicitly and explicitly, these models have influenced the way researchers have appraoched the communication process. And, conversely, they present an interesting historicla sketch of the assumptions man has held about communication.
To touch just a few: (a) Aristotle talked about the speaker-speech-audience; (b) Lasswell asked: who says what in which channel to whom with what effect? (c) Shannon investigated the source-transmitter-channel-receiver-destination; (d) Berlo emphasized source-message-channel-receiver. Each of these has proven a useful intellectual tool. But these models have been most appropriate in analyzing communication systems which are linear, directional, one-way, source-oriented, single-channel, where messages are verbal rather than affective, and where the primary concern has been on the transmission of information or influence, rather than on other possible communication outcomes. Currently, we see a growing interest in communication systems, total communication ecology, affective as well as cognitive consequences, and pluralistic communication outcomes. The interest in nonverbal symbolism has fed upon and in turn stimulated these new concerns. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 342)

Kaks olulist küsimust, mis Tartu-Moskva koolkonna sõnades kõlaks järgnevalt: Kui mitteverbaalne suhtlemine oleks semiosfäär siis (a) kus asub selle piir verbaalse suhtes ja (b) kuidas eristada (heterogeenseid) käitumisi mis on motiveeritud ja mis ei ole:

This array presents an exciting and challenging domain. but it also reflects a lot of intellectual confusion, particularly when researchers try to move from speculation to investigation. The confusion exists at two levels: (a) where to draw the boundary between verbal and nonverbal; and (b) where to chart the far perimeter between communication and non-communication. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 343)

Selleks ajaks oli juba selge, et mitteverbaalset suhtlemist uuritakse erinevatelt platvormidelt, üks on lingvistilise suunaga ja on harjunud mõtlema keelestruktuurides ning teine on psühholoogilise suunitlusega ja on huvitunud märgist:

Perhaps one final ambiguity is worth noting. Increasingly, there has been a move toward specifying the signs and sign patterns used in nonverbal communication. (This at least sorts out observable communication systems from the less observable, e.g., mental telepathy, extrasensory perception, casting spells, etc.) But there is still a theoretical difference between the linguistically oriented researches, who is used to thinking of language system or structure, and the psychologically oriented researcher who is happy with looking at a stimulus, e.g., a sign. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 345)

Väga tähtis on ka küsimus kuidas eristada signaale mida märkavad osalejad ja mida märkavad jälgijad/uurijad:

Increasingly, however, there is a recognition that there may be nonverbal acts or events which are "sign-vehicles" or "markers" (i.e., perceivable stimuli for some observer). But these markers may or may not be "signs" for a given receiver. (i.e., they may or may not have "sign value" or "meaning". This is an open question for investigation and not an assumption which can be made without empirical exploration. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 345)

Just nagu bahavioreme ja acteme, tabab nagu välk selgest taevast mind järjekordne tähelepanuta jäänud termin:

Another anthropologist, Roger Wescott, has suggested "coenesis/coenesics" as a label to blanket paralanguage, proxemics, posture, facial expression, body movement, intonation, and interactional events. This label is supported by Adam Kendon, who feels that "nonverbal communication" is too vague, and that more specific, and less negative, terminology should be used. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 346)

Paul Ekman and Walace V. Friesen. Hand Movements

Jälle näen mina autokommunikatsioonist kõnelemist, sel puhul mitteverbaalset laadi:

People have experiences as individuals when alonge, changes in feelings and mood. Nonverbal behavior may then be the only source of information about their experience, since people rarely speak when alone; and nonverbal behavior may be an especially rich source in such circumstances, because when the individual is alone his nonverbal behavior is less subject to inhibition or control for social reasons. If we are to understand the infleunce of social rules about nonverbal behavior in interpersonal interactions, particularly about the management of what we have defined as affect displays and self-adaptors, we msust also examine the individual when he is alone. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 354)

Loomuomane (intrinsic) käitumine on mulle varem silma jäänud, siit sain ka tähenduse - need on tegevused mis tähistavad iseennast:

We distinguished three types of coding. An arbitrarily coded act has no visual resemblance to its significant; the movement in no way looks like or contains a clue to what it means. An iconically coded act carries the clue to its decoding in its appearance; the sign looks in some way like what it means. An intrinsically coded act is like an iconic one, visually related to what it signifies, but here the act does not resemble its significant; it is its significant. For example, if one person hits another during conversation, the hitting act is not iconic but intrinsic, the act is the significant. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 356-357)

Kaheksa erinevat illustraatori tüüpi:

• batons: movements which accent or emphasize a particular word or phrase
• ideographs: movements which sketch the path or direction of thought
• deictic movements: pointing to an object, place, or event
• spatial movements: movements which depict a spatial relationship
• rhythmic movements: movements which depict the rhythm or pacing of an event
• kinetographs: movements which depict a bodily action, or some non-human physical action
• pictographs: movements which draw a picture in the air of the shape of the referent
• emblematic movements: emblems used to illustrate verbal statements, either repeating or substituting for a word or phrase

(Ekman and Friesen 1972: 360)

Enesetapu embleemid erinevates kultuurides:

Many messages are emblematic in more than one culture, but a different movement is used in each culture. With many of these the message involves a use of tools. For example, in the U.S. the emblem for suicide is placing the hand on the temple, with the index finger, with the hand in the "gun-shooting" emblem position (index finger extended, thumb raised and moved towards and away from the index finger, and the other fingers curled into the palm). In the Fore of New Guinea the emblem for suicide is grabbing the throat with an open hand and pushing up, a representation of hanging, which is how these people commit suicide. In japan the suicide emblem is either to plunge one fist into the stomach, a representation of hari-kari, or to draw the index finger across the neck, a representation of slitting the throat. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 365)

Mida lotmaanias võiks nimetada haptiliseks autokommunikatsiooniks, kannab hea lapsena mitmeid nimesid:

All have a category similar to our self-adaptors; Rosenfeld [24] called this category self-manipulations, Mahl [21] called it autistic, and Freedman and Hoffman [15] called it body-focused. All agree that this behavior related to negative feelings. There is disagreement about the specific negative feelings involved, their functions and meanings, and the usefulness of drawing further distinctions within this sphere of activity. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 372)

See oli huvitav artikkel. Nad jätsid oma täielikust tüpoloogiast palju välja mahukuse tõttu, kuid see-eest korvasid pildi ja mõne hea faktoidiga. Näiteks, et valetavad inimesed suunavad avatud peopesi "teadmatuses" kauem/rohkem üles (kvantitatiivselt), valetades väheneb illustraatorite kasutamine, masenduses/tüdimuses/väsimuses väheneb illustraatorite kasutamine samuti ja žest mis Argyle raamatust leitud tabeli järgi Kolumbias ja USAs (allikas: Saitz and Vervenka 1972) kannab tähendust 'faux pas' tähendab Ekmani ja Frieseni järgi samas ka enesetappu. Terviklikum tähendus oleks vististi "mul on nii häbi oma normi-hälbiva käitumise tõttu, et sooviksin teha enesetappu" (juhul, kui see žest on suunatud enda käitumisele muidugi).

Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Linda M. Ludwig. Visual Behavior in Social Interaction

Visuaalne interaktsioon (silmkontakt) on tuttav sõnapaar ühest aimekirjanduslikust kehakeeleõpikust. Siis pidasin seda juba tähelepanuväärseks kontseptiks.

The study of visual behavior in social interaction (or "eye contact," or "gaze direction," or "visual interaction") has become increasingly popular during the last decade; interest is high, articles are numerous, and the topic is clearly eligible for review. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 375)

Other research has been concerned with higher-level interactive functions of visual behavior within the relationship, and thus has typically varied the visual behavior of one interactant and observed its effects on the other. Most broadly conceived, these studies involve the influence of one member's visual behavior on the behavior of another member. The behavior influenced can be verbal or nonverbal, and the manipulated visual behavior can be conceived as a stimulus or as a reinforcer. When dealing with questions of influence, it is also possible to ask how the visual behavior of one member affects the cognitions of the other member: what does he think about the person looking; what sorts of attributions does he make. Finally, it is possible to study the communicative aspects of visual behavior, where "communication" implies that the sender's visual signal is intentional, and the receiver's interpretation assumes that intentionality. This is an area which has not yet been researched successfully, probably largely due to the difficulty of dealing with intentionality as a variable in psychological research. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 376-377)

Perhaps as a consequence of the importance of visual behavior in maintaining dominance hierarchies in primates, several studies have examined correlations between interpersonal dominance and visual behavior in humans. Strongman and Champness [51] paired ten subjects with each other in all combinations of two. The pair interacted briefly with each other and the frequency of breaking eye contact first was taken as a measure of submission. On each trial, the subject having fewer visual submissions was defined as the dominant member of the pair. The investigators found a highly consistent dominance hierarchy. Although a wide range of within-subject variation was found, it seemed to be operating within limits imposed by the dominance hierarchy. Argyle [1] suggested that dominant and/or socially poised persons look more at ohters than submissive and/or socially anxious persons. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 381)

The "information-seeking" function [2] of visual interaction is variously labelled "monitoring" [31], or "feedback" [1, 4]. The question subsumed under these rubrics are somewhat similar to those asked by researchers who study individual differences: the focus of attention is the person doing the looking - what he is looking for, why he is looking, what he sees, and how he uses it. Argyle and Kendon [3] have put forth a model of social interaction as a serial motor skill. The social skill performer uses the verbal and nonverbal cues of others in the interaction to change and correct his performance, in much the same way as the motor skill performed uses perceptual feedback from the environment to correct his performance [1]. In social interaction each person is continually looking for feedbacks from the others in order to modify his behavior [1, 3]. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 386)

Mõned üldised tähelepanekud, mis on huvitavad, kuid ei vääri viidetega tsiteerimist. Naised sõltuvad visuaalsest käitumisest suhtlemisel rohkem: vaatavad rohkem ja tunnevad end vaadatuna rohkem kui mehed. Sellest järeldati, et with regard to visual appearance females are the performers and males the audience. Huvitav on see, et järjepideva vaataja tõstab vaadatava vererõhku rohkem kui see, kes väldib pilku. Silmside tõstab vererõhku!
Viidetest leidsin kaks peaaegu järjestikkust tuttavat nime: (1) Simmel, G. (tahaks öelda, et see on George Simmel) avaldas 1921. a teose "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction" ja (2) Tomkins, S. S. 1963. "Affect, Imagery, Consciousness".

Allen T. Dittman. Developmental factors in Conversational Behavior

Mõned väga üldised sõnakõlksud mis tutvustavad uurimisssuunda:

In this paper I shall be discussing a number of topics which have been related to nonverbal communication over the years: encoding and decoding speech, feedback in social interaction, the development of communication skills, and the usefulness of coded information sources for efficiency in communication. (Dittman 1972: 404)

Siin on diskussioon sellest, kuidas kuulaja vastused (listener responses) on nii verbaalsed kui mitteverbaalsed, neil ei ole loomuomast (intrinsic) ega ka sümboolset tähendust, nad ei moodusta keelt, kuid funktsioneerivad signaalidena:

Listener responses (LR) comprise a borderline group of behaviors between the verbal and nonverbal. Some of them consist of linguistic forms ("Yeah," "I see," and the like), while others do not (head movements and some types of smile). They are all discrete events, arbitrary in the sense that they have no intrinsic meaning, and yet they are not symbolic in the sense of having reference. Thus they do not qualify as a "language," but are perhaps best described as specific signals that the listener is paying attention to the speaker, is keeping up with him, or that he has understood what was just said. The variety of LRs, especially the nonverbal ones, has not been studies in any grat detail, and it is not known to what extent different classes of them serve similar functions in conversation. (Dittman 1972: 405)

Kui verbaalne ja mitteverbaalne vastus olid samaaegsed, näis sel olevat sotsiaalne funktsioon (kõnevooru nõudmine või kõneleja tagassidevajadusele vastamine):

It was in our study of the relationship between nods and vocalizations that we found the possibility of using these responses as ways of getting at social regulation. The nod and the vocalization coincided far more frequently than chance prediction from their individual frequencies, and when they did coincide, they appeared to have a social function: a signal to the speaker that the listener now wants the floow, or a specific response to the speaker's need for feedback. (Dittman 1972: 409)

Siin kasutatakse kvantitatiivseid meetodeid, et uurida laste kuulamisvastuseid, mida on oluliselt vähem kui täiskasvanute puhul. Kuid sellega järeldused ka enam-vähem piirduvad. Arutlus on märksa huvitavam, sest tuuakse üles Piageti eristus egoistliku ja sotsiaalse suhtlemise vahel ning Meadi sotsiaalse mina konstrueerimisest. In fact, arutlus on igati põhjalikum kui artikli sisu, kuid vastuste asemel esitab hoopis rohkem küsimusi.

Howard M. Rosenfeld. The Experimental Analysis of Interpersonal Influence Processes.

Siin hoiatab uurija ilma empiiriliste tõestusteta käitumistele tähenduste omistamisest:

An assumption of the present paper is that classifications of behavior in the field of communication tends to be based excessively upon arbitrary and superstitious beliefs, rather than on empirical evidence of the functional organization of behavior. Virtually any distinct response may be assigned a unique personal or social meaning. Interpretations of responses on such gratuitous grounds as face validity (for example, the inference that the act of scratching oneself represents a self-deconstructive motive) may have heuristic value as hypotheses to be validated by empirical criteria; but too often a deceptively plausible hypothesis becomes uncritically accepted as a statement of fact. (Rosenfeld 1972: 425)

Lk 437 jutustatkse anekdootlikust eksperimendist, kus 40 paari (õpilane ja õpetaja) suhtlesid läbi ühendatud televiisorite. Õpetaja pidi õpilasele selgeks tegema mingi vaevuhoomatava kontsepti läbi sõnapaaridest õige valimise. Punktiskoori peeti elektroonilise näidikuga. Tuli välja, et edukad olid need paarid, milles õpetaja ja õpilane suutsid mitteverbaalsete signaalide abil õigeid ja valesid vastuseid eristada.
Sellest katsest said uurijad teada, et naeratuse roll on informatsiooni edastamisel vähemtähtis kui näiteks noogutused või kokkusurutud huuled.

O. Michael Watson. Conflicts and Directions in Proxemic Research.

Autor tsiteerib kohe alustuseks Halli definitsiooni prokseemikast, öeldes, et see huvitub nii "mikroruumis" toimimisest (inimestevahelised kaugused) kui ka sellest kuidas inimene suhestub oma elukeskkonnaga nt linnaruumid majade vahel - mida mina tean jalakäijate dünaamikana (pedestrian dynamics). Ta toob välja ka selle, et hilisemates kirjutistes asetab Hall rõhu mitte inimestevahelistele kaugustele vaid sellele kuidas inimesed oma meelte abil neid kaugusi reguleerivad (mis näib olevat semiootiline küsimus). Prokseemilise käitumise muutujad on määratletud järgnevalt:

1. Postural-Sex Identifiers. Thhis variable is scored to indicate the sex of the interactants and whether they are standing, sitting, squatting, or prone.
2. Sociofrugal-Sociopetal Axis. This variable concerns the relation of the axis of one person's shoulder to that of another person. Scoring is from fac-eto-face behavior to back-to-back.
3. Kinesthetic Factors. This variable is scored to indicate the distance of one person from another in terms of the potential for touching the other person. The scoring range is from within body contact distance to just outside reaching distance.
4. Touch Code. This variable is scored to provide for the amount and kind of touch which takes place during an interaction.
5. Visual Vode. The coding of this variable provides an index of the amount of visual contact during an interaction, from eye-to-eye to gazing off into space.
6. Voice Loudness. The measurement of the intensity of a person's voice during an interaction.
7. Thermal Code. The measurement of this variable provides information concerning the detection of thermal radiation or conduction from an interactant's body.
8. Olfactory Code. The measurement of this variable is concerned with the detection of undifferentiated body and breath odors.

(Watson 1972: 444-445)

Katseid mõjutavate muutujate kategooriad on Watsonil hästi huvitavad:

Included in the category of environmental characteristics are those features of the physical environment which are external to the interaction but which may play a role in influencing the interaction (e.g., light, temperature, noise, available space, etc.). Interactant characteristics are, of course, attributes of the interactants themselves, and include physical factors (height, weight, disfigurement, etc.), physiological factors (states of fatigue, anger, excitement, etc.), personal factors ("personality properties"), social factors (status, role, etc.), and interpersonal factors (past relationships between the interactants, degree of acquaintance, etc.). (Watson 1972: 447)

Lk 452 leidsin sõnad "definition of the situation", mis annab märku, et autor on arvatavasti lugenud Goffmani. Tal on selle kohta öelda nii palju, et kõik eelnevalt üles rivistatud faktorid võivad mõjutada osaliste olukorramääratlust. Samal leheküljel on ka märk ajastust, mil kõnealiseid katseid sooritati (60ndad) - välisõppuritega uurimuses osalesid ainult meessoost katsealused, sest "sel ajal ei olnud piisavalt naisssoost välisõpilasi". Selle kommentaariga tuli lagedale üks autori juhendatavatest doktoriõppuritest ja lehekülje allmärkuses on kena avaldus sotsiaalsest survest: "it is hoped that seeing his name in print will inspire Mr. Griswald to finish his dissertation."

Lk 453, alapeatüki "Directions in Proxemic Research" alguses kohtan ootamatult väga tuttavat sõna, millele järgneb arutlus Kenneth Pike'i kahest tuntuimast mõistest:

For me to explicate what I feel should be some directions in proxemic research, it is necessary to point out gaps that exist in our knowledge of proxemic behavior as a system of nonverbal communication. I will attempt to achieve this goal by discussing proxemic behavior within two contexts: levels of analysis in proxemic research, and proxemic behavior as a process of semiosis.
Using as an analogy the analytical distinction made by linguists between phonetic and phonemic approaches to sound systems, the terms "etic" and "emic" have been coined by Kenneth Pike, and applied to two different approaches, or levels of analysis, to the study of systems of human behavior [14]. The etic approach involves viewing system of behavior from outside the system, using criteria which are external to the system: ". . . phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of scientific observers." [12:575] The etic approach provides an initial base from which the observer can begin his analysis of the system.
The emic approach, on the other hand, is concerned with studying behavior from inside a single, culturally specific system of behavior. Criteria used in an emic description are drawn from the contrasts made within the system itself and are relevant to the internal functioning of the system. Emic distinctions are those that are recognized as meaningful to the "users" of the system themselves. (Watson 1972: 453-454)

Edasi läheb diskussioon niivõrd huvitavaks (märgiteoreetiliseks), et ma pidin järgnevad kolm lehekülje (koos viidetega sh) suisa sisse skanneerima:

Randall P. Harrison, Akiba A. Cohen, Wayne W. Crouch, B. K. L. Genova and Mark Steinberg. The Nonverbal Communication Literature.

1971 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation!

Proxemic Behavior: A Cross-Cultural Study, Michael Watsoni sulest, ilmus "Approaches to Semiotics" seerias Sebeoki toimetusel.

Muud teosed kirjanduse-artiklist kui ka ajakirja algusest:

Thomas Sebeok - Animal Communication
Robert Hinde - Non-Verbal Communication
Albert Scheflen - Body Language and the Social Order
Roger W. Wescott - Introducing coenetics
Ashley Montagu - Tocuhing: The Human Significance of Skin
Robert Sommer - Personal Space

Conclusion: This has been an epic read!

Keha ja tähendus nüüdistantsus

Nigu, Leenu 2008. Keha ja tähendus nüüdistantsus: Fine5 Tantsuteatri lavastus "Panus". Magistritöö. Tartu : Tartu Ülikool

Eelmisel aastal kuulsin mitmelt inimeselt selle töö kohta. Üks neist oli sealjuures selle töö juhendaja, Silvi Salupere, kui ma pärisin talt kehakeele uurimise kohta. Esteri kataloogiotsingu kaudu ma seda tööd aga ei leidnud ja sinnapaika ta jäigi. Nüüd lõpuks komistasin selle otsa magistritöid uurides ja haarasin selle järgi kohe.
Leenu Nigu on proovinud ühendada/võrrelda semiootikat ja fenomenoloogiat ning rakendanud seda uurimise käigus konkreetsele tantsuetendusele. Sealjuures on minu jaoks tähelepanuväärne, et ta kasutab muuhulgas seda sama Lanigeri, kes oli minuga samal kombel leidnud seose Rueschi ja Lotmani vahel ning hõiganud välja kommunikoloogia. Jätan siia allika:

Laniger, Richard L. 2005. The semiotic phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault. Sign System Studies 33.1.: 5-25

Leenu on teinud väga huvitava tabeli semiootika ja fenomenoloogia võrdluses (pilt allpool), kuid sellega näib tema semiootilisus ka piirduvat. Erinevalt tüüpilistest semiootilistest kirjutistest ei ehita ta märgimudeleid ega sega vestlusesse Peirce'i justkui igaüks peaks viimast teadma ja mõistma. Seetõttu on Nigu teksti ühest küljest äärmiselt lihtne ja meeldiv lugeda, kuid teisalt ei paku see erilist tsiteerimismaterjali. Harilikult on teaduslikud kirjutised nagu laoplats plekist konteineritega, mida saab omatahtsi üles tõsta ja ümber paigutada; Nigu tekst on siin analoogias jõgi, millest kuupmeetri välja tõstmisel idee jääb ikkagi samaks.

Just eile mõtlesin jalutades sõnadele võim, võime ja võimekus. Siin on sisuliselt sama mõttekäik (v.a. esimene kontsept, millega Nigu ei tegele):

Ihulise kogemuse saab jagada kahele tasandile - hetke-kehaks ja harjumuse kehaks. Hetke-keha on see, mis antud hetkel siin ja praegu mõnd tegevust sooritab. Harjumuslik keha aga on justkui motoorne mälu, mis viitab meie kehalisele võimekusele, ihusse talletatud teadmisele, mis kujuneb aja jooksul ning pideva kordamise teel. Merleau-Ponty toob ka ise siinkohal näitena uue tansu õppimise. See ei toimu reeglina mitte liikumise ratsionaalse analüüsi teel, vaid just ajapikku ja läbi korduste, mis muudab kehalise liikumise ihuliseks teadmiseks, liigutused ladestuvad korrates lihastesse ja muunduvad harjumuseks, mis sobivas situatsioonides aktiveeruda võib ja mille esilekutsumiseks teadlikku mõttetegevust enam vaja ei olegi. (Nigu 2008: 39)

Järgnevas katkendis on märke tähenduste sotsiaalsusest, kontseptist "ka märgi puudumine on märk" ja autokommunikatsioonist (ma näin seda kohtavat kõikjal):

Kultuuriliste olenditena oleme sunnitud tõdema, et nõnda nagu aistitav maailmgi, on ka ühiskond alati juba kohal, enne meid olemas ja meil tuleb selles paratamatult toimida (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 384). Seepärast tuleb meil loodusliku maailma kõrval avastada ka sotsiaalne maailm ja avastada seda mitte kui objekti või objektide summat, vaid kui pidevat välja või olemise dimensiooni - ma võin küll sotsiaalsest maailmast ära pöörduda, kuid sellega suhestumast ei lakka ma kunagi. Suhe sotsiaalse maailmaga on sügavam kui mistahes otsene aisting või hinnang (samas, 362). Selles valguses näivad ütlused igasuguse tähenduse ja kommunikastiooni kadumisest mitte fenomenoloogilised, vaid pigem solipsistlikud. Seejuures on Merleau-Ponty sõnutsi isegi suhtlemisest keeldumine üks suhtluse vorme (samas, 361). Uurija pilgu jagamine fenomenoloogiliseks ja semiootiliseks, millest üks keskendub kogeja isiklikule enesetajule ning teine kultuurilistele tähendustele, eeldab valikut iseenda ja teiste vahel. Kuid Merleau-Ponty ise väidab, et valides ühe teise asemel, kinnitame me seeläbi mõlema olemasolu - üksindus ja kommunikatsioon ei saa olla dilemma kaks otsa, vaid ühe ja sama nähtuse kaks "hetke" (samas, 359-369). (Nigu 2008: 43-44)

Nigu töö põhineb peamiselt Lotmanil ja Merleau-Pontyl (semiootikal ja fenomenoloogial, muidugi). Märkus raskesti tsiteeritavuse kohta vääris parabooli, sest seda on tõepoolest hea lugeda (isegi oleks juurde tahtnud), kuid tsiteerida teda väga hästi ei saa. Siin on küll rohkesti häid ideid, kuid nende laenamine oleks kohatu kui mitte võimatu. Näiteks mõiste "ihuline ajalugu" seostub minu jaoks mõistega "käitumuslik repertuaar", kuid sellal kui viimast ma oskan kasutada, oleks esimese mõistmise jaoks vaja Merleau-Pontyd lugeda. Kord oleksin ääre pealt seda teinud, raamat oli laenutatud, kuid kultuuriteooriate lugemikud neelasid vastava aja.
Magistritöö lisades on "Panuse" kavaleht ja DVD-videosalvestis. Vaatasin selles poole läbi, jõudsin momendini mis oli isegi kirjelduses lahe: kõigepealt žongleerib pallidega, siis ainult kätega ja viimaks ilma käteta. Sealtmaalt jätsin pooleli ja tirisin taas alla oma lemmikalbumi, et ise tantsima hakata.

Žestid eestikeelses dialoogis

Tenjes, Silvi 1995. Žestid eestikeelses dialoogis. Magistritöö. Tartu : Tartu ülikool

Redundancy on eesti keeles liiasus

Liiasuse mõiste on lähedalt seotud info mõistega. Liiasus on see, mis on teates prognoositav või kokkuleppeline. Vastandmõiste liiasusele on entroopia. Liiasus on kõrge prognoositavuse, entroopia aga madala ennustatavuse tulemus. Nii on madala prognoositavusega teates kõrge entroopia ja kõrge info protsent, ning kõrge prognoositavusega teates on suur liiasus ning madal info protsent. Kui ma kohtan tänaval sõpra ja ütlen "Tere!", siis on selles teates kõrge prognoositavus ja kõrge liiasus. (Tenjes 1995: 11)

Meediumite kategooriad:

1. Presentatsiooniline meedium: hääl, nägu, keha. Siin kasutatakse loomuliku keele sõnu, väljendeid, žeste jne. Nad nõuavad suhtleja kohalolu, kuna ta on meedium; nad on siin ja praegu ning loovad kommunikatsiooniakte.
2. Representatsiooniline meedium: raamatud, maalid, fotod, artiklid, arhitektuur, sisekujundus, iluaiandus jne. On arvutu hulk meediume, mis kasutavad kultuurilisi ja esteetilisi konventsioone, et luua mingit liiki "tekst". Nad on kujutavad, loovad. Nad võivad luua teksti, mis märgib üles 1. kategooria meediumi ja mis elab suhtluse osapoolest sõltumatut elu. Nad loovad kommunikatsiooni teoseid.
3. Mehhaaniline meedium: telefonid, raadio, televisioon, teleks. Nad edastavad 1. ja 2. kategooriat. Peamine erinevus 2. ja 3. kategooria vahel: 3. kategooria meedium kasutab tehniliselt loodud kanaleid ning on seega tehnoloogiliste konstruktsioonide subjekt. Ta võib A-tasandil rohkem müra põhjustada kui 2. kategooria esindajad.

(Tenjes 1995: 14)

Midagi intertekstuaalsuse suunas: teises peatükis (lk 21, "Keele kasutamine vestluses") kirjeldab Tenjes kolme teooriat neljalt isikult:

1. George Herbert Meadi sümboliline vastastikune tegevus (interaktsionism);
2. Jogn Langshaw Austini ja John Searle'i kõneaktide teooria ja
3. Paul Grice'i idee koostööst kui kõige põhilisemast inimestevahelisest suhtlusest.

Mind kummastas, et olen kõigi kolmega juba vähemal või rohkemal määral kohtunud. Meadi enda raamatut pole ma veel kätte saanud, kuid olen veel väga asjatundmatus faasis lugenud ühte tema õpilastest. Grice'i tähendusteooriat selgitati mitteverbaalse suhtlemise pragmaatikas ning Austini ja Searle'iga kohtusin sotsiosemiootika seminarides. Kommunikatsiooniteaduste maailm on väike? Üha enam hakkab näima nii.

Mingil momendil unistasin kognitiivteaduste valdkonnast midagi mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kohta leida, kuid seni on vaid psühhisemiootikas olnud udujuttu mudelitest (ennekõike Umweltist). Siin on märksa konkreetsemalt ära märgitud tasandid mida ma juba tean ja tunnen. Küsimus on selles, kas seda "kognitiivset seisundit" annab mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kaudu uurida.

Lähtudes üldiselt tunnustatud inimkäitumise teooriatest võib kommunikatsioonis eristada kolme liiki infot: info kognitiivsuse kohta; motivatsiooniline info ja kõneleja tundeliigutuslikud seisundid. Kognitiivne seisund vastab sellele, mida kõneleja parajasti mõtleb; motivatsiooniline seisund vastab eesmärkidele, mida kõneleja tahab saavutada - see, mida ta kavatseb; ja tundmuslik seisund vastab tema tundmuste füsioloogilisele astmele. Kognitiivsed seisundid võivad näiteks tekitada tundmuslikke seisundeid ja vastupidi. Kognitiivsete seisundite uurimine võib ka küsimuse juurde, kuidas meie teadmised maailmast on esindatud mälus ja kuidas me nende teadmistega suhtleme keele kaudu. Motivatsioonilised ja tundmuslikud seisundid võivad olla aluseks mõnele ideele või mõttele. Kanalid, milles info kodeeritakse inimkommunikatsioonis, on vastavuses inimeste meeleorganitega. Käitumine või signaalid on vaid märgid niivõrd, kui nad kannavad infot kõnelejalt kuulajale.
Mitteverbaalne käitumine on tavaliselt multi-funktsionaalne - samad käitumuslikud aspektid võivad edasi toimetada erinevat infot ning sama infot võib kodeerida erinevatesse kätumuslikesse aspektidesse. Oluline on teada saada, kuidas sellist infot edasi antakse. Kognitiivsed seisundid antakse edasi peamiselt verbaalse käitumisega ning sellest aspektist on käitumist ka uuritud. Motivatsiooniliste ja tundmuslike seisundite uurimisel jäeti mitteverbaalne valdkond algselt unarusse. Kuigi motivatsioonilisi seisundeid antakse edasi nii verbaalse kui mitteverbaalse käitumisega. Mitteverbaalsed vahendid on väga olulised, kui saatja oma motiive pole teadvustanud. Info alateadlike motiivide kohta leitakse sageli teadvustatud käitumise teatud versioonidena. Kõige lihtsam näide: öeldes "Head aega!" ei ole me samaaegselt käega lehvitamisest enamasti teadvustanud. (Tenjes 1995: 31-32)

Kirjeldus Birdwhistelli strukturaalsest lähenemisest mitteverbaalsele suhtlemisele:

Strukturaalse lähenemise eesmärk on anda selliste normatiivsete näidiste kogum, mida suhtluse osapooled interaktsioonis kasutavad. Eeldatakse, et osapoolte käitumine interaktsioonis on teatud määrani organiseeritud varjatud kommunikatiivsete koodidega. Strukturaalse lähenemise idee on esitada tegevuse varjatud koodide organiseerituse määr. Selle suuna teoreetilistel seisukohtadel on mitmeid ühisjooni deskriptiivse või strukturaalse keeleteadusega, kultuuriantropoloogiaga ja strukturaalse sotsioloogiaga. Kehaliste liigutuste uurimist seoses kommunikatiivsete funktsioonidega interaktsioonis võib nimetada kineesikaks sõna lingvistika analoogial. (Tenjes 1995: 38)

Vahemärkus: mida mina teadsin haptikana, on lk 44 ära märgitud taktiilse stimulatsiooni uurimise valdkonnana ja kannab nime takeesika. Lk 55 kohtan esimest korda sellist väljendit nagu ekstrakommunikatiivsed žestid. See mõiste pärineb Payratólt ja tähistab mängulisis või praktilisi žeste.

Tänu mahukale lisamaterjalile on see jämedaim magistritöö mida ma näinud olen. Just nagu Tenjese doktoritööga, on ka sel puhul empiirilise materjali, ehk ülesmärgitud žestid, nende verbaalsed saatjad ja umbkaudsed verbaalsed tähendused, liiga palju, et korraga võiks hoomata. Toon põhjalikkusest vaid ühe näite:

Siin on verbaalseks saateks selline tekst: "Ja siis oli Eedu Tinn. Ja tema (1) siis läks minema (2)..." Kus (1) üleval toimuva žesti kirjelduseks on "parema käe nimetissõrm sirgu, löök ülalt alla" ja (2) allpool toimuva žesti kirjelduseks "pöörab käe teistpidi, nii et osutaja on pöial". Ja see ei ole isegi kogu lause! Täislause on "Ja tema siis läks minema ja see koht jäi vakantseks", kus lause lõpuks tõuseb käsi üles pea juurde. Käežestide puhul toimub nii lühikese aja jooksul nii palju sündmusi mida võib üles märkida ja analüüsida. Siin tahaks lamedate reklaamide stiilis öelda: There's got to be a better way!, aga see küsimus jääb praegu õhku rippuma. Peagi loen üle ka doktoritöö, vb leian sealt midagi mis esimesel korral märkamata jäi.

Augustine On Lying

Gramigna, Remo 2011. Augustine On Lying: A Semiotic Analysis. University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. Master's Thesis

Augustine lifted up the discussion of lying from an ontological paradigm that dominated in Greek culture and that tackled the problem of lying within the frame of objective falsehoods, to the metalevel of the interpreter's beliefs and intentionality. The latter is thus conceived as a conscious performer that willingly uses a deceptive mode of signification, that is, making use of signs in order to deceive. As it will be argued in what follows, the current study suggests a semiotic reading of Augustine's theory of lying for it envisages lying as an intentional act performed by an agent by means of signs with the specific purpose of misleading others. 'Agency' is hereby conceived as the capacity of an agent to act in the world. Suffice to note, for the present, that lying always entails the usage of signs by an interpreter in order to deceive someone else. The nature of these signs will be clarified in the course of the present analysis.
Belief and intentionality are key terms in the conceptualization of the phenomenon of lying in an Augustinian fashion. As we shall see in what follows, Augustine points out that the characteristics of the lie are the split between thought and speech in the signification of the lie and the intention to deceive. The liar's mode of signification is mis-informative and his discourse is the manipulation of the dupe's beliefs and knowledge. (Gramigna 2011: 8)

Samal leheküljel on öeldud, et kuigi Augustinus mõtles esmajärgus verbaalseid märke, saab tema proto-semiootilist märgiteooriat rakendada ka mitteverbaalsetele märkidele. Näiteid sellest (tähendusest raseda vaikuse või žestidega valetamisest) leidis Gramina järgnevatest töödest:
Colish, Marcia L. 1978. St. Augustine's rhetoric of silence revisited. Augustinian Studies 9: 15-24
Genosko, Gary 1995: 92-94. Augustine gives us the finger. Semiotica 104 (1/2): 81-97.

Eristus valetamise ja petmise vahel:

The demarcaion between humanities and hard sciences in the treatment of lying seems to have produced also a demarcation in terminology concending that lying is a human feature whereas deception may also occur in the animal kingdom. I hereby refer to the terminological distinction between 'lying' and 'deception'. However, the abovementioned separation seems to be problematic and there is no general agreement upon it. (Gramigna 2011: 13)

The potentiality of semiosis and communication available for interpreters of a given community is provided by shared conventional sign systems - natural langauge for instance. The liar exploits this potentiality by possibilities of communication in order to pursue his deceptive goals, that is, to model the dupe's beliefs according to a pattern that the liar himself is aware to be false. To sum up, lying entails duplicitous signification, conceived as split between inner thought and outwards manifested signs. (Gramigna 2011: 33)

Lk 38 leidsin midagi, mis tuli ähmaselt tuttav ette siit: Jumal ei vaja inimesega suhtlemiseks sõnu, sest Jumal on cordis inspector, tähendab, Jumalal on võime vaadelda inimeste sisemust. See pani mind mõtlema, et "Jumal kõneleb kehakeelt". See tähendab, Jumal rakendab intersubjektiivset suhtlemist intrapersonaalsel tasandil (Rueschi terminites). See meikib senssi seniks kuni palvetamine on vajalik vaid selleks, et Jumalal oleks "empiirilist materjali" ehk afektiivseid kehalisi seisundeid, mille arvelt analüüsida "hinge puhtust". Teisalt on selline mõttekäik jabur, sest kui inimene usub südamest, et ta kuriteod olid heateod, siis sama mõistaks ka Jumal.

Before turning to the consideration of the intent to deceive, another point ought to be made. As indicated above, Chisholm and Feeham posed a distinction between lying and other species of deception on the basis of the concept of assertion. To make matters more clear, the authors refer to a specific aspect of deception reported by Emmanuel Kant. In this example, a man may feign to be about to leave on a trip by simply packing his luggage. In other words, the man pretends to be leaving by showing by signs of his behaviour (packing his luggage) because he wants someone else to assume that he is actually leaving. This example goes under the rubric of simulation and in particular under the strategies of "pretending". At this poing deceiving as such can be separated from the intent to assert a falsehood, which is proper to the lie. (Gramigna 2011: 44)

Kokkuvõttes põhjalik töö. Greimas, Pelc, Morris, Ekman jne olid kenasti esindatud. Lõppude lõpuks oli see semiootiline lähenemine Augustinuse valetamisteooriale, mitte Augustinuse märgiteooria seisukohaast valetamisele lähenemine. Palju läks ilmselt kaduma selle tõttu, et mind ei huvita praegu valetamine. Mõtlema jäin selle üle, et valetamine on üks pettuse vormidest. Meeldis, et töö oli sidus ja üksikasjalik. Muidu poleks tähele pannudki, aga kellegi proseminaritööga võrreldes oli see magistritöö tõesti hästi kirjutatud ja vormistatud.

[teine lugemine]

Bodily Communication

Argyle, Michael 1975. Bodily Communication. London : Methuen

Kohe raamatu eessõnas nimetab Argyle raamatuid mis on teda mõjutanud ja mulle juba tuttavate teoste (Mehrabian 1972, Knapp 1972, Birdwhistell 1970) kõrval nimetab ta R. Harre, P. ja F. Secordi teose "The explanation of social behaviour" (1972), mis on sotsiaalteaduste raamatukogu hoidlas olemas!

Condoni väida, et tänapäeval pööratkse rohkem tähelepanu iseendale kui teadmiste objektile, millest mitteverbaalne käitumine on üks osa, on Argyle sissejuhatuses sellisel kujul:

We have a good idea of the different messages which are conveyed by different bodily signals - emotional states, attitudes to other people, information about the self and supporting speech by providing illustrations, feedback, and synchronizing signals, and in sign-language replacing it. It is used as well in ritual and ceremony, art and music, propaganda and politics. (Argyle 1975: 3-4)

Märkide ja signaalide eristamise küsimus kerkib siingi:

By a sign or signal we shall mean an element of the behaviour, appearance, etc., of one organism that is received by the sense organs of a second organism and affects its behaviour. We exclude simply mechanical influence: if A pushed B over this is a mechanical effect (though it will probably a communication as well). Signs normally act at a distance, though we shall consider certain forms of bodily contact as signs. Some signals are intended to communicate - these will be called communications. Signals are a quite distinctive class of behaviour, because they have meanings - they stand for other objects or events, or create expectations of behaviour to follow. (Argyle 1975: 5)

Füüsilise ja sotsiaalse käitumise eristuse saab siit:

A number of sociologists have distinguished between human social behaviour and other events in the natural world. Human social acts, it is said, are initiated and planned with certain goals in mind; the performance is subject to self-direction, follows rules, and is meaningful to the performed in that he can give a verbal account justifying it, or may try to make an anticipated account come true. Furthermore, many social acts, verbal and non-verbal, have a symbolic character, which makes them different from nearly all animal behaviour. NV acts, like verbal ones, communicate quite differently from sheer physical signals. For example, the absence of a NV act, for example, a refusal to shake hands, may constitute an extremely important social act. Small differences in the physical acts performed e.g. small differences in the direction of gaze, can produce very big differences in their meaning. In this respect NV signals are similar to verbal ones, where a change in one letter can totally alter meaning. Furthermore, the same physical act can have quite different meaning in different cultures, just as a word can. Putting these two points together, doing nothing in the same situation may have a quite different significance in two different cultures. (Argyle 1975: 52)

Seos enese-esituse ja käitumusliku valetamise vahel:

[I]t appears to be necessary for both animals and humans to signal their identity to other people, for them to communicate enough information about themselves for others to be able to respond to them appropriately. Such information consists of symbolic information indicating to which of various categories of persons they belong. Presumably such self-presentation in birds is not a product of deliberate and reflective cognitive processes, and probably in many human beings it is not. However, self-presentation often involves quite careful planning, and a certain amount of deception. When this behaviour has been performed over a period of time it becomes spontaneous and unreflective.
It is also necessary for interactors to send enough information about the purpose of their behaviour to make it intelligible to possible onlookers; Goffman (1971) has called this 'body-gloss'. People are evidently aware of what their behaviour looks like to others, and they send additional NV signals to show that it has some acceptable and sensible purpose, or occasionally to communicate a misleading meaning, as in various kinds of deceptive behaviour. In these latter cases there is much more conscious awareness than in relaxed, and spontaneous behaviour. (Argle 1975: 55-56)

Denotatiivse-konnotatiivse suhe mitteverbaalses ja konteksti mõistmise tähtsus:

Psychologists analyse the meaning of signals in terms of the words and images evoked by them. Students of semiotics, however, point out that signs have two kinds of meanings - denotation and connotation. They denote a class of objects or events; they connote the abstract set of ideas which defines this class; connotation depends on the linkage of this sign with other signs in the communication system. Thus a gesture illustrating a large fish both represents the class of large fish and connotes this particular kind of beast. Connotation involves linkades with other concepts - small fish, large animals etc., both between verbalized concepts and between images of these classes. Connotation often deals in terms of opposition (large v: small) and of hierarchies of classes (fish as part of the animal kingdom). Some bodily signals have meanings as part of elaborate sign systems. Kenneth Pike (1957) has made the point that one could not understand what is going on at a religious service, a baseball game, a fishing expedition, or a scientific experiment unless one understood the ideas and plans in the minds of the participants, together with the whole set of concepts and rules connected with the religious service or baseball game. (Argyle 1975: 58)

Kuidas muuta grupi norme:

How can these rules be changed? Studies of change in group norms show that these are changed as the result of an individual's deviating, and persuading the rest of the group that the new norm is to their advantage. The deviate may get his ideas from other groups, or may have thought of the change himself. He will be successful in persuading the other group members if he is of high status in the group, has conformed in the past, possesses persuasive social skills, and can show the others that they will gain from the change. Presumably there is a kind of natural selection in which rules survive which provide the greates satisfaction to the majority of the group members. It follows that there may be sets of social rules as yet unthought of, which might be even more beneficial. Perhaps we should simply do without some of our present rules, just as we manage without the 'Boston switch'. (Argyle 1975: 67)

Kuidas lühiajalised mimeetilised ülekanded mõjutavad sotsiaalset kogemust:

A happy person thinks that other people are happy. In real social situations there is a further reason for this - a happy person produces at least a temporary cheerful state in those that he meets - which he sees as their emotional state, without realizing he has partly induced it himself. (Argyle 1975: 115)

Enamus mitteverbaalsest pettusest kannab positiivset funktsiooni:

In animals interpersonal signals reflect the real attitude of the animals concerned. In human being things are more complicated, and for strategic reasons signals are often sent which are not genuine. The most common form of deception is probably the expression of attitudes that are more friendly than the true attitude; this is partly to ingratiate superiors or others, from whom rewards are sought, partly to make life in social groups easier and pleasanter. Most dissimulation probably takes place in the face, since people are able to monitor their facial expression easily; it is not so widely known, however, that interpersonal attitudes are conveyed by a number of other non-verbal signals such as posture and orientation, which makes it possible to see through deceptive facial expressions. (Argyle 1975: 125-126)

Information about human individuals is conveyed in a similar way - there information is given involuntarily about race, age, and sex. In addition there is also deliberate manipulation of cues, or 'self-presentation'; the ideas which the sender has about himself are converted into bodily signals, which others have to decode. The manipulation of cues extends to some degree of control over the apparently fixed and involuntary cues for age, physique, and even race and sex. Though this is difficult to achieve and there are obvious limits to what can be done, nevertheless some people do change their voice and appearance to a remarkable degree by various methods including surgical operations. Human beings need information about each other, just as animals do. We have additional motives for sending it however; by creating a favourable impression on others we can gain material advantages, sustain a satisfying positive self-image, and a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' - become more effective in many social skills - teachers can teach their pupils more, psychiatrists can make their patients recover faster, if they are believed competent.
Personality can be interpreted in terms of the encoding and decoding of mainly non-verbal signals. But what is the message which is being sent? The involuntary cues convey all kinds of information about the sender's body, roles, and whatever cognitive dimensions or categories they use. In the case of the manipulated cues, the information sent is how the sender perceives himself, and how he wants others, in general or particular, to see him. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that people use quite different cognitive constructs in this sphere - people classify each other in terms of a great variety of dimensions, partly derived from the culture, partly individually developed. (Argyle 1975: 134-135)

Diskussioon metakommunikatsioonist:

If the verbal contents are the 'message', the non-verbal framing signals are a message about the message; but it is really the combination of the two that constitutes the complete message. Some psychologists have maintained that the message and the grame belong to completely differnt communication systems; but it is perfectly possible for the 'real' message to be carried by the non-verbal signals, as when two people agree about the contents but not about their relationship. These are really 'messages about the relationship'. However, from the point of view of the message proper it may be argued that the two channels combine to produce a total act of verbal communication, for example, a question asked in a spirit of polite inquiry, a piece of information given as a devastating rebuttal, or an order given as a mild suggestion. (Argyle 1975: 157)

Siin jätab Argyle blatantly välja autokommunikatsiooni:

Although individual rituals may employ similar kinds of symbolism, no communication is involved, because there are no shared signals. (Argyle 1975: 175)

Peatükk 10 ("NVC in society - politics & persuasion") väärib käesoleval momendil erilist tähelepanu.

In large groups of animals social order is maintained and leadership exercised by non-verbal encounters, mainly between the older and stronger males. In primitive human societies things are similar, except words are used - though words have little effect unless backed up by the appearance or reality of power. (Argyle 1975: 193)

:

We can distinguish five different kinds of political activity each of which makes use of non-verbal signals:

1. Direct political action
2. Civil disobediance
3. Peaceful demonstration
4. Demonstration of power by the authorities
5. Attempts to change the social position of a group

(Argyle 1975: 194-199)

Võib-olla see, millele van Dijk vihjas:

Racial and other minority groups, members of the lower social classes, and young people occupy underprivilieged positions in society. In addition to their material frustrations there are also those of being treated as social inferiors in everyday social contacts: the style of non-verbal behaviour of members of superior groups constitutes the main source of frustration. (Argyle 1975: 198)

Whether or not a political leader is elected to high office depends partly on his personal public image, quite apart from the policies he and his party stand for. This public image is derived partly from real events in his career, partly from the impression he gives on TV and in person, and it is partly the result of impression-management by public relations experts. (Argyle 1975: 205)

Ülesmärge: "Rhetoric of Nonverbal Communication" by Haig A. Bosmajian.

Mõtlesin seda teha juba ühe varasema teose puhul, kuid seekord tegin mõtte teoks: skännida põnevamad skeemid sisse.
1. Lk 217: Emotions perceived in schematic faces (from Thayer and Schiff, 1969: 76)

2. Lk 222: Birdwhistelli 60-märgiline kehakeel (näide sellest miks lingvistikat ei tasuks rakendada kehakeelele)

3. Lk 259: kõrge ja madala kodeeritusega žestid. Selle nägemisel meenus koheselt näost-näkku vestlus Tenjesega - tajusin, et tema žestid on kõrge kodeeritusega ja minu omad madala kodeeritusega. Kõrvalleheküljel on tekst: "...it has been found by Baxter, Winters, and Hammer (1968) that people with greater verbal facility used more gestures, suggesting that gestures are supplements rather than substitutes."

vahemärkus:
Gesture: action of shooting self
Meaning: faux pas
(lk 261)

Kuidas erinevad inimese ja looma mitteverbaalne suhtlemine:

Most animal communications are triggered directly by immediate stimuli and motivational states. Human communications, verbal or non-verbal, are partly the product of cognitive processes, are directed towards long-term goals, and depend in a complex way on the nature of the situation and its rules. As we have seen, social acts may be consciously planned and monitored; where they are more spontaneous the processes involved are similar, though there is less conscious attention to the performance. (Argyle 1975: 365)

Käitumise modelleerimine videomaterjali järgi:

Another form of social skills training uses 'modelling' - imitating the performance of skilled practitioners, seen either in person or on film. Again it may be necessary to use verbal intervention, to draw attention to certain aspects of the model's performance. And simply watching other people is not enough - the learner has to have a go himself. Research on training teachers at Stanford showed that watching a filmed model was valuable, especially if there was verbal commentary on it; role-playing, with verbal feedback and video-tape replay was also effective. However, with modelling and video-tape playback, verbal intervention is unnecessary (McKnight 1971). (Argyle 1975: 368)

Kokkuvõte. Hea. Võttis kolm päeva, et läbi närida, aga oli seda väärt. Olen kindel, et see on üks põhilisi allikaid, kust Pease oma jama ümber kirjutas. Argyle on kogunud ja tõlgendanud ise piisavalt, et see oleks, nagu sissejuhatuses on õeldud, samaagselt teaduslik ja populaarne. Siiski tundsin paljud kohad ära Pease'i töödest, ainult, et viimane oli teinud asja banaalselt lihtsaks, kirjutades tekstist välja kõik vähegi teaduslikud terminid. Jälle kord tunnen, et suhtluskoolitustel Pease'i tõlgenduste edasi andmine on vale.
Õppejõule seda teost näidates seostus sõna leheküljelt talle vastu vaatav sõna 'behaviour' tema jaoks behaviourismiga. Pärast seda mõtlesin järgi, kas see võib olla 'undercover' jätk behaviourismile, kuid tõendid osutavad teises suunas. Mitteverbaalse suhtlemise ajalool on oma ajalugu (Darwin, Efron, Birdwhistell ja Mehrabian, keegi neist pole minu teada seotud behaviourismiga). Argyle'i töö on sotsiaal-psühholoogiline, kuid kasutab põhiliselt "signaali" ja "sümboli" mõisteid. Argyle tõlgitseb paljuski tekste sellistelt tegelastelt nagu Levi-Strauss, Sebeok, McLuhan ja Huizinger (kellede seminaritekste me semiootika ainetes oleme lugenud).
Argyle'i sulest ilmus 1969 veel põhjalikum teos, Social Interaction, mis on 500 lehekülge pikk ja mille lugemiseks ma pean end varuma (lugemisjärjekorras on praegu palju teoseid). Tema väidetavalt olulisim panus valdkonda, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, pole Tartus saadaval. Wiki räägib, et Argyle oli üks esimesi ja mõjukamaid Inglise (Oxfordi) sotsiaalpsühholooge. Eriliselt huvitas teda inimese pilk (gaze) ja see oli ka teema, millest ta pärast Bodily Communicationi koos Mark Cookiga raamatu (Gaze and Mutual Gaze) raamatu kirjutas 1976. aastal. Good stuff.

Paralingvistiliste vahendite uurimine ja nende kasutamine eestikeelses kõnes

Tenjes [Lõhmus], Silvi 1991. Paralingvistiliste vahendite uurimine ja nende kasutamine eestikeelses kõnes. Diplomitöö. Juhendaja prof. H. Õim. Tartu Ülikool, Eesti keele kateeder

Paralingvistika on siin defineeritud nii laialt, et hõlmab kõiki mitteverbaalse suhtlemise vahendeid. Paralingvistika on "teadus keelelistest vahenditest" ja parakeel on "vahendite kogu, mis osaleb keelelises kommunikatsioonis" (lk 9). Parakeel on "süsteeem, mis väljendab verbaalselt raskesti tabavaid subjektiivseid faktoreid" (lk 10). Parakeel saadab kõnet, kuid kineesika ja miimika "on seotud näiteks inimese emotsionaalse seisundiga ning ei osale tingimata antud informatsiooni edastamises".
Paralingvistika komponentide eristamisel on Lotmani "looduslik", "kultuuriline" ja "mitte-kultuuriline" siin "universaalsed", "etnolingvistilised" ja "idolektilised". Võimalik ka "bioloogiline", "sotsiaalne" ja "individuaalne".

Paralingvistika vahenditeks ei peeta autonoomseid ja suletud semiootilisis süsteeme, kuid nad võivad olla hästikorrastatud semiootiliste mitteverbaalsete süsteemide elementideks.
Põhjaliku klassifikatsiooni mitteverbaalsetest märkidest on teinud Randall P. Harrison (Harrison 1973). Mitteverbaalsed märgid kuuluvad nelja kategooriasse:

1. etenduslikud koodid, kus mitteverbaalsed märgid tulenevad keha tegevusest: näoilmetest, silmaliigutustest, keha asenditest, puudutusetest, haistmisest. Etenduslike koodide allkategooria hõlmab selliseid paralingvistilisi nähtusi nagu hääle kvaliteet, kõne takerduvus, ohkamised, haigutused, naer, ühmatused jne;
2. tehislikud koodid, kus mitteverbaalsed märgid tulevad esile kosmeetika, rõivastusega, ehete asetusega. Siia kuuluvad veel kunstiobjektid, skulptuurid, arhitektuur jne;
3. vahenduslikud koodid, kus mitteverbaalseteks märkideks on valikud, sobivused ja leidlikkused. Näit. võib toimetaja kärpida fotot mitmel viisil, ta võib valida must-valge või värvilise, ta saab valida kas foto või joonistuse; samuti võib operaator valida lühikese või pika kaadri, ta võib lisada muusikat või heliefekte, ta võid moodustada kaadritest "uue süntaksi" (montaaž);
4. kontekstuaalsed koodid, kus mitteverbaalsed märgid muudustuvad aja ja ruumi kasutamisest. See võib toimuda läbi ajalise ja ruumilise kommunikatsioonisüsteemide lokalisatsiooni ning osavõtjate kunstikavatsuslike võtete.

Toodud kategooriad hõlmavad väga laia ala ja mitte alati pole neil kommunikatiivset väärtust.
Mitteverbaalsetel märkidel võib eristada kolme omadust: modaalsust, koodi ning funktsiooni. (Tenjes 1991: 14)

Birdwhistelli kineesika mõisted on Tenjesel eesti keelde tõlgitud järgnevalt: kine - üksus (vähim kommunikatsioonis eristuv üksus); kineme - kineem (foneemi analoog, žesti minimaalne ühik); allokine - alloüksus (üks paljudest kineemi variantidest või žestiühik). Eestikeelsed vasted pidi ta ise välja mõtlema (Tenjes 1991: 18-19).

Psühholoogid on õnnelikud, kui saavad indiviidi uurida suhteliselt isoleerituna, aga kineesikud rõhutavad, et indiviidi peab uurima sotsiaalses kontekstis. Olulised käitumuslikud jooned on suhted interaktantide vahel saavadki ilmneda vaid suhtlussituatsioonis. Kineesikud proovivad tabada suhtluses osalejate kogu käitumuslikku kompleksi ja siis kõrvale heita ebaolulist. Psühholoogid liiguvad vastupidises suunas: kõigepealt eraldavad mõned kõige olulisemad käitumisjooned, lisades hiljem järk-järgult juurde uusi. (Tenjes 1991: 26-27)

Neli silmkontakti funktsiooni Kendoni järgi:

1. kognitiivne - kõneleja vaatab eemale kodeerimisraskuste puhul;
2. monitoorne - kõneleja vaatab oma partnerit, et kindlaks teha mõtteüksuste lõppemist ja olla kindel, et tema partner on valmis rolli üle võtma;
3. regulatiivne - silmkontakt esineb kas partneri ergutamiseks või tema jutu keelamiseks;
4. ekspressiivne - vaadates partnerit, võib kõneleja ärritada või tema kõnet takerduma panna.

See diplomitöö ei ole väga mahukas (köitest poole moodustab mahukas bibliograafia), kuid see-eest on sisukas. Tenjese doktoritöös iseenestmõistetavad ja peaaegu, et märkamatuks jäävad viited on siin üksikasjalikumalt ära selgitatud. Seda lugedes tekkis "töö mida mina oleksin tahtnud teha, on juba tehtud" tunne - nii Birdwhistelli kui ka Mehrabiani tööde kõige iseäralikumad omadused (just need, mis mullegi on silma hakanud) olid siin juba kirjeldatud (kineesika tasandid ja kõigi mitteverbaalsete märkide kultuurilisus; immediacy). Argyle'i viite sain kohe üle vaadata, sest tema raamat ootab aknalaual järjekorras. Hea meelega loeks ka Tenjese magistritöö läbi enne doktoritöö taaslugemist.
Sain siit huvitavaid viiteid. Näiteks Allport & Vernor - "Studies in Expressive Movement" (1933) torkas silma, sest olen Allporti, kes oli omal ajal eminent psühholoog USAs, sulest lugenud raamatus individuaali religioonist. Google Booksi kirjeldus ütleb "Studies in Expressive Movement" kohta, et teose teine osa tegeleb sellega "mida su käekiri ütleb su isiksuse kohta", AGA esimene osa tegeleb "väljendusliku liikumise" küsimustega kolmel tasandil:

The first is the level of traits, interests, attitudes, or sentiments considered as composing an "inner" personality; the second is the level of behavior and expression; the third is the level of impression, the perception and interpretation of behavior by another.

Veebisait archive.org pakub tervest raamatust tasuta allalaetava versiooni, kuid .SMIL failiformaadi lugemiseks on vaja eriprogrammi ja minul ei õnnestunud sobivat leida. Igal juhul tuleks meelde jätta, et kui kunagi jõuan Darwini raamatuni (samuti veebis saadaval), proovin ka Allporti raamatut muukida.

Mapping the world

Randviir, Anti 2004. Mapping the world: towards a sociosemiotic approach to culture / Anti Randviir ; [supervisor Peeter Torop] ; Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

Vähemalt kord semestri jooksul. Iga korraga selgem kui eelnevaga.

All modelling inside culture and cultural beings is bound to semiotic reality. (Randviir 2004: 8)

"Igasugune modelleerimine kultuuris ja kultuurilistes olendites toimub semiootilise reaalsuse piirides." Kultuuriline käitumine ja selle tõlgendamine on ilmselgelt osa semiootilisest reaalsusest. Kerkib küsimus mida see modelleerimine endast täpselt kujutab, mis konstitueerib kultuuri piirid ja kultuurilise olendi.

The study of culture is always intrinsically semiotic, since it is always about communication. Communication, be it inter- or intrasubjective, is always social. Communication is executed through sign systems and artefacts that are frequently also the outcome of interaction. (Randviir 2004: 12)

Seos kultuuri ja kommunikatsiooni vahel näib vaieldamatu, just nagu inter- ja intrasubjektiivse kommunikatsiooni sotsiaalsus. Siin on huvitav see, et märgisüsteemid on interaktsiooni tulemus. Võiks öelda, et (inim)kommunikatsiooni tulemuseks on peale artefaktide ka mentifaktid.

As presented by W: Meyer-Eppler according to whom communication is the reception and processing of physically, chemically or biologically detectable signals by a living being (ibid.). This view is quoted and commented by Nöth as peripheral to the analysis of communication: "Semiosis without any activity on the side of the signal source certainly constitutes the lowest treshold of the semiotic field" (Nöth 1990: 170). This standpoint, in its rearranged form, appears to have two misleading aspects. Firstly, it confuses the relation between communication and semiosis - a more clear differentiation would refer to semiosis as the generation of meaningful unit(s), and to communication as the exchange of it/them. Secondly, it does not seem to be productive to approach semiosic activity as taking place only and strictly between two ontoglogically different subjects. If we speak of subjects of semiogenetic activity, there is no need for them to be different also on the ontological plane; the emergence of meaning is made possible in the tension field between different semiotic subjects rather than ontological subjects, as suggested by the cases of 'unilateral communication', autocommunication, intracultural communication, etc. (Randviir 2004: 25)

Mõnus, kuid nõuab jällegi semiootilise subjekti määratlemist. Võib-olla siin on midagi, mis jääb mul kahe silma vahele, kuid momendil tundub, intrasubjektiivse kommunikatsiooni puhul on ühes ontoloogilises subjektis rohkem kui üks semiootilist subjekti. Ainus viis kuidas momendil suudan subjekti määratleda, on (Foucault' järgi) "tahte allikas", mispuhul võib tõepoolest ühes inimeses valitseda mitu erinevat tahet, millest tegevusse rakendatakse korraga üks. Siin on sama mõttekäik sõnastatud teisiti:

no communication can be executed without signs. This entails that a semiotics of communication requires a semiotics of signification. Respectively, no signification can emerge without two different parties (even though both of them can be called into being by a single communicative agent); so the semiotics of the sign can hardly escape the level of code and that of communication. (Randviir 2004: 27)

"Tähistamine ei saa tekkida ilma kahe erineva osapooleta, kuigi mõlemad võivad olla ellu kutsutud üksiku kommunikatiivse agendi poolt." Iseendaga suhtlemine võib siin ulatuda nii kaugele, et nii sõnumi saatja kui ka vastuvõtja on sama indiduaal nt erineval ajahetkel.
Siinkohal mõistan esimest korda lk 29 skeemi kasutusse rakendada.

1. "Oma" kohtub "Teisega" ja ühisosast tuleneb
2. tähenduslikkuse äratundmine (otsustus, et midagi tähendab midagi), seejärel
3. tõlgendamine (sellele millelegi tähenduse andmine),
4. tekstualiseerimine (tähenduse kontseptuaalne struktureerimine) ja
5. tekstimine (tähenduse formaalne stuktureerimine).

Võttes väga robustse mitteverbaalse näite, võib öelda, et (1) teist inimest järgides võin (2) otsustada, et tema kindlal käitumisel on tähendus, (3) võtta arvesse kontekst ja muud aspektid mis paljastavad mulle võimaliku tähenduse, (4) valida sobivaim, kohaseim või kõige võimalikum tähendus ja lõpuks (5) olla kindel, et see tähendus on õige ning seda väljendada. Võib vabalt olla, et praegu tõlgendasin seda mudelit valesti.

By evoking fashionable norms of beauty in this way, a desired social behavior was achieved (or at least made more probable). (Randviir 2004: 32)

Mulle meeldib kuidas seda lauset (Belladonna kasutamise kohta) saab kohandada igasuguse mitteverbaalse manipuleerimise jaoks: "by evoking fashionable forms of behavior, a desired reaction can be achieved (or at least made more probable)."

Socialisation binds normative behaviour with cultural values that influence individual views on gender, ethnicity, ethics, religion and values ideologically loaded sociocultural constructions. Socialisation thus has a crucial role in bringing individuals from spatial integration to the level of logico-meaningful integration (Sorokin 1957, ch. 1.). Sociocultural integration, however, depends on the structural mechanisms of culture maintenance, and is thus guided by power relations and censorship hiding or highlighting certain cultural structures of possibilities of sociocultural networks. On the other hand, what may seem as inconsistencies in cultural system, may be subjected to social amendment or elaboration by social movements. Changes in both social and cultural morphology are thus mutually conditioned. (Randviir 2004: 38-39)

Sotsialiseerumine on ka protsess läbi mille täiendatakse oma metakommunikatiivset repertuaari või omandatakse 'käitumuslikku kapitali'.

'Centers' and 'peripheries' can be purely conceptual categories without any spatial articulation, yet making it possible to create popular messages the meaning of which is due to this opposition. Semiotisation of space and projection of meanings and metaneeds to both conceptual and physical areas is thus related to such unilateral communication that is operated by an intracultural (military, political, media, etc.) power position that makes it possible to reach group members, to whom knowledge about the world is mediated, in large numbers. (Randviir 2004: 67)

Tahaks siit välja lugeda, et kommunikatsioonisüsteemi keskuse ja perifeeria suhe pole ruumiline, vaid seotud võimusuhete ning informatsiooni distributsiooniga.

Seekordsel lugemisel torkasid rohkem silma selliste mõisted nagu sotsialiseerumine, ideoloogilisus, semiootiline reaalsus, bioloogiline ja kultuuriline Umwelt. Kummalisel kombel olen ma Rueschi paksust kogumikust läbi töödanud just need artiklid mida Randviir siin käsitleb (nt Social Control of Symbol Systems). Bergeri ja Luckmanni tööst tähtsustas ta institutsioonide aspekti ja Searli tekstist brute facts küsimust semiootilises reaalsuses. Osa ülikooli peahoone kujutisest meikis seekord senssi, aga raamatu viimased osad tüleks hoolikalt üle lugeda, sest seal käsitleb ta "märgi" mõistet ja üldistamise küsimust.

The birth of biopolitics

Foucault, Michel 2008. The birth of biopolitics : lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 / Michel Foucault ; edited by Michel Senellart. New York : Picador, 2008

Käesolev teos on üks kahest (Tartus) saadavalolevast raamatust mis käsitleb biopoliitikat. Ootasin midagi teistsugust. Olin pärast esimest sada lehekülge juba tüdinud majanduse ja valitsemise vaheliste seoste üle arutlemisest. Leidsin, et selles teoses pole minu jaoks suurt midagi. Kahesajanda lehekülje juures ei paistnud situatsioon muutuvad ja mõtlesin juba alla anda. Ainult see, et leidsin enne lõplikult loobumist raamatut hindavalt läbi lapates sõna behavior, päästis olukorra. Ja mul on hea meel, et otsustasin lõpuni lugeda. Asi läks lõpus huvitavaks. Ta defineeris kapitali ja kõneles inimkapitalist, defineeris kuriteo (tegu mis väärib karistamist), selgitas subjekti mõiste päritolu ja kuidas see seostub tahte või huviga ning jõudis lõpuks ka võimuni. Reis oli pikk ja kohati üpris tüütu, kuid seda väärt. Nagu on saanud kombeks, tsitaadid:

You recall the strict sense in which I understood "art of government," since in using the word "to govern" I left out the thousand and one different modalities and possible ways that exist for guiding men, directing their conduct, constraining their actions and reactions, and so on. Thus I left to one side all that is usually understood, and that for a long time was understood, as the government of children, of families, of a household, of souls, of communities, and so forth. I only considered, and again this year will only consider the government of men insofar as it appears as the exercise of political sovereignty. (Foucault 2008: 1-2)

On the other hand, what is entailed by what we will now call internal policy, by the police state? Well, it entails precisely an objective or set of objectives that could be described as unlimited, since for those who govern in the police state it is not only a matter of taking into account and taking charge of the activity of groups and orders, that is to say, of different types of individuals with their particular status, but also of taking charge of activity of groups and orders, that is to say, of different types of individuals with their particular status, but also of taking charge of activity at the most detailed, individual level. All the great seventeenth and eighteenth century treatises of police that collate and try to systematize the different regulations are in agreement on this and say explicitly: The object of police is almost infinite. THat is to say, when it is a question of an independent power facing other powers, government according to raison d'État has limited objectives. But there is no limit to the objectives of government when it is a question of managing a public power that has to regulate the behavior of subjects. (Foucault 2008: 7)

The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, deliquency, and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelledin the [light] of reason finally having reached its zenith. It wa a matter of showing by what does not exist (madness, disease, deliquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something, something however that continues to exist. That is to say, what I would like to show is not how an error - when I say that which does not exist becomes something, this does not mean showing how it was possible for an error to be constructed - or how an illusion could be born, but how a particular regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that does not exist able to become something. It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, real practices, which establish it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality. (Foucault 2008: 19)

We should keep in mind that heterogeneity is never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection. (Foucault 2008: 42)

More precisely, we can say that it is through interests that government can get a hold on everything that exists for it in the form of individuals, actions, words, wealth, resources, property, rights, and so forth. We can put this more clearly, if you like, with a very simple question: On what did the sovereign, the monarch, the state have a hold in the previous system, and on what was its right to exercise this hold based, legitimized, and founded? It was things, lands. The king was often, not always, considered to be the owner of the realm, and it was as such that he could intervene. Or at any rate he owned an estate. He could exercise a hold over the subjects since, as subjects, they had a personal relation to the sovereign that meant that whatever the rights of the subjects themselves he could exercise a hold over everything. In other words, there was a direct hold of power in the form of the sovereign, in the form of his ministers, a direct hold of government over things and people.
On the basis of the new governmental reason - and this is the point of separation between the old and the new, between raison d'État and reason of the least state - government must no longer intervene, and it no longer has a direct hold on things and people; it can only exert a hold, it is only legitimate, ounded in law and reason, to intervene, insofar as interest, or interests, the interplay of interests, make a particular individual, thing, good, wealth, or process of interest for individuals, or for the set of individuals, or for the interst of a given individual faced with the interest of all, etcetera. Government is only interested in interests. The new government, the new governmental reason, does not deal with what I would call the things in themselves of governmentality, such as individuals, things, wealth, and land. It no longer deals with these things in themselves. It deals with the phenomena of politics, that is to say, interests, which precisely constitute politics and its sakes; it deals with interests, or that respect in which a given individual, thing, wealth, and so on interests other individuals or the collective body of individuals. (Foucault 2008: 45)

What have the bourgeoise and capitalist economy and state produced? They have produced a society in which individuals have been torn from their natural community and borught together in the flat, anonymous form of the mass. Capitalism produces the mass. Capitalism consequently produces what Sombart does not exactly call one-dimensionality, but this is precisely what he defines. Capitalism and bourgeoise society have deprived individuals of direct and immediate communication with each other and they are forced to communicate through the intermediary of a centralized administrative apparatus. [They have] therefore reduced individuals to the state of atoms subject to an abstract authority in which they do not recognize themselves. Capitalist society has also forced individuals into a type of mass consumption with the functions of standardization and normalization. Finally, this bourgeoise and capitalist economy has doomed individuals to communicate with each other only through the play of signs and spectacles. (Foucault 2008: 113)

How is human capital made up? Well, they say, it is made up of innate elements and other, acquired elements. Let's talk about the innate elements. There are those we can call hereditary, and othes which are just innat; differences which are, of course, self-evident for anyone with the vaguest aquaitance with biology. I do not think that there are as yet any studies on the problem of the hereditary elements of human capital, bhut it is quite clear what form they could take and, above all, we can see through anxieties, concerns, problems, and so on, the birth of something which, according to your point of view, could be interesting or disturbing. In actual fact, in the - I was going to say, classical - analyses of these neo-liberals, in the analyses of Schultz or Becker, for example, it is indeed said that the formation of human capital only has interest and only becomes relevant for the economist inasmuch as this capital is formed thanks to the use of scarce means, to the alternative use of scarce means for a given end. Now obviously we do not have to pay to have the body we have, or we do not have to pay for out genetic make-up. It costs nothing. (Foucault 2008: 227)

We now adopt the point of view of the person who commits the crime, or who will commit the crime, while keeping the same content of the definition. We ask: What is the crime for him, that is to say, for the subject of an action, for the subject of a form of conduct or behavior? Well, it is whatever it is that puts him at risk of punishment. (Foucault 2008: 252)

What I think is fundamental in English empiricist philosophy - which I am treating completely superficially - is that it reveals something which absolutely did not exist before. This is the idea of a subject of interest, by which I mean a subject as the source of interest, the starting point of interest, or the site of a mechanism of interest. For sure, there is a series of discussions on the mechanism of interest itself and what may activate it: is it self-preservation, is it the body or the soul, or is it sympathy? But this is not what is important. What is important is the appearance of interest for the first time as a form of both immediately and absolutely subjective will. (Foucault 2008: 273)

Now you find the same kind of schema of an effect of totality, of a global reality arising through the blindness of each individual, but with regard to history. The history of humanity in its overall effects, its continuity, and in its general and recurrent forms - savage, barbarous, civilized, and so on - is nothing other than the perfectly logical, decipherable, and identifiable form or series of forms arising from blind initiatives, egoistic interests, and calculations which individuals only ever see in terms of themselves. (Foucault 2008: 307)

Well, let's say in a very general, overall way that for a long time the idea of regulating, measuring, and so limiting the indefinite exercise of power was sought in the wisdom of the person who would govern. Wisdom was the old answer. Wisdom means governing in accordance with the order of things. It means governing according to the knowledge of human and divine laws. It means governing according to God's prescriptions. It means governing according to what the general human and divine order may prescribe. In other words, when one sought to identify how the sovereign had to be wise and in what his wisdom consisted, one basically tried to regulate and model government in terms of the truth. It was the truth of religious texts, or revelation, and of the order of the world that had to be the principle of the regulation, or adjustment rather, of the exercise of power. (Foucault 2008: 311)

The relationship of verbal and nonverbal communication

The relationship of verbal and nonverbal communication / edited by Mary Ritchie Key. Paris : Mouton Publishers, 1980

Seda laenutama minnes imestasin miks ta on sotsiaalteaduste osakonna hoidlas, mitte pearaamatukogus või isegi semiootika osakonnas. Pärast lugemist arvan, et ta on täitsa õiges kohas. Pealkiri tõotas informatsiooni mida selles tegelikult ei sisaldu. Kõige lähemal sellele teemale on tegelikult vaid Mary Ritchie Key enda sissejuhatav artikkel sellest, kuidas keel ja mitteverbaalne käitumine on sotsiaalsüsteemide organiseerijad. See väide muidugi ei tähenda, et raamat oleks halb või kasutu. Vastupidi, sain sellest palju ja isegi head materjali - kohati pealekauba sellist, mis seostub vahetult minu käsiloleva uurimusega.
Seni loetud mitteverbaalse suhtlemise raamatutest on see esimene tõeline artiklikogu mille külge minu käed on saanud. Tõsi, arvutis on nii mõnigi taoline, kuid lugeda pole veel raatsinud. Teemade ja autorite paljusus teeb sellest mõneti kaootilise teose, kus oli minu jaoks nii head kui halba. Näiteks paar väga lingvistikapõhist artiklit ei andnud mulle midagi. Seevastu Eibl-Eibesfeldti ja kaaslaste artikkel nõudmisest, andmisest ja võtmisest Lääne-Uus-Guineas oli väärt näpuga jälge ajamist pilte vaadates. Analüüs videomaterjalist millel väikesed tüdrukud söövad pähkleid on äärmiselt huvitav ja valgustav. Ja muidugi viisakuse definitsioon, mille võiks emakeeles meelde jätta: viisakus tähendab küsida teiselt midagi, andes teisele võimalus keelduda ilma, et selle tõttu puruneksid suhted. Seda artiklit võiks tulevikus uuesti lugeda.
Autorite valik on tõepoolest kirju, mistõttu ei läinud isegi minu jaoks kasutud artiklid raisku, vaid andsid aimu valdkondadest, mis 1980ndaks aastaks olid välja kujunenud. Selles oli valdkonna esindajaid sotsio- ja psühholingvistidest ja generatiivgrammaatikast kuni pragmaatika ja neo-behaviorismini. Isegi sotsiaal- ja reaalteadustest valgus mõjutusi, kõige absurdsemad neist sealjuures võrdlesid keemiat ja semantikat ning panid paari füüsika ja käitumise. Sealhulgas kohtusin esimest korda kroneemikaga (chronemics) pikemalt kui lihtsalt maining ja lugesin esimest korda Adam Kendoni teksti. Jätan siia hulga tsitaate, mida pidasin säilitamisväärseks:

Preface

Out beginning premise is that when human beings interact, language, in a linguistic sense, may or may not occur, but extralinguistic correlates always occur.

For some purposes, of course, such as where the communication is principally informative, language is the conveyor. But for other purposes in human interaction, such as expressive and directive communication, nonverbal correlates carry the heavy load in the dialogue.

Language and Nonverbal Behavior as Organizers of Social Systems
by Mary Ritchie Key

I propose that verbal and nonverbal expressions of status (reflecting the economic system) and male/female differences are the most important features of differentiation in the dynamics of human interaction. (Key 1980: 7)

We can observe the organism and how it reacts to a behavioral event, i.e. a speech act or a nonverbal act, in terms of the organization of social relationships rather than the act being a conveyor of information which is either a 'truth' or a 'falsehood'. In this sense one can note that is is just as impossible to define a 'lie' as it is to define 'truth'. In fact, the concept of Truth may be one of the greatest deceptions that humans have devised. (Key 1980: 10)

The extraction of meaning from a verbal or a nonverbal act has to do with discovering the motivation for that act. (Key 1980: 10)

The term patterns of behavior implies a cyclic nature in the interaction of human beings with the environment or with other human beings. Linguistic and nonverbal signals have been called 'regulators' and 'control mechanisms'. Scholars have referred to the synchrony of interactional events - 'self-synchrony' (inner rhythms of an idiosyncratic nature) and 'interactional synchrony' (conversational rhythms). 'Syncing' or 'being in sync' are common terms now among people studying interactional behavior, as well as among professionals in the film industry. (Key 1980: 13)

Another certainty is that many, if not most, of the behaviors are articulated out-of-awareness. Some of these can be brought to awareness, but it is not at all clear how much the human being is capable of perceiving. In fact, a good case could be made for the human being or a family, group, or institution, becoming dysfunctional if too much is brought to awareness. (Key 1980: 22)

It could be that nonverbal behavior is where physiology and psychology or linguistics meet; nonverbal behavior is the interface where body and language blend. (Key 1980: 29)

In order to find the unifying scheme in which all the forces inherent in language and nonverbal exchanges are connected we might try another point of view. As I have suggested at the beginning of this chapter, we can look at language and nonverbal behavior as organizers of social systems. Physicists can explain much about the universe in relatively simple ways, by reducing the interaction to four basic forces. We can find easily applied analogies in human interaction by thinking of such terms as: attract-repel; affiliate-withdraw. (Key 1980: 29)

The Relation of Interactional Synchrony to Cognitive and Emotional Processes
by William S. Condon

Each language group will probably manifest its own body motion rhythms. Such differences may affect the interaction. Micro sound-film analysis is only just beginning to provide information about this complex dimension of behavior. (Condon 1980: 55)

Normal response exhibits temporal regularities which can be observed in the timing of the eye movements, the turn of the head, the verbal acknowledgement, and the motion and rhythms of the listener's body in relation to sounds, particularly human speech. A listener provides the speaker with almost constant feedback that he is attending, including information about the level of that attending. The body of the listener moves in time and intensity with the speech of the speaker. The speaker is probably aware at some level of the listener's responsive entertainment and the many subtle variations of it. (Condon 1980: 58)

An orienting response is the response of orienting oneself toward perceived stimuli, such as looking around in response to hearing one's name called. In daily life such looking around (within a certain time limit) provides the speaker with evidence that the person has heard him. (Condon 1980: 60)

Human history has been an illustration of the search for identity - that of the self. There has been an on-going clash between systems of belief and believable systems (based on information gathering). Emergent information which gains assent has an impact on prevailing systems of belief, often forcing reformulations. Our age, perhaps more than any other, is characterized by people beginning to study themselves as objects of knowledge. This is related more to man as a person in societies of persons and not so much to his physical nature which has had a longer history of study. People themselves and all their behaviors are taken as objects of knowledge. They are assumed to be as fully determined as any other natural process, even though incredibly complicated. The study of verbal and nonverbal communication highlights this trend. These are only two illustrations among a vast number of such studies across many dimensions. We are information gatherers as other cultures were food gatherers of various types. Humans are only animals, although specialized by their degree of intelligence. They will be found to be more and more fully determined. All aspects of their existence are beginning to be scrutinized: their gaze patterns, their posture and movements, their intonational patterns, their verbalizations, their communication leakages, their slips, their hesitations, their greetings, and their courtships and aggressions. And as their identity shrinks one wonders how they will come to view themselves and their purposes. These are the questions which also need to be raised. Human communication does not exist in a vacuum and greater knowledge of human behavior will have consequences on how people view themselves. (Condon 1980: 61)

Communication is not just a process of 'bits' of information traveling between people: it is just as much an overaching domain of trust and distrust; the multitudinous and subtle ways by which people love and hate, praise and blame, accept and reject - themselves as well as others. A such they affect the inner being of others, there to aid or hinder, with greater or lesser consequences on that inner life. (Condon 1980: 63)

A Method for Film Analysis of Ethnic Communication Style
by Carolyn Leonard-Dolan

As two individuals each possessing a distinctive repertoire of nonverbal behavior begin to interact with each other a new and complex system develops, a 'resultant' of the joining together of both the individuals' patterns. (Leonard-Dolan 1980: 94)

Chronemics and the Verbal-Nonverbal Interface
by Thomas J. Bruneau

The basic foundations of languages involve temporal alterations, perspectives, and functions which counteract the silence and null stances of rigid present orientations. However, on the other hand, verbosity and verbal reasoning may be counterproductive to an awareness of the present moment and a here-and-now focus necessary for awareness of nonverbal behavior. (Bruneau 1980: 109)

It may be hypothesized that personal tempo interacts in many significant ways to yeald particular space-time configurations in one's environments. It may also be hypothesized that habitual tempo in social and cultural situations interacts in significant ways with personal tempo. These propositions certainly deserve a great deal of focused investigation. Inquiry into the nonverbal meaning of time and human tempo has been curiously minimal. (Bruneau 1980: 111)

Numbers and systems of numbers epitomize the language of objective temporality. Consequently, relative temporal environments appear to be neglected in the theoretical constructions and models concerning nonverbal behavior. (Bruneau 1980: 112)

Requesting, Giving, and Taking: The Relationship Between Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in the Speech Community of the Eipo, Irian Jaya (West New Guinea)
by VOlker Heeschen, Wulf Schiefenhövel and Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

One of the guiding hypotheses of this article, is that nonverbal acts are not only prerequisites, necessary accompaniments, or substitutes of language proper, but that they are means of action in their own right, the employment of which depends heavily on the different strategies in face-to-face interaction. Connected with this proposal is the second hypothesis that for human beings in general it is advantageous to have at their disposal two channels of communication: the verbal and nonverbal. Thus human beings are enabled to require, beg, approach, and make claims, which can be hostile acts or acts of provoking repulsion and aggressivity, on the one channel, while maintaining the bonding process on the other. (Heesch, Schiefenhövel & Eibl-EIbesfeldt 1980: 141)

Preverbal Communication and Linguistic Evolution
by Ivan Fónagy

The stylistic value of a variant is at first determined by the articulatory gesture it involves. In the following stages of development of stylistic character, a determining factor is the distribution of variants in social space (social status, professional groups, sex and age, etc.). (Fónagy 1980: 174)

THe Nonverbal Context of Verbal Listener Responses
by Howard M. Rosenfeld and Margaret Hancks

Listeners are as active kinesically as they are verbally. They engage in a wide range of visible nonverbal behaviors, some but not all of which co-occur with their verbal listener responses. These include occasional shifts in posture, periodic changes in direction of orientation of the head and eyes, gesticulations of the hands and arms, and a variety of affective and emblematic reactions involving the face and head. (Rosenfeld & Hanks 1980: 193)

The most commonly identified kinesic form of listener responses is the head nod. Head nods may or may not accompany verbal listener responses. In fact they often occur in the absence of any verbal component, although the present analysis will be limited to consideration of listener responses that contain some vocal activity. An interesting difference between brief vocalizations [nagu "mhm"] and head nods is that the latter are much more likely to occur in listenere prior to the completion of a speaker's utterance. This difference in location may be attributed to the less interruptive consequences of nodding, versus talking, while another person is speaking. But a further possibility is that when the listener nods prior to completion of an utterance of the speaker, it indicates that the listener is processing information faster than the speaker is producing it. Such behavior could have important effects upon the subsequent type and amount of information provided by the speaker. There also has been some speculation that more complex forms of listener response, such as the combination of brief vocalizations and head nods, may communicate more complex feedback messages - for example, understanding or agreement rather than simple attention. (Rosenfeld and Margaret 1980: 194)

'Acquisition' of Communication Competence: Is Language Enough?
by Morton Wiener, Robert Shilkret, and Shannon Devoe

If we are to investigate nonverbal behaviors as components within a communication matrix, and as systematically emitted by and responded to as having communication significance by most, if not all, members of a given group or subgroup, it becomes important to discriminate nonverbal communication behaviors from nonverbal noncommunication behaviors (e.g. socially patterned behaviors learned as part of the social matrix such as patterns of walking typical of males or females in a given group, and nonsocial nonverbal behaviors such as swatting at a mosquito). Unfortunately, from our perspective, few investigators of nonverbal behavior have been concerned with discriminating between nonverbal communication behaviors - that is, nonverbal behaviors which, like verbal behaviors, are part of a code used by members of a group in communication behaviors - and nonverbal behaviors which an observer can use as a 'sign', that is, as behaviors from which an observer can make inferences about the behaving individual. (Wiener, Shilkret & Devoe 1980: 280)

The acquisition metaphor presents still a further problem for us. The term 'acquisition' seems to suggest some common end-point beyond which only minor change may occur and beyond which all 'competent' members of a language group are ostensibly interchangeable. However, a group of adults, all of whom have presumably acquired 'language', are not all equally likely to produce and comprehend poetry, metaphor, or proverbs; nor can it be taken for granted that all will 'comprehend' the 'same' nonmetaphorical, nonproverbial or nonpoetical statement in the same way; nor even that the same person will comprehend the 'same' statements in the same way at different times, e.g. on repeated readings of some particular book or article. Given these kinds of considerations, it would seem to be essential to include, in concerns about 'acquisition' some statements about excplicit criteria of mastery which specify what kinds of forms or combinations, for what kinds of contents, in what communication matrix, in what kinds of communication contexts, for what kinds of audiences, for what kind of speakers. (Wiener, Shilkret & Devoe 1980: 285)

FOr us, then, 'rule-following' is a phrase which describes the regularity and predictability of individuals' behaviors in contexts, and not a 'thing' which is acquired in addition to the behaviors themselves. That is, regularity and predictability of communication behavior are not statements of what the child 'knows' but statements of whether or not the child behaves consistently as assessed by some social norm. (Wiener, Shilkret & Devoe 1980: 285)

Silenve is Golden? The Changing Role of Non-Talk in Preschool Conversations
by D. Jean Umiker-Sebeok

Gaps are to a certain extent encouraged by the sequencing rules of spontaneous conversation, which allocate turns one at a time and where each such allocation involves a set of options open to participants. The current speaker, first of all, has to decide whether or not to select the next speaker himself, and at what point in his turn. If he does not select next speaker, the listener must decide whether or not to self-select, and, if he decides to take a turn, must project ahead to a likely termination of current speaker's turn and select an appropriate turn-entry device. Finally, the current speaker must decide if he will continue speaking if no listener has self-selected. At each of these decision-making points, participants may choose not to take a turn. In this sense, gapping, like overlapping, is a result of the conversation being a system of self-management, where turns are assigned through the direct interaction of participants. (Umiker-Sebeok 1980: 295)

Silence in adult conversations are, then, as systematically imbued with significance as signs where the signifier has an overt verbal or nonverbal form, and adequate conversational performances require that interlocutors be able to interpret and employ such 'zero-signifiers' correctly. (Umiker-Sebeok 1980: 196)

Dionysians and Apollonians
by Arnold M. Zwicky

Nobody knows what 'intuition' really is. My guess is that it is a sort of subconscious reasoning, only the end result of which becomes conscious. (Szent-Gyorgyi 1980: 317)

Why Electromagnetism is the Only Causal 'Spook' Required to Explain Completely Any Human Behavior or Institution
by F. T. Cloak, Jr.

Ti anticipate a bit: the characteristics of any living thing or any product of a living thing - including a behavior, an artifact, or a social organization - are entirely the outcomes of two sequences of events that happen to that thing and/or product - its ontogeny and its phylogeny. Very roughly, its ontogeny is the sequence of events through which the thing develops from seed, and its phylogeny is the sequence of events through which the seed acquired its characteristic ontogeny in the first place. (Cloak, Jr. 1980: 328)

But the ubiquity of the inverse square law suggests to me that all macroevents have microexplanations. If that is true, we are wasting our time when we look for correlations between classes of macroevents without simultaneously seeking microexplanations to provide the causal links... (Cloak, Jr. 1980: 329)

An instruction, a structure which can do a certain behavior, is like any other material structure except that is has this peculiar ability to behave on cue and then return to its pre-behavior state and hence, to behave again on cue. One can say that the instruction is the structure which can do behavior: or, metaphorically, that the structure carries the instruction; or that a pre-existing structure is programmed with the instruction by the modification of its fine structure. (Cloak, Jr. 1980: 334)

While a social organization is maintained, of course, it has effects on the behaviors of individual organisms, both members and nonmembers. These effects fall into two categories: In the short term, group-behaviors release or cue an instruction carried by one or more individual organisms; the resultant behavior may itself be sociogenic, as when a group-member, cued by being in the group situation, directs some sanctioning behavior toward another member cueing, in turn, some conformist behavior on his/her part - social control, in a phrase. In the longer term, the social organization and its behaviors make up a salient part of the environment controlling the subsequent evolution (phylogeny) of the instructional repertory of the population - again including sociogenic and other social isntructions. (Cloak, Jr. 1980: 335)

The Presentation Of Self In Everyday Life

Goffman, Erving [1959] 1990. The Presentation Of Self In Everyday Life. Penguin Books

Käesolev raamat vastas ootustele. Kõnekas on tegelikult see, kuidas need ootused üldse tekkisid. Goffmani dramaturgiline sotsioloogia on selline nähtus, mida paljud võtavad vaevaks mainida. Kirjanduses alati mitte just sellele teosele, sest pärast seda laiendas Goffman oma käsitlust veel mitmele väljale (avalik käitumine on üks). Ülikoolis pööratakse aga just sellele teosele alatasa tähelepanu - just nagu Austini, Ekmani ja Shannon-Weaveriga, väärib Goffman suhtlemise uurimisel pidevat viitamist.
Ootasin sellest teosest Goffmani käsitluse esimest nurgakivi ja seda ta ka oli. Just nagu esimese raamatu puhul mida tema sulest lugesin, oli ka käesolev täidetud väga lihtsalt sõnastatud arutluskäikude ja kirjanduslike näidetega. Kuna teos kirjutatud möödunud sajandi keskpaigas, on sel omad eripärad (subjekt on alati he), kuid üldiselt on sõnavaraga kerge harjuda. Mõned väljendid, nagu performance ja definition of the situation on niivõrd määravad selle töö puhul, et mujal neid kohates tekivad automaatsed sidemed Goffmani käsitlusega.
Hea lugemine ja akadeemiliselt usaldusväärne (või vähemalt niimoodi näib). Kuna teda on nämmutatud kõikjal, võib kasutada samale leheküljele jõudmiseks (just nagu Austin). Kindlasti tuleb lugeda uuesti, sest Goffmani lihtsapäraste argieluliste näidete kohta esitatud küsimused on just need millele hilisemad uurijad proovisid vastata. Kiidan igati heaks.

Et ma ei teinud esmakordsel lugemisel märkmeid ega tsiteerinud midagi, jätan siia kokkuvõtvad punktid mis pärinevad sellest raamatust:

Goffman develops the Johnson-Duclos duality.

1. GI: The constitutive Principle: People monitor their performances according to dramatic principles.
2. GII: The Explanatory Principle: In order to understand certain sequences of social behaviour these should be analysed for Act-action structure by reference to dramatic principles, and the accounts analysed for explanatory purposes as if they described the work and mode of performance of actors.
3. Goffman's analytical concepts.
   1. impression management (performance).
   2. cooperation and mutual support in impression management (team).
   3. place of performance and place of preparation of performance (back and front regions).
   4. discrepant roles are those played by people who put on countervailing performances or send up the performance being staged.
   5. The proof that these are performances is found in the fact that certain facts about the performers would discredit the performance and must be concealed.
4. Other analytical frameworks can be fitted within the generalized dramaturgical standpoints by exploiting the full range of R-r models.

(Harré & Secord 1976: 206-207)

Paralanguage And Kinesics

Key, Mary Ritchie 1975. Paralanguage And Kinesics (Nonverbal Communication). The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Hilisemas toimetatud teoses ütleb Key, et selle raamatu nimi oleks võinud olla "Kõik mida sa võiksid tahta teada mitteverbaalsest suhtlemisest". Oma aja kohta on see tõepoolest väga kokkuvõtlik ülevaade kogu valdkonnast. Sealjuures 1/3 raamatust on laialdane bibliograafia, kuhu raamatu originaalne omanik on teinud värvilise markeriga tähistusi. Sealjuures on ära märgistatud artikkel mille vastu minulgi on huvi: Thomas Sebeoki ""Paralanguage, kinesics, and cultural anthropology".
Raamat on kirjutatud märkmete laadis - iga lõik jutustab järgmisest nähtusest või tähelepanekust. Monospace kirjatüüp jätab veel enam mulje, et tegemist on uurija loengumärkmetega. Seda oli hoolimata lühidusest päris hea lugeda. Midagi liiga üllatavat ei kohanud, kuid oli lõike mida võib kunagi kasutusse rakendada. Selleks tuleks muidugi teos üle lugeda, sest esimesel korral lugesin teda öökapiraamatuna. Mary Ritchie Key sai pärast seda vististi tuntud nimeks valdkonnas, et ta toimetas köidet verbaalse ja mitteverbaalse suhtlemise vahelisest suhtest. Annan raamatule 10st 7. Vaata ka teistkordset lugemist.