Semiotics, Self, and Society

Sebeok, Thomas A. 1989. Preface. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, v-xiv.

In this insidious sibilant celebration of Singer's accomplishments - punning can be infectious - the pivotal substantive is "Self" - specifically that manifestation of it localized as the "semiotic self." For this sentimental reader, the title, and some of the contents too, reverberate with the sound of another form a bygone age: Symbols and Society, a nowadays all too seldom revisited volume, published in 1955. Graced with a remarkable, lengthy paper on "Symbol, Reality and Society," contributed by the "Continental Phenomenologist" Alfred Schutz, his oral presentation was directly followed by a concise comment on the part of the "American Pragmatist" Charles Moriis (Schutz 1955: 202), who enthusiastically welcomed this "addition to the literature of contemporary semiotic," since, as he noted, "there are few basic discussions in this field written from the standpoint of phenomenology." (Sebeok 1989: v)
This is one of those references that, if I had a lot of time and resources, I would definitely search out for. But, alas, there is much to read and not so much time to read it.
The closest link of the self in nature as well as in culture is with memory, both as a feature of a physical repository and as a social construct. The reason for this are quite straightforward: each organism requires information - I use "information" casually here to mean the representation of sets of prior events embodied in a code - about certain experiences in its past to enable that individual to steer with reasonable certitude of survival in its specific current Umwelt.
Memory in "man, proud man" makes up, as it were, a multi-sensory private documentary archive, severally composed of nonverbal signs with a verbal overlay. It is the articulatio secunda, or the syntactic aspect of language, which provides the machinery whereby memory organizes, continually remodels as a child playing witha tinkertoy, and finally imposes a coherent and personal narrative schema upon each of us. Since writing tends to conserve the semiatic self far beyond any oral tradition, literate peoples have invented the dialy or intimate journal (and, later, the family photo album, home movies, and comparable technological accoutrements), to delineate for themselves, in the form of supplementary aides memoire, a kind of dramatic "I" to furnish, in Peirce's memorable phrases (MS 318-355, 1907), their theatres of consciousness, to turn its activity from the stage "of the internal, to that of the external experience," or to "come down to the footlight of consciousness" (MS 339C; 505, 1905).
This blueprint, too, is what Jacob envisioned when, in the concrete titular and key metaphor of his recent autobiography, he fantasized carrying within himself a kind of statue interieure, "sculptured since childhood, that gives childhood, that gives my life a continuity and is the most intimate part of me, the hardest kernel of my character. I have been shaped this statue oll my life. I have been constantly retouching, polishing, refining it... Not a gesture, not a word, but has been imposed by the statue within" (Jacob 1988: 19).
Along with Popper and Eccles (1977: 129), we may say of the self that, "like any living organism, it extends through a stretch of time, from birth to death." The semiotic self is by no means identical with "the consciousness that binds our life together" (Peirce 1.381). While even the consciousness of synthesis is interrupted by periods of sleep, continuity of our semiotic persona (presumably even by those claiming to have been Born Again) is normally taken for granted. Again, Jacob's (1988: 14) question is stirring: "Why doesn't the system slip so that, after sleep has disassembled the mind, its memory and will, the mechanism is not reassembled somewhat differently, to form a different person, a different me?"
Memory agglutinates "man's glassy essence," a phrase which, thanks to Shakespeare, Peirce, and Singer has become a condensed emblem for specular semiosis, the process by which man converts his Umwelt into a unitary system of signs, a configuration, and, as Lecky had insisted in his theory of personality, Self-Consistency (1945), into an enduring, more or less singularly consolidated autobiographical identity (excepting, arguably, in that one per cent or so of the population designated, for that very reason, as "schizephrenic").
Memory also creates the illusion - "most ignorant of what he's most assured" - that all our acts are performed by the selfsame person, labeling the array of "fantastic tricks" that happened to us in our past as incidents which, notwithstanding that they may "make the angels weep," do compose a coherrent sequence of experiences. Memory itself is, of course, continually refigured to insure the maintenance of positive self-esteem. (Sebeok 1989: vi-vii)
There are so many ideas crammed into this page-length quote that I dare not decrypt and associate it with other stuff just yet. I'll only remark that "a condensed emblem" is becomes itself a condensed emblem, "a title", if semiophrenic thinking be applied to it. At some point I have to deal with these titles/emblems and the discourses they have condensed; and "deal" with the fact that I am irresistibly drawn to expressions beginning with the article "a." What started out as a curiosity in my music collection (e.g. collecting music by over a thousand bands named like A Perfect Circle, A Tribe Called Quest, A Love Like Pi, etc.) has infiltrated/infected my academic thinking.
Ethnography melds with the fruits of bioanthropology when the focus of inquiry is narrowed from its looser accessories and belonging to the human body (L'Homme nu) in the strict sense. This body - or rather consists of - a veritable armamentarium of ore or less palpable indexical markers of unique selfhood (save again perhaps for identical twins). (Sebeok 1989: viii)
I know of physical anthropology (e.g. archaeology) and the anthrpology of the body, even medical anthropology, but I've never met bioanthropology, at least not consciously/intentionally. The palpable individuality of selfhood in the bodily sphere is present in even the introductory textbook on physiology and anatomy which states on the very first pages that there is no "normal" human body. Every body is unique.
The study of the distinctive pheromonal function, subsumed under the new scientific rubric "semiochemistry," of human chemical signatures is in fact comparable with individual fingerprints (e.g., Albone 1984; on the comparison with fingerprints, see p. 65). It is, by the way, well known that human infants can sort out their mother's peculiar odor, and possibly even her idiosyncratic breast odor, from those of all other women. (Sebeok 1989: ix)
Why does only Sebeok speak of such things? Have other semioticians really not come across The Pheromone Myth, for example, which talks about semiochemicals?
And what of social position? "The self," it has been suggested (Chance and Larsen 1976: 205), "is intimately tied to primate social dominance..." The salience of this link in human affairs - the iconic spatial expression of social hierarchy - is generally clear (Sebeok 1988: 118), but let me adduce one familiar example [Hungarian tradition of serving the father first at the dinner table.] (Sebeok 1989: xi)
It now seems that because I'm not joining the army, I am no longer very interested in matters of authority, rank and hierarchy. But who knows, maybe this interest will return...

Urban, Greg and Benjamin Lee 1989a. TITLE. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1-13.

Mauss regarded as a universal the subjective sense of being a self. distinguishable from a surrounding world: "there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time his individuality, bothe spiritual and physical" (Mauss 1985: 3). This view of self in terms of self-awareness of discreteness or boundedness with respect to a surrounding cosmos, however, is first ard foremost a semiotic phenomenon. Despite the fact that Mauss distinguished between this universal self-awareness and the cultural construction of self concepts in different societies, the present papers view self-awareness as one pole of a continuum in the semiotic construction of self, a pole which depends upon culturally constituted, and especially, linguistic signs, such as the first person pronouns, as Peirce, and after him Singer, and other papers in the present valume, notably those by Lee and Urban, have stressed. (Urban & Lee 1989a: 2)
Self-concepts are basically like "worldviews" which differ from culture to culture and perhaps even within cultures. Self-notions, on the other hand, are meta-terms which describe the activities involved with the self (e.g. self-awareness, self-consciousness, self-communication, etc.).

Wolf, Ernest S. 1989. The Self in Psychoanalytic Self Psychology. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 15-25.

However, the term self had not completely disappeared from psychoanalysis. In A Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts by B. Moore and B. Fine, self is defined as:
...the total person of an individual in reality, including his body and psychic organization; one's 'own person' as contrasted with 'other persons' and objects outside one's self. The 'self' is a common-sense concept; its clinical and metapsychological aspects are treated under self image, self representation, etc. See ego, identity, narcissism.
That same year (1968), Charles Rycroft in A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis made an effort to distinguish between self and ego. He defined self:
1. When used by itself: the subject regarded as an agent, as being aware of his own identity and his role as subject and agent. 2. As part of a hyphenated word: the subject regarded as the object of his own activity. The self differns from the ego of psychoanalytic theory in that a) the self refers to the subject as he experiences himself while the ego refers to his personality as a structure about which the ego refers to his personality as a structure about which impersonal generalizations can be made; and that b) the ego, as defined by Freud, contains repressed, unconscious parts which cannot be recognized by the self as parts of itself. One of the existential criticisms of classical analytical technique is that its theory, particularly its metapsychology, leaves no room for the self.
It should therefore come as surprise to find that the highly praised exposition of psychoanalytic concepts The Language of Psychoanalysis by J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis devotes 13 pages to the ego while giving no mention to the self. Similarly, Otto Fenichel's masterful and comprehensive The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis has not given any reference to the self in its generality quite thorough index. (Wolf 1989: 16)
Gimme gimme definitions.

Urban, Greg 1989. The "I" Of Discourse. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 27-51.

At the same time, Benveniste's analysis has been taken up by theoreticians and philosophers concerned with the "self." As Singer (1984: 61) suggests, Ricoeur believes that Benveniste's analysis of pronouns provides a "new basis for a 'hermeneutics of the I am' as well as for a reconciliation between structuralism, psychoanalysis, and philosophy." Essentially, "I" is one of the hinge points between language, as an abstract Saussurean structure of oppositions, and discourse, as a specific instance of language use. Consequently, it represents a kind of socialization of the self, as it is brought into a culture-specific structure. The personal pronouns make possible an expression of "subjectivity." (Urban 1989: 29)
I believe there are other, nonverbal, expressions of subjectivity which are much more immediate.
Consequently, the two terms of the metaphor are seen as distinct but simultaneously as being related in some way, as in the expression "a sea of troubles," where the words a sea are taken as related to many, or same other expression of extent, metaphorically. (Urban 1989: 35)
This is why I prefer "a titles" to "the titles" - there are many many verbal expressions one could attribute to a single phenomenon. Language is vague. One could even say, nebulous, and possibly uncharted...
The behavioral, including discourse, patterns of others may be assumed without the behavior or discourse simultaneously representing them referentially as assumed. This kind of assumption or imitation I will call "iconic otherness" of the self. This is the basic stuff of culture - the participation of individuals in socially transmitted patterns of action and representation of the worlld, which are adopted "unconsciously" and without reflection.
At the same time, the adoption of such a pattern is a sign, in particular, an icon of the adopted pattern. Insofar as the imitation is faithful, the behavior, including speech, of the imitating actor is a sign vehicle capable of being read by others. It points to the conformity of the actor to the cultural patterns. It is thus in some measure meta-cultural, simultaneously as it is cultural. But it is meta-cultural in a peculiar sense, viz., in that the similarity of the behavior to its imitated counterpart need not be taken as such. There is nothing intrinsic to it that requires that it be taken as meta-cultural. (Urban 1989: 46)
Score for the behavioural sphere.
If the present interpretation is correct, de-quotative and theatrical "I" should go hand in hand with fixity of the underlying text. Fixity ensures the genuine social or shared character of the "I." Explicit signalling of the "I" as the "I" of another ensures an awareness of the assumed character of the "I," but simultaneously does not interfere with its occurrence as actual embodied iconic otherness. (Urban 1989: 48)
"Fixity" is a good word for the quality of texts, for example (cf. Bakhtin in Cresswell and Hawn 2012).
Metapragmatic awareness is the motor of cultural change in the discourse constitution of self. (Urban 1989: 50)

Straus, Terry 1989. The Self in Northern Cheyenne Language and Culture. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 53-68.

By dint of being addressed, even the inanimate objects become a person, another self with which the speaker himself is dialogically engaged. An individual Cheyenne might converse with spiritual beings, with deceased human beings, with a particular animal which serves as his guardian, or with a sacred object or place which embodies a spirit. To an outside observer, the dialogue in these instances may seem to be a monologue; the speaking seems to emanate entirely from the human person. But to a participant in this community of persons, the addressee in such instances understands the speaker and responds with other kinds of signs which are interpretable by the speaker. The addressee is thus affirmed as second person, "you." Hence, the dialogue is an exchange of signs between mutually constituted selves and it is the relationship between these selves, not the physical form, that is significant. (Straus 1989: 55)
I'm guessing this could be (a self-communicative variety of) animism. Also, note the difference between organicism (treating something as a biological organism) and organology (treating something as if it had a distinguishable head and limbs).
Speech and understanding come to man through omotome, which means "breath," "word," and also "consciousness." Through it, man both separates from and connects with those around him: it gives him individuality unknown in other species (Straus 1976). Simultaneously, it enables him to participate in dialogue. (Straus 1989: 56)
Arupael sensu moi? Language band sensu Hall?
When the failure to listen results in criminal behavior, it was and sometimes is punished by exile and/or shunning. Without communication, the personhood of thi criminal is denied. It can be restored only by the effort of a relative of the one punished, by re-educating and by re-integrating the individual into the tribal community. (Straus 1989: 56)
The phenomena of non-persons.
The heart, core of the individual, his center and summation, is the locus of all his relationships. It is also the symbolic source of his familial and tribal connections. Tsetsehestahase are those who "share the heart, the same native core" (hestah, "heart"). The head is the locus of the spirits, four of them, which both inform and provide a record of individual experience and behavior. An individual's behavior is often explained in terms of the strength of the "good" and "crazy" spirits within him. (Straus 1989: 64)
This is merely interesting. [huvitavused]
Interestingly, Nothern Cheyenne even interpret personal achievement tuistically. Whereas in the Euro-Americal tradition, achievement is seen as reflecting on the self, on its personal characteristics, among the Northern Cheyenne achievement is interpreted as evidence of support from relatives and other powerful persons. What an individual has accomplished he has accomplished because of the others with whom he has been and is in contact. The Other is always implied in the Self. (Straus 1989: 67)
The situation is not so very different, but the discourse that goes along with it seemingly is.

Daniel, Valentine E. 1989. The Semeiosis of Suicide in Sri Lanka. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 69-100.

Suicide itself is the outcome of a complex set of events involving numerous social actors and cultural forces. If anything, this paper attempts to reveal one little aspects of such a complex set, an aspect which, to borrow an expression from Arjun Appadurai, we may call, the "ecology of affect." (Daniel 1989: 73)
I wonder if this term may prove useful in my own work. It sounds familiar, as if from the discourse on the social construction of emotion, but I'm not sure.
I have claimed that "aloneness" is a concept and an experience that is culture specific, one which would seem odd to the average Westerner. I have also hinted that at best "aloneness" is a variant of, and not identical to, loneliness. To be lonely is to experience the absence of something or, more usually, somebody. To be sure, the Tamil word tanmai and its Sinhala equivalent tanikama does carry this meaning, but only on one side of the connotational coin, as it were. The experience of being lonely may be described as something experienced negatively, but self-consciously. The other side of the coin is "aloneness." "Aloneness" is also experienced negatively. But unlike its twin, "loneliness," "aloneness" is experienced unselfconsciously. It is something that eludes reflection. For a Westerner, being alone may also be experienced positively, in which case it is called "solitude." A similar but a more prosaic expression of such a positively valued experience is called "privacy." (Daniel 1989: 75)
Ehk: üksiLdus (loneliness), üksiNdustunne (aloneness), üksiNdus (solitude), eraviisilisus (privacy).
Paradoxically, "aloneness" is not being alone, in the strict sense. It is being disconnected from other human beings with whom one ought to be connected. The corollary of such disconnectedness is finding oneself in the company of undesirable entities, abnormal people and powers. The social bonds and one's bondedness with the social prevents the intrusion into society and the socialized self of such "alien" persons and powers. The symptoms in question may include, among others, madness (pissu), the running of a high fever (una), or recurrent miscarriages and still births (bada gässvima and lamay nätivela hambuvima). (Daniel 1989: 78)
Üksindustunne tekib siis kui ei olda ühenduses inimestega kellega peaks olema ühenduses.
Let us begin with one of Peirce's most general and often quoted definitions of a sign:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its object in which it stands itself to the same Object (CP 2.274)
The "First," "Second," and "Third," in this definition, is meant to correspond to Peirce's Phenomenological or Cenophythagorean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, categories we shall find reason to expand upon further on in this essay. Eight years later, in 1910, in what is one of his clearest explications, he defines the sign as follows:
By a Sign I mean anything whatever, real or factile, which is capable of a sensible form, is applicable to something other than itself, that is already known, and that is capable of being so interpreted in another sign which I call its Interpretant as to comunicate something that may not have been previously known about its Object. There is thus a triadic relation between any Sign, and Object, and an Interpretant (MS 654.7, 1910; cited in R. Parmentier 1985: 26).
And in a third definition, he brings out the indefinitely open process of semeiosis within which the sign is to be found:
[A sign is] anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign and so on ad infinitum. (CP 2.203)
(Daniel 1989: 78-79)
You can never have too many definitions of the sign.
In his attempt to rescue Peirce's broad, non-mentalistic, non-individualistic, theory of interpretants from the narrower psychologistic simulacra, John Dewey (1946: 85) sees the latter as a veritable ersatz.
My own use of Peirce's ideas may be read as an instance of throwing such caution to the winds. But this is not the way I intend it. To be fair, despite Peirce's own diatribe against psychologism he did frequently (and I feel, not only as a sop to Cerberus) employ psychologistic formulations. This is especially true, and in my own opinion quite appropriate, with respect to discussions pertaining to the emotional and energetic interpretants, where the interpretive effects of the sign are to be located in the recipient of the sign's message. With the logical interpretant, the larger, purely logical and even cosmogonic process of semeiosis becomes both clearer and more appropriate. My caveat emptor may be stated as follows: the interpretant is not the same as the interpreter; it is a larger and an impersonal process. To quote T.L. Short's (1986: 98) general definition of Peirce's interpretant: "[an] interpretant is not an interpreter. Instead, it is the particular thought, action, or feeling which interprets the sign. The formation of interpretants constitute an interpreter, which in some cases is a person." (Daniel 1989: 84)
It is questionable whether merely seeing something as an erzats rescues the real thing. I think Dewey was much too polemical about Morris's interpretation of interpretant or interpreter (brilliant phraseology).
Interpretants are either Immediate, Dynamic, or Final. The immediate interpretant refers to the capacity of a sign to transmit a certain kind of information to the interpretant or interpreter. The kind of interpretant involved here is a potential interpretant. The dynamic interpretant, as already indicated, is the actual semeiotic effect of a sign. And "the final interpretant, ais the interpretant that would be the best interpretant of a given sign, given a goal of interpretation" (T.L. Short 1986: 107). Each one of these interpretants are either Emotional, Energetic, or Logical. The differences among these three can be understood most clearly in their dynamic or actualized aspects. The emotional interpretant is, in Savan's (1976: 40) words, "the qualitative semeiotic effect" of a sign or, as Peirce describes it, "a mere quality of feeling" (cited in Shapiro 1983: 51). An energetic interpretant is an action that interprets the sign by engaging the outer physical world in muscular effort or the inner world in dialogic thought. It is constituted by an interpretive act in which some energy is expended. A logical interpretant, even when it is dynamic, i.e., is actually instantiated, is an expression of a habit of thought or action that is rule-governed (CP 5.476).
Even though the intersection of the two trichotomies yields nine possible classes of interpretants, some pairs are more "at home together," so to speak, than others. This the emotional interpretant is more "naturally" paired with immediate, the energetic with the dynamic, and the logical with the final/normal. (Daniel 1989: 85)
With every reiteration of his phenomenological categories in secondary literature, Peirce's categories become a little more clear.
Let us look at some ethnographic examples in greater detail. Among the NTV, the most conspicuous signs of "aloneness-disorder" in the withdrawal from all manner of transactions. To quote Sangili, "there is no giving nor receiving, no going nor coming, no words nor assertions, no saying nor listening, and, finally, there is even no eating" [...]. In the words of Sinnamuthu the diviner [...], "for those who have the affliction of aloneness, there is neither joy nor sorrow, satisfaction nor dissatisfaction, anger nor compassion, fear nor courage." (Daniel 1989: 86-87)
The matter of great depression.
No one knew that I had tanima tosam. I went to work, I ate, I drank, I played cards, I even went to the movies. I would be talking to you like this. You will think, "He is talking to me." But I will not be talking to you. Nobody knows what tanima tosam is. Even I did not know that I had it then. Only after I was cured did I know what it was. Even that (still) one cannot say. My tanima tosam can be quite different from your tanima tosam and his tanima tosam.
(Daniel 1989: 88)
Sounds like a demonization of depression. Also, the description is reminiscent of "numbness."
Peirce named his categories, with disarming simplicity: "Firstness," "Secondness," and "Thirdness." Firstness is a monadic property, a singularly intrinsic property of an event or experience, a mere potentiality. This means that:
in regarding a thing as having such a property, one is making no implicit reference to any second thing. Insofar as we regard something in this way, we are regarding it neither as existent or non-existent, as real or unreal, since, to regard a thing only in respect to its monadic properties, is to regard it as if it had no relationship whatsoever to anything else (including oneself), whereas the ideas of existence or reality pertain to things in their relationships to one another (Ransell 1986: 57).
Secondness is Peirce's category that describes those properties of things and events that are dyadic or of two-term relations. "Brute" is the word used repeatedly by Peirce to characterize this property of secondness. When the effect of two entities upon each other is a matter of the hic et nunc, ungeneralized (even though not ungeneralizable), and unmindful of reason, the effect may be called "brute," and deemed exemplary of secondness, and describable as the abrubt interruption of continuity. In his taxonomy of consciousness, Peirce calls the kind of consciousness that falls under the category of secondness altersense:
The self and the not-self are separated in this sort of consciousness. The sense of reaction or struggle between self and other is just what this consciousness consists in (CP 7.543).
In the broadest sense, thirdness is the name for the property of three-place or triadic relationships. One of its governing concepts is mediation (CP 5.66; 5.104; 5.121, 6.32; 8.332). In exchange, which constitutes a genuine triadic relation, giving "does not consist in A's putting B away from him and C's subsequently picking it up. ...There must be some kind of law before there can be any kind of giving..." (Hardwick 1977: 29). If giving is to be more than a mere mechanical act of physical transfer of B, it must conform to or be mediated by cultural habit or lawfulness. (Daniel 1989: 88-89)
I now understand why in the TMS they spoke so highly of codes - these organize messages lawfully...
Milton Singer (1984), McKim Marriot (1976) and I (1984a and 1984b) have argued, each in our own way, that the person in South Asia, ulike the one idealized in the West, is loosely and openly constituted, a "dividual" embedded in the flux of transactions and processes. To be bounded, to be static, and to be individuated is to be dead: "a symbol, once in being, spreads amond the peoples. In use and in experience, its meanings grows" (CP 2.302); it does not flounder. (Daniel 1989: 90)
I have ta take a contrarian position for a minute: it is beginning to bother me how pervasive the lame criticism of Westerners is. In every instance the East is praised as a happy andd holy land and the West as depraved and sick. The current is seems to be unidirectional; so much so that I'm beginning to boudt in its validity. In fact one could argue that the Western "dividual" is the greatest achievement of human kind. Peirce's genius could grow because he was shunned and avoided. He is unique. Had he become a Harvard teacher perhaps the symbols of that environment would have "grown" on him and instead of semeiotic we would know him as just another logician.
Thus to the question, what is man? or even, what is essentially man? The answer will be a symbol enjoined bya Final/Normal Logical interpretant. This does not mean that men and women as humans qua humans are to be emotionless or incapable of unreflective action. It means that a fully human person has emotions and actions that are already contained or evolving towards containment by the mediating acceptance of a Third, viz., culture, with its complex web of meanings and habits of thought and action. (Daniel 1989: 91)
Alas, an apology must be made for the tedium that Peircean semeiotic terminology is likely to have creted in the short run. Given the relative novelty of its application in interpretive anthropology, this is inevitable. And yet it is hoped that the use of Peirean semeiotic is seen as a gentle nudge to traditional interpretive anthropology to grow up and out of its footloose and fancy-free days. But most of all, it is also hoped that the time will come when the "peculiar terminology" will not be needed as declarative indexes any longer, and instead the powerful perspective of semeiotic, with its capacity for providing finer and finer insights into ever shifting realities, will be as commonplace and second nature as Cartesianism. Has not the reign of the latter long outlasted its usefulness? (Daniel 1989: 96)
One can only hope.

Rosen, Lawrence 1989. Responsibility and Compensatory Justice in Arab Culture and Law. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 101-120.

If it is the context of bargained for relationships that is ccentral to the definition of the person in Arab culture then it also makes sense that for the Arabs the idea of intentionality should also look somewhat different than that found in the west. The Arabic word for intent, niya, not only means "purpose," "design," and "will," but inasmuch as these features manifest themselves in direct faith niya also means "simple," "naive," and "sincere." It suggests in its semantic range what informants readily acknowledge in actual use, that a person constantly displays what lies inside him when he speaks or acts. Indeed, most Arabs do not recognize the idea of a distinct inner self that could exist apart from action, only of overt expressions which must of necessity conform to what a person must carry inside himself. To the extent that a person can be conducted to speak or act, or to the extent that one can learn of the variety of another's past utterances and deeds by careful investigation, one aquires direct access to that person's intentions. In ordinary social life this means that people readily presume to know other's states of mind and do not hesitate to elicit behavior or exert pressure by characterizing words and deeds in such a way that their attendant motivations may also be adduced (see Mills 1940, Burke 1962). In law, as we shall see, this means that judges usually presume they can discern intent simply from what a person has said or done and that intent can, therefore, remain a distinct element of legal consideration even when, in terms of formal doctrine, it does not necessarily appear as a constituent feature. (Rosen 1989: 104-105)
Can intention really be deduced from sayings? This does not feel right.
Justice and responsibility are also, no doubt, connected to views about the nature of power. Briefly, it can be argued that in the Arab view power stems from an extremely vide range of sources. Where one man may use wealth as a vehicle for ackuiring power another may use his capacity to capture the terms of discouse through his masterful rhetorical abilities. Power, being diverse, is very difficult to hold on to, and otherrs may rapidly challenge existing pretensions from highly diverse bases. Arabs frequently use the word that is often translated as "rights" (haqq), but its implications are not the same as our idea of a right. Haqq means "obligation" and thus the distribution of bonds of indebtedness among sentient beings. It does not convey our sense of an indubitable supportable claim. One only has rights, the Arabs say, to the extent that one can enforce them. To be away from your "rights" - i.e., to be away from your land, the people who support your claims to that land - is to have no right. One does not, therefore, look to the law or to political figures to enforce an entitlement but to add themselves to your network of interlocked associates whose particular resources can then be brought to bear on your behalf. And it is in this context, finally, that we may be able to consider some of the features of compensatory justice as it exists in the contemporary world. (Rosen 1989: 113)
Thus when in Western discourse on power, for example, it is "social" (e.g. Ardent 1969) then in the Arab world "rights" are equally social. You have power and rights only insofar as others around you recognize that you have power and rights. Both are in this sense semiotic.

Varenne, Hervé 1989. A Congusion of Signs: The Semiosis of Anthropological Ireland. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 121-152.

The strength of the anthropological argument lies in the fact that it makes sense to say that human action is intelligible only in the context of its occurrence. To understand any human behavior one must understand all the behaviors that occur around it - before it and after it, and in parallel to it - to the extent that it can be shown that these other behaviors somehow impinge on it. (Varenne 1989: 123)
This is the Malinowskian-Birdwhistellian and almost "religious worship" of context. But much like any given notice of Birdwhistell's kinesics, Varenne reifies the importance of context but then he himself proceeds to do something wholly unrelated. It's as if he sets of this impossible task (take account of everything) and does not even try to accomplish it himself. This is just a play of mentions. I should look out for this in my own work (don't preach methodology you don't use yourself).
The anthropologist is the privileged reporter of voices. He is not the hawker of a line in a marketplace of ideas.
I will not escape here a construction of anthropology that may have been useful at the end of the 19th centurry but which anthropologists rejected in the practice of their craft, if not in their presentation of self. (Varenne 1989: 126)

Boon, James A. 1989. Against Coping Across Cultures: The Semiotics of Self-Help Rebuffed. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 153-170.

We had taken the idiom of modern America because it seemed to have no discernible provenance, a spontaneous verbalism that embraced the immediate as well as he immediate future. But now that America has taken our most complicated philosophical concepts as part of its everyday slang, things are getting sticky (p. 103).
(Boon 1989: 160)
This is from Gita Metha's Karma Cola. Indeed, "karma" has become something wholly different in America than it is in India. As little as I know, it seems to me that the original concept is tied to reincarnation, e.g. what you do in this life has influence of your embarking on your next life; and Americans - as impatient as ever - take it to mean that if your are an asshole to someone today, some cosmic force will have revenge on you tomorrow. That is, "live harmoniously" becomes "don't be a dick."
My brief attempt here to read Hose conningly aims not to exonerate colonialism or the anthropology sometimes in cahoots with it (but sometimes not). I aim rather to help disclose more convoluted, mythlike undercurrents in political and historical arrangements that appear straightforward. One begins to suspect significantly contradictory sides to Charles Hose (not to mention Aban Jau!). Keith's 1927 tribute can make Hose seem almost relativist, "convinced that the difference between East and West is not so great as is usually believed; under our diverse creeds, codes, customs, tongues, and skin-tint is hid the same human nature - the same reactions" (p. 6). But exceptions doubtless marked such convictions. Keith-on-Hose even recalls moments cited above of the Turnbull-by-the-Rule: "As [Hose] was learning in his boyhood the habits of plants, birds, and beasts among the marshes of Waveney, he was equipping himself for the jungles of the East" (p. 6). But this parallel between Hose and Turnbull is ultimately misleading. Hose imposed other-government instrumentally; Turnbull seeks self-help presumably innocently. Still, who could say whether a colonialist superiority complex a la Hose or psychological self-identification a la Turnbull is more imbued with so-called "cultural imperialism?" Both, as Metha's Karma Cola can remind us, managed to suffocate differences. For the purpose of this paper, the crucial feature shared by Hose in 1927 and Turnbull in 1983 is this: Each felt compelled eventually to look back, self-regardingly, on his exotic adventures - one in a celebration of his colonialist career, the other in search of his personalized soul, both unremittingly, simplistically earnest. (Boon 1989: 167)
This article with its amusing turns of the phrase was a pleasure to read, but there's not much to quote. Alas, I'll leave here this conclusion-like passage.
Halting, variegated, uncocksue, responsibly and/or subversively doubting semiotics seldom make catchy headlines, book blurbs, interviews, -isms, or blueprints (agendas) for pilitical or psychological improvement. But formats must be preserved for these less marketable stories, too. For they are truer. (Boon 1989: 168)
I'll just take this as a go-ahead to be "cocksure" with my nonverbalism.

Leaf, Murray J. 1989. Singer, Kant, and the Semiotic Self. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 171-192.

While Peirce clearly predates the others, the concern with "empirical distinctions and observable processes" did not begin with him. Kan't actual position was that noumena, transcendental objects, were postulations, made to recognize thought and communication. The clarity of his analysis leads well beyond a statement of the importance of symbolic and communicative process into a quite concrete analysis of what can only be called their pragmatic (Kant's own word, alternating with "practical") bases in human life.
Kant used the term "object" as the complement of "subject." Anything the subject perceives is an object of perception; anything the subject thinks is an object of thought. An object could be a physical thing, and some were. But, he argued, transcendental objects, noumena, could only be ideas. Further, his description of the ways in which these postulations are inherently paradoxical and can never be legitimately thought of as arising from observation itself raised in turn the question of the purpose of such postulations. This further led Kant into a most interesting analysis of the nature of purpose itself, and the way it too was both individual and social. Finally, this in its own turn led his analysis of the way purpose and learned conceptions interact in perception and cognition - in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. This marked a specific mixture of introspective and objective analyses of individual thought processes that led eventually to Wundt and Bastian and through them to Boas and Malinowski.
An important aspect of Singer's own position is that the importance of the I-Thou-It relationship is observable as a matter of ethnographic experience, as is the use of the relationship in communicative activity. A "semiotic" analysis is an analysis of cultural communication that shows such a structure, and as he applies this to India it is further an analysis which shows that there are in fact indigeneous analyses of communication which recognize fundamentally the same basic conceptions, and themselves apply those conceptions to significant meaningful behaviors (Hindu ceremonials) - in order not just to analyze an action in a part of the world but to create, maintain, and project an order for the whole of it. Thus: "the interpretations of these symbolic representations are not merely syntactic or semantic but are fully semiotic in the sense that they try to take full account of the contexts of use and of the dialogues between the utterers and interpreters of the signs" (Singer 1984: 182), and:
When I first became aware of such selected and enacted self-images, I called them 'cultural performances." With the help of a Peircean semiotic analysis, we can see that these cultural performances provide the names and forms, the images and diagrams, the songs, and stories in a moving tableau of a self, not just a self burdened with an ancient past, but of an ideal self just coming into being. Indian identity is an "outreaching identity' of a self that reaches out to other people through personal devotion to a personal deity, that aspires to the general welfare through disinterested action, and, finally, that seeks a vision of ultimate cosmic reality in meditation (Singer 1984: 182-183).
Thus semiotic analysis is at one and the same time an analysis of communication, culture and social structure; the I-thou-it paradigm is the basic framework of communication, the conceptual basis of cultural traditions, and the building block of social structure. It is not just a logical analysis or elaboration of a general view of what the presumptions of communication must be. (Leaf 1989: 174-175)
Peirce's essay on "Consciousness and Language" (Peirce 1866) introduced the idea that man not only depended on signs but actually was a sign (cf. Harrison 1986: 174). In "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (1966c[1868]: 52-53), Peirce insisted on the universal importance of I-Thou-It in all thought and linked it to the idea of the continuity of all thought, meaning that ideas have reference only to other ideas in an unbroken stream, a notion much like James' "stream of consciousness." The point is also argued in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (1966b[1868]: 34), which can provide a short quotation that shows how close he comes to arguing simply by definition: "from the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign." (Leaf 1989: 176)
We consider a judgment to be objective, as distinct from merely our own personal judgment, when we expect all others to accept the categories under which we make it, and when we know that those categories will have the same significance for all of them. But how can we know this? We cannot, of course, have experience of someone else's perceptions or of the future - which Kant is well aware of. Rather, when we learn concepts we learn that some of them are considered universal as part of learning th concepts themselves, while others are not. We learn that time and space are universal when we learn what they are; we learn that beauty is more personal and relative in the same way. A judgment of objectiviy is an imputation; it is justified by our experience (of learning and using the concepts) for cencepts like space and time, but not for concepts like beauty. (Leaf 1989: 181)
Noumena are objects which are presumed to lie beyond perception, and in important cases to organize them. To transcend is to start in but go beyond. They transcenh perception in the sense that we see them as manifested in particular sensory experiences, but going beyond them. Such a thing, by definition, cannot be embodied in experience, and can not arise from it. It is, in Kant's analysis, therefore a pure creature of the intellect. (Leaf 1989: 181)
Peirce was not greatly concerned with the relation between psychological subject and conceptualized self, and generally wrote as though a person had one self, both subject and object, and one world. In a parallel way, sociologists such as Simmel and Redfield assumed that a culture or civilization had a world view which it imposed on its members; this naturally entailed a view of the self as singular and monolithic. Singer accepts Peirce's phrasing. He fairly consistently speaks of "the" self rather than, for example, "a" self or "one's selves," even though technically there is nothing in his scheme that would preclude the latter. (Leaf 1989: 184)
Kan't distinction between subject and conceptualized self was present in Wundt's argument fol folk-psychology (which would describe evolved concepts of selves and others) as a necessary extension of experimental (individual) psychology (Wundt 1916: 3), and was directly reflected in both Peirce's and G. H. Mead's (1964: 227) distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. Kant's portrait of the disparate shapes and occasions of conscious perception, however they occurred and without trying to impose his own unity on them, was the basis of Wundt's (1904) conception of "the manifold of consciousness" which he offered in place of traditional ideas of "mind," and his treatment of the way this manifold arose in behavior was in turn the basis of the "functional" psychology that was even more important to pragmatism than the self-other relation. Kan't concept that categories of perception were also norms, and the idea that laws of perception were laws of the objects themselves reappeared in almost exactly the same words in Wundt's (1897-1901: vol. 1, 10-11) argument that ethics were prior to logic in the development of human mentality and thought. (Leaf 1989: 185-186)
Is culture a text (or series of texts), or is it a play (or series of plays)? Can a play be reduced to a text? If we really want to understand the inner structure of our thought and behavior, such questions must be answered with factual precision. (Leaf 1989: 186)
The above quotes are way beyond me to affirm or negate anything about them. But this last one I can negate: no, we do not need to reduce culture to neither. Culture is both, or, rather a complex unity or interrelation of both.

Lee, Benjamin 1989. Semiotic Origins of the Mind-Body Dualism. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 193-228.

Veidler develops this contrast by examining the auxiliaries used te reverbalize a nominalized verb. One can 'make' a promise, 'hold' a belief, or 'reach' a decision. The auxiliaries most associated with performatives are 'make', 'give', and 'issue', whereas the mental state verbs share 'have' (to have a belief) along with a host of interesting alternates. One can 'nourish' a hope, 'cherish' a belief, and 'hide' an intention. What we 'hold' in some mental state, we can 'issue' in some illocutionary act. Mental act verbs, as might be expected, lie in between. Some, like 'decide', 'choose', and 'identify', share 'make' with the performatives; but not 'issue', expect in 'issuing a decision' (in which case it functions like a performative). Other auxiliaries, such as 'reaching' a decision stress the telic or achievement aspect of these verbs. As Vendler puts it:
The total import of the emerging picture is clear enough. Man lives in two environments, in two worlds: as a "body," and "extended thing," he is among objects and events in the physical, spatio-temporal universe: as a "mind," a "thinking thing," he lives an communes with objects of a different kind, which he also perceives, acquires, holds, and offers in various ways to other citizens, to other minds (Vendler 1972: 34)
Vendler then proceeds te establish the nature of these "objects of a different kind" which the mind "communes with." These objects turn out to be thought or propositions. (Lee 1989: 212)
"Mental act verbs" describe well the metaphors in Whiskey Blanket's raps, such as "gripping an idea" and the like. Vendler's quote made me wonder if Peirce's three interpretants are not just mind-body (logical-energetic) dualism in collaboration with emotions.
And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are the same thing as thought. For if I say I see, or I walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my body, my conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it may be that, as often happens in sleep, I think I see or I walk, although I never open my eyes or move from my place, and the same thing perhaps might occur if I had not a body at all. But if I mean only to talk of my sensation, or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, it becomes quite true because my assertion now refers only to my mind, which alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk [my emphasis] (Descartes 1911: I, 222).
(Lee 1989: 224)
This is a really weird argument.

Singer, Milton 1989. Pronouns, Persons, and the Semiotic Self. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 229-296.

Peirce was admittedly indebted to Kant in several respects, as Leaf notes. Kant's analysis of the universality and validity of judgments indicates an important source for Peirce's pragmatic and social theory of truth as that opinion which will be arrived at by an unlimited community of investigators. In Peirce this is closely connected with his social theory of logic and of reality as the object of those opinions destined to be arrived at by the community of scientific investigators. (Singer 1989: 230)
So if an unlimited community of investigators, for example, arrive at Chomsky's opinion that Žižek has no theory, then that is the truth.
Another positive debt Peirce owes to Kant is the distinction between a representation and its object, as when Kant says that the transcendental self cannot be known as an object, but can be conceived as a representation (vorstellung). In his earlier writings Peirce used "representation" and "representamen" for "sign" in the definition of semiosis as a triadic relation of sign, object and interpretant. The Kantian source of this usage is not always recognized because vorstellung is often translated as "idea" (Kant 1965: 344-352; Peirce 1977a: 192-194). (Singer 1989: 230)
Thus appears a chain of equivalences: "representamen - sign - vorstellung", much like in Lotman there's a virtual equivalence between "culture - semiosphere - the universe of mind".
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant devotes five pages to the power of using signs. This may not be very much in a work of about 200 pages, yet his analysis of signs enters significantly into the rest of the work in his distinction between symbolic and conceptual representations; between demonstrative, rememorative, and prognostic signs; and in the definition of thinking as talking with ourselves and listening to ourselves inwardly (by repreductive imagination) (Kant 1974: 65). Not only do such distinctions and definitions anticipate Peirce, but they bring a substantial portion of Kant's anthropology and the Critique within the domain of a semiotic analysis. Kant, however, did not explicitly generalize the concept of the study of signs as a general discipline or method, as Peirce and Locke and the Stoics did (Yngve 1986). Kant seems to have used logical analysis and introspective observation of his own mental processes as his "method." He admonished people, however, not to "eavesdrop" on their own mental processes. Suc hexcessive introspection, he observed, tends to produce "fanaticism" or madness (Kant 1974: 15). (Singer 1989: 230-231)
I did not know Kant had written about signs! Also, I am still surprised that no one has yet generalized the study of nonverbal communication as nonverbalism and nonverbal behavior in literature as concourse.
The I may be taken, first, as nothing but the sum total of one's thoughts. In this sense I am identical with my mind: I am a mind. Second, it may be taken to denote the ordering or "generating" principle of the unity of consciousness... In this sense I have a mind. Finally, if we recall that the "function" that gives the individual of a particular mind itself depends upon the spatio-temporal continuity of a sentient body (not to mention the body's role in action and speech), then we see the reason for yet another sense of the I, the one denoting the body. In this sense I am a body (Vendler 1972: 204).
(Singer 1989: 231)
From Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology.
When Peirce replaced I, it and thou as names for his three categorios by the more technical names Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, he did not lose interest in the three pronouns. As Fisch points out, Peirce wrote the 1891 Century Dictionary definition of Tuism as the doctrine that "all thought is addressed to a second person or to one's self as a second person" (cf. Singer 1984a: 85, 86). In other words, Peirce's youthful use of I, it and thou for his three categaries did not exhaust his interest in the three pronouns as kinds of words which also expressed kindds of persons, thoughts, impulses, actions, and feelings. (Singer 1989: 234)
So there may indeed be reason for trying to combine Peirce and Goffman: the self (I), the other (thou) and the situation (it) can coincide (the last one only contingently, but still).
The triad of rheme, dicent and argument may sound a bit arcane but it is Peirce's semiotic translation of the triad long familiar in logic and rhetoric as term, proposition and argument, and in grammar as word, sentence and paragraph. (Singer 1989: 236)
Demystifying Peircean jargon.
In a youthful 1863 oration on "The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization," Peirce quotes Emerson's "things are in the saddle, and ride mankind" to suppert the generalization that the age of scientific material progress is an "idistical" one which has suceeded an "egotistical" age, and will be follewed by a "tuistical" age (Peirce 1982: 113). These three adjectives were not coined by Peirce, but were used by Coleridge, according to Fisch, to signify an excessive use of the three pronouns (see illeism in the Oxford English Dictionary and Fisch 1982: xxix). For Peirce, the three adjectives are also clearly associated with the use of the three pronouns "I," "it" and "thou," but now used as names for three historical ages instead of names for his three categaries of being and consciousness. (Singer 1989: 240)
Peirce's language is interesting in itself. Not much seems to have been done with it, but everyone sure does love reiterating it. Illeism, by the way, "is the act of referring to oneself in the third person instead of first person." (wiki)
There is some evidence to indicate that Whitman shared Swinton's idealistic theory of language in the notes for a lecture on "An American Primer" and the many entries he collected for a combined dictionary and phrase book called "Words": "a perfect writer would make words sing, dance, kiss, do the male and female act, bear children... or do any thing, that man or woman or the natural powers can do" (quoted from Whitman's An American Primer in Kaplan 1980: 229). (Singer 1989: 245)
Homologous to other "organicist" theories, e.g. Lotman's cultural semiotics, which - seen in this light - also aims to make texts and codes do anything that a person can do. An example would be crossing borders: persons can physically cross borders, texts have to be translated and appropriated for them to truly "enter" a given culture; but when it does it immediately and definitely intermingles with other texts of that culture and "bears children" as an avalance of further texts.
Towards the end of his lecture, Professor Vernant described the archaic and classical Greek ego in distinctly anti-Cartesion language - neither bounded nro unified, without introspection, extroverted rather than introverted, witha nexistential rather than a reflexive self-consciousness.
As has been many times states, the cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am, had no meaning for a Greek. I exist because I have hands, feet and feelings; I exist because I walk and run, because I see and feel. I do all these things and I know that I do them. I never think my existence through the consciousness of them. My consciousness is always dependent on the outside; I am conscious of such and such object, of a certain sound, or of a kind of pain. The individual's world has not taken the form of self-consciousness, of a limited, inner universe in its interior, radical individualit. Bernard Grouthuysen sums up the special nature of the ancient individual in a brutal but provocative formula by saying that self-consciousness is the apprehension of the self in a "He" and not yet in an "I" (Vernant 1986: 12-13).
(Singer 1989: 255)
This is the same reason cogito ergo sum makes no sense for me. The fact that these activities appear similar in dreams does not mean that they are or could be identical to the real thing.
Not only is there no "cogito, ergo sum" in the classical texts, according to Brunschwig, but there is a "paradoxical" objectified version which could be formulated as follows: "I see my self (in my work or in some other projections of my self which have been enumerated above) then I exist; and I am there where I see myself: I am that projection of myself which I see" (Brunschwig 1983: 375). (Singer 1989: 257)
Quite relevant for unraveling a similar matter in Mead's social self (or, rather, objectification of the self).
Having made the prayers, etc. the dancing may begin. The song should be sustained in the throat; its meaning should be shown by the hands, the mood (bhava) must be shown by the glances; rhythm (tala) is marked by the feet. For wherever the hand moves, there the glances follow; where the glances go, the mind follows; where the mind goes, the mood follows; where the mood goes there is the flavour (rasa) (Mirror of Gesture 1970: 17).
(Singer 1989: 271)
Nonverbal behaviour in an ancient Indian manual.
Another consideration in support of Erkson and the interactionists is that psychoanalytic practice uses the methods of free association and interpretation of dreams that are essentially methods of semiotic mediation between patient and analyst. In Western culture, that mediation is primarily verbal - "a talking cure." In other cultures, such as those of India an Japan, the analyst may depend more on tactile, visual, and "body language." Which of these media gives the most direct access to the "inner self" may itself be a culturally specific question as the papers by Danies, Rosen, Straus, and Wolf suggest. (Singer 1989: 274)
This is a title for a wholly another topic - the over-belief in verbalization, e.g. talking about problems magically "fixes" them.

Lee, Benjamin and Greg Urban 1989b. Afterthoughts. In: Lee, Benjamin & Greg Urban (eds.), Semiotics, self, and society. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 297-303.

Of critical importance for him [Whorf] is the distinction between primary and secondary speech genres. Primary speech genres are parts of everyday speech - jokes, verbal dialogues, everyday narration, etc. - while secondary speech genres such as novers, dramas, commentarios, scientific and philosophical tekts, etc. incorporate and represent the primary speech genres. (Lee & Urban 1989b: 297)
Quite similar to the distinction between primary and secondary modelling systems in Estonian cultural semiotics. Perhaps there is direct or indirect influence present here? It is rather doubtful, but someone should definitely look into it some day.
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