Ajateadvuse kohta

Larrabee, M. J. 1993. Inside time-consciousness: Diagramming the flux. Husserl Studies 10(3): 181-210.

The usual metaphor for time is flow. Edmund Husserl, in describing experience of our inner temporality, uses the term often: Fluss. In the final three decades of his life (1900s to 1930s), he gives us a well-articulated theory of time, especially the experience of its ongoingness and of ourselves in the processing of time. He refers to this latter, our immanent temporality, as a "flux" or flow and thus calls up the image of the river moving along with its contents comprised in that flowing, gaining their fluent qualities from it. Yet Husserl's theory is not limited to a mechanistic understanding of flow as pure series, but in fact incorporates both a serialized aspect and a decentering, highly complex aspect of inner time-consciousness. The theory, then, requires a new metaphor, a re-mapping from serialistic diagrams to more dynamic ones. The challence lies not only in achieving this re-mapping, but in showing the relation of dynamic diagrams to the serialistic ones that are still vital to the full descriptions of inner time-consciousness. (Larrabee 1993: 181)
Kuna käesoleva lugemise eesmärgiks on saada ajateadvusest mingisugune ülevaade, et kirjutada sellest aspektist Mamardašvili ja Pjatigorski käsituses, kommenteerin ma see kord eesti keeles ja põhiliselt tõlgin fraase mis võivad mind aidata. Tõlge on nõrk, sest tähtis pole siin mitte täpsus vaid arusaadavus. "Aja kõige harjumuspäraseim metafoor on voolamine." "aja kestvuse kogemus ja meie isemused aja töötlemisel", "Husserly teooria ei ole piirdatud mehhanistliku arusaamaga voolamisest kui puhtast seeriast, vaid hõlmab nii seerialiseeritud aspekti ja sisemise ajateadvuse detsentraliseerimise keerulist aspekti." // M. ja P. käsituses on samuti aja voolamist käsitletud ja seerialisus võib kokku langeda aja diskreetsusega, nt liikumisena mittemõistmise seisundist mõistmise seisundisse.
The results of the apprehension of time-consciousness are two-fold, via a double intentionality; one is a serial temporality of ordered living experiences, the other a dynamic "temporality" not containable within the ordinary images of time-diagrams. (Larrabee 1993: 182)
"Ajateadvuse tajumise tulemused läbi topelt-intentsionaalsuse on kahekordsed: üks on elatud kogemuste korrastatud, seerialine temporaalsus ja teine on dünaamiline "ajalisus" mida ei saa mahutada tavaliste ajadiagrammide kuvandisse."
I first look at the three levels of constituted temporality and constituting consciousness, in order to connect the flows of inner time-consciousness with Husserl's diagrams of time. Next I give a reading of time-apprehension, especially as articulated in some supplementary texts pivotal to their interpretation, Nrs. 50 and 54; this reading interweaves descriptions of two Togethers that provide nontemporal consecutiveness and simultaneity, with an analysis of intentionalities operative in time-constituting. (Larrabee 1993: 182)
Ajateadvus, ajatajumus ja ajakehtestamine.
What are the indications that inner time-consciousness is not just a type of serialized time, a flowing along like a river? Two aspects of inner time-consciousness give the primary spatial image of flow, indeed of two intersecting flows, something like two tapes moving at right angles to one another. Husserl posits a temporalizing consciousness that constitutes both external worldly time (the time of clocks) and the internal, immanent time of consciousness. There are three levels to this constitutive nexus, (2) constituted wordly object time, (b) constituted inner time of immanent temporal Objects, that is, of conscious processes or mental processes (Erlebnisse), such as perceivings, and (c) the level of constituting time-consciousness. Level (a) is transcendent of consciousness, but both (b) and (c) are "within" it and are constitutive sources: (b) constitutes (a) and in turn is constituted by (c), the absolute, ultimate level of consciousness. (Larrabee 1993: 182)
"Husserl sätestab, et on ajastav teadvus mis kehtestab välise maailmalise aja (kellaaja) ja sisemine, vaimne teadvuse aeg." Nende aegade ristumise keskmes on kolm tasandit: (a) kehtestatud maailmaline objekti aeg; (b) kehtestatud sisemine, vaimsete ajaliste Objektide aeg ehk vaimsete protsesside, nagu tajumised, aeg; ja (c) kehtestava ajateadvuse tasand. Tasand (a) on teadvuseülene, aga nii (b) kui ka (d) on selle "sees" ja on kehtestavad allikad: (b) kehtestab (a) ja (b)-d omakorda kehtestab (c), ehk absoluutne, ülim teadvuse tasand. // Neid tasandeid tuleks võrrelda M. ja P. teadvuse-käsitusega.
The vertical intentionalities of this flow or flux would stem from the interconnections among phases of the actually constituting time-consciousness (retention, directed at a past; impressional consciousness, directed at a Now; and protention, directed at a future). (Larrabee 1993: 186)
Siin on "retentsioon või peetus (kinni hoidmine, pidamine) mis on suunatud minevikku; muljeline teadvus mis on suunatud Praegusele hetkele; ja protentsioon või ettenägelikkus mis on suunatud tulevikku".
This diagramming technique displays both the "standing" or static features of inner time and inner time-consciousness, thus the horizontal and the vertical lines as they remain the same formally for each moment. The "streaming" feature of immanent temporalizing, that is, as it continuously functions to temporalize the fluctuating "content" of the inner-time line, would become visible if the above images were flipped through in the same way that a booklet of still photographs can be flipped through to display motion. (Larrabee 1993: 187)
"sisemise aja "seisvat" või staatilised tunnused ja sisemine ajateadvus" / "Vaimse ajalisuse "voolav" omadus, nii kuidas see järjepidevalt toimib sisemise ajajoone kõikuva "sisu" ajalikustamises, muutub nähtavaks kui vaimseid kujundeid lapatakse läbi samamoodi nagu pildiraamatut võib sõrmede vahel lapata nii, et see kuvab liikumist."
Husserl characterizes the longitudinal (Längs-) intentionality of the diagram's vertical line, that is, the intentionality of the flowing phases of the consciousness of inner time (at least the series of retentional phases) as "the unity of the flux itself as a one-dimensional, quasi-temporal order" (Hua X, 82 [PITC 108]). (Larrabee 1993: 187)
"voolavuse enda ühtsus on ühedimensiooniline, kvaasi-ajaline korrastus"
It can, however, be taken in two ways (at least): (2) immanent time given experientially, especially in human nonreflective life, is not as sharply delineated as in phenomenological analysis; it more or less occurs in a nebulous way and is often read through the glasses of world time; (b) the full concretion of one's consciousness' immanent temporality, when unified, has one dimension which is itself the consciousness and encloses the totality of continua, but it is not a dimension without articulation, with only one mode of operation. One way to demonstrate this point is to attempt an non-serial diagram of immanent temporality. (Larrabee 1993: 187)
"vaimne aeg mis on antud kogemuslikult, eriti inimese mitterefleksiivses elus, ei ole nii teravalt piiritletud kui fenomenoloogilises analüüsis; see toimub rohkem või vähem ebamäärasel viisil ja seda loetakse tihti läbi maailma-aja prillide".
The processing of Erlebnisse might be comparable to a spatialized extension across a temporal expanse, but if we look at real world analogues for flowing, there are intriguing possibilities in, for example, the flowing of the river; it encompasses more than water traversing a measurable area between two points on the riverbanks. There are the dynamisms of flowinng, fascinating anomalies to the usual neatness of a straight flow. The processing of the constitutive flux, however, is even less serial than a river's flowing and hence descriptively further from a line diagram. (Larrabee 1993: 188)
"kui me vaatame päriselulist analoogiat voolamisega, siis ilmnevad huviäratavad võimalused näiteks jõe voolamisega; see hõlmab rohkemat kui vee liikumist läbi mõõdetava ala kahe jõekarda vahel. On ka voolamise dünaamilisus. Sirgjoonelise voolamise tavalises selgepiirilususes on huvitavaid anomaaliaid." // Siin saaks aja voolamise kõrval rääkida ka ajakeeristest.
One image (a faulty one) of the time-apprehending is that they modify by operating as a series of points and simply pass contents from one to the next. (Larrabee 1993: 189)
Siin saaks rääkida M. ja P. mõttes teadvuse sisudest ja sellest kas need on ajaliselt korrastatud või mitte. // Aga kuna minu aeg on hetkel piiratud, siis DNF.

Chisholm, Roderick M. 1981. Brentano's Analysis of the Consciousness of Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6(1): 3-16.

The source of our concept of time, according to Brentano, is the intuitive experience he calls 'proteraesthesis" [Proterästhese] or "original association" [ursprüngliche Association]. This experience, he insists, is to be distinguished from sensation. Examples are the hearing of a melody, the seeing of something in motion, and the seeing of something at rest. In each case, we experience a succession [Nacheinander]: in the first case one note preceding another note; in the second case the moving object being now in one place and now in another; and in the third case one and the same thing remaining exactly where it was. (Chisholm 1981: 3)
Meie ajakogemuse allikas on Brentano järgi intuitiivne kogemus mida ta nimetab proteraesteesiks. Seda kogemust tuleb eristada tajumusest. Meloodia kuulmine, millegi liikumise nägemine ja millegi paigalpüsimise nägemine on proteraesteesi näited. Igal neist juhtudest me kogeme järgnevust: meloodia puhul eelneb üks noot teisele; millegi liikumise puhul näeme liikuvat objekti ühes kohas ja hetk hiljem teises kohas; millegi paigalpüsimise puhul püsib see midagi täpselt seal kus ta oli.
The experience of any such succession involves what may be called an experience of the past [Verganenbeitsempfindung]. (Chisholm 1981: 4)
Järgnevuste kogemisel on oluline minevikukogemus. // Siin võib vaielda Peirce'i moodi, et kogu inimese minevikukogemus on inimese mitteteadvuses olemas ja selgitada seda mõistlikult harjumuste võtmes.
Some have said that the field of consciousness is temporally extended in the way in which, say, the visual field may be said to be spatially extended. (Chisholm 1981: 4)
Teadvusel on ajaline ulatus just nagu nägemisel on ruumiline ulatus. // Siin võib Jakobsoni paralleele luua ka teadvuse, aja ja muusika vahel (muusikametafoor on selleks sealjuures ootamatult kohane).
It is tempting, but hardly adequate to the facts of the matter, to describe the experience of proteraesthesis by appeal to memory. (Chisholm 1981: 5)
Minu eesmärkidel on täiesti õigustatud rääkida mälust. Ainult, et ka mälu mõistet tuleb siis mänglevalt muuta, mõjutada ja manipuleerid. Tulvingu kronesteesia võib siin abistada.
No act of thinking, or representation, occurs without the subject ipso facto judging with evidence that that act of thinking, or presentation, occurs. Brentano puts this by saying that the act of presentation has itself as its "secondary object." If I think of a unicorn, the unicorn is the "primary object" of my thinking; and my thinking of a unicorn is the "secondary object" of my thinking. Brentano would also put the latter point by saying that my thinking of the unicorn is an object of my "inner perception." (Chisholm 1981: 6)
M. ja P. metateooria lähtub vististi sarnasest eeldusest. Fenomenoloogiline topeldamine, neh.
Proteraesthesis is to be distinguished from sensation - for the object of sensation, in the strict sense of the term "sensation," are not in any way presented as being past. But, as we have said, it is a necessary accompaniment of every sensation. Indeed, Brentano says that sensation exists only as the boundary [Grenze] of an experience of proteraesthesis. (Chisholm 1981: 7)
See on oluline erinevus. Proteraesteesis erineb tajust, sest see seostub minevikukogemusega. Tajus kui sellises ajalisuse moment puudub.
According to Brentano's early view, then, the adjectives "past" and "future" serve to modify their subjects in this way. Hence past Kings and future Kings are not genuine things but are merely entia irrelia. (Chisholm 1981: 8)
Siin saab minevikku ja tulevikku tähistavaid keelelisi vahendeid vaadelda ajaliste moodoritega. Ka entia irrelia on kasulik mõiste, aga sedagi tuleks praeguste eesmärkide tarbeks võtta at face value.
Thus, where the secondary object of the sensation is a present sensation, the primary object of the proteraesthesis is a past sensation. This means that the primary object of the proteraesthesis is a modified intentional relation - an intentional relation that is past. The modifying attribute of pastness was thought to be quantitative and capable of degrees. (Chisholm 1981: 8)
Samamoodi saab ilmselt rääkida intentsionaalsetest suhetest tulevikku. (Lühidalt, plaanidest.)
Colors and sounds cannot form a continuum, for they are of different species. How, then, can things and nonthings form a continuum? (Chisholm 1981: 8)
Selle vastu võib vaielda sünkreetilisusest lähtudes. Kuna aega napib jääb siingi DNF.

Schacter, Daniel L., Paul L. Wang, Endel Tulving and Morris Freedman 1982. Functional Retrograde Amnesia: A Quatitative Case Study. Neuropsychologia 30(5): 523-532.

The genesis of functional retrograde amnesia is often dramatic: Patients suddenly become aware that they cannot remember their name, where they live, or anything about their personal past. (Schacter, et al. 1982: 523)
Siin võiks luua mälu metateooria ja arutleda seda kuidas primaarne mäletamine võib olla kohal, kuid sekundaarne mäletamine, ehk mäletamine mäletamise kohta, on puudu. Fenomenoloogilise topeldamisega saab kõike teha.
As described by TULVING, episodic memory is concerned with information about personal experiences that are tied to unique temporal and spatial contexts. In contrast, semantic memory is concerned with general knowledge of facts, rules and concepts that is not linked to specific autobiographical events. The episodic/semantic distinction has proved useful in studies of organic amnesia. (Schacter, et al. 1982: 523-524)
See eristus on tõepoolest kasulik, kuid praegune eesmärk on kõike nihestada ja seegi eristus pea peale või kummuli keerata.
P.N. was able to describe in detail many people, places and specific episodes pertaining to that job. All this took place at the same time that he remembered almost nothing about his personal past, including his name. He did know, as stated earlier, that he was called "Lumberjack" by the employees at the courier service. He retrieved six scattered memories from other periods of his life, most of which pertained to dramatic events of childhood, such as injuries and fights. (Schacter, et al. 1982: 527)
Sellega saab seostada "vahutamise" teema, e südametunnistuse.
One specilative possibility is that "facts about oneself", such as knowledge of one's name and family members, are the control elements of episodic memory. Control elements may be viewed as hierarchically organized memory units that can activate or inhibit specific kinds of information that are nested under them. It may not be entirely implausible to hypothesize that access to specific autobiographical episodes depends upon the activation of the higher-order classes or categories of personally relevant knowledge that we have labelled control elements. It is possible to think of one's name as constituting the "ultimate control element" of episodic memory. Its activation may be a necessary condition of access to other mnemonic information that personal identity subsumes - past events, knowledge about family members, friends and the like. (Schacter, et al. 1982: 530-531)
Just sellist spekulatsiooni mul vaja ongi. Atmosphere'i You Can't Imagine How Much Fun We're Having oli minu kontroll-element.


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