Mapping the world

Randviir, Anti 2004. Mapping the world: towards a sociosemiotic approach to culture. Tartu: University of Tartu

In order to understand the features or parameters that would enable the application of textuality to different sociocultural phenomena, it is obviously necessary to refer to the context most often associated with extralinguistic treatments of texts. Following the tradition of cultural semiotics and approaching culture as a system of texts, we can distinguish it from nature according to the principle(s) of the textual. This means that the instrumental opposition 'nature - the textual' draws a line between the 'illegible', 'unintelligible', 'hardly interpretable' on the one hand and the 'legible', 'intelligible', 'interpretable', on the other. (Randviir 2004: 19)

Need vastandused on kasutatavad.

...it does not seem to be productive to approach semiosic activity as taking place only or strictly between two ontologically different subjects. If we speak of subjects of semiogenetic activity, there is no need for them to be different also on the ontological plane; the emergence of meaning is made possible in the tension field between different semiotic subjects rather than ontological subjects, as suggested by the cases of 'unilateral communication', autocommunication, intracultural communication, etc. (Randviir 2004: 25)

Ontoloogiliste ja semiootiliste subjektide eristus tuleks meelde jätta, autokommunikatsiooni puhul on see eristus tähtis.

Any meaningful phenomenon, in order to be a cultural unit proper (Schneider 1968: 2; Eco: 66, 73-83), has to be demarcated and arrayed, that is, textualized and possibly also texted. It is precisely through 'text' that we can describe the resolution of the original collision, and it is via the 'textual' that we can semiotisize the realm outside of cultural units. It is important that the conceptual range of 'text' should not be limited to written records alone: it must just as well be kept in mind that, without possessing formal features of text, cognitive images share similar semiotic features to artifacts. (Randviir 2004: )

Seostub käitumise tekstualiseerimisega (kirjeldamise küsimus).

The speech circuit is started and ended on the psychological level of association of concepts and sound-images... (Randviir 2004: 48)

Tekkis idee, et vastandus concept - sound-image võib minu käsitlus olla vastandus intention - movement. Sellele saaks terve käsitluse ehitada.

451° Fahrenheiti

Bradbury, Ray 2005. 451° Fahrenheiti. Punane Raamat
Originaal: Bradbury, Ray 1953. Fahrenheit 451. New York

Filmiadaptsioon sellest teosest oli märgatavate erinevustega. Näiteks ei olnud filmis robotkoera, helikopter-autosid, uljalt kihutavaid noorukeid ega Fabiust. Ja Clarisse oli filmis kooliõpetaja, mitte peatselt 17 saav nooruk. Ja raamatus sai Clarisse surma, mitte ei liitunud "raamatuinimestega", kes filmis oli hulk erinevaid inimesi, raamatus aga viis habetunud professorit. Raamatu lõpp läks väga krüptiliseks, ilmselt Piibli mõjutusel, aga muidu oli meeldiv. Üks professoritest oli isegi maininud "heasüdamlikku filosoofi" (tegelikult filantroobist eetikut), Albert Schweitzerit, keda ma asun peagi lugema.

Raamatut, mis kõneleb raamatute põletamist, lugesin nonverbalistlikust perspektiivist:

Montagil oli tunne, nagu keerleks neiu tema ümber, pööraks teda siia-sinna, raputaks kergelt ja tühjendaks tema taskuid, kuigi neiu ei liikunud paigast. (Bradbury 2005: 14)

Samasugust mõju tekitab hiljem ülemuse Beatty kõne, võib öelda, et diskursus mõjub Montagi kehale. Siin selle töttu, et Clarisse kõnetab teda, suhtlem temaga nagu inimene. Erinevalt naisest Mildredist, kes suhtleb temaga nagu "läbi klaasseina".

Montag vaatas jälle seinale. Neiu nägu sarnanes ka peegliga. Võimatu; sest oled sa tundnud palju inimesi, kes sinu enese valgust sulle tagasi peegeldaksid? Inimesed sarnanevad enamasti - Montag otsis võrdlust ja leidis selle oma tööalalt - tõrvikutega, mis leegitsevad niikaua, kuni nad kustuvad. Kui harva võtavad teiste inimeste näod vastu ja heidavad tagasi meie oma ilme, meie oma kõige südamelähedasema, väreleva mõtte!
Millist uskumatut kaasaelamisvõimet omas see neiu! Clarisse oli nagu haaratud vaataja nukuteatris aimanud iga Montagu silmapilgutust, žesti, sõrmeliigutust veel enne, kui see jõudis teoks saada. Kui kaua olid nad koos jalutanud? Kolm minutit? Viis? Ja ometi paistis see aeg nüüd nii pikana. Kui määratu suur oli neiu nüüd Montagi ees laval; millise varju tema nääpsuke kogu heitis seinale! Montag tundis, et kui tal hakkaks silm sügelema, siis neiu pilgutaks. Ja kui tema suulihased vaevaltmärgatavalt pingule tõmbuksid, haigutaks neiu veel enne, kui ta ise seda teha jõuaks. (Bradbury 2005: 18-19)

Interactional mimicry. Montag ei ole kaua suhelnud inimesega, kes "võtaks vastu" nii palju ja kellega võiks tekkida vahetu side. Ta on hämmeldunud ja tüdruku kestev mõju talle on raamatus läbiv teema, kuigi Clarissega lävib ta vähe ja 40ndaks leheküljeks on Clarisse ise kadunud.

Ta tundis, et tema naeratus kadus näolt, sulas küünlarasvana ja valgus alla, otsekui oleks mingi fantastiline küünal, mis oli liiga kauaks põlema jäänud, nüüd kokku vajunud ja kustunud. Pilkane pimedus. Ei, ta ei ole õnnelik. Ta ei ole õnnelik. Ta ütles seda iseendale. Ta tunnistas, et see on tõsi. Ta oli oma õnnelikkust kandnud nagu maski, neiu oli selle maskiga üle muruplatsi ära jooksnud, ja oli võimatu minna neiu uksele koputama ning maski tagasi paluma. (Bradbury 2005: 19)

Küünla metafoori kasutab autor korra hiljemgi, kui Mildred kurvastuses kängu vajub. Kurbus ja being down, literally. Keha kaotab kurbuse korral toonust ja näoilmed on "äravajunud". Maski metafoor on veel parem, sest Clarisse röövib oma süüdimatu maailma-küsitlusega (küsib "miks?", mis selles võimalikus maailmas on ohtlik) Montagilt tema teadmatuse loori. Ta kaotab oma sisse-põlenud naeratuse ja seda meelerahu ta ei saagi enam tagasi.

"Ma olen väga, väga armunud." Ta püüdis sõnadele vastavat nägu teha, kuid sellest ei tulnud midagi välja. "Ma olen!"
"Oi, palun, ärge vaadake nii!" (Bradbury 2005: 29)

Clarisse teeb Montagile võilille-testi (kui puudutada võilillega oma lõuga ja see jätab jälje, siis see tähendab, et oled armunud) ja Montagile ei jää jälge. Ta püüab sõnadega kinnitada, et ta on, sest tal on ikkagi Mildred, kuid tegelikkus on teistsugune ja näoga ei suuda ta seda väljendada. Veel enam, Clarisse näeb tema tahtlikku näoilme manamist läbi ja talle ei meeldi see. Darwin kirjutas oma Expression-is, et armastusele ei vasta ühtegi näoilmet. Ekmani järgi kasutab Montag siin kuvamisreeglit, kuvab midagi mida pole või ei saagi olla, edutult.

Te ei ole nii nagu teised. Ma olen mõnda näinud, ma tean. Kui ma räägin, vaatate mulle otsa. Kui ma eile öösel ütlesin midagi kuust, te vaatasite kuud. Teised ei teeks seda kunagi. Teised läheksid ära ja jätaksid mu rääkima. (Bradbury 2005: 30)

Normaalne suhtlemine on saanud selles maailmas erijuhtumiks. Tähelepanelik kuulamine ja reageerimine on haruldane nähtus. Eriti ilmekas on see Beatty puhul, kes kõneleb justkui päheõpitud vormeleid.

"Aga kõige rohkem," jätkas Clarisse, "meeldib mulle inimesi vaadelda. Mõnikord sõidan ma päev läbi metroos, vaatlen ja kuulan neid. Tahaksin ära mõistatada, kes nad on, mida nad tahavad ja kuhu nad sõidavad. (Bradbury 2005: 37)

Clarisse oli ka seega üksjagu nonverbalist. Filmis kohtubki ta Montagiga kiirrongi peal, kus ta jälgis teisi inimesi. Meeldib see, et "mida nad tahavad ja kuhu nad sõidavad" on seotud vaatlusaluste intentsioonidega - Clarisse konstrueerib nende rolle ja nende eesmärke.

"Kunas me kohtusime? Ja kus?"
"Millal me kohtusime, milleks?" küsis naine.
"Ma mõtlen meie esimest kohtumist."
Montag aimas, et Mildred pimedas kulmu kibrutas. (Bradbury 2005: 48)

Midagi, mida võib järeldada, kui vastuse asemel kostub vaikus ja tunned vestluskaaslase käitumismustreid piisavalt, et järeldada, mis toimub. Märksa kummalisem järeldamisprotsess toimub hiljem kui Montag katsub oma nägu ja avastab, et ta naeratab.

"Aga Clarisse'i lemmikteema ei olnud tema ise. Selleks olid teised, ja mina ka. Ta oli esimene inimene paljude aastate jooksul, kes mulle tõesti meeldis. Ta oli esimene inimene, kes vaatas mulle otse silma ja näis minust hoolivat." (Bradbury 2005: 76)

That's the magic of the gaze.

[Faber kõneleb raamatute kvaliteedist] Minule tähendab see tekstuuri. Sel raamatul on poorid. Tal on oma nägu. Seda raamatut võib mikroskoobiga uurida. Me näeksime läbi läätse tõelist elu, mis voolab mööda oma lõpmatus mitmekesisuses. Mida rohkem on neid poore, mida rohkem elu üksikasju suudetakse igale paberilehe ruuttollile jäädvustada, seda kõrgem on teose kunstiväärtus. Niisugune on igatahes minu kvaliteedimääratlus. Üksikasjade, värskete üksikasjade edasiandmine. Head kirjanikud puudutavad sageli eli. Keskpärased libistavad kiirusega käed sellest üle. Halvad vägistavad ta ja jätavad kärbeste söödaks.
Näete nüüd, miks raamatuid vihatakse ja kardetakse? Nad näitavad poore elu näol. Mugavust armastavad inimesed tahavad näha ainult ümmargusi vahast nägusid, poorideta, karvadeta, ilmeta. (Bradbury 2005: 87)

Nägude analoogia meikib senssi. Eriti viimane osa, sest kõige ilusamad näod on need, milles lihased parajasti ei ole väga pingul. Modellid teevad oma catwalk-i sisuliselt dogface-ides (selle erinevusega, et hoitakse näolihaste toonust). Ümmargused, poorideta, karvadeta, ilmeta näod on ilusad, aga mitte kvaliteetsed (neil ei ole omadusi, nad ei "suhtle").

"Me uurime välja, kes on teie sõber [Fabius], ning karistame teda!"
"Ei!" ütles Montag.
Ta kõrvaldas leegiheitja kaitse. Beatty heitis Montagi sõrmedele kiire pilgu ning tema silmad läksid veidi suuremaks. Montag nägi seal üllatust ja silmitses ise oma käsi, et näha, missuguse uue toega need toime olid tulnud. Tagantjärele mõeldes ei jõudnud ta iialgi selgusele, kas andsid talle lõpliku tõuke mõrvaks tema käed või see, kuidas Beatty tema käe liigutusele reageeris. Tema kõrvade ääres kõlas teda puudutamata mööda veerenud kivilaviini viimne mürin. (Bradbury 2005: 122)

Siin on feedback loop. Montag reageeris sellele, kuidas Beatty reageeris tema tegevusele. Veel üks ilmekas näide pärineb tundmatust videoklipist, kus mustanahaline meesterahvas selgitab, et iga kord kui ta astub lifti ja valgenahaline naisterahvas astub sammu eemale ja surub oma käekoti endale tihedalt vastu keha, tekitab see automaatselt tahtmist toimida tema suhtes vägivaldselt.

Montag hakkas minema põhja poole ja leidis hetke pärast, et teised järgnesid talle. Ta imestas ja astus kõrvale, et Grangerit mööda lasta, kuid Gragner vaatas talle otsa ja noogutas pead. Montag läks edasi. (Bradbury 2005: 164)

Nii kinnitasid vanad professorid noore uustulnuka liidripositsiooni.

Eraldi tsiteerin Beatty kõnest sellise hiilgava katkendi:

Te mäletate kindlasti, et ka teie klassis oli mõni erakordselt hea peaga poiss, kes järjest jutustas ja vastas, kui teised istusid nagu puunotid ja vihkasid teda. Ja kas ei olnud see just hea peaga poiss, kelle te pärast tunde valisite peksu ja piinamise ohvriks? Muidugi oli. Me kõik peame olema ühesugused. Inimesed ei ole mitte vabadena ja võrdsetena sündinud, nagu põhiseadus ütleb, vaid nad on võrdseks tehtud. Kui igaüks sarnaneb teisega, siis on kõik õnnelikud, sest ei ole suurmehi, kellega ennast võrrelda, et ennast hinnata. Nii on lood! Raamat on laenatud relv naabri käes. Põleta see ära! Võta kuul relvast! Ohjelda inimmõistus! Kes teab, keda haritud inimene võib homme oma märklauaks valida? Võib-olla mind? Seepärast ma ei kannatagi neid. (Bradbury 2005: 63)

Cognitive Sociology

Cicourel, Aaron V. 1974. Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Interaction. New York: Free Press

Status as structure and process. Goode notes that even interaction between strangers involves some minimum normative expectations, and hence some kind of social organization is presumed by participants ignorant of their 'actual' statuses and roles. Thus some set of minimal 'boundary conditions' informs our actors of each other even if their imputations are seen as mistaken during subsequent reflection. The basis for social interaction among strangers therefore, is presumably those properties attached to the most institutionalized activities of everyday life. Thus, 'whether a given relationship can be characterized as a status is a matter of degree. Statuses are, then, the role relationships which are more fully institutionalized or which contain a great number of institutionalized elements' (1960, p. 250). (Cicourel 1974: 13)

References to conformity and nonconformity are not clear because social scientists have not made explicit what they mean by normative and non-normative conditions, and role and non-role behaviour. Presumably the various statuses one occupies cover a wide range of identifying characteristics and conduct, most of which would be subsumed under 'status' categories like 'male', 'female', 'student', 'father', 'husband', 'mother'. 'Non-role' behavior might then refer to scratching one's head, picking one's nose, 'some' laughing or crying (assuming there are no imputations about a 'sick' role). But when would walking 'too fast' or laughing 'too loud' or smiling 'too often' or dressing in 'poor taste' be considered 'normal' features of some set of 'statuses' and corresponding 'roles', taken singly or in some combination, as opposed to the generation of imputations that suggest or demand that the actor be viewed as 'sick' or 'criminal', and so forth? (Cicourel 1974: 15)

I want to underline the necessity of linking the strategies of interaction among actors with the structural framework employed by the social analyst. The observer must make abstractions from complex sequences of social interaction. How does he decide the role-status-norm relevance of the exchanges about which he observes or interviews? To what extent must he take the actor's typifications, stock of knowledge at hand, presumed appearance to others, conception of self, strategies of self-presentation, language and the like, into account in deciding the institutionalized character of status relationships, role relationships, and the normatively based expectations employed or imputed? (Cicourel 1974: 16)

The interpretive procedures enable the actor to sustain a sense of social structure over the course of changing social settings, while surface rules or norms provide a more general institutional or historical validity to the meaning of the action as it passes, in reflective sense. To the Median dialectic of the 'I' and the 'me' is added the explicit requirement that the actor must be conceived as possessing inductive (interpretive) procedures, procedures designed to function as a base structure for generating and comprehending behavioural (verbal and nonverbal) displays that can be observed. An implicit basic or interpretive procedure in Mead's theory would be the notion that participants in social exchanges must assume that their use of verbal and nonverbal signs or symbols are the 'same', or this 'sameness' (in an ideal sense) must at least be assumed to hold (Stone, 1962, p. 88). (Cicourel 1974: 27)

...interpretive procedures are constitutive of the member's sense of social structure or organization. The acquisition of interpretive procedures provide the actor with a basis for assigning meaning to his environment or a sense of social structure, thus orienting him to the relevance of 'surface rules' or norms. This fundamental distrinction between interpretive procedures and surface rules is seldom recognized in conventional sociological theories. The conventional way of suggesting the existence of interpretive procedures is to refer to the notion of the 'definition of the situation'. But in using this phrase, the sociologist does not attempt to specify the structure of norms and attitudes, nor indicate how internalized norms and attitudes enable the actor to assign meaning to his environment nor how such norms and attitudes are developmentally acquired and assume regular usage. The traditional strategy of the sociologist is to endow his model of the actor with the ability to assign meanings, but only after assuming that internalized attitudes and norms provide automatic guides for role-taking. (Cicourel 1974: 45)

The child initially acquires simple properties of interpretive procedures and surface rules which permit him to detect restricted classes of normal forms in voice intonation, physical appearance, facial expressions, cause and effect, story beginnings and endings, simple games, and the like; he finds it difficult if not impossible to understand exceptions and explanations of them which often terminate with 'that's the way it is'. Adult description of the 'why' of everyday life to children provide a rich source of information on adult notions of simplified social structures. (Cicourel 1974: 50)

Hence members are continually giving each other instructions (verbal and nonverbal cues and content) as to their intentions, social character, biographies, and the like. The interpretive procedures and their reflexice features provide continuous instructions to participants such that members can be said to be programming each other's actions as the scene unfolds. Whatever is built into the members as part of their normal socializing is activated by social scenes, but there is no automatic programming; the participants' interpretive procedures and reflexive features become instructions by processing the behavioural scene of appearances, physical movements, objects, gestures, sounds, into inferences that permit action. (Cicourel 1974: 58)

The specification of alternatives and the presumed classes from which they are chosen require generating rules to structure and transform an environment of objects into meanings that 'close' the stream of behaviour into possible alternatives such that choice reflects both the member's and researcher's perspectives. To assume that the only valuable framework is one that imposes denotative structure determined by the researcher and divorced from members' imputed intention and usage, reduces the actor to a rather simple 'dummy'. (Cicourel 1974: 65)

When sociologists propose theories of social interaction, their conceptual apparatuses and research procedures presume that the language used to describe theoretical procedures, obtain, and describe data, is not a problematic feature of claims to knowledge. Language and non-oral elements of communication are always given some passing remarks as to their 'obvious' importance, but these elements are not independently studied and made essential conditions for the study of social interaction. (Cicourel 1974: 74)

...the linguists's preoccupation with a bounded sentence often means that he will ignore false starts and knowledge presumed by participants about in-group intonation patterns, visual cues relating to facial expressions, gestures and body movements, physical distance, dress, physical appearance, poorly formed sentence or utterance fragments, presumed social relationships, idioms, and in-group codes. (Cicourel 1974: 75)

Members use interpretive procedures for generating context-sensitive measurement sets consisting of identifiable normative lexical items, grunts, gestures, conversational chunks, body movements and intonational shifts which have indexical constraints throughout the exchange, but which nevertheless produce 'clear, understandable, and relevant' meanings for the participants' practical goals in the interaction. The choice of words, phrases, gestures, intonation and so on, provides the speaker-hearer with a basis for justifying the interpretation of what is happening, and what is to be done next or at some future time. The member's choice of surface representations for communicating his experiences can never convey the ramified thoughts which reflexively give him feedback about unfolding objects and events, and thus endow all communication with an 'openness' of meaning. (Cicourel 1974: 93)

...grammatical structures of speech acts is merely one part of indexical activity or the production process, and no more 'natural' than raising or lowering the voice, stepping closer to or farther from someone during a conversation, or relying on facial expressions and body movements to communicate the intent of one's thinking. (Cicourel 1974: 111)

There are many activities accomplished each day that do not have to be described verbally. Our experiences of the everyday world are not always mapped into verbal constructions, yet we may assume that speaker-hearer proficient in the normative use of language probably incorporate normative rules of language use into their thinking and thus are able to describe experiences as if the verbal categories were constitutive of the experiences. (Cicourel 1974: 119)

Participants in group interaction (as in the perceptual experiments descibed by Haber) receive more information than they are aware of or can possibly verbalize. It is not clear how selective particulars (ignored, stored, or available only by prodding or by verbal associations) are utilized to construct accounts, nor how perceptual, somaesthetic, kinaesthetic, and auditory information become selectively processed by a reflexive self. The speaker-hearer must proess information so as always to be 'seeing' the meaning or intentions of his own actions, as well as the actions of others, in a retrospective and prospective way that is situated and is contingent on an open horizon of unfolding possibilities (Schutz, 1964; Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1968b). (Cicourel 1974: 127)

Much of the creative activity of the everyday social interaction of hearing persons is hidden from us because it is tempered by selective attention, constrained by the sequential production of oral expressions, informed by and dependent on short- and long-term memory and grammatical and conversational systems which organize information normatively. (Cicourel 1974: 141)

As I review the tape over and over again, I find it difficult to describe what I think I 'see' and 'hear'. I think I 'understand' many kinesic-visual (Birdwhistell, 1970; Ekman and Friesen, 1969) and auditory non-verbal activities that are 'happening', but find it difficult to represent them verbally for the reader. As I notice the children communicating to one another with glances, one word statements, pointing gestures, nonverbal auditory outbursts, touching each other, and the like, I assume that various kinds of information are being exchanged but I cannot be explicit about the presumed content. (Cicourel 1974: 143-144)

Sociologists use the term normative to signify tacit and explicit rules which are prescriptive and proscriptive for some group. The reference to such rules is similar to a linguist's notion of grammatical rules; they are idealized instructions for recognizing or producing some state of affairs which others can implement or accept as 'normal' or 'correct' or 'appropriate'. Grammatical structures in oral languages are powerful but learned rules for representing cognitive activities necessary for attributing and creating order and meaning from everyday experiences. Normative categories are necessary for the assumption that intersubjective communication exists regardless of the differences of meaning, or distortions or assumed or imputed 'errors' which can be delineated by particular observers or participants of some communicational exchange. When linguists engage in semantic analysis, or when students of artificial intelligence construct programmes for various kinds of normative categories in the data base used to describe segments of speech. A similar tacit use is made of normative categories that index semantic information contained in a lexicon or dictionary. The cultural meanings employed by the researcher trade on his intuitive knowledge of some native language. (Cicourel 1974: 149)

The Silent Language

Hall, Edward T. 1968 [1959]. The Silent Language. Greenwich (Conn.): Fawcett

People of the Western world, particularly Americans, tend to think of time as something fixed in nature, something around us and from which we cannot escape; an ever-present part of the environment, just like the air we breathe. That it might be experienced in any other way seems unnatural and strange, a feeling which is rarely modified even when we begin to discover how really differently it is handled by some other people. (Hall 1968: 19)

Honest and sincere men in the field [anthropology] continue to fail to grasp the true significance of the fact that culture controls behavior in deep and persistent ways, many of which are outside of awareness and therefore beyond conscious control of the individual. When the anthropologist stresses this point he is usually ignored, for he is challenging the deepest popular American beliefs about ourselves as well as foreigners. He leads people to see things they might not want to see. (Hall 1968: 35)

Language is the most technical of the message systems. It is used as a model for the analysis of the others. In addition to language there are other ways in which man communicates that either reinforce or deny what he has said with words. Man learns to read different segments of a communication spectrum covering events of a fraction of a second up to events of many years. This book deals with only a small part of this spectrum. Other chapters describe the content of messages of the man-to-man variety and how they are put together. (Hall 1968: 38)

Vrd. man-to-man ja face-to-face.

Culture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough what it hides most effectively from its own participants. Years of study have convinced me that the real job is not to understand foreign culture but to understand our own. I am also convinced that all that one ever gets from studying foreign culture is a token understanding. The ultimate reason for such study is to learn more about how one's own system works. The best reason for exposing oneself to foreign ways is to generate a sense of vitality and awareness - an interest in life which can come only when one lives through the shock of contrast and difference. (Hall 1968: 39)

Power tools, glasses, TV, telephones, and books which carry the voice across both time and space are examples of material extensions. Money is a way of extending and storing labor. Out transportation networks now do what we used to do with our feet and backs. In fact, all man-made material things can be treated as extensions of what man once did with his body or some specialized part of his body. (Hall 1968: 60)

Freud also relied heavily on the communicative significance of man's acts rather than his words. He distrusted the spoken word, and a good deal of his thinking was based on the assumption that words hid much more than they revealed. He depended more on communication in the larger context; on the symbols of dreams and the meaning of insignificant events which would ordinarily go unnoticed and were therefore not subject to the censors that we all have within us. Despite his massive discoveries, what Freud really lacked was a theory of communication. Today, years after the major part of his theory was laid down, psychoanalysis still lacks a systematic way of describing the events of communication which occur between doctor and patient. (Hall 1968: 63)

Vt. Jurgen Ruesch.

In time, as formal systems become firmer they become so identified with the process of nature itself that alternative ways of behavior are thought of as unnatural - if not impossible. Yet this rigidity has its advantages. People who live and die in formal cultures tend to take a more relaxed view of life than the rest of us because the boundaries of behavior are so clearly marked, even to the permissible deviations. There is never any doubt in anybody's mind that, as long as he does what is expected, he knows what to expect from others. (Hall 1968: 75)

Kuniks teen mida minult oodatakse, tean mida oodata teistelt.

There is little or no affect attached to informal behavior as long as things are goind along nicely according to the unwritten or unstated rules. Anxiety, however, follows quickly when this tacid etiquette is breached. Extreme discomfort is apt to occur when someone stands to close or uses a first name prematurely. What happens next depends upon the alternatives provided by the culture for handling anxiety. (Hall 1968: 76)

Kuniks asjad sujuvad kenasti enigmaatiliste reeglite järgi, ei ole informaalse käitumisega seotud emotsioone. Kui neid kirjutamata reegleid aga rikutakse, järgneb ärevus. Liiga lähedale tulemisega seostab hilisemas ta hilisemas raamatus, The Hidden Dimension, ärevuse asemel hoopis adrenaliini vallandumist.

To recapitulate, man is constantly striving to discover the meaning of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals [definition of the situation]. The professional scholar soon learns to diregard the immediate explicit meaning of the obvious and to look for a pattern. He also has to learn to scale his perceptions up or down, depending on what type of communication he is trying to unravel. (Hall 1968: 96)

The hierarchical emphasis which the Japanese observer gave this pattern suggests another aspect of our way of life which is ostensibly characterized by an underlying formal pattern of equality. It points up to the fact that we also have a very complex informally patterned status system. The counters on the mobility scale are numerous and so finely grained that while the average person can manipulate the system he cannot describe how it works technically. (Hall 1968: 116)

Pattern congruity or style in writing is a function of knowing what can and cannot be achieved within the limits of the pattern. Newspaper or journalistic writing is adapted to the medium and all that medium implies. When it is bad it's because the writer has not learned what can be done within the limits set by the pattern. To do this type of writing well is a highly skilled art and is learned only after years of experience. The writing of a scientist is often incongruous because it drags the reader from one analytical level to the next and then back again. This kind of writing treats the reader like the boor who says "get it," indicating the scientist's fear that people will twist, distort, and take exception to what he says. He has to communicate on a number of different analytical levels at once by footnoting and overqualifying each statement. In defense of my fellow scientists it should be said that one of the most difficult things in the world to do is to learn to keep the levels apart as well as to maintain congruity. Harry Stack Sullivan, a very great contributor to psychiatric thinking in this country, once described his own attempts at writing by saying that the person who appeared before him as he wrote and who appraised his sentences as they were coming out was a cross between an imbecile and a bitterly paranoid critic! Sullivan was not alone in having this kind of self-image; he recognized the difficulties and the humor of having to try to force one's writing onto such a Procrustean couch. Another point to make about scientists is that most of them are more concerned about making precise statements than they are about writing. They depend upon their colleagues to know what they are talking about. Therefore, they can get by with less literary ability than writers. Scientific congruity and not literary congruity is their preoccupation. (Hall 1968: 125)

The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life

Goffman, Erving 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday

Let us now turn from the others to the point of view of the individual who presents himself before them. He may wish them to think highly of him, or to think that he thinks highly of them, or to perceive how in fact he feels toward them, or to obtain no clear-cut impression; he may wish to ensure sufficient harmony so that the interaction can be sustained, or to defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, antagonize, or insult them. Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of others, especially their responsive treatment of him. (Goffman 1959: 3)

Of the two kinds of communication - expressions given and expressions given off - this report will be primarily concerned with the latter, with the more theatrical and contextual kind, whether this communication be purposely engineered or not. (Goffman 1959: 4)

In noting the tendency for a participant to accept the definitional claimsn made by the others present, we can appreciate the crucial importance of the information that the individual initially possesses or acquires concerning his fellow participants, for it is only on the basis of this initial information that the individual starts to define the situuation and starts to build up lines of responsive action. (Goffman 1959: 11)

Belief in the Part One is Playing. When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be. (Goffman 1959: 17)

It is sometimes convenient to divide the stimuli which make up personal front into "appearance" and "manner," according to the function performed by the information that these stimuli convey. "Appearance" may be taken to refer to those stimuli which function at the time to tell us of the performer's social status. These stimuli also tell us of the individual's temporary ritual state, that is, whether he is engaging in formal social activity, work, or informal recreation, whether or not he is celebrating a new phase in the season cycle or in his life-cycle. "Manner" may be taken to refer to those stimuli which function at the time to warn us of the interation role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation. Thus a haughty, aggressive manner may give the impression that the performer expects to be the one who will initiate the verbal interaction and direct its course. A meek, apologetic manner may give the impression that the performer expects to follow the lead of others, or at least that he can be led to do so. (Goffman 1959: 24)

While in the presence of others, the individual typically infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual's activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey [m-c]. In fact, the performer may be required not only to express his claimed capacities during the interaction but also to do so during a split second in the interaction. Thus, if a baseball umpire is to give the impression that he is sure of his judgement, he must forgo the moment of thought which might make him sure of his judgment; he must give an instantaneous decision so that the audience will be sure that he is sure of his judgement. (Goffman 1959: 30)

As Sartre suggested: "The attentive pupil who wishes to be attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears open wide, so exhausts himself in playing the attentive role that he ends up by no longer hearing anything." And so individuals often find themselves with the dilemma of expression versus action. Those who have the time and talent to perform a task well may not, because of this, have the time or talent to make it apparent that they are performing well. It may be said that some organizations resolve this dilemma by officially delegating the dramatic function to a specialist who will spend his time expressing the meaning of the task and spend no time actually doing it. (Goffman 1959: 33)

Commonly we find that upward mobility involves the presentation of proper performances and that efforts to move upward and efforts to keep from moving downwards are expressed in terms of sacrifices made for the maintenance of front. Once the proper sign-equipment has been obtained and familiarity gained in the managemenet of it, then this equipment can be used to embellish and illumine one's daily performances with a favorable social style. (Goffman 1959: 36)

Maintenance of Expressive Control. It has been suggested that the performer can rely upon his audience to accept minor cues as a sign of something important about his performance. This convenient fact has an inconvenient implication. By virtue of the same sign-accepting tendency, the audience may misunderstand the meaning that a cue was designed to convey, or may read an embarrasing meaning into gestures or events that were accidental, inadvertent, or incidental and not meant by the performer to carry any meaning whatsoever.
In response to these communication contingencies, performers commonly attempt to exert a kind of synecdochic responsibility, making sure that as many as possible of the minor events in the performance, however instrumentally inconsequential as these events may be, will occur in such a way as to convey either no impression or an impression that is compatible and consistent with the over-all definition of the situation that is being fostered. (Goffman 1959: 51)

Misrepresentation. It was suggested earlier that an audience is able to orient itself in a situation by accepting performance cues on faith, treating these signs as evidence of something greater or different from the sign-vehicles themselves. If this tendency of the audience to accept signs places the performer in a position to be misunderstood and makes it necessary for him to exercise expressive care regarding everything he does when before the audience, so also this sign-accepting tendency puts the audience in a position to be duped and misled, for there are few signs that cannot be sued to attest to the presence of something that is not really there. And it is plain that many performers have ample capacity and motive to misrepresent the facts; only shame, guilt, or fear prevent them from doing so. (Goffman 1959: 58)

Mystification. I have suggested ways in which the performance of an individual accentuates certain matters and conceals others. If we see perception as a form of contact and communication, then control over what is perceived is control over contact that is made, and the limitation of regulation of what is shown is a limitation and regulation of contact. There is a relation here between informational terms and ritual ones. Failure to regulate the information acquired by the audience involves possible disruption of the projected definition of the situation; failure to regulate contact involves possible ritual contamination of the performer.
It is a widely held notion that restriction placed upon contact, the maintenance of social distance, provide a way in which awe can be generated and sustained in the audience...(Goffman 1959: 67)

A theatrical performance or a staged confidence game requires a thorough scripting of the spoken content of the routine; but the vast part involving "expression given off" is often determined by meager stage directions. It is expected that the performer of illusions will already know a good deal about how to manage his voice, his face, and his body, although he - as well as any person who directs him - may find it difficult indeed to provide a detailed verbal statement of this kind of knowledge. (Goffman 1959: 73)

A status, a position, a social place is not a material thing, to be possessed and then displayed; it is a pattern of appropriate conduct, coherent, embellished, and well articulated. Performed with ease or clumsiness, awareness or not, guile or good faith, it is none the less something that must be enacted and portrayed, something that must be realized. (Goffman 1959: 75)

When a performer guides his private activity in accordance with incorporated moral standards, he may associate these standards with a reference group of some kind, thus creating a non-present audience for his activity. This possibility leads us to consider a further one. The individual may privately maintain standards of behavior which he does not personally believe in, maintaining these standards because of a lively belief that an unseen audience is present who will punish deviations from these standards. (Goffman 1959: 81)

It has been suggested that the object of a performer is to sustain a particular definition of the situation, this representing, as it were, his claim as to what reality is. As a one-man team, with no teammates to inform of his decision, he can quickly decide which of the available stands on a matter to take and then wholeheartedly act as if his choice were the only one he could possibly have taken. And his choice of position may be nicely adjusted to his own particular situation and interests. (Goffman 1959: 85)

It should be made clear that dramatic and directive dominance are dramaturgical terms and that performers who enjoy such dominance may not have other types of power and authority. It is common knowledge that performers who have position of visible leadership are often meerly figureheads, selected as a compromise, or as a way of neutralizing a potentially threatening position, or as a way of strategically concealing the power behind the front. So also, whenever inexperienced or temporary incumbents are given formal authority over experienced subordinates, we often find that the formally empowered person is bribed with a part that has dramatic dominance while the subordinates tend to direct the show. (Goffman 1959: 102)

A team, then, may be defined as a set of individuals whose intimate co-operation is required if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained. A team is a grouping, but it is a grouping not in relation to a social structure or social organization but rather in relation to an interaction or series of interactions in which the relevant definition of the situation is maintained. (Goffman 1959: 104)

One over-all objective of any team is to sustain the definition of the situation that its performers foster. This will involve the over-communication of some facts and the under-communication of others. Given the fragility and the required expressive coherence of the reality that is dramatized by a performance, there are usually facts which, if attention is drawn to them during the performance, would discredit, disrupt, or make useless the impression that the performance fosters. These facts may be said to provide "destructive information." A basic problem for many performances, then, is that of information control; the audience must not acquire destructive information about the situation that is being defined for them. in other words, a team must be able to keep its secrets and have its secrets kept. (Goffman 1959: 141)

A performer who is disciplined, dramaturgically speaking, is someone who remembers his part and does not commit unmeant gestures or faux pas in performing it. He is someone with discretion; he does not give the show away by involuntarily disclosing its secrets. He is someone with "presence of mind" who can cover up on the spur of the moment for inappropriate behavior on the part of his teammates, while all the time maintaining the impression that he is merely playing his part. And if a disruption of the performance cannot be avoided or concealed, the disciplined performer will be prepared to offer a plausible reason for discounting the disruptive event, a joking manner to remove its importance, a deep apology and self-abasement to reinstate those held responsible for it. The disciplined performer is also someone with "self-control". (Goffman 1959: 217)

The political and dramaturgical perspectives intersect clearly in regard to the capacities of one individual to direct the activity of another. For one thing, if an individual is to direct others, he will often find it useful to keep strategic secrets from them. Further, if one individual attempts to direct the activities of others by manipulation, authority, threat, punishment, or coercion, it will be necessary, regardless of his power position, to convey effectively what he wants done, what he is prepared to do to get it done and what he will do if it is not done. Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized. (Of course, the capacity to convey effectively a definition of the situation may be of little use if one is not in a position to give example, exchange, punishment, etc.) Thus the most objective form of naked power, i.e., physical coercion, is often neither objective nor naked but rather functions as a display for persuading the audience; it is often a means of communication, not merely a means of action. The structural and dramaturgical perspectives seem to intersect most clearly in regard to social distance. The image that one status grouping is able to maintain in the eyes of an audience of other status groupings will depend upoin the performer's capacity to restrict communicative contact with the audience. (Goffman 1959: 241)

Underlying all social interaction there seems to be a fundamental dialectic. When one individual enters the presence of others, he will want to discover the facts of the situation. Were he to possess this information, he could know, and make allowances for, what will come to happen and he could give the others present as much of their due as is consistent with his enlightened self-interest. To uncover fully the factual nature of the situation, it would be necessary for the individual to know all the relevant social data about the others. It would also be necessary for the individual to know the actual outcome or end product of the activity of the others during the interaction, as well as their innermost feelings concerning him. Full information of this order is rarely available; in its absence, the individual tends to employ substitute-cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, etc. - as predictive devices. In short, since the reality that the individual is concerned with is unperceivable at the moment, appearances must be relied upon in its stead. And, paradoxically, the more the individual is concerned with the reality that is not available to perception, the more must he concentrate his attention on appearances. (Goffman 1959: 249)

The general notion that we make a presentation of ourselves to others is hardly novel; what ought to be stressed in conclusion is that the very structure of the self can be seen in terms of how we arrange for such performances in our Anglo-American society. (Goffman 1959: 252)

Behavior in Public Places

Goffman, Erving 1966. Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings. New York: The Free Press.

Briefly, a social order may be defined as the consequence of any set of moral norms that regulates the way in which persons pursue objectives. The set of norms does not specify the objectives the participants are to seek, nor the pattern formed by and through the coordination or integration of these ends, but merely the modes of seeking them. Traffic rules and the consequent traffic order provide an obvious example. Any social system or any game may be viewed quite properly as an instance of social order, although the perspective of social order does not allow us to get at what is characteristically systemic about systems or what is gamelike about games. (Goffman 1966: 8)

In this study I shall try to be concerned with one type of regulation only, the kind that governs a person's handling of himself and others, and by virtue of, his immediate physical presence among them; what is called face-to-face or immediate interaction will be involved. (Goffman 1966: 8)

There are many social settings that persons of certain status are forbidden to enter. Here an effort to prevent penetration of ego-boundaries, contamination by undersirables, and physical assault seems to be involved. (Goffman 1966: 10)

But the individual may also give information expressively, through an incidental symptomatic significance of events associated with him. In this case one might say that he emits, exudes, or gives off information to someone who gleans it. Linguistic messages can be "about" anything in the world, the sender and the subject matter having no necessary connection, coinciding only when autobiographical statements are being made. Expressive messages are necessarily "about" the same causal physical complex of which the transmitting agency is an intrinsic part. (Goffman 1966: 13)

For the course of a social occasion, one or more participants may be defined as responsible for getting the affair under way, guiding the main activity, terminating the event, and sustaining order. Also, a differentiation is sometimes found among full-fledged participants and various grades of onlookers. Further, between beginning and end there is often an "involvement contour," a line tracing the rise and fall of general engrossment in the occasion's main activity. (Goffman 1966: 18)

The harm produced by physical interference in any of its forms is partly due to the social humiliation of being seen as helpless, by the offender and possibly by others, and so has distinctly social-psychological components. Other important ways in which the regulations ensuring physical safety impinge upon nonphysical matters will be considered later. (Goffman 1966: 23)

The commubnicative behavior of those immediately present to one another can be considered in two steps. The first deals with unfocused interaction, that is, the kind of communication that occurs when one gleans information about another person present by glancing at him, if only momentarily as he passes into and then out of one's view. Unfocused interaction has to do largely with the management of sheer and mere copresence. The second step deals with focused interaction, the kind of interaction that occurs when persons gather close together and openly cooperate to sustain a single focus of attention, typically by taking turns at talking. Where no focused interaction occurs, the term unfocused gathering can be used. Where focused interaction occurs, clumsier terms will be needed. (Goffman 1966: 24)

A typical sign of an oncoming psychosis is the individual's "neglect" of his appearance and personal hygiene. (Goffman 1966: 27)

In every society these communication possibilities are institutionalized. While many such usable events may be neglected, at least some are likely to be regularized and accorded a common meaning. Half-aware that a certain aspect of his activity is available for all present to perceive, the individual tends to modify this activity, employing it with its public character in mind. Sometimes, in fact, he may employ these signs [dress, bearing, movement and position, sound level, physical gestures such as waving or saluting, facial decorations, and broad emotional expression] solely because they can be witnessed. (Goffman 1966: 33)

Further, while these signs seem ill suited for extended discursive messages, in contrast to speech, they do seem well designed to convey information about the actor's social attributes and about his conception of himself, of the others present, and of the setting. These signs, then, form the basis of unfocused interaction, even though they can also play a role in the focused kind. (Goffman 1966: 34)

Just as the individual finds that he must convey the right thing, so also he finds that while present to others he will inevitably convey information about the allocation of his involvement, and that expression of particular allocation is obligatory. Instead of speaking of a body idiom, we can now be a little more speçific and speak instead of an "involvement idiom" and of rules regarding the allocation of involvement. (Goffman 1966: 37)

Exline, Ellsworth, etc. norm of attention.

The individual's own body, or an object directly associated with his body, provides a very common object for his own involvement. And while such activity may have a technical instrumental rationale, as when an individual attempts to remove a splinter with a needle, usually a self-decorative or self-indulgent element is seen to be at work. In any case, as instances of auto-involvement, of self-directed, self-absorbing physical acts, we have: eating, dressing, picking one's teeth, cleaning one's fingernails, dozing, and sleeping. These activities will be referred to as "auto-involvements"; the easier term "self-involvements" would seem also to include absorption in less distinctive somatic matters, such as discussing and fantasies concerning the self. (Goffman 1966: 65)

autokommunikatsioon

One of the disturbing and characteristic things about occult involvements, both verbal and bodily, is that the others present cannot "get at" the general intention by which the individual is apparently governed, and cannot credit the offender's account should he offer one. This suggest that in ordinary life there is an expectation that all situated activity, if not obviously "occasioned," will have a degree of transparency, a degree of immediate understandability, for all persons present. It is not that the specific actions of the actor must be fully understood - they certainly are not, for example, when the family watches the repairman fix the TV set - but merely that they be given a situational coating through being in a context of known ends or generally recognized techniques. (Goffman 1966: 76)

Where there are only two participants in a situation, an encounter, if there is to be one, will exhaust the situation, giving us a fully-focused gathering. With more than two participants, there may be persons officially present in the situation who are officially excluded from the encounter and not themselves so engaged. These unengaged participants change the gathering into a partly-focused one. If more than three persons are present, there may be more than one encounter carried on in the same situation - a multifocused gathering. I will use the term participation unit to refer both to encounters and to engaged participants; the term bystander will be used to refer to any individual present who is not a ratified member of the particular encounter in question, whether or not he is currently a member of some other encounter. (Goffman 1966: 91)

In brief, then, encounters are organized by means of a special set of acts and gestures comprising communication about communicating. (Goffman 1966: 99)

Metakommunikatsioon korrastab läbikäimisi.

It may be noted that while all participants share equally in the rights and obligations described, there are some rights that may be differentially distributed within an encounter. Thus, in spoken encounters, the right to listen is one shared by all, but the right to be a speaker may be narrowly restricted, as, for example, in stage performances and large public meetings. (Goffman 1966: 100)

Persons who can sustain lapsed encounters with one another are in a position to avoid the problem of "safe supplies" during spoken encounters - the need to find a sufficient supply of inoffensive things to talk about during the period when an official state of talk prevails. (Goffman 1966: 103)

...when an individual opens himself up to talk with another, he opens himself up too pleadings, commands, threats, insult, and false information. The mutual considerateness characteristic of face engagements reinforces these dangers, subjecting the individual to the possibility of having his sympathy and tactfuness exploited, and causing him to act against his own interests.
Further, words can act as a "relationship wedge"; that is, once an individual has extended to another enough consideration to hear him out for a moment, some kind of bond of mutual obligation is established, which the initiator can use in turn as a basis for still further claims; once this new extended bond is granted, grudgingly or willingly, still further claims for social or material indulgence can be made. (Goffman 1966: 105)

Jäi pooleli lk 156.

Paralanguage And Kinesics

Key, Mary Ritchie 1975. Paralanguage And Kinesics (Nonverbal Communication). Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

The study will not include nonverbal events such as music, painting, and writing, except in reference to paralinguistic and kinesic acts. Nor will it include such mental states as motivation, intention, thought processes, symbol responses, and belief systems, which are all important studies which must be dealt with eventually in reference to nonverbal communication, but are beyond the scope of this book. (Key 1975: 10)

Kinesics is articulation of the body, or movements resulting from muscular and skeletal shift. This includes or actions, physical or physiological, automatic reflexes, posture, faxial expressions, gestures, and other body movements. (Key 1975: 10)

The human communication in these discussions takes place primarily between human beings or to oneself but may at times involve other animate creatures who can respond. On a given day, an animal trainer may actually spend more time communicating with animals than humans. A hermit may communicate primarily with non-humans and with himself. Just as important in our discussions is the communication to oneself, particularly as a function of expressive or emotive behavior, or a dress-rehearsal for a future communication to other humans. Whistling in the dark is self-communication. Observations of the communication to self move toward the discovery of "Who Am I?" (Key 1975: 12)

Autokommunikatsioon ja enesehool.

...the incidental type is quite apart and separate from any semantic value of the Behavioral Event in question. There seems to be a continuum of intentional to inadvertant - or, instituted to spontanous. (Key 1975: 32)

The matter of responsibility might be considered in connection with contradictory accompaniments to language. Perhaps there is less realization of responsibility towards that which is conveyed by the explicit Verbal Act. For example, a chief of police might seem actually to believe himself when he says that he has no racist feelings, even though his nonverbal behavior, in the way of hesitations, misplaced stress, pitch distortions, facial expressions might clearly communicate deep-seated discriminatory feelings. Or the parent who declares vehemently that he understands his offspring and feels no generation gap may indicate by nonverbal behavior that he is pretty far from communicating. It is these communications that the minority persons and the youngster receive - not the Verbal Act. (Key 1975: 35)

It is a truism that vocal and bodily expressions are never repeatable in exactly the same proportions and therefore defy experimentation. Like sentences in human language, they are infinite in variety. The application of scientific methods and experimentation is destructive to the spontaneity and communicative value in emotional expression. It changes the data. (Key 1975: 81)

The term "startle pattern" was introduced by Landis and Hunt to refer to the immediate, tense movements characteristic of a fright reaction. (Key 1975: 99)

I have outlined nine general categories where communication is effected by tactile kinesic acts: (1) Greetings and congratulations, (2) Conversational behavior, (3) Ritual and Rites of Passage, (4) Affection, (5) Play, (6) Occupational, (7) Learning or evaluating activity, (8) Manipulation in interpersonal relationships, and (9) Warfare and agression. (Key 1975: 102-103)

The manipulation of interpersonal relationships is expedited by tactile expression. Often this relationship involves the need to demonstrate authority. Discipline is more effective with small children by tactile means. In the courtroom the police personnel holds the arm of a young man brought in for trial. Authority is demonstrated in different ways in different societies. (Key 1975: 104)

Autistic gestures are self-directed. They have been said to be "meaningless," but we have already indicated that every movement has some kind of meaning and if observed and analyzed can be seen to be a part of the communication act. Austistic thinking, or day-dreaming, is a means of adapting to the world around us. It is a rehearsal of the past and the future and everyone participates. Autistic behavior is different when one is completely alone, and when one is alone but there is a possibility of another entering the room. (Key 1975: 105)

In the discussion of the Model in chapter II it was seen that the Signal may include certain olfactory experiences such as perfume and incense. These signals, along with others, comprise a group of items which are indirect communication. In space (in another room) and in time (after the crowd has left), they may continue emitting their fragrance, for example, a vase of flower, or incense left at the temple. In this way they are different from body odors which convey something during speech acts or during silences between them. (Key 1975: 109)

This definition of rhythm suggests an intimate relationship between speech and body movement. And, in fact, other scholars (for example, Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson) recognize this relationship by such terms as "postural silence," meaning immobility. By analogy, while cessation of vocal activity results in silence, cessation of kinesic activity results in postural silence or a kinesic freeze. Perhaps we should say near cessation of kinesic activity, because imperceptible, out-of-awareness movement continues that can be recorded by delicate instruments. (Key 1975: 117)

The context of situation comprises, briefly, the how, when, and where, the what and the under what circumstances. It involves the choice of channel of communication, such as acoustic, optical, tactual, or chemical; the temporal element and time duration; the location, position, and the space/distance relationship; the description and relationships of the speaker-hearer as well as the non-participants or audience in the surroundings; the physical condition of the surroundings (the amount of light, noise, silence, and artifacts); the Zeitgeits the society is considered to be in; the individual idiosyncracies of the participants; and finally, the style of communication in the medium and genre used. (Key 1975: 122)

Description of the speaker and hearer(s) implies age, sex, and race or culture, each having its varying set of behavioral norms. In addition, the status or the power relationship of the participants must be noted in order to interpret the communication between them. The persons involved, of course, display several roles; even in a single day a person may be a father, a teacher, a customer, a patient, a client, a group president, and a chauffeur. (Key 1975: 130)

To interpret the meaning of behavioral events, it is necessary to know the familiarity and desired goals of the participants. Persons well known to each other might exhibit behavior which would be bizarre if they were just acquaintances. (Key 1975: 130)

Derogatory imitation, [William] Austin continues, is one of the most infuriating acts of aggression one person can commit on another. (Key 1975: 150)

Another illustration is the event of clearing the throat. One cannot say what this means in isolation; it must be interpreted to determine whether it means: (1) a physiological act of necessity; (2) a signal to call to attention the listener; (3) an intent to interrupt a long-winded speaker; (4) a response - an acknowledgment, where speech might be precluded; or (5) a warning, for example to a child. (Key 1975: 165)

Ultimately the practical value of an academic focus on these matters must be dealt with. WIll communication be enhanced between individuals, communities, and nations, by examining the nonverbal subsystems of communication? I think not, contrary to my own first assumptions when I started seriously studying nonverbal communication. In fact, bringing these things to attention, other than for scientific purposes, may even be counterproductive to communication. Flack (1966) speaks of the "limits to sharable meaning." Relationships can be destroyed by knowing too much, or communicating too much - with all the potential for inaccuracies. Or relationships can be destroyed by abortive communication - by trying too hard and bungling. Human beings cannot function with equanimity when too much detail is brought to the level of awareness. The human can cope with only so much. Blind spots are a protection, in a sense. Bringing too much to the attention of a person, about the way he or she fiddles with their hands, or grimaces, or uses over-high pitch too often, will not enhance communication, and may push the individual into isolation. (Key 1975: 169)

• Leslie A. White, "The symbol: The Origin and basis of human behavior," The science of culture: A Study of man and civilization, 1949, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Reprint Series, Social Sciences A-239).
• Flack, Michael J. 1966. "Communicable and uncommunicable aspects in personal international relationship," Journal of Communication 16.3, pp. 283-290.

Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology

Graeber, D. 2004. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.

The nineteenth-century "founding figures" did not think of themselves as having invented anything particularly new. The basic principles of anarchistm - self-organization, voluntary association, mutual aid - referred to forms of human behavior they assumed to have been around about as long as humanity. The same goes for the rejection of the state and of all forms of structural violence, inequality, or domination (anarchism literally means "without rulers"), even the assumption that all these forms are somewhat related and reinforce each other. (Graeber 2004: 7)

[Georges] Sorel argued [in Reflections sur le Vioelnce] that since the masses were not fundamentally good or rational, it was foolish to make one's primary appeal to them through rational arguments. Politicsis the art of inspiring other with great myths. For revolutionaries, he proposed the myth of an apocalyptic General Strike, a moment of total transformation. To maintain it, he added, one would need a revolutionary elite capable of keeping the myth alive by their willingness to engage in symbolic acts of violence - an elite which, like the Marxist vanguard party (often somewhat less symbolic in its violence), Mauss described as a kind of perpetual conspiracy, a modern version of the secret political men's societies of the ancient world. (Graeber 2004: 18)

In typical revolutionary discourse a "counter-power" is a collection of social institutions set in opposition to the state and capital: from self-governing communities to radical labor unions to popular militias. Sometimes it is also referred to as an "anti-power". When such institutions maintaim themselves in the face of the state, this is usually referred to as a "dual power" situation. (Graeber 2004: 24)

...all societies are to some degree at war with themselves. There are always clashes between interests, factions, classes and the like; also, social systems are always based on the pursuit of different forms of value which pull people in different directions. (Graeber 2004: 25)

A revolution on a world scale will take a very long time. But it is also possible to recognize that it is already starting to happen. The easiest way to get our minds around it is to stop thinking about revolution as a thing - "the" revolution, the great cataclysmic break - and instead ask "what is revolutionary action?" We could then suggest: revolutionary action is any collective action which rejects, and therefore confronts, some forms of power or domination and in doing so, reconstitutes social relations - even within the collectivity - in that light. Revolutionary action does not necessarily have to aim to topple governments. Attempts to create autonomous communities in the face of power (using Castoriadis' definition here: ones that constitute themselves, collectively make their own rules and principles of operation, and continually reexamine them), would, for instance, be almost by definition revolutionary acts. And history shows us that the continual accumulation of such acts can change (almost) everything. (Graeber 2004: 45)

In one sense states are the "imaginary totality" par excellence, and much of the confusion entailed in theories of the state historically lies in an inability or unwillingness to recognize this. For the most part, states were ideas, ways of imagining social order as something one could get a grip on, models of control. (Graeber 2004: 64)

POWER/IGNORANCE or POWER/STUPIDITY
Academics love Michel Foucault's argument that identifies knowledge and power, and insists that brute force is no longer a major factor in social control. They love it because it flatters them: the perfect formula for people who like to think of themselves as political radicals even though all they do is write essays likely to be read by a few dozen other people in an institutional environment. Of course, if any of these academics were to walk into their university library to consult some volume of Foucault without having remembered to bring a valid ID, and decided to enter the stacks anyway, they would soon discover that brute force is really not so far away as they like to imagine - a man with a big stick, trained in exactly how hard to hit people with it, would rapidly appear to eject them.
In fact the threat of that man with the stick permeates our world at every moment; most of us have given up even thinking of crossing the innumerable lines and barriers he creates, just so we don't have to remind ourself of his existence. If you see a hungry woman standing several yards away from a huge pile of food - a daily occurrence for most of us who live in cities - there is a reason you can't just take some and give it to her. A man with a big stick will come and hit you. Anarchists, in contrast, have always delighted in reminding us of him. Residents of the squatter community in Christiana, Denmar, for example, have a Christmastide ritual where they dress in Santa suits, take toys from department stores and distribute them to children on the street, partly just so everyone can relish the images of the cops beating down Santa and snatching the toys back from crying children.
Such a theoretical emphasis opens the way to a theory of the relation of power not with knowledge, but with ignorance and stupidity. Because violence, particularly structural violence, where all the power is on one side, creates ignorance. If you have the power to hit people over the head whenever you want, you don't have to trouble yourself too much figuring out what they think is going on, and therefore, generally speaking, you don't. Hence the sure-fire way to simplify social arrangements, to ignore the incredibly complex play of perspectives, passions, insights, desires, and mutual understanding that human life is really made of, is to make a rule and threaten to attack anyone who breaks it.. This is why violence has always been the favored recourse of the stupid: it is the one form of stupidity to which it is almost impossible to come up with an intelligent response. It is also of course the basis of the state.
Contrary to popular belief, bureaucracies do not create stupidity. They are ways of managing situations that are already inherently stupid because they are, ultimately, based on the arbitrariness of force.
Ultimately this should lead to a theory of the relation of violence and the imagination. Why is it that the folks on the bottom (the victims of structural violence) are always imagining what it must be like for the folks on top (the beneficiaries of structural violence), but it almost never occurs to the folks on the top to wonder what it might be like to be on the bottom? Human beings being the sympathetic creatures they are this tends to become one of the main bastions of any system of inequality - the downtrodden actually care about their oppressors, at least, far more than their oppressors care about them - but this seems itself to be an effect of structural violence. (Graeber 2004: 71-73)

While anthropologists are, effectively, sitting on a vast archive of human experience, of social and political experiments no one else really knows about, that very body of comparative ethnography is seen as something shameful. As I mentioned, it is treated not as the common heritage of humankind, but as our dirty little secret. Which is actually convenient, at least insofar as academic power is largely about establishing ownership rights over a certain form of knowledge and ensuring that others don't really have much access to it. Because as I also mentioned, our dirty little secret is still ours. It's not something one needs to share with others. (Graeber 2004: 96)

Approaches to Theories for Nonverbal Signs

Lange-Seidl, Annemarie 1977. Approaches to Theories for Nonverbal Signs. Studies in Semiotics, Volume 17. Lisse: The Peter De Ridder Press

For education at conservatories and academies of art, the use of models always went without saying. It was, however, associated with practical training, not with theoretical education. May we assume real sign competent only in art? Or, converesely: is the complete control of a communication event already art? Or artificial? As long as we believe in the unconscious use of nonverbal communication elements and not in intention concerning semiosis, we cannot use the notion 'competence'. Only after having once more considered the essential features of a sign, only after a theoretical reorientation will the notion 'sign competence' be used with justice. The prior condition for a system that is formalizable and formalized is that the notation and conservation of signs are normalized and standardized (cf. p. 38 and 39f). (Lange-Seidl 1977: 21)

psychology will have to help us to distinguish releasing signs from provoking ones, consoling signs from encouraging ones (cf. note 27). How do people become indifferent to signs because of their being used too often? The close connection of American semiotics with behaviorism can help us here; behaviorism may be instructive for a constitution, use and rejection of signs, but may not be so decisive that intentionality, meaning, and finality, which constitute the essence of the sign, should be neglected as is the case with many American studies. (Lange-Seidl 1977: 29)

Only as long as a sign-philosophic and sign-theoretic synopsis does not exist will one dare to speak about the 'prelingual' character of nonverbal signs. Sign competence is worth a theoretization as much as communicative competence, which cannot remain a lingual one, if it is not to ignore reality by being limited to a 'homo loquens'. (Lange-Seidl 1977: 29)

Bceause we are familiar with the actor as a prototype of the ability to slip arbitrarily into roles which he not only fills up verbally both also semiotically in many ways, some semioticians consider the signe arbitraire available for lies (cf. Sampson 1972). He who learns to control his movements, he who employs proxemics consciously, can programme them like language, and with their help is able to lie as he is by means of language. (Lange-Seidl 1977: )
[Sampson, G., 1972. "Natural Language and the Paradox of the Liar", Semiotica 5, pp. 305-23.]

[from Notes]
Corresponding to John L. Austin (1962), How to Do Things with Words, an essay "How to Do Things with Signs" should be written; especially the intersection between action by speech and action by nonverbal signs should be investigated (Lange-Seidl 1977: 45)

http://tartu.ester.ee/record=b1616166~S1*est

Darwin and Facial Expression

Ekman, Paul ed., 1973. Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc.
"Päritud harjumused" - inherited habits on see printsiip Darwini kolmest printsiibist, mis ei pea vett ja ainsana ei ole semiootiline.

Ekman, Paul 1973a. "Introduction". Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ekman, Paul ed. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc. Pp. 1-10

To my knowledge there has been no thorough study of facial expressions of emotions shown in the cinema of different nations, or in commercial or amateur still photographs, or in family albums, although such a study might be interesting and relevant. (Ekman 1973a: 8)

Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Suzanne 1973. "Facial Expression of Emotion in Nonhuman Primates". Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ekman, Paul ed. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc. Pp. 1-89

Because of the impossibility of recording everything, data recording must be selective. Such selection results in an interpretative rather than a completely objective record. This is even the case with film or videotape records, since the choice of when to film is itself selective. Furthermore, the total context, which includes smells and activities occurring on the hidden side of the animla, is often missed in a film record. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 17)

Audiovisuaalne materjal on ette selektiivne. Kendoni suudlemiraundide uurimuses oli see eriti ilmekas, sest kaugele põõsaste taha peidetud kaamera nägi ainult ühte pingil istuva paarikese seljatagust ja nägu vaid juhul kui nad olid teineteise poole pöördunud.

Each facial expression consists of what van Hooff (1962) calls "expressive elements." Expressive elements are anatomical features (such as the ears, eyes, or mouth) in a particular position (i.e., toward, wide open, closed). The use of checklists of facial elements to describe facial expressions, such as van Hooff's (1967), facilitates systematic collection and comparison of data. Furthermore, the recent development of frame-by-frame analysis of motion-picture film and videotape (employed by van Hooff, 1967, and Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1971, in press) has also augmented the accuracu and detail of descriptions of facial expressions, particularly when they involve movement. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 18)

Vrd. "väljenduslikke elemente" Birdwhistelli kineemidega.

...nonvisual communication...(Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 20)

word

In animal studies, communication is generally defined as behavior in one animal, the sender, which evokes a response ina nother animal, the receiver. [...] The question of whether the behavior is intentional or not is generally evaded, since no method has been devised as yet to tell what an animal is thinking. This is, nevertheless, an important question... (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 21)

Sure it is, especially in relation to communication.

FIG. 2. Results of the cluster analysis of chimpanzee behavior:

• "Play": Relaxed open mouth; Gnaw-wrestle; Grasp poke; Pull limb; Gymnastics; Gnaw; Hand-wrestle; Gallop; Mount;
• "Aggression": Tug, Brusque rush; Bite; Grunt-bark; Shrill bark; Arm-sway; Stamp; Hit; Stamp-trot; Trample; Sway-walk;
• "Affinity": Pant; Mouth-mouth; Smooth approach; Embrace; Smooth touch; Hold out hand; Silent-pout; Cling; Mount-walk; Groom; Groom-presentation; Autogroom; Mount-presentation; Genital investigation; Male mating; Stretched pout-whimper; Pout-moan; Silent bared-teeth; Crouch-presentation; Watch;
• "Excitement": Rapid "Oh oh"; Squat-bobbing; Rising hoot; Vertical head shake;
• "Submission": Bared-teeth-scream; Bared-teeth-yelp; Crouch; Hesitant approach; Shrink, flinch; Upsway; Avoid; Flight; Parry;

(From van Hooff, 1971)

Groups are structured in such a way that each animal holds a particular position in the troop in terms of its ability to assert its will or to dominate others. This aspect of social organization is called the dominance hierarhy [rank order]. Once dominance relationships are established, each animal in a troop knows its relationship to every other animal. Since the behavior of an animal is related to its dominance, its behavior can be predicted, and such predictable social ordering keeps conflict at a minimum. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 24)

Thus the precise function of a signal is context-bound, and its precise "meaning" applies only to a particular situation (Shirek-Ellefson, 1967). This functional context-dependency of emotional expression is an extremely important concept, for it is only in conjunction with context that affect expressions can coordinate social interactions. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 28)

...one cannot accurately call a behavior "determined by inheritance" (or by the genes, or any other single factor), since multiple systems of the animal and multiple aspects of the environment are involved in producing all behaviors. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 30)

Näitlejate tööd juhib ka stsenaarium, ja juhuslikud tingimused.

[näide antiteesist:] ...gaze aversion, a common signal of mild submission, is a striking reversal of the stare, which is a component of all threat displays. (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973: 31)

Charlesworth, William R., and Kreutzer, Mary Anne 1973. "Facial Expressions of Infants and Children". Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ekman, Paul ed. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc. Pp. 91-168

A person can possess an ability (a competence) to do something, but whether he does it at all during his life depends upon many performance factors that serve as necessary conditions for the ability to be made manifest. Such factors include attentional skills, persistence, memory, the right audience, and motivation. In testing for abilities, a good diagnostician will do his best to optimize testing conditions in order to insure that the negative aspects of these factors do not work to obscure the individual's abilities. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 99)

Another distinction made in this chapter is the division between the expression of emotions on one hand and the recognition of expressions on the other. The former refers to the expressive behaviors themselves, whereas the latter refers to an individual's sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others. To illustrate, the infant may smile only when she smiles, but not respond at all when she frowns or has a neutral expression, thus revealing that he recognizes the difference between her smile and her other facial expressions. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 104)

Surprise has been discussed by some writers as an epistemic emotion - one involving the relation between an individual's knowledge or expectations about a particular stimulus and what the stimulus actually turns out to be. [...] Epistemic: a word derived from the Greek pertaining to knowledge or the conditions for acquiring it. Epistemic emotions refer to those emotions such as interest, curiosity, boredom, and surprise, which have to do with what the individual already knows or desires to know. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 117)

Coyness has more of a flirtatious social element, whereas shame has more of a cognitive element - the awareness of having transgressed against a rule. Embarrassment, in contrast, seems to involve more awareness of one's own appearance. Furthermore, shame and embarrassment seem to be more situation-dependent, whereas shyness can be viewed more or less as a persistent personality trait. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 119)

A somewhat surprising finding is Berne's (1930) report of a positive relation between IQ and teacher ratings of lack of affection in nursery school children. This could be a reflection of the more intelligent child's greater inependence and his greater immersion in activities at preschool, resulting in fewer social contacts. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 133)

Ordinarily when a child assesses an individual's emotions, he has a wealth of cues in addition to a fixed facial expression. He sees the patterning of the facial expression from its onset to its peak with concomitant grosser body movements, and sometimes with verbal statements. These cues are supplemented by his knowledge of the context of the emotional response, and sometimes, by knowledge of the individual's past behavior and general dispositional traits. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 147)

In addition to preventing a decline in facial activity with age, Thompson claimed that social mimicry served to stylyze facial expressions. Evidence for this claim was the fact that sighted children showed less variability in facial expression than blind children, visual experience presumably having the effect of shaping a person's expressions to conform to more standardized expressions of others. (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 153)

...instrumental expressionf of anger (hitting, kicking)... (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 155)

...some form of internal model - a visual, kinesthetic proprioceptive image... (Charlesworth & Kreutzer 1973: 159)

Ekman, Paul 1973b. "Cross-Cultural Studies of Facial Expression". Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ekman, Paul ed. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc. Pp. 169-222

While we suggest that the face is the chief, if not the only site for muscular movements that are unique to one or another specific emotion, we do not mean that the face shows only emotional expressions. Quite the contrary. The ace is the site for illustrators (e.g., the brow movements as an accent mark), for regulators (primarily with glancing) and also for emblems, such as winks and tongue shows. (Ekman 1973b: 182)

Probably the greatest source of confusion between emblems and emotional expressions is that some emotional expressions may be modified and transformed into emblems. How, then, do we distinguish between an emotional expression and an emblematic expression? We need to consider both the appearance and usage of each, and we must also define a middle ground between the emblematic and emotional expression - the sumlated expression. A simulated expression is avoluntary attempt to appear as if an emotion is being experienced. If it is well done, then most people who see it will be misled and think they are seeing an emotional expression, not a simulation. A simulation is used either to conceal the fact that no emotion is felt or as a mask to cover one feeling with the appearance of another. (Ekman 1973b: 182-183)

...a simulated expression is enacted when a person wants to mislead another as to his feeling, and if performed skillfully is very similar to the expression of a felt emotion, while the emblematic expression is a stylezed version of the expression, which is used to state or mention an emotion but to convey the impression that it is not being experienced at the moment. The emblematic expression is noticeably different in appearance from both the actual emotional expression and the simulation. (Ekman 1973b: 183)

Two quite different research approaches have been used to study the question of whether there are universal facial expressions of emotion. The first method entails systematically sampling, on film or videotape, facial behavior shown in a particular situation by people in two or more cultures, and then measuring in some fashion the facial muscular movements shown by the people in each culture to determine whether they are similar or different. We shall call this method the components approach, since it studies whether the actual components of facial expressions shown in two or more cultures are the same or different. The second method entails showing examples of facial expression to people in different cultures and determining whether they interpret a facial expression as signifying the same or a different emotion. This method (which we will call the judgement approach, since it studies whether people from different cultures will judge the same emotion when viewing the same facial eppearance), was first used by Darwin, as we noted earlier, but not in his cross-cultural studies. (Ekman 1973b: 188)

The problem of recording facial expressions is threefold: the costs of film and videotape, the need to take the record unobtrusively so that the subject is not made self-conscious, and the determination of how much of the facial behavior to record. Measurement is probably the most difficult problem, as the face is a complicated expressive system, quickly changing into various appearances. Until quite recently there has been little agreement about how to measure facial expression, and the investigator has had to invent his own measurement scheme. (Ekman 1973b: 188)

Petrinovich, Lewis 1973. "Darwin and the Representative Expression of Reality". Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review. Ekman, Paul ed. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc. Pp. 223-256

The doctrine of special creation, in addition to insisting on the existence of an impassable discontinuity between the various animal species (and the especially between man aht the "lower" animals), strenuously insisted on the immutability of species: that all species are unchangeable, and that they were created during the six days of Genesis when they were endowed by a munificent creator with their essential physical structure and mental abilities. The mental life of animals was held to be entirely instinctive, and only man had the faculty of reason. While some theologians were puzzling over the problem how a pair of all of the known species could fit into the Ark, Darwin was collecting and organizing evidence to establish the doctrine of evolution. (Petrinovich 1973: 224)

One of the leading philosophers of the day who wrote on evolution as early as 1850 was Herbert Spencer. Spencer formulated an evolutionary associationism in which the association of ideas operated phylogenetically. If such associations are repeated often enough, the cumulative effects are inherited by successive generations. Thus, there is an inheritance of acquired traits, by this process associations become instincts. He was among the first to elaborate the conception that the mind is what it is because it has had to cope with particular environments. Spencer had a strong impact on psychology through his influential Principles of Psychology (1855), but Darwin (1887) denied that he derived any conscious profit as a consequence of Spencer's writings because the philosophical methods employed lacked an empirical base and were, therefore, of no scientific use. (Petrinovich 1973: 225)

Wundt, in Germany, and his student, Tichener, in the United States were quite influential in the developing science of psychology, and are important in the present context in terms of their views on methodology. They represented the school that was known as structuralism, the aim of which was to discover the contents of the mind and, in this way, to deliniate the structure of consciousness. Tichener defined psychology as "experience dependent on an experiencing person." He sought to reduce mind to its elements and discover the laws by which the elements combine. Tichener considered psychology to be an extension of the scientific method to a new field of inquiry and believed that the subject matter (and, ideally, the methods) of the two science, physics and psychology, were essentially the same: that physics studies the world without reference to man, while psychology studies the world with reference to the person who experiences it. (Petrinovich 1973: 236)

Most psychological research has employed what Bruniswik calls systematic design, in which a relatively small number of variables is chosen for study, and then these variables are systematically manipulated. The ideal of this method is to hold all variables constant but one, to vary it systematically then control it and to allow another to vary, and so forth. This manner of proceeding is regarded by most scientists as representing an optimal strategy. (Petrinovich 1973: 244)

The meaninf of individual differences within the framework of systematic design also deserves comment. Since external conditions are treated as random error variance and are treated "quasy-systematically by computational elimination." Individual differences are, thus, considered as unwanted error variance produced by a lack of control of relevant factors. (Petrinovich 1973: 245)