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A Function of Musement

Deely, John 1991. Modeling Anthroposemiosis. In: Anderson, Myrdene; Merrell, Floyd (eds.), On Semiotic Modelling. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 525-593. [ESTER]

And yet, the two differ at least as much - or perhaps I should say: exactly as much - as do "Umwelt" and "Lebenswelt", or (to fall back on an older analogate within the set of attempts over the centuries to interpret the relation of our organismic type to intelligent behavior of other animal forms) as do the vis aestimativa and ratio particularis (Deely 1971) whose difference disappears when it comes to tracing them through the sensible products of evolutionary adaptation (Deely 1966). (Deely 1991: 525)

A functive analogate.

Similarly, the notion of modeling system is familiar to semioticicians, being especially the creation of the Tartu group and primarily associated with language. (Deely 1991: 525)

Semitoic!

In Part 2, under the heading of Textuality, I will examine, so to say, the linguisticization of the world of experience - that is, the species-specific element of experience that makes the human modeling system, or experience anthroposemiotically considered, different from the modeling system of animals employing communication systems lacking the code constitutive of the signum expertum ad placitum (the sign experienced linguistically, let us say). This sign will appear as ultimately rooted as such in the relation of signification grasped and deployed in its distinction from the perceptive sign-vehicle and the content signified. (Deely 1991: 526)

Perhaps relevant for a science-fiction future wherein humans become telepathic and "languaging" is retained as a form of art.

We will see in establishing this how textuality, virtual in the Umwelt, becomes actual through the indefinite decompositions and recompositions of experience linguistically construed by means of the establishment of a praeter-biological code which no longer, as in Sebeok's notion (cf. Baer 1981: 183), adequates the Uexküllian notion (1940) of 'meaning-plan' because it breaks the proportion between biological heritage and object as such experienced. (Deely 1991: 526)

I have no clue what's going on here but I think I found a title.

This examination of code will bring us to the third element in our modeling of anthroposemiosis, that curiously detached exercise known generically as "criticism" wherein, at one and the same time, what is most distinctive and what is most feeble in anthroposemiosis coincide to create that illusion whereby the literary aspect of semiosis is raised to the pinnacle of intellectual achievement and treated perversely as a self-contained and autonomous exercise of semiotic competence. Here we will make explicit a point that will have been established virtually in the two previous stages of the discussion - to wit, that the critical function and faculty is a subspecies of semiotic competence rather than identical with semiotic competence. Subordinate to and subtended by much broade processes of semiosis, criticism owes its validity to its connection with, rather than to its misleading appearance of autonomy within, those processes. (Deely 1991: 526)

Something something literary production is not the pinnacle of what can be done with signs.

It is a question of appreciating [|] the expanse of the framework and depth of the foundation that belongs to semiotics today by birthright as an offspring of the doctrine of signs gestated by the Iberians after 1529 (Soto's Summulae), crystallized thematically in Painsot's Treatise of 1632, named by Locke in 1690, and implemented by Peirce in its wholesale possibilities with the essay on categories of 1867 and in the many essays thereafter until his dath in 1914. (Deely 1991: 526-527)

Domingo de Soto's Summulae has been digitized (GB) but it does not look like it has been translated; "his addressing the logic of terms and propositions from within the conceptual framework of sign theory was an important step toward the development of semiotics and the logic of ideas, which subsumed logic with epistemology and dominated logical theorizing for almost the next 300 years" (Hill 2011)

There are signs, and there are other things besides: things which are unknown to us at the moment and perhaps for all our individual life; things which existed before us and other things which will exist after us; things which exist only as a result of our social interactions, like governments and flags and things which exist within our round of interactions - like daytime and night - but without being produced exactly by those interactions. (Deely 1991: 527)

The world consists of signs and non-signs.

Let us recall as an example the arcane consideration of physical entities which have ex hypothesi no bodies: the angelic beings of Christian belief, the general idea of a "spirit world", or of a unique divine being than which no greater can be conceived. Even more than mythical animals or legendary heroes, these entities are, from the standpoint of experience, purely objective being. (Deely 1991: 531)

The mode of being of Stapledon's universe of music.

The environment selectively reconstituted and organized according to the specific needs and interests of the individual organism constitutes an Umwelt. The Umwelt thus depends upon and corresponds to an Innenwelt or cognitive map developed within each individual. This may enables that individual to find its way in the environment and to exist as a base station or node within a network of communication, interest, and livelihood sharable especially with the several other individuals of its own kind. (Deely 1991: 535)

A definition of the Innenwelt. Not sure if very workable.

In fact, in my own opinion, being steeped in the German tongue is an impediment to the full unfolding of what is proper to this concept, because it exacerbates the entanglement with Kantian idealism (an entanglement ultimately counterproductive for the understanding of the Umwelt as it applies species-specifically to our own life form), and tends to make of the distinction between object and thing a diremption rather than a difference often able to partially coincide experimentally. (Deely 1991: 536)

Define:diremption - "a sharp division into two parts; disjunction; separation".

As a result, the Umwelt as it is structured by linguistically mediated social interaction becomes freed from overdetermination by biological heritage, enabling the formation of what I have called (1982: 111ff., after Morris 1946) the post-linguistic (or "tertiary" modeling) system, teh semiotic equivalent of what anthropologists heretofore have termed simply culture - a semiotic system postlinguistic in nature but presupposing language in order both to come into being in the first place and in order to be understood in what is proper to it (see also Deely, Williams and Kruse 1986: xii-xv). (Deely 1991: 537)

Not bad, though Morris' term if I recall correctly was applied to signs and not sign systems. Nevertheless, viewing culture as a post-linguistic sign system would be more-or-less in the spirit of modelling systems theory.

The regions of so-called "human sciences" no less clearly exhibit the modeling procedures. Thomas More's Utopia and Plato's Republic provide alternative models for consideration in further remodelling of the experienced world of human beings, the actual Umwelt. (Deely 1991: 538)

Utopias as models.

We see then what is required of the sign: it needs to be a means of establishing connections, and not in any bare physical sense: experience is not needed for smoke to be an effect of fire, but it is needed if smoke is to become a sign of fire (an extremely important point: see Painsot 1632: 137 note 4). The sign in its proper being requires an understanding of how there can be connections established in an objective sense which yet does not preclude (and it is here that the doctrine of signs departs from the dogma of Kantian criticism, and dictates in the process of appropriating semiotically the Uexküllian notion of Umwelt some remodeling of the very notion from within) incorporating whatever of the physical as such may happen to be objectified within the large totality of the species-specific lifeworld. (Deely 1991: 540)

I'm really beginning to like this example (cf. Eco 1976: 17). // Paneb mõtlema sellest, kas Marslased ei pane 2+2 kokku, et Maal on elu kui Maa lahvatab põlema.

This fact further explains why the sign as such is not something that directly appears in experience - why a sign as such is never a thing on the one hand or an object simply on the other. It is never an object simply, for an object simply represents itself within awareness, while a sign simply makes something other than itself present in awareness. (Deely 1991: 542)

Now define "awareness".

They exist rather as objects experienced in what is proper to them as a network of relations originated in or even (something) for the purpose of controlling the objectivity experienced by an animal which, besides perceiving - say - marks on paper, or a carving in stone, grasps their relation to objects not on the paper nor in the tone physically but nonetheless signified and conveyed by those marks according to a convention or code which makes of them signs - i.e., which makes of them the foundation for a complexus of relations to a corresponding objective structure understandable but not perceptible in the marks or carvings as physical objects given in perception. (Deely 1991: 544)

"Complexus" you don't see that often.

To create a text is to come to understandi that "the role of the object in the semiosis is", as Johansen puts it (1985: 2350), "not confined to being an element in an experiential situation interpreted to tell if a symbol applies or not"; and to proceed accordingly in the use of signs to freely structure objectivity in a contour and manner accessible only to a conspecific in the precise sense of another organism able to share that understanding and to grasp signs fashioned on its basis - that is to say, encoded according to patterns neither reducible to nore accessible within the perceptible dimension of the sign structure as such. Text creation is a function of musement, for the understanding of which function two terms must be clarified: code and idea. (Deely 1991: 546)

Text not necessarily communicative or significative.

"In all general inquiries about signs", Peirce observes (1907: 9), "nothing is of more livey importance than maintaining a clear and sharp distinction between [|] the object, or proposed cause of the sign, and the meaning, or intended effect". (Deely 1991: 549-550)

A useful hint as to what "object" is for Peirce.

In another sense, no doubt, it is possible to speak of a "code" as defining a familiar path zoösemiotically (cf. Baer 1981: 183): there is a thirdness, an "ideal being", at work in all of nature, not, as Sebeok justly put it (1984a: 2), just in "that minuscule segment of nature some anthropologists grandly compartmentalize as culture". (Deely 1991: 553)

A teleological thirdness: human species becoming "fully human".

An interpretant in general need not be logical. It is the ground on which whatever object functions as a sign. Interpretants exist, consequently, at those points in semiosis where objects are transformed into signs or signs are transformed into other signs. Ideas are interpretants, but not all interpretants are ideas: interpretants as such are indifferently physical or even mental. They define the points of innovation in semiosis. In other words, when an interpretant is introduced to explicate a sign, this is where the original sign is amplified into another sign. And the act of amplification is where the innovation takes place. (Deely 1991: 553)

Still somewhat ambiguous, but not bad. Amplification, development.

There is an Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicationa INterpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and [|] must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.
The communicational interpretant in this sense, as embodied in the objective world, is precisely what we have called code, of which the linguistic code (no less virtual in its universality than any other code, be it noted) is a subspecies. (Deely 1991: 553-554)

Actually extremely useful.

If we combine Jakobson's factorial model (1960: 353) and his subsequent "corresponding scheme" of functions, with the factorial element indicated as substructural to the superstructural element of function; redraw the separating line in this combined schema so that the asymmetry defining textual communication (now understood as the communication typical of inhabitants of a human Umwelt, or Lebenswelt, in contrast to the inhabitants of strictly perceptual Umwelts) becomes a matter of foreground; invert the central column of the model as a whole so as to place iconic emphasis on the superstructural nature of the asymmetry constitutive of the code as dimanating the textual element in the overall situation; and add brackets to indicate the objective dimension of relationality as such introduced into the Umwelt as remodeled by ideas; we then have the schema in Figure 1. [|]
(Deely 1991: 554)

So many damn alterations.

— where emotion provides the motivation whence the "addresser" attempts (conari) to reach another with a unique conception (poetic message) by means by a sensory modality (phasis) in a context of existence by means of establishing a code or putting now into operation (with or without perceived modification) a pre-existing code. (Deely 1991: 555)

What the hell is a phasis?

Two attempts have been made to represent schematically the complexity of the process in its dynamic dimensions. One is the attempt by Sebeok (1972: 14), directly based on Jakobson's model, which takes the elements and embeds them in a Morley triangle, so as to bring out the essentially triadic nature of the semiosis which is not foregrounded as such in Jakobson's model. The Sebeok version nicely brings out the complexity of the dynamics, but it has a major drawback for our present concerns. Sebeok generalizes the notion of code to an abstract commonality of the species-specific biological rearticulation of environment into objective world through a relational network, in order to account precisely for the zoösemiotic component as such of communication as common to all animals, including humans. (Deely 1991: 555)

This is in his Perspectives in Zoosemiotics.

As a result, to understand Johansen's model, which he calls "the semiotic pyramid", the reader needs to make some adjustments, distributing our above notion of code among the five "poles" of the pyramid, by actively conceptualizing at each point the respective contributions of the ten axes and planes, identified by Johansen, to the formation and operation of the metalingual or "commensurating" code proper to anthroposemiosis in the unique dimension of textuality which characterizes in a permeating fashion the totality of human experience, of anthroposemiotic objectivity as virtually including the Umwelt of zoösemiosis. Johansen's model (1982: 473; more fully discussed in 1985: 266), stripped of its exclusively Peircean technical vocabulary, relabelled at each pole so as to suppress technical presuppositions not explicable [|] terminologically within the limits of the current discussion, and enhanced by an explicit identification of the ten axez constituting the pyramid, may now be introduced into the present discussion. See Figure 2.
(Deely 1991: 556-557)
  • Johansen, Jørgen Dines 1987. Sign Concept, Meaning, and the Study of Literature. In: Deely, John; Evans, Jonathan (eds.), Semiotics 1982. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 473-482.
  • Johansen, Jørgen Dines 1985. Prolegomena to a Semiotic Theory of Text Interpretation. Semiotica 57(3/4): 225-288. DOI: 10.1515/semi.1985.57.3-4.225 [De Gruyter Mouton]
In the history of these questions, this contrast was early recognize in the philosophical tradition as defining the difference between logos and mythos, i.e., between the understanding operating in the line of assigning a prospective reason for a defined state or condition of being experienced as irreducible to the experience of it, and understanding operating in the line of conjecture free of the restraints imposed by the aim of coinciding discursively in a determinate (if partial) way with structures of experience which represent accurately prejacent dimensions and elements of physical being as they stand in their independence of our experience of them. (Deely 1991: 562)

A definition of a myth. And an illustration of the kind of paragraph-spanning sentences this paper is filled with - why use 5 concise words when you can pile 50 clauses on top of each other.

The contingency of the linguistic sign is indefinitely exploitable, but only if we insist on its externality vis-à-vis an actual situation at hand (c.348-347 BC: Book I, Chap. 10, 76b23-27):
All syllogism, and a fortiori demonstration, is addressed not to the spoken word, but to the discourse within the soul, and though we can always raise objections to the spoken world, to the inward discourse we cannot always object.
Unlike the actual world at any given moment, the world of could-bes and could-have-beens admits of the infinite regress, synchronically as well as diachronically. (Deely 1991: 563)

Recording for the citation for where Aristotle mentions inner speech.

Beyond being a rhetorical play, the label is a way of referring to a strategy for encouraging a view of semiotic not as a theory in either the traditional critical sense or in the traditional scientific sense, but as a doctrine of signs which transcends the opposition of culture to nature by having for its unifying object the action of signs, semiosis, explicitly recognized as an activity or process constructive not only of human experience but of all organismic experience and of the physical environment itself as tending to give rise to and supportive of the existence of the plethora of Umwelts (including the species-specifically human one) precisely in their contrast, as objective worlds, to the physical realm of the environment which the objective worlds not only rest upon, but indirectly modify while partially including and directly restructuring objectively the surroundings. (Deely 1991: 564)

Sebeok's "major tradition" encompasses both nature and culture.

[...] or with elements de facto eluding our particular biological channels of sense (too remote - the case of planets and stars on the one side; too tiny - the case of elements such as quarks and photons, molecules and atoms) or even with elements de jure precluded from access by any biological channel of sense as such (the pure spirits, the Gods of later monotheism in general, Allah specifically, etc.). (Deely 1991: 566)

Phraseology for criticizing attempts to do exactly that (bioengineer humans that are capable of communicating with the spirit realm and God itself).

Maritain observes of this larger notion, this surplus creating an admixture whereby the whole of culture is textualized (. 1964: 91):
The term language does not relate only to the words which we use, it covers also all that which serves us to make ourselves understood, and therefore the whole imagery which we use and which is that of the men to whom we speak, at such and such a moment of time and in such and such a place on earth. (Supposing that through some telephone through duration we could tell a contemporary of Julius Caesar something which concerns our epoch, could we speak to him of airplanes and of electronic machines, of the British Parliament, or of the Praesidium of the Communist Party? The other person would not understand anything; it would indeed be necessary to use the imagery furnished by his own type of culture, as well as his own words and his own syntax.)
[|] Given the coextensiveness, then, of textuality with the objective world of human experience, it is all a question of how one is to construe the "linguistic admixture" demonstrable within every semiological system - i.e., within the totality of human experience, including the experience of "nature" so-called. (Deely 1991: 566-567)
  • Maritain, Jacques 1984[1964]. Notebooks, Chapter 3. Translated by Joseph W. Evans. New York: Albany, 81-89.
It is not just a question of new foundations for the human sciences, and a putting aside of the ill-advised or - as Culler (1981: 20) more mordantly muses - "futile attempt to distinguish the humanities from the social sciences". (Deely 1991: 567)

Define:mordant - "(especially of humour) having or showing a sharp or critical quality; biting."

It is not so much that "realism is in essence deeply mythic" (Con Davis 1985: 56) as that reality - the reality of human experience, wherein the line between what is dependent upon and independent [|] of interpretive acticity can never be finally drawn because that very line itself shifts with each new achievement of understanding - is in essence thoroughly semiosic. (Deely 1991: 570-571)

Jesus Christ.

In this context, one can appreciate Culler's reasons (1981: 35) for deeming literature - if not "the" at least "a" - "most interesting case of semiosis":
Though it is clearly a form of communication, it is cut off from the immediate pragmatic purposes which simplify other sign situations. The potentiol complexities of sigifying processes work freely in literature. Moreover, the difficulty of saying precisely what is communicated is here accompanied by the fact that signification is indubitably taking place. One cannot argue, as one might when dealing with physical objects or events of various kinds, that the phenomena in question are meaningless. Literature forces one to face the problem of the indeterminacy of meaning, which is a central if paradoxical property of semiotic systems. Finally, unlike so many other systems which are devoted to ends external to themselves and their own processes, literature is itself a continual exploration of and reflection upon signification in all its forms: an interpretation of experience; a commentary on the validity of various ways of interpreting experience; an exploration of the creative, revelatory, and deceptive powers of language; a critique of the codes and interpretive processes manifested in our languages and in previous literature. In so far as literature turns back on itself and examines, parodies, or treats ironically its own signifying procedures, it becomes the most complex account of signification we possess.
It is difficult to see how the word "account" is used here, where some synonym of "example" or "token" seems to be demanded by the context. (Deely 1991: 571)

Relevant for discussing the opposite case: when a literary work has clear external ends.

  • Culler, Jonathan 1981. The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [Internet Archive | lg]
No doubt the most startling example of mistaking semiotics from within its provided by the late notes of Bakhtin, who seems never to have recovered from his youthful conception of semiotics as of a piece with Russian Formalism (Bakhtin 1971: 147): "Semiotics deals primarily with the transmission of ready-made communication using a ready-made code. But in live speech, strictly speaking, communication is first created in the process of transmission, and there is, in essence" - which I interpret to say "prejacent to and independent of the anthroposemiosis itself" (unfortunately, this fragment concludes by ending in the middle of a tantalizing sentence posing "The problem of changing the code in inner speech...") - "no code." (Deely 1991: 584-585, n 19)

Tantalizing stuff indeed.

Johansen, reflecting our idea that it is more a question of semiotic surplus than of linguistic admixture that ought to guide our understanding of textuality, remarks flatly (1985: 286), as the reason for "the point made in [his] article", that "without taking into consideration the role played by nonverbal semiosis in the generation and interpretation of text meaning, the vary fact that meaning is possible becomes a mystery", and he dismisses as a "fiction" the idea that "verbal knowledge" can be derived or operate independently of the knower's experience - word meaning itself being already an abduction. (Deely 1991: 585, n 21)

Most of this lengthy paper was just a clever advertisement for Johansen's work.

Kull, Kalevi; Bogdanova, Olga; Gramigna, Remo; Heinapuu, Ott; Lepik, Eva, Lindström, Kati; Magnus, Riin; Moss, Rauno Thomas; Ojamaa, Maarja; Pern, Tanel; Põhjala, Priit; Pärn, Katre; Raudmäe, Kristi; Remm, Tiit; Salupere, Silvi; Soovik, Ene-Reet; Sõukand, Renata; Tønnessen, Morten; Väli, Katre 2015. A hundred introductions to semiotics, for a million students: Survey of semiotics textbooks and primers in the world. Sign Systems Studies 43(2/3): 281-346. DOI: 10.12697/SSS.2015.43.2-3.09 [utlib.ee]

An increase in the number of introductory courses is especially notable in the countries where some universities provide a degree in semiotics, e.g., Italy, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Brazil (Kull 2009). What all these issues demonstrate is the need for an overview of semiotics textbooks. Indeed, at the University of Tartu as a semiotics centre, with its full-scope programme in semiotics (including majors on the bachelor's, master's, and doctoral levels), the need to address this topic is particularly acutely felt. Thus, our purpose is to give a (pluri)review of all existing introduction to semiotics. (Kull et al. 2015: 282)

What's going on in Brazil?

This means that we have not included textbooks that deal with some particular branch of semiotics, e.g. only with sociosemiotics (e.g., Leeuwen 2005), visual semiotics (e.g., Sonesson 1988), biosemiotics (e.g., Hoffmeyer 2008), or literary semiotics (e.g. Simpkins 2001), semiotics of film, theatre, etc. (Kull et al. 2015: 283)
  • Simpkins, Scott 2001. Literary Semiotics: A Critical Approach. Lanham: Lexington Books. [ESTER]
However, introductory textbooks that attempt to give a general overview while departing from a particular field or approach in semiotics (e.g, Peircean and pragmatist perspective in Tejera 1988; or semiotics of text in Pozzato 2004; or non-verbal communication in Leeds-Hurwiz 1993) are included. (Kull et al. 2015: 283)
  • Tejera, Victorino 1988. Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression. Leiden: Brill. [ESTER]
Anthologies and readers — This category comprises various anthologies and readers which assemble full key texts or extracts from significant texts in semiotics, often arranged in chronological order. Among the works of this type, the first one - and still one of the best - to be published in English was an introductory anthology by Robert E. Innis (1985) that also contains introductory comments on classic texts. Another collection titled Frontiers in Semiotics (Deely et al. 1986) is supplied with an introduction by John Deely and characterized by a broad treatment of semiotics. Another early anthology was compiled by Martin Blonsky (1985). (Kull et al. 2015: 284)
  • Innis, Robert E. (ed.) 1985. Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology. Bloomington: Indian University Press. [ESTER]
  • Deely, John; Williams, Brooke; Kruse, Felicia (eds.) 1986. Frontiers in Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [ESTER | lg]
  • Blonsky, Marshall (ed.) 1985. On Signs. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. [ESTER | lg]
This small book by Roland Barthes was the earliest in this group. It introduces the terminology of the French structuralist school departing from Saussure. [...] Barthes considers semiology as a part of translinguistics studying "great signifying unities of discourse" (Barthes 1995[1964]: 11), an area that is still trying to take definite [|] shape. The elements of semiology presented in the book are extracted from linguistics: language and speech, signifier and signified, syntagm and system, denotation and connotation. After a theoretical explanation of his key notions, comparing linguistic and semiological approaches, Barthes introduces the semiological prospects of these terms (for example, the garment and the food systems). Barthes also discusses the problems of these notions when describing various systems. He considers reconstituting the functioning of the systems of significations other than language to be the aim of semiological research. (Kull et al. 2015: 286-287)

I have fastidiously managed to avoid Barthes as much as possible. Perhaps his Elements of Semiology could be a not-too-upsetting introduction to his thought.

— Bense's Semiotik: Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen [Semiotics: General Theory of Signs] (1967)!br /!This is a short but very dense and original introduction to Peircean semiotics. First, it gives an overview of Peirce's theory of signs (abstract semiotics), then moving on to the issues of ontology and epistemology of signs. Finally, Peirce's classification of ten sign types is applied to the signs of natural language as well as different types of language. The work is richly illustrated with comprehensive diagrams. (Kull et al. 2015: 287)

Now I finally know what to call Peircean semiotics in general.

— Trabant's Elemente der Semiotik [Elements of Semiotics] (1976)!br /!The textbook focuses on introding semiotics as a new discipline. Trabant begins by quoting various renowned scholars (Locke, Lambert, Hegel, Sasusure, Morris and Klaus-Buhr) on what semiotics is. Philosophy and linguistics are seen as primary sources of semiotics, complemented by influences from cybernetic theory of information.!br /!The first part of the work gives an overview of the foundations of the theory of signs (Saussure, Morris, information theory). The second part develops the notion of sign as action. Trabant is a proponent of deveoping semiotics based on the theory of action, which could also be read as a critique of the positions on semiotics cited in the first part of the work. Trabant uses speech act theory, Wittgenstein's approach and hermeneutics to formulate the basis of his theory. A semiotic approach, as he says, should not be based on information theory's concept of communication, but on communication as action. (Kull et al. 2015: 290)

This one comes across as the most sympathetic to my own views.

— Scholes' Semiotics and Interpretation (1982)
Scholes' book could rightfully have the subtitle "Introduction to literary semiotics", but we have included it in our review as an excellent example of a user-friendly textbook on applying semiotics in the humanities. The author is concerned about the pedagogical aspects of his work and stresses the importance of the students' own interpretation: "the student's productivity is the culmination of the pedagogical process" (Scholes 1982: 4-5). To achieve this purpose, the student must be exposed to models of interpretive texts. Scholes offers a useful and inspirational set of such models based on the ideas of Jakobson, Barthes, Riffaterre, Lotman, Todorov, Genette and other scholars. The addendum of this valuable book consists of a little glossary and a commented bibliography. (Kull et al. 2015: 292)
  • Scholes, Robert 1982. Semiotics and Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press. [Internet Archive | ESTER]
— Silverman's The Subject of Semiotics (1984)
This book is not really an introduction but is intended as a methodological guide which claims the centrality of psychoanalysis to semiotics. The work covers the ideas of Saussure, Peirce, Barthes, Derrida and Benveniste, but the main heroes for the author are Freud and Lacan. Her point is that the human subject is the subject of central importance to semiotics. The book includes a post-structuralist (and feminist) introduction to the analysis of film and literature as studied in connection with viewers and readers. Thus, it represents an original approach for advanced-level students. (Kull et al. 2015: 293)
  • Silverman, Kaja 1983. The Subject of Semiotics. New York: Oxford University Press. [Internet Archive]
— Sless' In Search of Semiotics (1986)
David Sless seems to be best known for his claim that "semiotics is far too important an enterprise to be left to semioticians" (Sless 1986: 1) which is the opening sentence of the book. Indeed, one of the stated aims of his book is to make semiotics more accessible to a general audience by discarding obscure jargon. The book is easy to read, with each chapter concentrating on one topic summarized at the end of the chapter. All in all, it is a short and clear presentation of Sless's conception of semiotics. For the author, semiotics is first and foremost the study of communication and understanding. Within communication, there are two kinds of semiosis: one within the author/text relation and the other within the reader/text relation; researchers into semiotics must occupy one of these positions. Much of his book is devoted to the analysis of the different positions that can be taken by participants in communication. In this sense, as Sless claims, semiotics is not a science, as communication cannot be studied from a neutral position (Sless 1986: 38). Another problem that Sless explores is the question of meaning, which he defines as "the end product of semiosis" (Sless 1986: 91). The last two chapters of the book are dedicated to semiotic research and the founders of semiotics. Whie some aspects of the book could be considered outdated, it is noteworthy in its goal to guide the reader away from semioticians and towards semiotics. (Kull et al. 2015: 294)
  • Sless, David 1986. In Search of Semiotics. London: Croom Helm. [Internet Archive]
— Clarke's Principles of Semiotic (1987)
This is a brief introduction to semiotics as a discipline on language and logic, written in an enjoyably lucid style. In this sense, it is a good coursebook on the Peircean school of semiotics from the point of view of a philosopher of language. Clarke starts his history of semiotics from the antiquity, concluding that semiotics was mostly applied in the field of medicine where a symptom stands for a disease. He discusses the views of Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans on linguistic semiotics, paying much attention to Sextus Empiricus. Mediaeval authorities noted include St. Augustine and William of Ockham. From the field of communication theory, a treatment of H. P. Grice and the theory of speech acts is included. In the final chapter, entitled "Language", Quine, Frege and Kripke are covered. (Kull et al. 2015: 294)
  • Clarke, David S. 1987. Principles of Semiotic. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Internet Archive]
Deely's conception of the sign entails that it mediates between physical reality and any experience of reality (as well as between reality as it exists in physical terms and reality as it comes into being by way of influence from the future). The fifth edition, published in 2009 by Tartu University PRess, contains five new chapters into which he incorporates his by then developed thought about the human being as a semiotic animal (rather than a rational animal pace Aristotle or res cogitans, i.e. a thinking thing pace Descartes). A crucial distinction is that between objects (mind-dependent being) and things (mind-independent being) - a distinction Deely claims only the semiotic animal is capable of drawing. (Kull et al. 2015: 296)

It might be time to re-read Basics of Semiotics. Reading it as a first year student might have been a mistake.

— Johansen's and Larsen's Signs in Use: An Introduction to Semiotics (1994, English ed. 2002)
Two Danish professors of comparative literature have authored a balanced approach to semiotics in which the concepts of discourse and narrative occupy a prominent place. Vivid illustrations and examples from different walks of life render the subject comprehensible, yet not oversimplified. A professionally compiled glossary and biographical sketches of persons covered in the book provide a useful supplement. [.|.] The main focus of the book nevertheless is on the semiotics of text. Discourse analysis and its various methods, as well as modern narratology, are discussed quite thoroughly. Text is understood as semiosis rather than as a complex structure. (Kull et al. 2015: 299-300)

For some reason I seem to be gravitating towards literary semiotics here.

  • Johansen, Jørgen D.; Larsen, Svend E. 2002[1994]. Signs in Use: An Introduction to Semiotics. London: Routledge. [ESTER]
— Lidov's Elements of Semiotics (1999)
Lidov's book is a good theoretical study on general semiotics. The text is arranged to be useful to the novice, presenting the theory of semiotics in the context of classic sources David Lidov understands semiotics as a comparative perspective of the artifacts of conscious life. This makes him also pay attention to the possibilities of the existence of unconscious signs. The authors he is using include, e.g., Hjelmslev, Martinet, Goodman. He speaks about structuralism as a supplement to pragmatism. Among othes, he says: "I meniton Greimasian theory because of its influence and suggestiveness, but I have not been able to discover any grounds for believing it" (Lidov 1999: 137). Lidov's background in the theory of music gives advantage to represent different theories and models in clear and playful manner. (Kull et al. 2015: 304)
  • Lidov, David 1999. Elements of Semiotics. New York: St. Martin's Press. [Internet Archive]
— Merrell's Signs for Everybody, or, Chaos, Quandries, and Communication (2000)
While this book purports to be about "semiotics for everybody", one could argue that Signs for Everybody is not really an introduction to semiotics but an introduction to Peircean semiotics. Still, Peirce's person plays a marginal role here compared to his philosophy. In fact, Merrell has chosen to avoid the history of semiotics altogether and present instead an explanation of the basic semiotic categories. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's concept of the sign, he moves on to the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness, the different types of signs, and the action of signs. After this, Merrell proceeds to the second major theme of the book: the criticism of binarism. For this purpose, he adopts terms and concepts borrowed from mathematics and quantum physics, attempting to show that life and semiosis cannot be described in purely linear and binary terms. (Kull et al. 2015: 304)
  • Merrell, Floyd 2000. Signs for Everybody, or Chaos Quandries and Communication. New York: Legas. [ESTER]

Lotman, Juri; Uspenski, Boriss 2013[1971]. Kultuuri semiootilisest mehhanismist. Tõlkinud Peet Lepik. — Uspenski, Boriss, Vene kultuuri jõujooni: valik artikleid. Koostanud Peet Lepik ja Boriss Uspenski; tõlkinud ja kommenteerinud Peet Lepik, Malle Salupere ja Andres Ehin; toimetanud Silvi Salupere. Tartu: Ilmamaa, 207-239. {Л·208}

[...] iga ajaloos esinev kultuur sünnitab teatud temale iseloomuliku kultuurimudeli. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 207)

Viimati lugesin seda teksti käesoleva aasta alguses (vt JJA 2023-01). Kaks korda ühe aasta jooksul sama maja röövida — nad ei oska seda oodatagi! Faili (Uspenski raamatu PDF-i) koos allajoonimistega olen muidugi ära kaotanud — tegelikult ei viitsi lihtsalt üles otsida, sest postituses on lisaks rõhutatud kohtadele ka kommentaarid — mistõttu esimese asjana joonistasin uuesti raamid ümber katkenditele, mis on juba siin blogis olemas. Üritan nii palju kui võimalik laveerida ümber nende (siin samas kohe selle ennatliku reegli vastu eksides) ja teostada sellist mitmekordset ülelugemist, mida kunagi kavatsesin (edutult) teostada ühe Baldwini tihke tekstiga. Igal juhul ei ole ülelugemine mõttetu ja mõttetu oleks hoopis minna seminari ilma, et oleks tekstiga värskelt tuttav.

Põhiline siin on see, et "teatud [kultuurile endale] iseloomulik kultuurimudel" vastab minu arvates kultuuri enesemudelile, st korraga enesekirjeldus [~tooken] ja teaduslik "mudel" sellest, misasi on kultuur [~tüüp].

Kogu määrangute mitmekülgsuses võib samal ajal eristada ka midagi ühist, mis nähtavasti vastab mõnedele kultuurile intuitiivselt omistatavatele tunnustele termini mis tahes tõlgendamise korral. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 207)

Kultuurimääratlustel on ühisosa, mis on intuitiivselt (justkui a priori) mõistetavad.

Sellegipoolest läheb kultuuril niisugust vastandumist alati vaja. Just kultuurist saab seejuures opositsiooni markeeritud liige. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 208)

Markeeritud kultuur ja markeerimata mitte-kultuur.

inimkogemuse kondenseerimisvõime (erinevalt looduse algkujulisusest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 208)

Justkui artoonika põhitees: kunst (tinglikult järeletehtu) on mingis mõttes "algkujulise" (looduse) modelleerimise (vähendamise, kondenseerimise) tulemus.

[...] kusjuures ka võitlus vanade rituaalidega võib omandada eriliselt ritualiseeritud iseloomu. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 209)

See on iseenesest päris kõnekas ülekanne kirjanduse sfäärist: innovatiivne võitlus iganenud vormidega muutub ajapikku ise iganenud vormiks.

[...] siis Pauli tegevuses ilmneb märgilisuse järsk rõhutamine nendes (käitumis)vormides, mis olid juba olemas. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 209)

Vt nt kuidas Putin on approprieerinud nii Tsaari ja Nõukogude (kahepäine kotkas tema luksusmõisa sissepääsu kohal, Georgi lint, jne) sümboolikat.

Sapir-Whorfi hüpoteesi kannul on mitmes töös rõhutatud ja uuritud keele mõju inimkultuuri mitmesugustele ilmingutele. Viimasel ajal on Émile Benveniste toonitanud, et metakeele rolli võivad täita üksnes loomulikud keeled ja ses mõttes on neil inimese kommunikatsioonisüsteemides täiesti eriline koht. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 210)

Ilmselt tema nö "metasemiootika" (vt Eco 1976: 30, n 1).

Kuid tundub vaieldavana, kui autor selles artiklis teeb ettepaneku pidada pärissemiootilisteks süsteemideks ainult loomulikke keeli ja kõiki teisi kultuurimudeleid semantilisteks - niisugusteks süsteemideks, millel puudub oma süsteemne semioos ja mis selle laenavad loomulike keelte sfäärist. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 210)

St Benvenistel on tõenäoliselt eristus semiootiliste ja semantiliste süsteemide vahel. Lotman ja Uspenski vaidlevad vastu, et ka muudel kultuurimudelitel (st eeldatavasti mitte-keelelised märgisüsteemid) on ka oma "süsteemne semioos", mis kõlab päris hästi.

Kultuur on struktuursuse generaator, ja sedaviisi loob ta inimest ümbritseva sotsiaalse sfääri, mis biosfääri kombel teeb võimalikuks elu - siiski mitte orgaanilise, vaid ühiskondliku elu. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 211)

Ühiskonna ja kultuuri suhe on leidnud siin ühe sõnastuse (paljudest võimalikest). Kultuur teeb ühiskondliku elu võimalikuks, eeldatavasti, tänu loomulikule keelele ja muudele märgisüsteemidele, mis on loomulikust keelest tuletatud.

Struktuursuse presumptsioonil, mis keelelise suhtlemisvilumuse resultaadina välja kujuneb, on võimas korrastav toime kommunikatsioonivahendite kompleksile tervikuna. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 211)

Pani mõtlema presupposition'i mõistele Eco semiootikateoorias.

Niisiis baseerub kogu inimkogemuse säilitamise ja vahendamise süsteem teataval kontsentrilisusel, mille keskmes asuvad enesestmõistetavamad ja püsikindlamad (n.-ö. kõige struktuursemad) struktuurid). Äärealadele lähemal paiknevad moodustised, millede struktuursus ei ole ilmne või pole [|] leidnud tõestust, kuid mis üldistesse märgilis-kommunikatsioonilistesse situatsioonidesse sisestatuna funktsioneerivad struktuuridena. Niisugustel kvaasistruktuuridel on inimkultuuris nähtavasti väga kaalukas koht. Veel enamgi: just teatav seesmine korrastamatus, poolik plaanipärasus tagab nii inimkultuuri suurema sisemise mahutavuse kui ka dünamismi, mida korrapärasemad süsteemid ei tunne. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 211-212)

See jällegi kõlab nagu Jakobsoni kontsentriline mudel, mille keskmes on keeleteadus, natukene väljaspool semiootika, sellest väljaspool sotsiaalantropoloogia ning päris servas vist majandus vms. Mõte on sarnane: keskmes on kõige "enesestmõistetavad ja püsikindlamad" märgilised nähtused, aga äärealadel nähtused, millel on oma semiootiline aspekt olemas kui vähegi lähemalt vaadata. Ka katkendi lõpus rõhutatud tsentri-perifeeria dünaamika võib sellisest vaatekohast toimida: vähem-struktureeritud süsteemide "seesmine korrastamatus" on nagu varu, mida saab alati asuda struktureerima.

Meie käsitame kultuuri kui kollektiivi mittepäriliku mälu, mis avaldub teatava keeldude ja ettekirjutuste süsteemina. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 212)

Taolistest väljaütlemistest võis Eco (1976: 12-13) jällegi järeldada, et Tartu-Moskva koolkonnas tegeletakse väärtuste, normide, reeglite ja muu mitte-otseselt-semiootilisega ("ettekirjutus" on teatud metafoorilise "grammatikana" mõistetuna arusaadavalt semiootiline, aga mitte iseenesest nii).

See tees ei välista individuaalse kultuuri võimalikkust, juhul kui keegi käsitab ennast kollektiivi esindajana, aga ka kõigil autokommunikatsiooni juhtudel, mispuhul üksik indiviid täidab - kas ajas või ruumis - kollektiivi eri liikmete funktsioone ja moodustab faktiliselt grupi. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 212)

Kui seda siin lugeda kahasse tema nö kommunikatsioonimudeliga artiklis "Kultuurisemiootika ja teksti mõiste" (vt Lotman 2022: 57-59), siis ilmneb, et kultuur on sotsiaalne nähtus metonüümiliselt ja metafooriliselt (just selles järjekorras): kollektiivi esindajana on üksikisik osa ühiskonnast ja siin on tegu (2) auditooriumi ja kultuuritraditsiooni vahelise suhtlemisega; kollektiivi eri liikmete funktsioone täites on üksikisik ühiskonnaga isomorfne või sarnanev olem ja siin on tegu (3) lugeja suhtlemisel iseendaga. Sellisel lugemisel on veel huvitavaid tagajärgi, mida ma hetkel veel ei suuda adekvaatselt välja joonistada.

Edasi, kultuur kultuur on mälu või teisisõnu mälusalvestis sellest, mida kollektiiv on juba läbi elanud, on ta vältimatult seotud möödunud ajalookogemusega. Järelikult sünnihetkel kultuuri kui niisuguse olemasolu ei saagi sedastada; kultuur teadvustatakse alles post factum. Kui juttu tehakse uue kultuuri loomisest, siis toimub paratamatu etteaimamine, s.t. hakatakse tõenäoliseks pidama seda, mis (nagu eeldatakse), saab rekonstrueeritava tuleviku seisukohast mäluks (loomulikult võib niisuguse oletuse õigustatust demonstreerida vaid tulevik). (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 212-213)

Kammkultuuri esindajad ei teadnud ilmtingimata, et nad on kammkultuuri esindajad (selleks on nad osutunud tagantjärele).

Seega (käitumise) programm toimib suunatud süsteemina: programmi koostaja vaatevinklist on programm suunatud tulevikku; käitumise (programmi) realiseerituse vaatevinklist on kultuur pööratud minevikku. Sellest järeldub, et erinevus käitumisprogrammi ja kultuuri vahel on funktsionaalne: üks ja sama tekst võib olla nii seda kui teist, olles antud kollektiivi üldises ajalookangas eristatav funktsiooni poolest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 213)

Ütlen ausalt, ma ei tea mis siin täpselt toimub — mis käitumisprogrammist jutt käib. Järgmises lõigus räägitakse "semiootilistest reeglitest, mille järgi inimkonna elukogemus kultuuriks muutub. Neid viimaseid saabki tõlgendada programmina". Üsna ebamäärane, kujundlik kraam.

Teatud juhtudel võib nende kahe aspekti vahel puududa otsene kooskõla: nii näiteks võib eri liiki eelarvamusi käsitada elementidena aegunud kultuuritekstist, mille kood on kaduma läinud, s.t. niisuguse juhuna, kus tekst elab koodist kauem. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214)

Paneb mõtlema traditsionalistlikest meestest, kes meemivad, et "naise koht on köögis", aga ei taha mõeldagi selle ettepaneku presuppositsioonist, et mehe koht on järelikult tööl ja tema roll ulatada kogu oma palgatšekk naisele köögis. See loosung on jäänud püsima näitena (teisesenenud funktsiooniga) tekstist, mille kood (ühiskonnakorraldus, milles sugu määrab eluvaldkonna) on juba hääbunud.

On iseloomulik, et paljud struktuurid ei võimalda üldse enda kehtestatud reeglite aktuaalsuse kuigivõrd olulist muutmist, teisisõnu väärtuste mis tahes ümberhindamist. Seega ei ole kultuur tihtipeale häälestatud hankima teadmist tulevikust - tulevik kangastub seiskunud ajana - ja tulevikuks saab piaks veninud "nüüd". See on aga vahetult seotud orientatsiooniga minevikku, mis tagab hädavajaliku stabiilsuse; ja see on kultuuri eksisteerimise üks tingimusi. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214)

Selle pikaksveninud nüüd-i tehniline nimetus on "the specious present". Üldiselt näib see katkend rõhutavat, et mälusalvestise või käitumisprogrammina ei soosi "paljud struktuurid" kultuuris innovatsiooni. // Minu jaoks on praegu oluline hoopis vastupidine nähtus: tulevikust teadmiste hankimise semiootilised mehhanismid. St ajaloo-semiootika asemel otsin futuro-semiootikat.

Pikaealisuse poolest moodustavad tekstid kultuuri sees hierarhia, mis tavaliselt samastatakse väärtuste hierarhiaga. Kõige väärtuslikumaks saab pidada tekste, mis antud kultuuri kriteeriumide kohaselt on maksimaalselt püsivad ehk pankroonilised (kuigi võimalikud on ka "nihestatud" kultuurianomaaliad, mil kõrgeima hinnangu saab hetkelisus). [|] See võib kooskõlastuda teksti fikseerimiseks kasutatavate materjalidega ning tekstide säilitamise koha ja mooduste hierarhiaga. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214-215)

Koodide hierarhia ei tundu pooltki niivõrd problemaatiline kui tekstide hierarhia, kuigi teine on konkreetsem-materiaalsem (tekstid raamatukogus ja arhiivis on kõrgemalt hinnatud kui tänavatekstid, kellegi "mina olin siin" gräffiti).

Koodi pikaealisuse määrab tema struktuuri põhitegurite konstantsus ja seesmine dünamism - võime muutuda, säilitades samal ajal mälestusi eelnenud seisunditest ja järelikult teadmist oma ühtsusest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 215)

Aspekt, mida saaks väga kergesti ümber lülitada (või seda sealt otsida) kultuuri enesemudeli temaatikas.

Faktide jada muutumist tekstiks saadab alati selektsioon, s.o. ühtede, tekstielementideks siirdatavate sündmuste fikseerimine ja teiste, olematuteks kuulutatavate unustamine. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 215)

Nt kui inimkond jutustab iseendale inimkonna terviklugu, siis üks maailmajuhtidega seksiv naine võib pälvida terve peatüki, aga terved paljumiljonilised rahvused minna vähimagi mainimiseta.

Tekst ei ole tegelikkus; ta on aines selle rekonstrueerimiseks. Sellepärast peab dokumendi semiootiline analüüs alati eelnema ajaloolisele. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 215)

Need kaks poolust (ajalooline ja semiootiline analüüs) vajavad eraldi käsitlemist (mu praeguses ettevõtmises).

Seega kollektiivse mälu mahu teatavad piirangud on eeldatavad ja tingivadki säärase ühtede tekstide väljatõrjumise teiste poolt. Kuid teistsugustel juhtudel saab ühtede tekstide puudumine teiste olemasolu vältimatuks tingimuseks - nende semantilise kokkusobimatuse tõttu. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 216)

Orwell tõrjub välja Burdekini jne. Kui mul saabuvad rahakamad ajad siis hakkan (RVL-i kaudu) jahtima haruldaseid raamatuid (nt Burdekini Quiet Ways), eriti selliseid, millest võib leida arvustusi, aga mitte raamatut ennast, justkui neid enam ei eksisteerikski, nagu nad oleksid mingid fantoomid (nt Isbyami Infinity and Ego).

Kui tõusuaegadel loovad ühiskondlikud [|] formatsioonid paindlikke ja dünaamilisi mudeleid, mis pakuvad kollektiivsele mälule avaraid võimalusi ja soosivad selle avardumist, siis sotsiaalset loojangut saadab reeglina kollektiivse mälumehhanismi tardumine ning mälu ahenemise kasvav tendent. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 216-217)

Jõudeaegadel on mahti pluralismiks; vaevalistel aegadel jätkub energiat vaid argiolmeks ja ellujäämiseks.

Esimesel juhul omandab põhimõttelise tähenduse muuhulgas küšimus "kuidas seda või teist nähtust nimetatakse?". Vastavalt sellel võidakse ebaõige nimetamisakt samastada teistsuguse sisuga (vt. allpool). Vrd. keskaegsete otsingutega, leidmaks nime nendele või teistele hüpostaasidele, mis vabamüürlastel on muide jäädvustatud rituaalis. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 217)

Silme ette tulevad kabalistlikud skeemid, milles arvudele antakse nimetus ja sisu. (Endiselt ei ole veel lugenud Lotmani artiklit vabamüürlastest 1992. aasta Akadeemias.)

Vastavalt sellele võib eristada kultuure, mis keskenduvad peamiselt väljendustasandile, ja kultuure, mis keskenduvad peamiselt sisutasandile. On sege, et juba väljendustasandile keskendumise faktis endas, käitumisvormide range ritualiseerimise faktis endas peitub tavaliselt väljendusplaani ja sisuplaani vastastikku ühene (ja mittemeelevaldne) suhe, nende vastastikuse põhimõttelise lahutamatuse omaksvõtt (nagu see on iseloomulik eriti keskaegses ideoloogias) või tõendus väljendustasandi mõjust sisutasandile. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 218)

Mis on kultuuritüpoloogiad?

Mis tahes elavasse kultuuri on orgaaniliselt sisestatud vasturääkivus süsteemsuse pideva täiustamispüüde ja samas pideva võitluse vahel struktuuri automatiseerumise vastu, mis täiustamise taotlemisel tekib. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 229)

Täiustumisele püüdlev innovatsioon vs automatiseerunud arhaism.

Inimene pole pelgalt kogu muust loodusest märgatavalt muutlikuma maailma osa, vaid ühtlasi ta suhtub muutlikkuse ideesse endasse täiesti teistmoodi. Kui kõigi orgaaniliste olendite püüdluseks on neid ümbritseva keskkonna stabiliseerimine, kogu nende muutlikkus on püüd jääda muutumatuks maailmas, mis muutub hoolimata nende vajadusest, siis inimese jaoks on keskkonna muutlikkus olemise loomulik tingimus; tema jaoks on normiks elada muutuvates oludes - eluviisi muutumine. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 229)

Epigraafiliselt relevantne inimloomuse voolavusele.

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