AC: Mihhail Lotman

Mihhail Lotman

1. Kas autokommunikatsioon korrastab isikut ennast või informatsiooni/tähendust/teadmisi?

On olemas erinevaid autokommunikatsiooni vorme ja need korrastavad erinevaid asju. Kui ma lähen poodi siis teen endale nimekirja nendest asjadest mida ma ostan - see on autokommunikatsioon mis korrastab minu poeskäiku. Samas see distsiplineerib, et ei osta igasugust träni mida on poes kiusatus osta, aga on täiesti mõttetud. Loon ette sellise nimekirja mis on vajalikud asjad ja siis see korrastab ja distsiplineerib, aga mitte minu mõtlemist vaid minu tarbimist. Täiesti teine asi on näiteks see kui ma peaksin päevikut ja kirjutaksin igal õhtul üles mis mul päeval juhtus, mida ma mõtlesin jne - sellel võivad ka olla väga erinevad eesmärgid. Päevikupidamise klassikaline eesmärk oli 18. ja 19. sajandil eetiline areng. Ma kirjutan üles oma vead, patud jne - see oli selline ateistlik ekvivalent pihile, aga ei pihi mitte preestrile vaid pihin iseendale. Ja sellega ma korrastan näiteks oma käitumist, oma eetilisi tõekspidamisi jne. Need kaks eri tüüpi on ka seotud eri paigutusega ajalises dimensioonis. Kui ma lähen poodi ja teen nimekirja, see on autokommunikatsioon mis on suunatud (lähi)tulevikku. Kui ma kirjutan üles mis minuga päeval juhtus, siis see on palju keerulisem asi. Ma fikseerin iseenda positsiooni mineviku suhtes selleks mingisuguseid korrektiive tuua tuleviku käitumisse, hoiakutesse jne. Kuid on olemas ka kolmas võimalus kus ma lihtsalt kirjutan üles oma mõtteid selleks, et neid läbi analüüsida ja siis ma korrastan mõtteid. Kuid kõige levinuim autokommunikatsiooni vorm on mitte fikseeritud tekst vaid lihtsalt mõtted. Noh, käin, mõtlen - mõnikord täiesti suvalistest asjadest, mõnikord ma mõtlen selle üle mida teha, mõnikord ma mõtlen selle üle kuidas ma mõtlen. Kõik need korrastavad erinevaid asju ja autokommunikatsiooni puhul nagu igasuguse teise kommunikatsiooni puhul on olulised kaks tüüpi. Mõnikord nagu faatilises funktsioonis sa kommunikeerid lihtsalt selleks, et kommunikeerida. Selle faatilise funktsiooni eesmärk on identiteedi kehtestamine ja üleval hoidmine. Igaüks meist mõtleb selle üle kes ta on ja väga tihti kõige tähtsamad asjad on üldse alateadlikud. Hommikul ärkad ja sa tead kes sa oled. Kust sa seda tead? Kust sa tead, et sa oled see sama kes sa olid eile? Kurjuures erinevate haiguste puhul on see nagu arvuti: lülitad sisse, aga ta ei mäleta; kõik tuled põlevad, aga op-süsteem ei tule ette. Ja see on väga oluline autokommunikatsiooni eksistentsiaalne funktsioon, et sa tead kes sa oled.

See oli kõige põhjalikuim vastus senimaani ja sul olid kohe näited olemas, mida ma tavaliselt pean pinnima välja inimestelt. Ma pean ütlema suur aitäh juba esimese vastuse peale.

No lähme edasi!

2. Millal on tekst autokommunikatiivne: kas esimesel, korduval või igasugusel lugemisel?

Võõra teksti või enda teksti puhul?

See küsimus on Henry Bromsist lähtuv, sest tema jaoks iga tekst ei ole autokommunikatiivne. Tema näide oli see, et kui sa loed Anna Kareninat siis sa ei saa midagi teada rongiliiklusest venemaal, aga sa saad mingit naudingut.

Aa, et tegu on ikka võõra tekstiga. Siin on jällegi: missugune tekst? Kui ma loen näiteks rongi sõiduplaani siis mis mõttes ta on autokommunikatiivne? Mõnes mõttes on, sest ma nagu tean, et rong tuleb alles kolme tunni pärast, ma jõuan ära käia poes, kõrtsis ja siis vaatame kas jõuan sellele rongile. Huvi pakuvad need juhtumid kui inimene loeb mingisugust teksti korduvalt. Siis ta enam ei taha teada mis seal juhtus - ta juba teab. Aga sellisel juhul ei ole kirjaniku tekst autokommunikatsioon - ta ei kirjuta seda sulle. Aga kui sa juba korra loed läbi siis teist korda loed sa seda teistmoodi. Võiame näiteks nimelt sellise teksti mis on kirjutatud meelelahutuse mõttes. Arthur Conan Doyle kirjutas Sherlock Holmes'i. See oli puhas haltuura: ta ei armastanud seda tegelast, ta ei tahtnud seda teha, ta üritas teda mitu korda tappa jne. Ja siis kõik normaalsed inimesed lugesid selle jaoks, et teada mis sealt tuleb. Aga nüüd Umberto Eco või mingisugused hullud uurijad, nagu ka mina, loeme korduvalt neid asju läbi ja saame sealt teistsugust informatsiooni. Minu jaoks on Hamlet selline tekst mida ma pidevalt loen ja ma pean ütlema, et peaaegu iga kord ma saan sealt midagi uut. See on peaaegu nagu puhas autokommunikatsioon. Uus tuleb mitte sellest, et seal on mingi uus väline informatsioon vaid uus on selle pärast, et ta resoneerub teistmoodi. Ehkki ma pean ütlema, et väga tihti ma leian uued teemad: armastuse käsitlus Hamletis ei ole üldse triviaalne; siis alkoholismi teema. Esimesel paarikümnel lugemisel ei pannud üldse tähele kui tähtis see on seal, aga on. See ongi nagu autokommunikatsioon, et sa saad uue informatsiooni sealt kust nagu ei tohiks saada. Sa mõtled iseenda mõtteid, no sa tead oma mõtteid, aga sa äkki jõuad millegi uueni. Nii on ka sellise teksti puhul. Ma võin sellele ka vastata mis on automaatne lugemine. Tihtipeale on religioosne lugemine selline: sa loed seda, ütleme, Meie Issa palvet, aga tegelikult sa ei saa aru mis seal toimub ja selle peale sa ei mõtle - sa loed selle pärast, et sa pead seda lugema. See ei ole nagu autokommunikatsioon, mingil määral on ka, just nagu iga mehhaaniline tegevus, aga see ei vaja süvenemist. Aga kui ma järjekordselt loen Hamletit siis mulle tundub, et ma lihtsalt jõuan sügavamale.

3. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud tagasiside mõistega?

See on hea küsimus, sest kui näiteks mingisugune autor kirjutab mingisugust kunstiteksti, siis on mingil määral tema mentaalse pildi ees mingi lugeja ja ta tegelikult tahab tagasisidet. Isegi sellistel ekstreemsetel kirjanikel nagu Nabokov. Ta väitis, et teda absoluutselt ei huvita lugeja ja ta ei kujuta ette... Ta ei taha kirjutada seal Ameerikas, Nõukogude Liidus tal ka lugejaid ei ole. Siis küsiti, et kelle jaoks ta kirjutab? Kahe inimese jaoks: iseenda jaoks ja oma ideaalsele alter egole - selline pool-skisofreeniline asi. Aga isegi sellisel juhul saab ta mingisugust tagasisidet oma ideaalselt alter egolt. Autokommunikatsiooni puhul see tagasiside on otsesem, vahetum ja valulisem kui tavalise kommunikatsiooni puhul. Iseennast on raskem petta. Võimalik, sest paljud tegelevad sellega väga edukalt, aga kui sa oled piisavalt kriitiline ja halastamatu enda suhtes siis on raske. Jällegi: mis tüüpi tekstiga on tegu? Mis tagasisidet ma ootan ostunimekirjast? Nota bene, ära unusta seepi? Siin muuseas on huvitav probleem - ma ei tea, kas edaspidi tuleb üles nendes küsimustes - et: autokommunikatiivse teksti kommunikatiivne struktuur. Näiteks inimesed räägivad iseendaga erinevas vormis. On inimesi kes räägivad iseendaga põhiliselt kolmandas isikus - "tema". Ja teatud vaimsetes situatsioonides ja kultuurides on see täiesti normaalne. Kotkasilm ei joonud! Kes see Kotkasilm on? Mina. Väga levinud on see, et räägitakse iseendaga teises isikus - sa produtseerid iseendas vestluskaaslase ja pöördud nagu tema poole, aga see tema oled jällegi sina. Iseendaga rääkides sõna "mina" kasutamine ei ole sugugi levinud, see on mõnes mõttes kõige huvitavam juhus.

See on küll ühes küsimuses peaagu puudutatud.

Nojah, hea küll, siis on pool küsimust juba vastatud.

4. Kuidas suhtleb kultuur iseendaga?

Kui me vaatame kultuuri kui sellist elavat organismi siis ta sutleb iseendaga nagu... See on ka nendes [Kultuurisemiootika] teesides. Kui te lugesite siis näete, et kultuuris on autokommunikatsioon isegi tähtsam kui üksininimese jaoks. Inimene kes käib ja pomiseb omaette - praegu me saame aru, et ta räägib mobiiltelefoniga, aga kuskul 30 aastat tagasi oleksime arvanud, et tal on mingi kiiks. Aga kultuur räägib pidevalt omaette ja kultuuri jaoks on väga oluline see funktsioon millest ma juba rääksin, see enesele identiteedi kehtestamine. Kultuur peab endale pidevalt meelde tuletama kes ta on. See, et hommikul ärkan üles ja ikka olen mina. Kultuuri puhul me teame tuhandeid rahvaid ainult nimepidi; kusjuures me teame, et neid ei ole hävitatud, aga nad lihtsalt kaotasid identsuse iseendaga.

5. Kas mõtlemine on autokommunikatsioon?

Üks autokommunikatsiooni vorme on mõtlemine. Kas mõtlemine on ainult autokommunikatsioon? Ei pruugi olla. Kui ma lahendan matemaatilist ülesannet siis see ei ole eriti autokommunikatsioon, aga see on mõtlemine. Autokommunikatsioon on üks väga oluline mõtlemise vorm ja teised kommunikatsioonivormid tihtipeale algavad autokommunikatsioonist. Kõige lihtsam näide: teed ettekannet, aga ette mõtled selle läbi, mõnikord isegi kirjutad läbi.

6. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla sisemiste adressaatidega suhtlemine?

Seda ma just ütlesin, jah, see ongi nii. Ja see ei pruugi tähendada mingisugust paranoiat. Sellel võivad olla puhtalt sellised... Ühelt poolt kogemuslikud, aga teiselt poolt esteetilised eesmärgid. Näiteks kui ma luuletan.

7. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud automudelitega (enesekirjeldusega)?

Iga enesekirjeldus tähendab autokommunikatsiooni. See on nagu ühepoolne suhe. Kas enesekirjeldus mõjutab ka autokommunikatsiooni? Küllap mõjutab, aga ma ei oska praegu hoobilt öelda kuidas.

8. Võid sa kohapeal välja mõelda näite sellest kuidas AK kvalitatiivselt muudab informatsiooni?

Siin on see Hamleti näide. Mingisugune informatsiooni hulk on üks ja sama, aga autokommunikatsioon transformeerib seda. See aktiveerib ühed asjad ja teised asjad ei ole enam nii huvitavad. Ma mäletan, et kui ma esimesi kordi Hamletit lugesin siis mind huvitas väga selle filosoofiline problemaatika, siis kultuuriline taust jne. Aga praegu see enam nii väga ei huvita, vaatan rohkem selle psühholoogiat... Suur mõistatus on see Horatio kuju. Väga olulisel moel transformeerib.

Nüüd ma imestan, et Andreas Ventsel ei toonud Dostojevski Idiootide näidet, mida ta on kuus korda lugenud. Ta rääkis millestki hoopis muust, aga see selleks.

9. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib toimuda sõnumite edastamisega endale läbi ruumi (aja asemel)?

Ma ei saa küsimusest aru. Mis tähendab läbi ruumi ja mitte läbi aja?

Juri Lotmanil oli kardinaalne väide, et sõnumite edastamine mina-sina kanalis toimub läbi ruumi ja mina-mina kanalis läbi aja.

Aa.

Et kas võib olla ka vastupidi? On selline stsenaarium mõeldav?

Ma pean siis nagu füüsiliselt oma kehast siis väljuma või?

Kujutame ette.

No ma fantaseerin siis. On olemas sellised mälestused inimestel kes on kliinilises surmas, et kuidas nad näevad nagu iseennast seal lamamas. No vot, et võib enne operatsiooni sinna seina peale kirjutada: "Kuule, tule tagasi!" See on ruumis, aga üldiselt räägitakse, et analoogilist kogemust saab mingi väga tugeva narkootikumiga, näiteks meskaliiniga. Mul ei ole kliinilise surma kogemust. Võib ka muidugi vastupidi: olles iseendast väljas jätta kellelegi kirja...

Mulle tuleb kohe meelde see unenägude juhtum, et sa teed unenäos midagi, siis ärkad üles ja oled pettunud, et seda ei olegi päriselus tehtud.

10. Kas enesetaju on autokommunikatsiooni vorm?

Nagu juba esimesele küsimusele sai vastatud: enese teadvustamine on üks olulisi autokommunikatsiooni eesmärke niiet nad on seotud ja eneseteadlikkus on autokommunikatsiooni tulemus. Siin on inglise keeles kerge teha vahet [self-perception'il ja self-awareness'il], aga eesti keeles raske. Järelikult need asjad ei ole nii kaugel teineteisest.

Okei. Vastus on siin enam-vähem jah siis?

Jah, ma ütlesin, loomulikult...

Sest teiste vastused on kõik olnud ei.

See on jah, aga see ei ole üks ja sama, see on nagu põhjus-tagajärg, aga nad on kindlasti seotud.

11. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla puhtalt autoreferentsiaalne nagu see on süsteemiteoorias?

Kindlasti mitte.

Siis ta ongi selline erinevus süsteemiteooria ja kultuurisemiootik vahel?

Aga kus süsteemiteoorias on öeldud, et see on nii? Ma ei ole süsteemiteoorias üldse midagi autokommunikatsioonist lugenud. Ma muidugi lugesin süsteemiteooriat kolmkümmend aastat tagasi...

Kas ma peaksin rääkima siis?

No mis seal on?

See on suhteliselt hiljuti Luhmannist lähtuv...

Luhmann ei ole eriti tõsine autor süsteemiteooria seisukohalt. Ta on pigem sotsioloog. Ma mõtlesin ikka matemaatilist süsteemiteooriat: Shmarovs, Bertalanffy ja need... Minu jaoks olid seal hierarhilised struktuurid olulised. Kuidas see küsimus veel kord oli?

Ma selgitan oma sõnadega siis. Luhmannist lähtuvas süsteemiteoorias käib see umbes nii, et ennastloovates süsteemides on keskkond juba iseenda osa niiet ei olegi midagi väljaspool millele saaks viidata vaid kõik on juba süsteemis sees.

Kindlasti teie ei ole minu sees.

Kindlasti mitte.

Muidugi ei ole. Kui mõelda mis siin nüüd siis toimub... Kalevi Kull ei ole minu sees ja... Kalevi Kull on minu Umwelti oluline osa, aga siiski ma teen vahet - me ei ole üks füüsiline keha.

See on pigem küsimus, et kuidas võrrelda meie [kultuurisemiootilist] autokommunikatsooni selle autokommunikatsiooniga mis saab toimuda ainult sellega mis on sinu peas kui süsteemis juba sees. Ehk siis mitte ei ole väljast tulevat sisendit vaid autokommuniktasioon selles mõttes saab toimuda ainult sellega mis on juba sees.

Kui ma kommunikeerin iseendale, et mitte unustada homme rääkida Kaleviga mingitest meie õppetooli asjadest. See ei ole autoreferentsiaalne, sest see on täiesti normaalne tekst.
Okei, võtame järgmise küsimuse.

[Pöördub Kalevi Kulli poole] Kas sina ka tegid läbi selle inkvisitsiooni? [Kalevi vastab eitavalt]

See ei ole inkvisitsioon.

Ei ole inkvisitsioon, okei.

See on peaaegu nagu eksam, teile [kui õppejõududele]. Aga selline eksam kus ei ole õigeid vastuseid. [Kalevi Kull kostab taustal:] Suurepärane.

Ei, on küll õiged vastused. Õiged vastused on need mida mina annan.

12. Kuidas erineb autokommunikatsioon tavalisest märgiprotsessist e semioosist?

Anti Randviiru vastus oli, et ei erinegi. Aga mis on sinu vastus? Mis on see õige vastus?

Nüüd olen ma lollis olukorras - ma pean Antit ümber lükkama. See ei ole üldse minu eesmärk. Autokommunikatsioon on üpris spetsiifiline asi. Semioos on palju üldisem ja semioos võib üldse mitte kommunikatsiooniga seotud olla, ehkki täna siin on mitu korda väidetud vastupidist. Semioos on palju fundamentaalsem ja lihtsam asi. Kommunikatsioon on alati rajatud semioosil, kuid mitte vastupidi.

Ma arvan, et need ongi sellised vastused mida tudengid kes kunagi tulevikus loevad seda võivad tahta teada, et kuidas need suhted on.

13. Kuidas vaatleksid isiksust ühiskondlike koodide individuaalse valikuna?

Või kimbuna?

Kuidas ma vaataksin seda kimbuna? No kimbuna vaatangi!

Kuidas see mehhanism toimib?

See on siis "lihtne" lisaküsimus. Keeruliselt toimub. Filosoofias, sotsioloogias ja politoloogias on erinevad lähenemised. Tähendab, see ei ole semiootiline küsimus vaid pigem ühiskondlik. Minu vaatevinklist on inimesel palju isiklikku vabadust. Jah, meile on ette antud mingisugused koodid, mallid jne kuid koodide ja mallide eest ma ei vastuta. Ma vastutan selle eest mis ma teen ja oma tegudes ma realiseerin oma vabadust. Kusjuures need teod võivad olla täiesti koodimurdmised. Eriti teismelistel on see, et nad käituvad spetsiaalselt valesti.

14. Kas "auto-communication" erineb kuidagi "self-communication"-ist?

No misasi on self-communication, see ongi autokommunikatsioon. See on üks võimalus kuidas tõlkida autokommunikatsiooni. Auto on kreeka keeles, see on see sama.

15. Kuidas sina suhtled iseendaga?

No mis vormis, kas sina, mina või tema? Ma mitte kunagi ei suhtle "temaga". Ehkki jälle kui vaadata Freudi järgi siis mõnikord suhtleme ja "tema" on selline despoot meie sees. See on huvitav, et väga tihti sina-vormis, aga ainult mõnikord mina-vormis. Mul on praegu isegi raske täpselt defineerida millal, sest tihti see sõltub mitte kommunikatsioonivormis vaid tujust. Kui ma ei ole endaga rahul siis ma alati ütlen "sina" ja see ei ole sugugi harv.

AC: Andreas Ventsel

Andreas Ventsel

1. Kas autokommunikatsioon korrastab isikut ennast või informatsiooni/tähendust/teadmisi?

Kui me mõtestame autokommunikatsiooni Lotmani järgi siis on iga teksti funktsioon kommunikatsioonisüsteemis alati nii isikut kui ka informatsiooni taaskorrastada. Selles mõttes eeldab küsimus kindlasti mõlemapoolselt jah-vastust. Autokommunikatsioon korrastab nii isikut kui ka informatsiooni, sest autokommunikatsioon on igasuguse kommunikatsiooni üks komponent, me ei saa neid üksteisest lahutada. Teatud kultuuritüübid kalduvad rohkem autokommunikatsioon poole ja teised rohkem info edastamise poole. See sõltub siis vastavalt kultuuritüübist kui ka kontekstist kus see esineb. Just lõuna ajal rääkisime Marek Tammega, et alati tuleb rõhutada teksti ja konteksti üksteisest sõltuvust. Ei ole konteksti kui sellist, see on alati niiöelda relatsiooniline, et tekst loob konteksti ja kontekst teataval viisil loob ka teksti. Aga kui ma peaksin valima siis loomulikult peaks autokommunikatsioon teisendama või transformeerima isikut ennast ja samas teha saab ta seda üksnes selle kaudu, et see informatsioon mida ta enne teab saab kodeeritud lahti individuaalse koodiga, siis loomulikult ta süvendab või teisendab seda eelnevat informatsiooni ka. Mõlemad on olulised: muutub nii informatsioon, tähendus, teadmine kui ka siis isik ise, sest vähemalt lähtudes "Kultuurisemiootika ja teksti mõiste" artiklis välja toodud viiest teksti funktsioonist kommunikatsioonisüsteemis on see päris ilmne, et mõlemad muutuvad.

Silvil oli ka selline päris lihtne vastus, et see toimub astmeliselt: kõigepealt informatsioon ja siis sa ise. Ka hea.

2. Millal on tekst autokommunikatiivne: kas esimesel, korduval või igasugusel lugemisel?

Siingi on vastus umbes sama mis esimesel, sest ükski kommunikatsiooniakt ei toimu ilma autokommunikatiivse komponendita, kuid kui olla Lotmani tekstile truu siis peaks ütlema, et korduval lugemisel. Tekst vähemalt oma sisu tasandil peaks jääma samaks kui me ta vastu võtame ja siis autokommunikatsiooni käigus teda teisendama vastavalt sellele millised koodid me siis valime selle teksti lahti kodeerimiseks või selle teksti mõtestamiseks. Võib-olla "korduval" oleks neist kolmest valikust siis kõige parem. Vähemalt juhul kui me peame silmas just teksti mis tuleb sissepoole autokommunikatsiooni käigus. Esimeses küsimuses on ka see, et üks asi on see kui autokommunikatsioonis tuleb sisse tekst mida me siis uuesti hakkame kodeerima lahti, lisame uue koodi, siis teine tekst on see mis on juba läbinud selle kodeerimise. Kui peame silmas seda esimest teksti sisendust endale siis ta peab olema korduv, sest vastupidisel korral oleks ta lihtsalt uue informatsioonipaki niiöelda edasiandmine kus suureneb informatsiooni teadjate hulk aga mitte informatsioon ei muutu selle käigus.

3. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud tagasiside mõistega?

Kuidas sina ise seda raamistaksid?

Tundub, et sellest võiks mõelda natuke Peirce-likult, et autokommunikatsiooni käigus ma kodeerin ühe ja sama teksti uue koodiga, vahetan koodi ja saan uue tähenduse ja paiskan selle uuesti kommunikatsiooniringlusse. Sealt tuleb äkki tuleb see tagasiside, et kui ta on juba läbinud autokommunikatsiooni, on uue tähenduse või enese-selguse juba kätte saanud ja hakanud sellega opereerinud siis tagasiside võiks lisanduda autokommunikatsioonile või midagi sellist. See oleks üks variantidest.

4. Kuidas suhtleb kultuur iseendaga?

Siin on mõnes mõttes kaks võimalust. Üks on Lotmanist lähtuv autokommunikatsioon just selles väga kitsas mõttes ja millele on tegelikult keskendunud pigem see suvekool ja teine on see enesekirjeldus kus kõige mastaapsemas ja universaalsemas mõttes on kultuur loomulikult alati loomulikult autokommunikatsioon kuna kultuurist kui semiosfäärist midagi väljapoole ei jää vähemalt semioosi mõttes siis paratamatult on tegu autokommunikatsiooniga. Aga kui me räägime nüüd autokommunikatsioonist koodivahetuse mõttes siis see on natukene teine aspekt mida Lotman tahab rõhutada. See natuke kattub ka auto-comunication'i ja self-communication'i eristusega mil mulle tundub üldises mõttes on siiski sama, aga oluline on nüüd see, kas rõhutada transformatsiooni protsessi või tulemust. Siin on võib-olla väike erinevus sees.

Mulle endale meeldib selline tõlgendus mille poole mõned on nagu vihjanud, et kultuuri puhul on väga raske täheldada seda self'i, aga isikul on see olemas ja siis ma olengi mõelnud, et äkki oleks mõttekas omistada autokommunikatsioon kultuurile ja self-communication isikule. See oleks lihtne lahendus.

Jah, kui me nõustume, et inimese puhul on self'ile kerge osutada. Seda sõna on muidugi kerge kasutada, aga mida see tähendab või kui küsida "Mis ma siis ise olen?" siis oleme raskustes kohe. Täpselt sama võib öelda ka kollektiivse mälu kohta. Paljud kriitikud süüdistavad nende mõistete kasutajaid totalitaarsuses.

5. Kas mõtlemine on autokommunikatsioon?

Kindlasti on mõtlemine autokommunikatsioon. Kasvõi iseendalt üha enamate küsimuste esitamine ühe ja sama asja kohta on teataval viisil ikkagi autokommunikatiivne tegevus. Minu arvates toimib siin abduktiivne loogika, mida ka Lotman selle autokommunikatsiooniga tahab siin öelda. Minu arvates iseloomustab see just sellist kvalitatiivset uurimisprotsessi, et ta pidevalt reflekteerib enda eelnevaid tulemusi: selles mõttes ma midagi uut ei saa, aga vaatan seda distantsilt ja muudan vaatenurka. Vaatenurga muutmisega kohe muutub teataval viisil ka vaadatav, sest vaadatavat kui sellist pole puhtal kujul olemas.

6. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla sisemiste adressaatidega suhtlemine?

Nii ta vist nagu on mõeldud. Ma sean ennast nagu objektiks ja see kes ma olen küsib iseenda kohta. Siis toimub võõrandumine või kahestumine, kui sisemisi addressaate on mõeldud selles mõttes. Ma pean iseendas teatud sisemist distantsi looma endaga kui küsijaga ja endaga kui sellega kelle käest küsitakse.

Mõned mõtestavad seda küsimust selles võtmes, et näiteks üks ajuosa suhtleb teisega.

See on võimalik, aga ma ei ole selles ajupoolkerade diskursuses kindel - ma ei pea seda sellisel viisil eriti pädevaks seisukohaks tänapäevaste kognitiiv-neuropsühholoogiliste uuringute taustal. Küsimus ei ole selles, et kontinuaalne ja diskreetne oleksid kuidagi halvad mõisted. Lihtsalt see ajupoolkerade metafoor, mis esialgselt ei olnud mõeldud metafoorina, oli väga selge: siin ongi ühes ajupoolkeras lokaliseeritud üks kodeerimissüsteem, teisse teine ja need on põhimõtteliselt erinevad - sellisel viisil see vist ikka päris ei päde tänapäeval. See, et ühel ajupoolkeral võib olla natuke rohkem kalduvust teatud infohulki töödelda, see on üks asi, aga teiselt poolt näiteks kui aju saab kahjustada siis võib üks ajuosa üle võtta need aju funktsioonid mis olid ette nähtud kahjustatud osale. Selles mõttes ei ole see lokaliseeritus determineeritud. Kasutame siis seda pigem metafoorina kuiet sõnasõnaliselt.

7. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud automudelitega (enesekirjeldusega)?

Mulle tundub (ja Silvi ettekandes ustrojstvo ehk mehhanismi teemal), et kommunikatsioon viitab ikka teatud protsessile ja mudel viitab protsessi tulemusele. Selles mõttes automudel võib olla ka enesekirjeldus, kuid enesekirjledus viitab ka ikkagi protsessuaalsusele. Automudel on pigem selle protsessi väga abstraktne kontsentraat. Mudel eeldab ennekõike seda, et tal oleks võimalikult suur seletav jõud. See aga eeldab, et ta peab olema võimalikult lihtne, koosnema minimaalsetest funktsoneerimiseks vajalikest osistest. Mudel minu arvates viitabki nendele väga minimaalsetele osistele või aspektidele mis selle mudeli siis toimima panevad. Kommunikatsioon on pigem protsess siis. Mudel ja enesekirjeldus ei ole samaväärsed, sest enesekirjeldusest tuleb alles välja see mudel.

Selle pärast ongi see intervjueerimine kasulik - saab teada need väikesed erinevused.

Kui me loome näiteks eesti ajalugu, siis see on enesekirjeldus teataval viisil, aga mudel ta veel ei ole. Mudel oleks ta siis kui me sealt tooksime välja need täiesti minimaalsed igal pool selles kirjelduses esinevad tendentsid ja looksime mingi karkassi.

Ma esitan siin lisaküsimuse: kas kultuuritüpoloogiad on seotud nende mudelitega?

Siin tuleb jälle rõhutada, et kultuuritüpoloogia puhul need tüübid ei ole midagi mis on eestleitavad. Tüpoloogiad on minu arusaama järgi Lotmani jaoks ennekõike mingite korrelatsioonide tüpoloogiad. Üks ja sama tekst võib esineda erinevates tüpoloogiates ja kanda erinevat funktsiooni. Tüpoloogiad ongi funktsioonide tüpologiseerimise niiöelda tulemid. Üks ja sama tekst võib vabalt kanda erinevat funktsiooni - mõtlen siin materjaalselt sama teksti, sest kui me vaatame tekste kui tähenduslikke tervikuid siis nad ei ole enam sama tähendusega kui nad kannavad erinevat funktsiooni. Tüpoloogia on ka suhteline mõiste. Minu arvates tulebki seda rõhutada Lotmani ja üldse Tartu-Moskva koolkonna puhul, et see on väga relatsiooniline. See lähenemine on tõesti heas mõttes post-strukturalistlik. Võib-olla mõnele ei meeldi see seisukoht, aga isegi täna kui Remo Gramigna rääkis nendest primaarsetest ja sekundaarsetest keeltest, et kas primaarne keel on siis alati loomulik, lingvistiline, keel? Või tuleks võtta seda teistmoodi? Et me ei pea alati võtma seda nii, et esmane või primaarne modelleeriv süsteem on alati lingvistiline keel. Või on siin hoopis suhte küsimus? Ja kui on suhte küsimus, siis kaob ära see probleem milles süüdistas Lotmanit Sebeok. Mulle tundub, et Mihhail on pigem seda meelt ja mina olen ka seda meelt. Loomulikult väga paljudes kohtades ta toob näite, et lingvistiline keel on primaarne. See on täiesti tõsi. Aga esiteks mitte igas kohas ja teiseks see näide on võib-olla lihtsalt kõige kujukam, sest me võime keelt vaadata primaarse modelleeriva süsteemina ka selle pärast, et ta on kõige enam modelleerimist võimaldav. Ta ei ole mitte kõige algupärasem vaid kõige mitmekesisem ja võimaldab erinevaid modelleerimisi.

Mulle meeldis ka Mihhail Lotmani raamatus Struktuur ja Vabadus see, et primaarne ja sekundaarne modelleeriv süsteem on suhteline mõiste, sest ma ei olnud seda varem kohanud.

Absoluutselt, sest see avab suure potentsiaali kultuurisemiootikas, sest süüdistused lingvistilises keelekesksuses on alates Saussure'ist peale kogu strukturalismi haaranud ja selle tõttu vist ka kultuurisemiootika kuulub vähemalt mainstream mõtlemises ennekõike ikka strukturalismi paradigmasse.

8. Võid sa kohapeal välja mõelda näite sellest kuidas AK kvalitatiivselt muudab informatsiooni?

Et mingi oma näide kuidas mingi väline sisend siis sinu jaoks siis muudab mingit informatsiooni.

See väline ei ole mõeldud mitte niimoodi. Ma toon näite. Teen mingit teadustööd ja olen mingisse faasi jõudnud; loen oma tööd, vaatan oma tööd - töö on selles mõttes sama, ma kodeerin seda ühe ja sama koodiga millega ma olen selle üles ehitanud. Nüüd aga vahetan koodi ja püüan seda dekodeerida seda teise koodiga, vaadata seda teisest paradigmast - mis siis nende andmetega juhtub? See teine kood ei pea tulema väljast, vaid võib juba sees olemas olla.

See näide on päris hea, aktuaalne ka tudengite jaoks.

9. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib toimuda sõnumite edastamisega endale läbi ruumi (aja asemel)?

Eile rääkisime ka, et see eristus on rohkem nagu näitlikustamiseks, et aeg on autokommunikatsioonis nagu olulisem. Võid ühes kohas olla - näiteks vangikongis - ja vaadata aknast välja: üks ja sama merevaade, aga võin mõtestada seda romantilises võtmes või realistlikus võtmes (et homme lähen tapalavale vms) ja see pilt avaneb mulle hoopis teistmoodi. On selge, et ruumi ei saa autokommunikatsioonis täiesti välistada, sest ruum kindlast määrab konteksti kaudu ka meie koodivaliku. Vanglas on päris kindlasti hoopis teised koodid kui kuskil mujal. Ja Aristotelese järgi aeg ennast ainult läbi ruumi tajutavaks teebki - kui ei oleks ruumi siis ei oleks ka aega. Selles mõttes on nad kindlasti omavahel seotud. Ma arvan, et mida Lotman tahab sellega (et aeg on autokommunikatsioonis tähtsam) siin öelda on see, et me võime tõesti näiteks haiglas liikumatult voodis lebades ühtegi liigutust tegemata ikkagi mõelda, kommunikeeruda iseendaga.

10. Kas enesetaju on autokommunikatsiooni vorm?

Lotmanist lähtudes vist ei ole. Kui ma tunnen valu, kas see on enesetaju? Kui valu tundmine on enesetaju siis see kindlasti erineb eneseteadlikkusest ehk iseendast kui individuaalist teadlik olemisest. Valu on üldine, seda tajub iga organism - mitmete suurte autorite bioeetilised-filosoofilised mõtisklused paljuski just sellel üles ehituvadki. Aga see kuidas me seda valu mõtestame eeldab ka teatavat eneseteadlikkust. Näiteks kas see valu on tingitud, on põhjuseta või põhjendatud näiteks isamaa eest võideldes või purjus peaga maha kukkudes on kaks erinevat asja. Enesetaju selles kõige primaarsemas mõttes ei ole autokommunikatsiooniga samane mõiste.

Taipasin just, et enesetaju võib olla autkommunikatsiooni aluseks.

Enesetaju on kindalasti vajalik, aga ma arvan, et see ei ole see mida Lotman silmas peab.

11. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla puhtalt autoreferentsiaalne nagu see on süsteemiteoorias?

Jätame selle lihtsalt vahele, sest süsteemiteooriat ma ei tea eriti palju.

12. Kuidas erineb autokommunikatsioon tavalisest märgiprotsessist e semioosist?

Siin võib vastata samamoodi nagu esimesele küsimusele: autokommunikatsioon on autokommunikatsiooni üks komponente. Kommunikatsioon on kindlasti üldisem mõiste kui autokommunikatsioon, aga me võime komunikatsioonis kui sellises eristada autokommunikatsiooni mis on suunatud endale ja kommunikatsiooni mis on suunatud teisele info edastamisele. See ei ole lihtsalt sõnade mäng. Uspenskij ja Lotman kirjutasid autokommunikatsioonist väga vähe, lausa häbenematult vähe - see mõiste on palju perspektiivikam kui nad algselt adusid. Oluline on see, et nad seostasid seda orienteeritust (kas on autkommunikatiivne või suunatud info edastamisele) erinevate kultuuri modelleerimistüüpidega ja see on see moment mis mingisse raamistikku paigutatuna annab palju juurde kui me tahame mingeid kultuurinähtusi uurida.

13. Kuidas vaatleksid isiksust ühiskondlike koodide individuaalse valikuna?

Siin tekkis mul oma ettekannet kirjutades küsimusi. Esiteks võib siin "valiku" all mõelda just seda valiku momenti ehk isiksust kes valib, rõhutades teatud tahet. Ja teisalt tundub siin olevat presentne ka see aspekt, et valik on mõeldud kimbuna: see on teatud valik, kood.

Set.

Jah, täpselt. "Set" on ka Universe of the Mind'is nii tõlgitud. Ja mulle tundub, et pigem ongi see just set'ina mõeldud. See ei tähenda muidugi, et Lotman vähendaks kuidagi seda tahtevabadust. Autokommunikatsioon on üks võimalikke viise kuidas seda individuaalset vabadust teoreetiliselt välja selgitada. Eesti keeles jääb jah natuke segaseks see asi.

Jah, selle tsitaadi tõlkisin ma ise kehvasti inglise keelest.
Kõige parem on [Lotmanit] muidugi lugeda vene keeles. Just täna rääkisime Silviga, et venelaste ustrojstvo tõlgitakse näiteks artiklis "On the semiotic mechanism of culture" 1978. aasta New Literary History kui "mehhanism"...

14. Kas "auto-communication" erineb kuidagi "self-communication"-ist?

Nagu ühe varasema küsimuse juures sai arutatud: mulle tundub, et auto-communication rõhutab just seda koodivahetuse protsessi ja kirjeldab just seda mehhanismi kuidas uus tähendus saab võimalikuks. See self-communication on pigem üldisem mõiste. Ma arvan, et auto-communication on pigem selle self-communication'i allmõiste. Self-communication võib olla kui inimesed kultuuri-siseselt saadavad üksteisele mingeid sõnumeid. Erinevalt auto-communication'ist rõhutab self-communication kogu seda kupatust. Kultuuri enesekirjelduses toimivad täpselt samad protsessid: üks on autokommunikatiivne; teine on kultuuri-sisesene, niiöelda inimeselt inimesele edasi antava informatsiooni levik kus ei muutu informatsiooni kvaliteet (see jääb samas), vaid suureneb informatsiooni omajate hulk (annan informatsioonipaki sulle üle jne). Autokommunikatsioon räägib aga just sellest transformatsiooni protsessist. Mulle pigem tundub, et auto-communication võiks olla selle self-communication'i allmõiste. Täpselt samamoodi nagu auto-communication on kommunikatsiooni kui sellise allmõiste.

Sa oled esimene kel on selline konkreetne eristus. Enamus ütleb, et üks tuleb lihtsalt kreeka keelest ja teine inglise keelest ja vahet pole.

15. Kuidas sina suhtled iseendaga?

Kui ma mõtlesin selle sama küsimuse üle, lugesin pidevalt ühte ja sama kohta korduvalt ja korduvalt ja korduvalt... Ja siis olin kahevahel, et kuidas seda mõista. Küsin Toropi käest ja siis veel Silvi käest ja siis kuidagi hakkas asi nagu liikuma ühele poole ja teisele poole... See on ka nagu iseenda mõistmine: ühes mõttes oli mul olemas mingi kindel seisukoht. Samas ma kahtlesin selles, püüdsin kuidagi teistmoodi mõtestada seda. Aga iseendaga suhtlemine. Ma arvan, et ma püüan paremaks saada.

Väga hea vastus.

Ega seal muud ei olegi, aga eks see kriteerium, et mis on parem või halvem, selle paned ikka ise paika.

Aitäh sulle!

Ole hea.

AC: Silvi Salupere

Silvi Salupere

1. Kas autokommunikatsioon korrastab isikut ennast või informatsiooni/tähendust/teadmisi?

Ma arvan, et see on nagu kaheastmeline, et ta tegelikult mingis mõttes alguses korrastab seda informatsiooni või teadmisi või mis iganes kuidas seda nimetada, aga see peaks omakorda viima ka, nojah, kui me nüüd peame hakkama veel isikut defineerima, ma arvan, et me võime öelda, et see peaks seda mõttetegevust ka kuidagi korrastama. Kuigi samas ma jäin just hiljuti mõtlema selle oma kogemuse ja autokommunikatsiooni peale, et ma ei tea kas seda saab nimetada autokommunikatsiooniks, aga seal pidevalt käib nagu enda üle mõtisklemine, et see mingis mõttes võib ka vastupidi olla, et see hajutab või segab sind. Ma ei tea, võibolla peaks õige vastus olema see, et see autokommunikatsioon võib olla lihtsalt mitut eri liiki, et sa võid selle endale panna eesmärgiks näiteks mingite meditatsioonide puhul ja siis on see tõesti korrastav, aga samas autokommunikatsioon võib olla ka mingis mõttes mitteteadlik, et sa ei saa seda nagu juhtida. Sa nagu räägid iseendaga, teed midagi ja mingid mõtted häirivad, et see on ka nagu autokommunikatsioon võibolla, jah, ja sa ei suuda neid juhtida.

Neil küsimustel ei ole nagu õiget vastust, aga ma arvan, et sul on õigus, et siin ongi hästi palju erinevaid võimalusi.

2. Millal on tekst autokommunikatiivne: kas esimesel, korduval või igasugusel lugemisel?

Ma arvan, et ta jällegi sõltub ja seda ei saa ette aimata.

Kas tekst üldse saab olla ise autokommunikatiivne?

Ei, ta saab olla, muidugi, aga ma mõtlen, et ta võib hakata tööle ja võib mitte hakata. Ma arvan, et õigem oleks öelda niimoodi, et ma ei arva, et igasugusel lugemisel.

Okei. Sa oled esimene kes niimoodi ütleb.

3. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud tagasiside mõistega?

Ma arvan, et ta on otseselt seotud. Ta reaalselt peakski olema seotud, sest tegelikult autokommunikatsioon, mis on kasvanud välja sellest kommunikatsioonimudelist, kus feedback on sisse kirjutatud, ma näen, et see on otseselt seotud ja tegelikult autokommunikatsiooni võib ilmselgelt ümber kirjutada selles tagasiside metakeeles, ma ei näe mingit takistust.

Esimene esineja [Peter Grzybek] umbes umbes nii tegigi.

4. Kuidas suhtleb kultuur iseendaga?

Nojah, see on väga raske küsimus selle pärast, et siis kerkib küsimus nende - kui me räägime suhtlemisest ja kommunikatsioonist - kerkib küsimus, et mis kanalites, et kuidas need teated peaksid siis liikuma, mis see kanal on ja kes see saatja-vastuvõtja on? Tegelikult on seda üsna raske ette kujutada, et jah, Lotman räägib nendest tekstidest ja mälust ja nii edasi ja nendest mehhanismidest mis siis on mingis hästi generaliseeritud või siis üldistatud vaates, et see on siis midagi niisuguston, et tekst kui niisugune on mingis hästi üldises mõttes. Ma ei usu, et kultuur nüüd saaks iseendaga suhelda, seal peavad olema mingisugused need kandjad kes siis genereerivad ja tekstid kogunevad ja siis see sama tagasiside... Et niimoodi.

5. Kas mõtlemine on autokommunikatsioon?

Nojah, see mul tuleb meelde... Ma ei saa mitte tsiteerida [Terry] Pratchetit, kes ütles, et kõik inimkonna probleemid on tekkinud sellest, et keel mis algselt oli mõeldud selleks, et küsida teiselt kus õunapuu otsas need head õunad kasvasid, et seda hakati kasutama igasuguste filosoofiliste probleemide lahendamiseks. See on täpselt selline asi, et mõtlemisel ja mõtlemisel on vahe, et kui ma mõtlen selle peale, et kas mu kõht on tühi ja kust ma selle toidu saaksin - see ei ole tegelikult mõtlemine. Selline niiöelda päris mõtlemine - ma arvan, et see läheb küll sinna autokommunikatsiooni alla. Me võiksime neid nimetada niiöelda vaimseteks küsimusteks.

Ma esitan siin lisaküsimuse või annan suuna: tuletan meelde sellist mõistet nagu Bahtini sisedialoog.

Bahtinis on ikkagi Võgatskilt enamus tulnud. No vot, aga ma ütlengi, et see sama dialoog, et sa võid seda dialoogi pidada ka niisugusel väga primitiivsel tasandil ja siis ma ei kujuta ette, et mis sellest nagu eriti tõuseks. Mulle on ikka alati tundunud, et autokommunikatsioon on midagi kõrgemat.

6. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla sisemiste adressaatidega suhtlemine?

Nojah, ilmselt peaks niimoodi defineerima selle pärast, et kui me üldse tahame seal rääkida adressaat-adressandist on selge, et nad peaksid ikka olema sisemised... Kus siis veel?

Ma just ise taipasin, et selles küsimuses ma lähtusin ühest Lotmani väitest, et tal on nagu peas mingisugused vestluskaaslased.

Nojah, see tuletab meelde seda - ma ei tea küll kes seda ütles - et Sokratesel oli deemon kellega ta suhtles ja siis oli selline idee, et tol vanal ajal lihtsalt need parem- ja vasakpoolkera olid nagu võrdsemad kui praegu, ja selle pärast olidki need osad jaotatud, et niimoodi tõepoolest suhtlesid parem- ja vasakpoolkerad omavahel. Seda on tänapäeval natuke üle-arendatud.

Mulle meenus see Anti Randviiru tõlgendus, et on autokommunikatsioon ontoloogiliste subjektide vahel, ehk siis nagu füüsilised isikud, ja siis on ka autokommunikatsioon semiootiliste subjektide vahel, ehk ühes inimeses võib olla mitu mina.

See on selline väga skisofreeniline... Tegelikult ongi, aga kas on siis küsimus selles, et siis tõepoolest võib tulla selline psühhhiaatriline seletus, aga sa võid selle teise mina nagu ka ise tekitada ja see on paljudele omane, et sa endaga ikkagi suhtled.

7. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud automudelitega (enesekirjeldusega)?

Põhimõtteliselt peaks olema niimoodi, et kui tuua need kaks eesliidet, kui me võtame nüüd vene keeles ja mõlemad on tõepoolest auto-, et nad peaksid olema nagu otseselt seotud, niisamuti nagu ka kommunikatsioon on koos kirjeldustega. Lotman ei räägi mitte ainult inimesest, vaid ka kultuuri puhul see enesekirjeldusest tekibki kui kultuur on iseendaga autokommunikatsioonis. Ma arvan, et see seos on tõesti otsene ja loomulikult kui me räägime ka mingisugusest konkreetsest inimesest, isikust, siis ta nagu ka oma teadvuses konstrueerib kaks mina ja nagu küsib enda käest, kas siis vaatab peeglisse või niisama või... tegelikult kogu aeg kommunikeerib oma tegevust. Siis loomulikult see on seotud enesekirjeldusega. Kas ta siis kiidab iseennast paremaks või mis iganes, aga kuidagi ta konstrueerib seda enda mina.

8. Võid sa kohapeal välja mõelda näite sellest kuidas AK kvalitatiivselt muudab informatsiooni?

Muidugi on raske kohapeal välja mõelda... Sest just oli mingil istungil juttu sellest ornamendist ja ratta klõbinatest... Eks ma olen selle peale ka enne mõelnud, aga rääkida pole keegi sellest nagu nõudnud.

Oli ka aeg.

Jaa, ja viimane aeg. Ma kujutan ette, et üks asi mis võiks olla nagu nende rongiratastele on... Ma ei tea nüüd konkreetset näidet, aga ma usun, et see võib mõjuda ja sellel on suur mõju. Igasuguned rütmilised asjad - muusika on just selline kus on mingisugused segmendid mis vajavad mingit korrastatust. See on võimeline muutma informatsiooni selles mõttes, et ta on võimeline... kasvõi kui sa vaatad midagi või ükskõik kuidas sa seda informatsioon saad või siis kuuled samal ajal midagi või näed midagi... Ta on võimeline muutma sinu informatsiooni selle mõttes, et sinu vastuvõttu nagu mõjutada. Kui on mingi ühtemoodi muusika siis sa seda sama asja näed ühte moodi, aga kui on teistmoodi muusika siis näed ka teistmoodi. Selles mõttes on võimalik, konkreetset näidet ma ei tea, aga kui hakata mõtlema, siis kas see näide ei sobi, et kui taimedele seal Mozartit ja mida iganes mängiti... Et noh, tegelikult mulle tundub, et inimesega on täpselt sama olla, et me ei erine nii palju. Võibolla seda ei ole võimalik niimoodi mõõta, aga põhimõtteliselt kuna me oleme täpselt samamoodi elusorganismid siis see peaks samamoodi mõjutama.

Mulle endale meenus kohe interferentsi näide, et sa oled ühes seltskonnas, räägid midagi, ja kõrvallauas keegi ütleb valju häälega mingi sõna ja ühtäkki sa kuuled täpselt sama sõna ka enda seltskonnas.

No vot, need deja vu-d ja sellised asjad, need on jah tihti, aga siin on tõesti huvitav, et kas ja kuidas seda saab seletada selle...

Ka see kuidas sõnajärjest võetakse kinni kui sa üritad vahele sekkuda, siis umbes nagu "ka mina mõtlen, et" ja siis järgmine inimene ei lõpeta rääkimist vaid ütleb samamoodi, et "ma mõtlen, et".

Mhm. Ja-ja. Või kui korraga sama asja öeldakse.

9. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib toimuda sõnumite edastamisega endale läbi ruumi (aja asemel)?

Ma mõtlen nüüd mida siin mõeldakse, et kas see on midagi taolist, et sa nagu kirjutad endale mingi kirja ja siis loed seda mujal. Aeg ja ruum on ikka tõsiselt seotud... Või see küsimus siis mõtleb seda, et kui ma loon oma teadvusesse kaks isikut, kommenteerin mingeid oma tegevusi, oma mõtetest, siis see on nagu ajas aga ruumi ei ole, aga mõnes mõttes ikkagi on. Ma võin selle kohta öelda siis jah, et tõesti ma võin kirjutada endale mingi kirja, mingi meeldetuletuse, et kas see ei ole midagi niisugust, et "ole nüüd tubli" ja panen selle seina peale ja kui ma seda vaatan siis nagu, jah, on küll ruumis, võib ikka. Või siis ma ei tea, see on ka see sama, et räägitakse kui tahad kõhnaks saada siis pane ennast kohnana sinna külmkapi peale.

Sa oled esimene kes on üritanudki sellele vastata. Eva ütles lihtsalt, et aegruum on lahutamatu ja ongi kõik.

10. Kas enesetaju on autokommunikatsiooni vorm?

See self-perception on minu jaoks liiga kuidagi, kuidas nüüd öelda, füüsikaline...

Nagu vahetu, äkki?

Jah, et see on nagu ikkagi seotud otseselt tunnetusega, meeleorganitega, minu jaoks. Selles mõttes ma arvan, et mitte, et ei seostu.

Vähemalt on konkreetne vastus.

11. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla puhtalt autoreferentsiaalne nagu see on süsteemiteoorias?

Ma nüüd täpselt ei kujuta ette mida mõeldakse autoreferentsiaalsuse all. Enesele viitamine või?

Jah.

Aga kas siis ei ole ikkagi see süsteemiteoorias enesele viitamine üsna mehhaaniline, selline masinlik... Noh, eks see sõltub ka süsteemiteooriast, eks neid ole ka erinevaid, et kui võtame, ütleme, klassikalise süsteemiteooria mis on otseselt seotud hermeneutika ja nende asjadega, siis... ma ei tea, aga põhimõtteliselt ma ei näe siin mingit ületamatut lõhet.

12. Kuidas erineb autokommunikatsioon tavalisest märgiprotsessist e semioosist?

Võibolla see pertseptsiooni värk on sealt puud, sest kui Peirce'i jaoks on semioos ikkagi seotud märgi tajumisega ja selle igavese küsimusega - või Benveniste - et selleks, et märk oleks pead sa teda märkama. See on autokommunikatsiooni poolt... see on väga raske, sest ta on ka mingis mõttes nagu märk, aga no tundub, et see on ikkagi mingil teisel tasandil, võibolla siis kah nagu esmane ja teisene, see on nagu esimene ja teine intentsioon nagu skolastidel oli.

13. Kuidas vaatleksid isiksust ühiskondlike koodide individuaalse valikuna?

No aga see on ju väga selge, siin ei ole midagi sellist, Lotman on sellest paljudes teistes kohtades rääkinud. See ühiskond või kultuur on nagu maatriks, aga iga inimene võtab sealt... See individuaalse ja kollektiivse see seos... Inimene loomulikult valib sealt - ta isegi ei vali, ei saa öelda niimoodi, et ta spetsioolselt valib, aga temal on lihtsalt... See tuletab mulle meelde Fawcett'i, kes on ilma asjata ära unustatud ja kellel oli see väga selgelt ära näidatud selle oaasi ja kogu kulturi seos milles kujutatakse selliseid diagramme - siin on see suur, nagu üldine ja siis on see väiksem osa mis on siis nagu iga indiviid. Ja siis ongi, et see mis me kõik ühiselt jagame kultuuriga ja siis see mis on meie oma, privaatne sfäär. Iga inimene koosnebki nagu sellisest kahest poolusest.

Jurgen Ruesch'il on üpris sarnane mudel.

Nojah, vot, tuleb vaadata kas ta Fawcett'ile viitab, sest tegelikult Fawcett oli kuuekümnendatel ja ta on ilmaasjata, jah, kuidagi nagu... Muidugi ma arvan nendes sotsio-asjades tegelikult tsiteeritakse, aga tal on väga asjalik see süsteem.

Ma tänan selle viite eest.

Palun.

14. Kas "auto-communication" erineb kuidagi "self-communication"-ist?

Ma jällegi ei tea, see on metakeele küsimus, et kes seda self-communication'it kasutanud on ja mida ta selle all mõtleb. Aga kui ma sõnu nüüd vaatan siis ma ei näe [erinevust], sest auto peaks ju tähendama kreeka keeles ka midagi "ise", et selles mõttes on see keeleline küsimus. Aga on täiesti võimalik, et keegi on sellele self-communication'ile mingi oma tähenduse andnud, ma tõesti ei tea seda.

See tähendus on enam-vähem sama, aga self-communication on Ameerika diskursusest.

No vot.

15. Kuidas sina suhtled iseendaga?

Pidevalt ja see käib mulle nii närvidele, et kogu aeg käib mingisugune vestlus, et selles mõttes on väga halvasti. Ma jäingi mõtlema siin kui Anti ütles, et see on suletud süsteem. Täitsa lõpp, jumal teab mis niimoodi juhtub, et ei saa õhtul magama jääda - kogu aeg midagi toimub.

AC: Eva Lepik

Eva Lepik

1. Kas autokommunikatsioon korrastab isikut ennast või informatsiooni/tähendust/teadmisi?

Autokommunikatsioon korrastab nii isikut ennast kui ka informatsiooni, sest informatsioon semiootilises mõttes on alati seotud sellega kes mõtleb või sellega kes tunnetab ja see peaks olema vastastikku põimiv ja/või põimuv protsess, tähenduse loomine ja samal ajal siis isiksuse muutumine-evolutsioneerumine.

2. Millal on tekst autokommunikatiivne: kas esimesel, korduval või igasugusel lugemisel?

Ma pooldan seda seisukohta, et tekst - ükskõik siis millises semiootilises keeles ta ka ei oleks - on võõras teadvus mille inimene endale ligi laseb või oma teadvuse selle kõrval tahaplaanile jätab kui ta sellesse võõrasse teksti süveneb. Iga lugemine, ma olen üsna veendunud, või igasugune teksti vastuvõtmine loob uued tähendused ja järelikult on ka autokommunikatsioon iga kord uus.

3. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud tagasiside mõistega?

Lahutamatult. Selle pärast, et seda ei saa ajast eriti eraldada. Räägitakse vist küll, et unenägu kestab väga lühikest aega. Aga üldiselt on ikkagi mingisugune ajavahe olemas mingisuguse mõtte mõtlemise ja selle juurde tagasi tulemise vahel ja see tagasiside nõuab aega.

4. Kuidas suhtleb kultuur iseendaga?

Ilmselt ma olen nõus Lotmani käsitlusega ja Tartu-Moskva koolkonna arusaamadega sellest asjast: kultuur produtseerib tekste ja interpreteerib neid. Ja need tekstid võivad olla loomulikult igasuguses vormis, kultuuristatud maastikust kuni kultuuri või muusikani välja. Ma võin siia juurde tuua ka mingisugused tsentri ja perifeeria kontseptsioonid, aga see kõik on väga üldteada ja mul ei oleks selle kohta midagi uut ütelda.

5. Kas mõtlemine on autokommunikatsioon?

Suuresti. Jah, mis ta veel olla saab siis.

6. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla sisemiste adressaatidega suhtlemine?

Jah, võib küll.

Siin on lisaküsimus, et: kas sul on omad sisemised adressaadid?

Ma ei liigitaks ennast küll mingiks eriliseks skisofreenikuks, aga ma arvan küll, et ma räägin mingisuguste osadega endast.

7. Kuidas on autokommunikatsioon seotud automudelitega (enesekirjeldusega)?

Vältimatult. Selle pärast, et ei ole võimali ennast kirjeldada ilma selle sisekõneta või ilma seda sisekõne tajumata või kuidagi selle üle reflekteerimata. Ja see enesekirjeldus võib olla puhtalt autokommunikatiivne, seal ei tarvitsegi olla mingisugust välist väljendust.

8. Võid sa kohapeal välja mõelda näite sellest kuidas AK kvalitatiivselt muudab informatsiooni?

Positiivse mõtlemise näide. See on tõesti niimoodi, et kui minu ette kerkib mingisugune raskus või probleem siis ma võin selle enda jaoks ümber tõlgendada potentsiaalsuseks või võimaluseks midagi paremaks teha. Ja see on juba informatsiooni kvalitatiivne muutmine. See tähendab, et ühest küljest võib see ju olla see, et ma muudan oma hinnangut, aga lõppude lõpuks kui me enne kokku leppisime, et informatsioon on lahutamatult seotud sellega kes seda informatsiooni valdab või haldab, siis see on kvalitatiivne muutus.

9. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib toimuda sõnumite edastamisega endale läbi ruumi (aja asemel)?

Senikaua kui me ei suuda olla ühel ja samal hetkel mitmes kohas korraga jääb ajafaktor alati valitsevaks.

See oligi absurdiküsimus.

10. Kas enesetaju on autokommunikatsiooni vorm?

Minu jaoks tekib siin ka see küsimus, et kas enesetaju ja enesekirjeldus ei ole mitte üksteiseks üleminevad protsessid...

Ikka on

Et sellisel juhul, mõistagi, jah.

Inglise keeles enesetaju asemel on self-perception ja self-awareness, nad on mõlemad... Et siis minu näide on ka umbes selline, et ma ei näe mida mu kätt [siin selja taga], aga ma tean mida see teeb. See on enesetaju, aga kas see on enesega suhtlemine?

Mingil tasandil, mis ei pruugi olla niiöelda kõrgem ajutegevus, on seda kindlasti. Niipea kui sinna juurde tekib veel mingisugune verbaliseering või mõte, siis seda enam; kuigi ma arvan, et autokommunikatsioon ei tarvitse olla verbaalne.

See on väga hea vastus.

Ma olen mõelnud selle füüsilise intelligentsuse üle, et näiteks kui keegi on kümnevõistleja, siis tema keha oskab väga paljusid asju teha kõrgel tasemel - seega, igasugune füüsiline võimekus, kui see ka ei ole mingisugune intellektuaalse pingutuse vili, et siis... Ma arvan, et seal käivad mingisugused väga põnevad autokommunikatiivsed protsessid, mingisuguseks soorituseks keskendumine mis ei tarvitse samuti olla mingil määral verbaliseeritav, ma täpselt ei tea, ma ei ole sportlane. Need füüsilise tegevuse vormid mis minult suurt keskendumist nõuavad on osaliselt verbaliseeritavad, aga mitte täielikult.

11. Kas autokommunikatsioon võib olla puhtalt autoreferentsiaalne nagu see on süsteemiteoorias?

Ei usu. Esiteks on väga keeruline korraldada olukorda kus ei ole väga palju väliseid stiimuleid. Me rääkisime siin sellest kuidas on võimalik kunstlikult luua tingimused kus väliste stiimulite hulk on viidud miinimumini ja on ju teada igasugused religioossed praktikad mis tegelevad sellega kuidas mingisugune sisekõnevool seisma panna, oma meeled tühjendada, aga see peaks nüüd olema just selle puhta autoreferentsiaalsuse vastand, see meelte tühjendamine.

Kuidas nii?

Meelte tühjendamine välisest on samal ajal ka tühjendamine sisemisest. Mitte, et ma sellest kõigest väga palju teaksin. Ma ise ei praktiseeri meditatsiooni sel kujul mis niimoodi teeks; samal ajal, mida aeg edasi, seda rohkem ma tunnen sellest puudust. Võibolla peaks.

12. Kuidas erineb autokommunikatsioon tavalisest märgiprotsessist e semioosist?

Ausalt öeldes väga raske öelda, et üldse kuidagi erineks. Tundub nii, et mõlemad on piiratud ainult tajuva või mõtleva subjekti ajalikkuse ja surelikkusega.

13. Kuidas vaatleksid isiksust ühiskondlike koodide individuaalse valikuna?

Robert Musil on minu arvates kunagi kirjutanud, et tänapäeva inimene on hunnik ajakirjaväljalõikeid. Ma arvan, et mida teadlikum subjekt seda paremini ta neid ajaleheväljalõikeid valida suudab. Ühiskondlikud koodid, normid ja muu selline kraam võiks olla peamiselt ületamiseks, ütleksin ma. See ei tähenda, et ma oleksin loomu poolest väga vägivaldne või väga anarhistlik või midagi muud, aga ma arvan, et inimese individuaalse arengu potentsiaal on seda suurem mida enam ta on neist normidest ja koodidest teadlik ja mida paremini ta ennast neist vabastada suudab. Ütleme nii, et vähemasti tema sisemine mina ei peaks olema selle värgi külge aheldatud. Inimene ei peaks ideaalis defineerima ennast oma lemmikbändi, oma pangakonto, oma läbitud haridusasutuste kaudu...

Ometi me teeme seda.

Jah. Pigemini selle kaudu kui elus ta ennast tunneb.

14. Kas "auto-communication" erineb kuidagi "self-communication"-ist?

Ma ei tea mis vahet on.

Ega keegi vist ei tea, nad peaksid nagu samaväärsed olema.

Jah, just, kui üks on kreeka keeles ja teine on inglise keeles, et kas seal on midagi vahet ka tegelikult...

15. Kuidas sina suhtled iseendaga?

Mida edasi, seda rohkem üritan ma endale andeks anda, et ma olen lihtsalt inimene ja seda vähem üritan enda üle kuidagimoodi mingisuguse kujutletava superego seisukohast kohut mõista.

Kas on mõni selline praktiline näide ka, näiteks iseendale kirjutamine või midagi sellist, mida sa annaksid maailmale edasi selle intervjuu kaudu?

Mida ma maailmale edasi annaks? Ma arvan, et maailm saab ilma minu nõuanneteta suurepäraselt hakkama ja ma arvan, et vaimsed praktikad mis aitavad inimesel selle maailmaga toime tulla peab igaüks endale ise valima vastavalt oma kalduvustele ja vajadustele, peamiselt vajadustele. Ilmselt ma palvetan, jah.

Ilmselt

Jah.

AC: Jelena Grigorjeva

Jelena Grigorjeva

1. Does autocommunication organize the self/ego or information/knowledge or something else?

I suppose that self-communication as such is such a miracle that demonstrates us a very interesting phenomenon. If we can communicate with somebody in our self that means this somebody is present in our self. So we can speak about at least two different partners of communication in us. Who are those partners of communication? Definitely this aspect organizes our self-reflection because we understand ourself or in communication with the others, but then we go inside ourself and share this experience with whom... This is the major question as it seems to me at the moment of our semiotic discipline as such. Because we admit that we can communicate with ourselves then we communicate through some instance that makes us different inside our self. And this instrument or, I would rather say, this partner organism is language. So we are always communicating with our self as well as with others by means of language. What it organizes then - everything. Without language we cannot communicate, without language we cannot understand our selves. Then, we are always understanding our selves by means of this intermediary instance, language.

I'l rephrase the question. Autocommunication qualitatively restructures something. What is that something: is it yourself or is it the information?

This is the core question: what structures language? Can you answer this question: what structures language? That was my question now during the last session by the way: what is structure? If we take off this instrument, language, in the general sense - in semiotics we use language in a very broad sense as you know. So, then, what is left? And it seems that there is nothing left. Still we feel that language is not equal to us, to our self, what ever it is.

Do I understand correctly, then, that you are treating every sign system as a language?

Yes, this is the basic statement of semiotics. We treat all sign systems as a kind of language. Those systems - they determine different languages, multiple languages, but still any sign system is a language.

This is something different from the [pre-written] questions, but how do you feel about Charles Morris's claim that we should dispense with terms like "language" and "sign" and "meaning" because they are too vague?

Yes, if he would suggest something better then we could discuss this question. Actually it does not even matter how we call those things, the description is functional. Language is just a means for transmitting information in system[atic?] way. So any system can be used as a language. What is a system? System is a set of elements and rules of using them. And this system forms a filter. We filter the whole outer so-to-say world into our mental image or phantom that we create of ourselves first of all.

2. When is a text autocommunicational: upon first reading, upon repeated readings or in any reading?

Of course in every reading. If nobody reads the text there is no text. We, interpreters, introduce a system to every object, text including. The matter that this text, given text for example, were composed already in comprehensible language is another thing. It is not obligatory, we can read any object as a text, introducing this system approach. But of course unpredictability, that means sense, increases when we have two equal partners of communication, one generating text, the other interpreting. But only in reading text can come into being at all.

I'll rephrase the question in a more specific way. This question stems from Henry Broms and he has his own theory of autocommunication that claims that not every text is autocommunicational, because if the text does not contain accurate information... For example, if you read Anna Karenina you won't know basically anything about Russian railway but you do enjoy Anna Karenina and you get something inspirational from it. It communicates with you even though it doesn't give you any specific information.

It gives some information, that's all. And what kind of information you extract from this text depends on you and your task, your aim, pragmatics. What do you want to learn from Anna Karenina? About railways in Russia in the second haly of the 19th century? Usually not, that is about psychology. But of course all of this ... is not alien to this text. The author has the right to compose this text in a desired way. The author has his or hers task, pragmatics, and interpreter has the same set, and they internally relate with each other. So this is a dialogue with the author.

3. How is autocommunication related to the notion of feedback?

I suppose that everything about communication is about feedback. There is no communication if we do not get any feedback. So feedback is an important checking moment of the very fact that this act of communication had happened. This is a simple scheme: stimuli-reaction. No reaction, no communication. So that is why feedback is built directly into the process of communication. And autocommunication is the same. I would say that autocommunication is some particular case of any kind of communication. It is simply a higher level of understanding of the process of communication: talking to yourself as if you have constructed the other communicative partner. So feedback from yourself will look as: Oh! I have learned from myself something new by means of language of course.

4. How does a culture communicate with itself?

I do not understand the question. Why do you think that culture communicates with itself?

Well...

This is an assumption. Maybe I do not join this assumption.

In a general sense, culture is mixed in with the notion of autocommunication and one of the interpretations by Lotman is that culture is a singular message that humanity sends to itself.

Yes, in this sense then...

But what about in the sense that culture itself is an artifical intelligence, it is a personality so to say and, uh, how does it communicate with itself?

I suppose that self-communication is still possible only by means of something else, that is, the instrument of language. So culture of course communicates with itself when we take some historical restricted period. We can say that authors who wrote their text in the 19the century communicate with authors who started in the 20th century. We communicate with them. I communicate with my teachers Juri Lotman and Zara Mints by means of their text. Does it mean that culture communicates with itself? But the borders of this self is very very vague. When we go to the question of bordering, so to say what is the self of culture, it is simply impossible. When you go to those frontiers of different languages, of different rites and riddles, it is a complex of multiple sign systems and they communicate with themselves in this or that... whatever, culture... Human life...

An acceptable answer would have also been that every time someone writer or creates a text, a veritable new text with new meaning, then culture is in fact communicating with itself through this new text.

But again, through language. Texts are products of language, culture is a product of language, practiced by its organs, humans in our case, or dogs in the case with dogs. So this is a collective phantom we agreed to call our culture, or our language.

How do you feel about the proposition that culture is also a language?

No, I think that culture is a product of language and that's why we can extract the rules and regularities of language, practiced by this or that community and this all forms culture, memory, language skills, its organs of language, members of this society or community and so on. So this a multidimensional whole.

5. Is thinking a form of autocommunicatian?

With this I agree totally. Thinking is a form of autocommunication. Thinking is arranging your impulses that you get from organs of sense, what you perceive, and then express them, represent them in different ways: in words, in pictures, maybe in body movements and so on, but the very process of this translation of course takes place in personal individual brains. This is a process of thinking.

This question stems from Mikhail Bakhtin actually, from his understanding of thinking as internal dialogue and is also related to these closely related terms like intra-personal communication, intra-psychic communication and intra-subjective communication - and they are framed as forms of thinking.

Yes, I suppose this is a very clear classification. Quite acceptable, even at this moment.

6. Is autocommunication an interiorized form of social relations? (the case of internal companions)

This is the case of internal companions - people inside your head who you can talk to. Like Juri Lotman claimed that he has internal conversations with other intellectiual persons.

Yes. I suppose yes. It can be formulated this way. Interiorized form of social relations. You think in a dialogue, when it happens, it is always with society, social relations. It is all about your function within this or that community.

I'll rephrase the question as: do you have any internal companions?

Yes, of course. Loads of them. Since my childhood I used to play [with] dolls, for example, and this is a specific self-constructed actual partner of communication, invisible friend. I'm always followed by a whole bunch of invisible friends, talking to me, including my teachers Lotman and Zara. But they are here, in my brain.

Also, extending this question... Eva claimed that every time you read a text you let the consciousness of the author inside yourself and you can communicate with that foreign consciousness. How do you feel about that?

Yes, I would say that this is wishful thinking. We do not know whether we can reconstruct or approach to another's mind, author's mind. What we perceive is determined by our personal cultural background and we can never achieve total understanding of the other. It doesn't mean whether it is Lev Tolstoy or your schoolmate. Never ever. But we can make negotiations about it. With the dead author it is very hard to do but with alive partners it happens sometimes - understanding. But in a way I think that all acts of communication - all acts of self-communications are communication acts and all self-communication are communication acts in a way.

7. How are autocommunication and automodels (self-description) related?

But it is self-evident that in the process of thinking - let us call autocommunication thinking simply, maybe it will help - in this process you create a picture, a worldview, smaller or bigger, more general or less general, more specified, less... This is a model and this model will be of course self-model, first of all. Everything that we model or describe by means of language is always our mind. So was it the answer?

To be truthful I do not know the answer to this one. Most of these questions do not have a right or wrong answer.

But, now, I did not ask right or wrong, I asked if it is an answer.

I presume that self-description is one outcome of autocommunication.

And some other outcomes? Examples...

Well, actually, that is number eight, qualitative structuring of information. That is the most common [example].

8. Can you come up with an example on the spot of how AC qualitatively restructures information?

It's so complicated question.

The common example which Lotman draws would be that you're writing a poem and then you hear, for example, the train rhythm and it inspires you to create a certain rhythm in your own poem. Can you invent or remember your own examples of how self-communication changes something specific?

I could answer but this answer would be too general - not an example, per se, but I suppose it's not a satisfactory answer. So let us skip this question.

9. Can autocommunication occur through the transfer of messages in space (instead of time)?

I know this distiction by Juri Lotman but I disagree with it because we can only speak about preferences. "Time and space" is an analytical distinction. Timespace is one continuum and we can only discuss the question of preferences. So all we can discussed is this Tolstoy's text, for example, it is communication in time. Tolstoy communicates with us readers and it is not self-communication in this sense but self-communication also happens as in space so in time, this is the law.

I can rephrase the question in a more suitable way because the factor of time, the importance of it here is to create this difference between me and myself, so can you think of any other ways to create this difference so that autocommunication will be meaningful?

No. The only way is this gap between you and you by means of language and that takes time; that takes both time and space, always. So you are not equal, the next moment world changes. The whole system of semiosphere that Lotman describes is not static but in permanent change, constant change, mutable, and of course - this is Heraclites - you cannot enter one and the same flow [of the river] twice. We change in time and that's why we can communicate with ourselves in time and so on.

The lotmanian tenet here would be that the change in time is necessary for there to occur another code, because the message doesn't change - what changes is the code and through code, generally, you yourself. So the rhythm is actually a syntactical code that changes the message.

Yes, of course it does, it changes the message.

10. Are self-perception and self-awareness forms of autocommunicaton?

Yes.

Now this is a question that is very near and dear to me because this evades language. Because self-perception and self-awareness are not language phenomena, they are very immediate.

Mm... I don't think so. You cannot perceive yourself without contact with the otherness; the otherness in the more general sense.

Let's take the example of kinesthesia. For example, I am not looking at my hand but I know what it's doing. Is this autocommunication?

Why not?

Why not.

The major question here is that again we cannot define the main term that we're using here. We use the term auto- or self- and what does it mean? Again we turn to the same question that I pronounced during the last [conference] session: If we take [away] the language - in the general sense - of a human being, what is left? What is self-perception if you do not decode information? And decoding information is all about the otherness. At least with the help of language a man can stay alone on isolated island with himself by means of language, because we are never alone. We bear this something that is not equal to us. We are not equal to language, all of us feel it. We describe language, we follow it, see the laws, but we are not language. Language is somehow different to us and that's why self-perception is about this. We have different senses, different channels, we accumulate this information. Those senses are channels, filters... of what? Nobody knows. We get the result of self-perception, for example, because we are constructed this way, formed. A set of filters collecting information worked by our brain by means of language. First of all verbal language, of course, for humans. So this is a very uncertain point about self. What is this self? Where are the borders of this self?

What do you think?

I think in such a way that we are all organic stuff at least in this world. We are a manifestation of language principles. It embodifies itself in us, in its organs. And that's why it develops in different ways like the forest or a whole landscape with different languages, different branches of those languages and so on and so on. The very fact of self-communication proves that we've got access to the next level of cooperation with language, with this other that inhabited the whole organic stuff on this earth. We go to this access to understand is here with language, but who are we? And proceed from this point to cooperate with language consciously.

We are running out of time [before the next presentation at the conference]. What if we skip two questions and move on to question thirteen?

13. How (do or) would you view personality as an individual set of socially significant codes?

This is something that Lotman has said and many have repeated but no one has taken it up and developed it. So what do you think abouti this claim that personality is an individual selection of socially significant codes.

Yes, I suppose yes. But if we understand socially significant codes rather widely as any kind of communication with the environment then in this sense I would agree, because if we reduce this field of... It is again about definitions and restricting our terms. If we reduce social life only to, I don't know, being included into professional hierarchies then it will not work. But if we'll expand it wider then I totally agree. This is a set of socially significant codes or codes of communication, skills and possible system of filters, again, set of filters, different filters.

14. Is there a difference between autocommunication and self-communication?

This is a question about terms.

Until we have not defined what is self we cannot discuss this aspect as well. Maybe in the term of autocommunication it is more theoretical, it is more clear the aspect of creativity. Self does not bear this meaning of being active in generating statements, in generating systems. But in auto- you take responsibility on your behalf, separating yourself from language. Although I know that I am determined by language I still by my own will accept responsibility of acting and speaking. And this is my part of cooperation with all the set of socially significant codes. My responsibility - this is authorship - and that can make a difference.

15. How do you communicate with yourself?

In various ways.

Well, name a few.

But all the text that I produce are first of all a product of self-communication. I cooperate with language although, in a paradoxical way, the more you train in language the more you learn to operate language. The less you participate in the process of generating statements in this language you do it absolutely automatically. I can produce my thought in language -in words or using keyboard - in real time. I have no gap between my thought and fixating this thought in language because I am trained in this language. I achieved it through learning and this is really a paradox because it seems that if language is different to us then the more you train the more you should resist the otherness of language but in my case it goes another way.

Autocommunication II

Torop, Peeter 2002. Locations in Intersemiotic Space. In: Sarapik, V., K. Tüür and M. Laanemets (eds.), Koht ja Paik II. Place and Location II. Tallinn: Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Arts, 59-68.

In the case of nonverbal texts, the more abstract segmentation into the continual and the discrete systems of language became important. hereby it is important that a text with the continual dominant creates its meaning through the whole, or in the deductive way, and a text with a discrete dominant through its elements, or in the inductive manner. At the same time, a general principle is that continuality and discreteness are two co-existing parameters. (Torop 2002: 59)

An interesting supplication to the Lotman-Uspenskij (1973) distinction between discrete/continuus sign systems: here deductive/inductive and whole/elements aspects are added.

The juvenile book is an example of a metacommunicative whole in which the prototext is supplemented by a range of verbal and visual metatexts. While in culture the metacommunicative connections of a single prototext are usually separated and they are connected by time, or collective cultural memory, then in the book as a cultural text it is possible to create coherence in terms of space and time. (Torop 2002: 61)

I'm not exactly sure how this could be useful, but it may help explain intertextual "loans" and prototextual connections between dystopias and the biblical paradise myth.

A process taking place in intersemiotic space can be compared to a textologist who tries to sense, through notes, blueprints and versions, the working of the writer's mind and the story of the creation of his work. In the case of literature we can talk about the macrotime of the manuscript and the microtime of a concrete page of the manuscript. (Torop 2002: 62)

These are valuable terms for the #metablog discussion. Namely, that I consider "academic blogging" to be the best possible way to conduct humanitarian science. It is a "thinker's diary" where the influences from other thinkers are oblique/transparent, so that when future readers do read my papers, for example, they can check every reference and even see the connections with similar ideas that I have come across. I can only imagine how incredible it would have been for modern semioticions if Juri Lotman and others had conducted their scientific work this way...

Blueprint is like culture. In blueprint we can distinguish the complementarity of sign systems in the creative process, follow the shaping of an intention into a conceptual work of art, analyse the world of thought of the creator and his location in the intertextual space. For example, Fyodor Dostoyevsky's notebooks contain ideas, pictures, blueprints of others, but also details of attacks of epilepsy, facts connected with housekeeping, and also social and political thoughts. Being a notebook belonging to the pre-material of a novel, it contains a lot of information that is seemingly of secondary importance, though belonging to the same era. The result of complex study of a blueprint is the peculiarity of the creation process, and together with that, understanding the specific nature of the final text. Analysis of the creative process is holistic by nature, since the final result is already known. (Torop 2002: 63)

Indeed I have thought about including non-academic material (still about nonverbal communication) for a while, and tried to survey estonian web for notes on body language, etc. Maybe I should start recording my own observations as well? Well, I'd like to record an idea from my discussion with Jamie. She claimed that Estonian body language is reserved and shy, and there seems to be a lot that is so subtle that she does not understand it. For example, someone left the company and another person turned to her and told her that the person who left the company must have been deeply offended; yet Jamie noticed nothing like that herself. This would actually make for a theme in nonverbal communication - something to the effect of attention-blindness.

The accepting of a text into culture and the creation of a text are both autocommunicative process. The autocommunicativeness of culture is not much different from the autocommunicativeness of an individual creator. In neither case do we know with certainty if the case is about mnemonic autocommunication, i.e., about reporting the already known in another form or other sign systems, or with discovering autocommunication, i.e., with the creation of nover correlations in what exist in memory. (Torop 2002: 64)

Torop as if acknowledges the difficulties with discriminating varieties of autocommunication and downplays these differences. I tend to believe that there are significant differences in individual and supraindividual (cultural) forms of autocommunication - so much so that they seem like completely different processes, similar merely in outward appearance.

The intersemiosic aspect of culture is due to the partial overlap of signs and languages or sign systems of different arts - first, on the level of independent existence of these languages and texts created in them (e.g. film and theatre). The existence of a text as different simultaneous texts (e.g. novel, film, performance, picture) on the level of mental interference in the second. The third: the level of projection to the propositional texture or intertextual background. At the intersemiotic description of culture the recognisability takes place not only in the reception of individual holistic texts, but also in fragmentary reception processes. In the intersemiosis of culture, making sense and the hierarchisation of signs does not depend merely on texts - the same signs can belong to different texts and sign systems, and possess different meanings in different systems. Understanding cultural perception mechanisms in the basis for the understanding of the interlingual, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, and intermediality; thus the ontology of signs of different cultural texts is based on the nature of intersemiosis. (Torop 2002: 64-65)

This may become useful for concursivity: not only is it intersemiotic but there's an intertextual and even interlingual aspect, as certain descriptions "live their own life" burrowing into different texts.

The result comes in the need for a functional classification of signs outside the classification of types of signs. For the purposes of recognisability, it is useful to distinguish a priori or generally known signs, processual or authorship signs that bear a conception and aro often of an ad hoc nature, and a posteriori signs, i.e., signs making sense of the text as a whole. The functional aspect enables cultural autocommunicative sign processes and transformations to be followed, e.g. the translation of processual or authorship signs into a priori or conventional signs. This goes both for the translation of a verbal sign into another verbal sign, and the translation of a verbal sign into a visual or audiovisual. (Torop 2002: 65)

A neat simplistic sign-distinction. In broad terms, "body language" discourse deals with conventional (a priori; "coded") behavioural signs and nonverbal communication discourse deals with unconventional (ad hoc; "uncoded") behavioural signs.

A new parameter is mental text, or the notion of a text as a prototext with metatexts rooted in it that actualises as a mnemonic picture, and the peculiarity of which depends on the hierarchy of communication channels in culture. Mental text is not easily analysable as assembled text in the collective or individual memory. The same metacommunicative situation can also be described as a complementary text in which there is the coexistence of a text and metatext of different types either inside the text (comments, illustrations, foreword, etc.) or outside it (criticism, advertisement, parody, staging, etc.). In addition to relations between text and metatext, description can be based on the complementary nature of perception processes that allow us to talk about the multimodal text. If multimodality sways outside the text, i.e, when text is realised in a different material, we can talk about the multimedial text (e.g. multimedial commentary on a book). (Torop 2002: 66)

Just as there is a variety of understandings of autocommunication there is a variety of understandings of text. In fact, this seems to be the case with most notions of Tartu semiotics: code, language, semiosphere, space, culture, etc.

The Russian Perspective on the Notion of the Self: Mikhail Bakhtin’s “Inner speech” and Yuri Lotman’s “Autocommunication” (by Kim Soo Hwan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) [PDF]

The concept of “inner speech” by Bakhtin, which represents the semiotic connection between consciousness and unconsciousness, was suggested as a conceptual alternative to the Freudian unconscious. Meanwhile, a theoretical concept relevant to Bakhtin’s inner speech in Lotman’s thoughts — indeed, one of the most original and creative concepts of the latter — is that of “autocommunication.” Autocommunication refers to the case in which the subject does not transmit information to another person but directs it back to himself or herself. If Bakhtin tried to show why monologue-like inner speech was not a monologue but a complicated dialogue, Lotman proved why surplus repetition was creation instead of repetition. (Hwan)

In the first instance, semiotics is notably careless and/or carefree when it comes to the probems of the unconscious. In the second instance, Lotman indeed had a deal with repetiton, which was most likely influenced Jakobson's parallelisms. Lotman even claimed, that repetition could function as a metaphor. Now I realise that this may have something to bo with Bakhtin: the latter spoke of how the Devil, in Dostoevsky's works, repeated what a character said and although the words were exactly the same, the meaning was different.

In thinking of the self/ego, Russian theorists take a standpoint different from that of their Western counterparts. Their strategy is to concentrate on justifying the multiple, creative, and dynamic self-creating semiosis instead of revealing the emptiness of and cracks (fissures) in the subjectivity. Can we call it a characteristic strategy of “peripheral” thinking, which is distinguished from the “central” one, or is it merely another piece of evidence that shows the theoretical frailty of Russian thoughts on the issue of the subject? This is an open question. (Hwan)

I feel as if Hwan is falling for that same trap that is the first questions in my list of issues with autocommunication. Namely, he presumes that autocommunication and inner speech have to do with the concept of self or ego or subjectivity. To me it seems that these are indeed Western themes that Russians aren't very interested in, at least were not during the Soviet era.

Broms, Henry and Henrik Gahmberg 1983. Communication to Self in Organizations and Cultures. Administrative Science Quarterly 28(3): 482-495.

An autocommunicational text (e.g., a novel) may be read many times over; its function, however, is not to add information in the quantitative sense, but to enhance the ego. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 482)

Really? Really really really?

The founder of modern sociology, Vilfred Pareto, said some sixty years ago, "Actions come from sentiment, not logic. Logic is applied a posteriori" (Pareto, 1968). (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 482)

I quite like this.

At the center of this store are the group's myths about itself - "we Americans." These images form and maintain the culture. The symbols, images, or simply call them group habits, are stored in typical words, pictures, and actions. Images can be transmitted from generation to generation in initiating courses, in schools, street corner societios, and, on the corporate level, in seminars and bull sessions. They cal also be transmitted by way of signs, the flags of nations, or evocative corporate trademarks. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 483)

I'd like to know what these "typical actions" exactly are.

The phenomenon of communicating to oneself is a mechanism and a procedure that produces "mythic" information, i.e., those very symbols and shared images that form the nucleus of any culture. There are a number of instances in which such an information flow from "I" to "I,"as Lotman expressed it, is apparent. These are situations in which man turns to himself, as in diarywriting. Writing in a diary may be done in order to remember dates and events, but diary writing is also a medium through which to clarify one's own thoughts. Such turning-to-oneself processes to pacify and clarify the mind, with the help of autobiographies, diaries, monologues, and meditational formulae, are typical features and important elements even in our present-day cultures. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 484)

Again some marked differences from Lotman's autocommunication. For example, Lotman (to my knowledge) doesn't say AC produces mythic information (if "new" information itself is not a mythical dream). Crarifying one's thought I like - that I can see.

Barnlund's (1971) model of intrapersonal communication is interesting in an autocommunicative sense, since it implies that a person, while sending a message, is "cueing" himself. The diary writer, while writing in his diary, is in fact cueing himself at the same time. Similarly,when a person is writing a memo, he is both informing the other person and "cueing" himself. The word "cueing" seems to hint at a self-imposed change. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 484)

And this sounds awfully lot like Blumer's self-indication.

The communication system "I"-"He" makes it possible to transfer quantitative information, when information quantity is seen as central. In the second communication system, "I"-to-"I,"a qualitative change takes place in the person or group in question, which leads to enhancement of the ego of a person or of the team spirit of a group. This change leads to a displacement of context and thus to the introduction of a code, which turns the original message into a new one. When the sending of information to oneself is particularly strong, the result may be a reconstruction of the inner self. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 485)

This is where Broms is inventing stuff for his own purposes (something to do with corporate culture, I guess).

But in autocommunication, the ego-enhancing information is not additive and cannot be measured in quantities. The novel Anna Karenina does not really add to our knowledge anything substantive about Russian railways, regardless of how many times we read it, but there is another kind of information intertwined in the text, between the lines, a sort of qualitative information. (Broms & Gahmberg 1983: 486)

Whoa, in this sense every non-scientific (or non-"informative") text is automatically autocommunicative.

Autocommunication

Autocommunication - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Autocommunication is a term used in communication studies, semiotics and other cultural studies to describe communication from and to oneself. This is distinguished from the more traditionally studied form of communication where the sender and the receiver of the message are separate. This can be called heterocommunication.

So autocommunication seems to primarily a cultural studies term. It hasn't hit me yet that this is so, because there are similar terms in philosophy (e.g. introspection), psychology (e.g. inner speech), physiology (e.g. proprioception), etc. It may very well be that it is portrayed this way because only Lotman and Broms are cited in this article, and the notion in question is specifically autocommunication, not self-communication. There's a very important aspect to this: in cultural studies the "self" that communicates with itself is a "supraindividual" self. It's not even a "social" self, but a society as a self.

Where heterocommunication gives the receiver new information, autocommunication does not. Instead it enhances and restructures the receiver's ego. Both forms of communication can be found either in individuals or within organisations. When autocommunication is done by an individual it can be called intrapersonal communication.

Here I think is a malformation [abnormal or anomalous formation or structure; deformity] of the concept. Lotman has written that autocommunication "enhances and restructures" the information. I don't recall him speaking about the ego, as such, but that may be the fault of my own memory. Vaatame üle: "autokommunikatsioon, mida ligikaudu määratlevad mõisted, nagu "avastus" ja "inspiratsioon": minu poolt minusse sisestatud informatsioon korreleerub eelnenud informatsiooniga, mis on fikseerunud mu mälus, korrastab selle ja tulemusena saadakse väljundina märkimisväärne informatsioonihulga kasv." (Lotman 2010: 74). This is only one definition (I'm relying on my own notes, not on the original text). In translation: [this second type of] atucommunication is approximately defined by notions such as "discovery" and "inspiration": information that I input into myself correlates with previous information that is already fixed in my memory, organizes it and the resulting output is given as a remarkable growth of quantity of information. My translation is bad but the essence seems to be organizing information, not mysely (of course here one could retort that you are the sum total of information you contain... but that would be an awful reduction).

Autocommunication is typical for religious or artistic works. Prayers, mantras and diaries are good examples. In organisations and corporations strategic plans and memos, for example, can function like mantras. But any text (or work) can become autocommunicational if it is read many times over.

This probably comes from Henry Broms rather that Juri Lotman. The latter did talk of religious or artistic works but I'm not sure he claimed that these works themselves autocommunicate. Rather, these types of works are better suited for performing autocommunication. Prayer and admiring art have an autocommunicative function - in these cases the artistic work (as input) enable one to organize one's memory (in prayer you look back at your day and ahead to the future; artistic work is an especially condensed form of information carrier that reveals itsely to different viewers very differently). Diaries are the most common form of autocommunication, and Mihhail Lotman has explicated this very well: "Inimene kirjutab endale, just nagu oleks ta keegi teine. (M. Lotman 2012: 172-173). I think something useful would come from this discussion if I could form some questions to ask people who attend the summer school of semiotics (on autocommunication) next week. E.g. Does autocommunication organize the self/ego or information/knowledge or something else? Returning to this quote, I find it interesting that a text becomes autocommunicational if it is read many times over. Why is repeated reading the treshold? Couldn't first reading reorganize your thoughts? Is this a matter of opinion or is it in some way measurable? This should be a question: When is a text autocommunicational: upon first reading, upon repeated readings or in any reading?

Summer School 2013 – Autocommunication in Semiotic Systems: 40 years after the Theses on the Semiotic Study of Culture | IASS-AIS

[Let us try to] contemplate on communication and autocommunication as a specific topic in cultural semiotics – also in exemplary case studies as a possibility to open discussion on cultural semiotics either as a coherent monolith or an open cumulative paradigm developed through ad hoc research;

The bold phrase suggests what reading wikipedia above already confirmed: that autocommunication is "a specific topic in cultural semiotics". This may be why autocommunication is not listen among "Communication basic topics" on wikipedia (but hey, neither is nonverbal communicatian!).

[Let us try to] hypothesise whether is it possible, both in cultural semiotics and semiotic research associated with contemporary Tartu, to gain the level of systemic coherence presentable in the form of a New Theses?

I would say no, but that's just me. I base my opinion on the varieties of semiotics present in Tartu. It would be very difficult - if not impossible - to create a systemic coherence in it. At best, I would imagen, certain "specific topics" could be presented systematically. That is, we would need a Thesis on Autocommunication, a Thesis on the Semiosphere, a Thesis on the Text, a Thesis on Space, etc.

The problem of autocommunication in psychological practice
[PDF]

Autocommunication is a communication process which represents a particular form of human interaction with oneself. Autocommunication is a term used in scientific literature to describe communication from and to oneself.

This may seem fairly general but some phrases are quite indicative. For example, it says that autocommunication represents "a particular form" OF "human interaction with oneself". That is, autocommunication is here a form of... self-communication? If we take autocommunication to be supraindividual, then yes. But this nit-picking does indicate towards an actual problem: how is autocommunication related to other similar notions, be they self-communication, self-indication or "interaction with oneself". The latter even raises the question whether interaction with oneself is something different than, say, "intraaction". As a sidenote, I thought about how far I can actually go with these notions. Specifically, I am very interested in what I call - for lack of better terms - "nonverbal self-communication". This is completely different from what is normally considered communication. I tried conveying the difference visually. The upper model is Saussure's communication model. The lower scheme is quasi-Goffmanian:

The difference is that on the upper model two people exchange words but on the lower model words are not necessarily exchanged and there are countless other people involved (here only two are represented). And the self (person on the left) does not only "communicate" nonverbally with other people in the vicinity, but also with him- or herself and the situation at large. This may seem as if I'm simply pushing the boundaries for amusements sake, but these are actual concerns for some and are only beginning to gain some scientific notice. For example, what I consider "nonverbal self-communication" was just my own idea based on nothing more than personal experience; but then I heard a TED talk by Chris Shea, who says: "...it allows me to step back, I can recognize in myself that something is triggered ... and I can be aware of that." This is what I mean: sometimes I may not be very aware of what others are doing or expressing around me, maybe because I'm concentrating on something else or I am simply not able to look around me and stare at people without giving it away, but I can still feel the effects that the behaviour of others brings out in me. Chris Shea's example is noticing that she is flashing someone the tongue and asking herself, as if, "Why am I doing that?" I don't think this perspective is very prevalent in the "body language" discourse, but there seem te be scientists who are very well aware that people's behaviour is "interconnected" in very subtle ways. It may even be that the best way to "read" a situation would be not to eye down others but to simply take note of one's own behaviours. This, too, comes with a risk - mainly of becoming too self-involved. Let's present a question: How is autocommunication related to the notion of feedback?

The theoretical analysis shows that a number of concepts are used to describe this communication process. You can find various definitions of this phenomenon in different researches. There are “autocommunication” [Lotman, 2000], “intrapersonal communication” [Roberts, 1987; Aitken, 2002; Brewers, 2006], “internal dialogue” [Bakhtin, 1994; Kuczynsky, 1988, 1990], “intra-subjective communication” [Petrenko, 1988], “intra-psychic communication” [Freud, 1997; Perls, 1993, 2001].

Whoever wrote this document is fairly aware that others have come up with similar terms before and after Juri Lotman (his is still named first, though). I'll take this as the basis of my own list at the end of this post. The significant aspect of all of this is that most of these terms have an "internal" quality to them. Yet, from the standpoint of textual "supraindividual" notion of autocommunication, it does not have to be "internal" as in intra-personal, intra-subjective or intra-psychic. Rather, the supraindividual notion presumes that several people, or a whole culture or society, constitutes a "whole", a supra-individual person, that communicates with itsely. Think of the case of cultural self-communication wherein a culture communicates with itself. Question: How does a culture communicate with itself?

A variety of these definitions happened during the evolution of psychological science. This variety reflects the stages of this movement.

Again, very true. Bastian, Tichener, Wundt, Freud, James and Mead would be some examples.

Autocommunication is realizing inside the consciousness (psyche). It is the result of consciousness. Autocommunication performs an adaptive function. In information and communicative approach autocommunication is necessary for survival and adaptation to the environment. It can help to interpret a perceptual data for more effective being [Roberts, Edwards, Barker, 1987; Shedletsky, 1995; West, Terner, 2004]. Thinking is a form of intra-psychic communication [Barker, Kibler, 1971].

I can concur with the statement that autocommunication is the result of consciousness - this applies even for the supraindividual "universe of the mind" approach (cultural autocommunication is the result of so-called social mind). Adoptive function, on the other hand, is suspiciously non-Lotmanian. That is, he said (to my knowledge) nothing about this (it is well known that he held anti-Darwinian views). Same goes for interpreting perceptial data and "effective being" (whatever that may be). The last statement is the most interesting and poses a question that has bothered me for a while: Is thinking a form of autocommunicatian?

The idea of consciousness as a space of autocommunication is presented in researches of interactionism [Mead, 1964, 1967, Blumer, 1986; Shyuts, 2004]. Autocommunication is an interiorized form of social relations that shapes the structure of a human person.

I bet some of my teachers would like this first statement: consciousness as a "space" of autocommunication reifies the "fuzzy topography" of cultural semiotics. "Space" seems to be a metaphor here, but then again I'm not on good grounds with discourse on space. The latter claim, that autocommunication is an internalized form of social relations makes sense even from the Lotmanian perspective. Juri Lotman claimed that his mind contained "other minds" with whom he was in constant dialogue. This is a common idea is early psychology and G. H. Mead is indeed a good example of such thinking. Personally I very much like this perspective, because I have a first-hand sense of having "other minds" intermingle with my own (e.g. the ideas of Lotman, Foucault and countless others inhabit my mind and I "converse" with them when I ponder these ideas). Is autocommunication an interiorized form of social relations?

The self, like the mind, is a social emergence (has a social nature?). This social conception of the self, Mead argues (entails) that individual selves are the products of social interaction. Autocommunication is presented as a self-interaction in the Blumer’s concept. Self-interaction is an internalized social process in which the actor interacts with oneself [Blumer, 1986]. The conscious and complete internal communication can be initiated in the inner world only when a problem appears [Schutz, 2004].

This is the well known contention of Mead on the subject of self-formation. Blumer's concept of self-interaction makes sense in terms of, for example, talking to oneself, or even playing with oneself (not a masturbation joke), as when a child hits the football against the wall (although in this case he or she "interacts" with the wall?). The latter part may be scratched for now because we are dealing with psychic phenomena, not bodily.

In the researches of some authors it is noted that autocommunication occurs between “imaginary companions” – different semantic positions on the same theme...

"Imaginary companions" is exactly the term needed to explicate the concept of "internal addressates" (because "addressate" is a weird word).

Several researchers identify the concepts of inner dialogue and inner speech postulating the fact of the genetic and functional dialogic human consciousness [Bakhtin, 1986, 1994, Vygotsky, 1996, 2003, 2005]. In contrast to this approach other authors by analogy with the external speech processes produce monologue and dialogue as the main form of inner speech [Strakhov, 1969]. Other authors say that inner speech is just a means of verbal expression of internal dialogue. Vygotsky used the term “inner speech” both to define a conversation with oneself and a process of expressing thoughts into words [Vygotsky, 1996].

In forming the concept of the semiosphere, Lotman relied on this dialogic understanding of human consciousness, claiming (something to the effect that) the elementary act of understanding is translation and the elementary act of translation is dialogue. Vygotsky's conflation of both "conversation with oneself" and "a process of expressing thoughts into words" makes sense in light of the dictum "autocommunication precedes, companions and succeeds communication". That is, every time one communicates (in whatever form) one is at the same time communicating with oneself.

The functions of intrapersonal communication are to ensure consistency and integrity of personality on the basis of self-determination and self-identification [Shibutani, 1998; Rogers, 1994; Maslow, 2004].

Kui Mihhail Lotman räägib unenägudest, siis ta ütleb, et "üheks normaalse inimese tingimuseks on, et ta ärgates suudab taastada identiteedi iseendaga." (M. Lotman 2012: 97). Autocommunication may be the way a person achieves "identity" with him- or herself, so-to-say "becomes oneself". I would express it in a very general way as "self-communication is a prerequisite for self-identification". This may be formed as an ambiguous question: How are autocommunication and automodels related? This PDF seems to be a draft for a psychological article. Here are the "functions" of autocommunication from the empirical part:

Compensatory function	autocommunication is initiated in order to continue the dialogue and compensate for a shortfall op positive communication. Through internal dialogues a person compensates the excess of "negative" interpersonal communication or lack of the "positive" one.
Self-isolation	autocommunication is necessary to avoid negative communication.
Emotive function	emotional discharge and assessment of the situation are realized in autocommunication.
Self-therapy	autocommunication is required for implementing self-help and self-support in difficult situations.
Social reflection	autocommunication is necessary to understand how people perceive and evaluate themselves and others.
Communicative anticipation	autocommunication is necessary to plan and simulate activity and communication, to rehearse behavior and "live" situations.
Moral regulation and development	autocommunication is necessary to analyse a person's compliance to one's conscience requirements and one's transformation as a result of this comparison. It implements as a self-criticism and self-training, self-praise and self-charge.
Epistemological function	autocommunication is necessary to implement learning and sely-discovery.
Introspection and self-determination	autocommunication is necessary for introspection and self-determination, it is necessary to make a decision upon oneself and make a responsible choice.
Understanding	autocommunication is necessary for understanding and self-understanding.

It goes on like that and gets boring, because autocommunication seems to be "necessary" for almost anything a person does, but it is not clear how or why.

Andrews, Edna 2003. Conversations with Lotman: cultural semiotics in language, literature, and cognition. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Lotman argues that this form of communication is much more important than has previously been thought, and that autocommunication in fact only secondarily serves a mnemonic function (i.e., when the second 'I' is 'functionally equivalent to a third party' [1990: 21]). The primary role of autocommunication is a cultural one - to create new information. The new information transmitted is qualitatively restructured and necessarily involves a doubling and is never self-contained (1990: 22). (Andrews 2003: 28)

Adrews's interpretation of Lotman is surely not perfect but it is the best I can find at this point. New information seems to come from reorganization of old information (I wonder if this is what is meant by doubling). And qualitative restructuring is a good term. Can you come up with an example on the spot of how autocommunication qualitatively restructures information?

One of the more salient features of autocommunication is that sign types are more indexicalized (e.g., abbreviations can be deciphered only by the text creator, complete sentences are lacking) (Lotman 1990: 26-7). Lotman even claims that rhythmical-metrical systems originate in the autocommunication system and not the 'I-s/he' system (1990: 30). Lotman concludes his discussion with the observation that all of culture is not only 'the sum of the messages circulated by various addressers' but 'as one message transmitted bp the collective "I" of humanity to itself ... a vast example of autocommunication' (1990: 33). (Andrews 2003: 29)

Instead of "supraindividual self" I should use "the collective I of humanity" at least when speaking of this idea in Lotman's work.

Lotman, Yuri 2001. Autocommunication: ‚I’ and ‚Other’ as addressees. – Lotman, Y. Universe of the Mind. London; New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 20-35. [by lyhiyhendus]

The difference comes down to the fact that while in the ‚I-s/he’ system information is transferred in space, in the ‚I-I’ system it is transferred in time. (Lotman 2001: 21)

Considering everything else Lotman says about autocommunication’s transformational qualities, it may seem that he reduces space strictly to the delivering of messages without any change: messages are being passed along as they are, almost naturally. In this light, also, it seems that autocommunication is necessary if any kind of translation is to occur: all translation is autocommunication: culture can not operate without the dimension of autocommunication.

This problem has fascinated me for a while. It seems fairly simple: when you communicate with another then the message travels through space; but when you communicate with yourself the message travels through time. Makes perfect sense, right? Not if you consider the variations. If the main function of autocommunication is to produce new information then the aspect of time gets confusing. Isn't communicating with oneself even faster than communicating with another? Also, the "perspective" of space here is person-dependent: if I write a diary in order to communicate with myself then I won't necessarily read it at the same spot where I wrote it. Lyhiyhendus seems to spot some issues as well: he seems to be missing to "transformational" or "qualitative restrtructuring" aspect. I think a somewhat antagonist question can be posed here: Can autocommunication occur through the transfer of messages in space?

The ‚I-s/he’ system allows one merely to transmit a constant quantity of information, whereas the ‚I-I’ system qualitatively transforms the information, and this leads to a restructuring of the actual ‚I’ itself. (Lotman 2001: 22)

Messages passed along the i-s/he channel have the ability to trigger autocommunication processes, and if such triggering does not take place, the message will have been meaningless to the adressee? In light of studies of power relations: every effect on a subject needs to trigger his autocommunication processes: power works on autocommunication, inserts itself in the I-I channel.

Here we can see that Juri Lotman's understanding of subjectivity (the "I") has become severely outdated (I'm hoping to hear newer perspectives at the conference). His "I" seems to be static and uninvolved with communication until it communicates with itself. It almost seems that this may have been the effect of Soviet power: with other people you censored yourself and only transmitted pre-packaged messages ("Mehed etendasid tervitusrituaali number seitseteist, surusid seejärel kätt" (Remsu 1989: 86-87)). So it might be due to historical conditions that Lotman was inclined to write this way. Or, simply for the purpose of explicating complex subject matter, he depicted a static subject. Lotman's vision of subjectivity could merit further study. Lyhiyhendus comments that communication triggers autocommunication. This comes close to my earlier statement that "autocommunication precedes, companies and succeeds communication." On power working on autocommunication a lot more could be said, and hopefully lyhiyhendus will say something more on this in his presentation. For my purposes it makes perfect sense, because power "structures" behaviour largely through what Scheflen calls "self-censure".

Simultaneous transmission along two communication channels is not only a property of artistic texts, it is also a feature of culture if we take culture as a single message. We can therefore divide cultures into those where the message transmitted along the general linguistic ‚I-s/he’ channel is predominant, and those oriented towards autocommunication. (Lotman 2001: 33)

Cultures oriented towards autocommunication are capable of great activity, but are often much less dynamic than human society requires. (Lotman 2001: 35)

This statements seems a bit paradoxical: if autocommunication is the only phenomenon that enables a subject to transform itself, how can a culture be less dynamic if it is oriented towards autocommunication? It is here, I think that we need to separate autocommunication from self-description, the latter being an outcome of specific autocommunicational processes, while the formes would signify any kind of inner semiotic activity that has the possibility to transform the subject. Self-description forms the subject in one specific mold, autocommunication transforms, and even makes possible the transformation of, the subject.

Here I must pay some well-deserved lip-service to pluralities. Lotman takes culture to be "a single message," which is a pretty weird perspective. Birdwhistell, for example, critiqued E.T. Hall for endorsing "George L. Trager's global incorporation of all culture as communication" (1968: 96; my italics). This may be why the semiosphere and perhaps other Lotman's notions as well are touted as "totalitarian". This may be "global incorporation" in work; the significant difference (which makes Lotman's view that much weirder) is that Trager considered all culture as communication, not all culture as a single message. Surely culture is more like a network or even a boggledy-botch [tohuvabohu] of communication. In a similar vain I don't think autocommunication is the only phenomenon that enables a subject to transform itself; the psychological listing of autocommunicative functions should be a testament to that. Yet the contention that self-description (or alternatively: automodel) is only one product of autocommunication is spot on.

Steedman, Marek 2006. State Power, Hegemony, and Memory. In: Shönle, Andreas (ed.), Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 136-158.

At its most straightforward this translation is the transmission of a message from one person (or culture) to another. One speaker transmits a coded message to another, who must "decode" it to extract the meaning. Lotman contrasts this model with autocommunication, in which the sender and the receiver are the same "person." The underlying semantic content of the message remains the same in autocommunication, but "recoding" transforms its meaning. Lotman illustrates the concept with the example of "diary jottings ... which are made not in order to remember certain things but to elucidate the writer's inner state, something that would not be possible without the jottings" (Universe of the Mind, 21). In such jottings "the message is reformulated an acquires new meaning"; it is "qualitatively transformed." A parallel restructuring occurs in the identity of the diary jotter: in autocommunication, "while communicating with himself, the addresser inwardly reconstructs his essence, since the essence of a personality may be thought of as an individual set of socially significant codes, and this set changes during the act of communication" (22). (Steedman 2006: 143)

Q: How would you view personality as an individual set of socially significant codes? This suggestion is very valuable, because it can be linked with Peirce's "man ≈ sign" formulation. Yet I have not met anyone actually taking this perspective and running with it. Not once. It's one of those quotes that sounds really neat and applicable but no actual application can be found. I'm hoping to do so myself with the notion of "behavioural sphere" but even that is doubtful. Concerning autocommunication, this passage reifies the "generation of new meaning" aspect of autocommunication. There seems to be a mismatch of positions or metalevels here. Does the autocommunicating jotter do so in order that someone else may elucidate his or her inner state? Seems doubtful. And again it is confusing whether this "qualitative transformation/restructuring" is aimed at information or the self. I'd say that the jotter is transforming his or her own understanding of the jotted abbreviation, but here it seems that he or she is transforming him- or herself.

For Lotman this, too, is an instance of autocommunication. Indeed, "culture can be treated both as the sum of the messages circulated by various addressers (for each of them the addressee is 'another,' 'she' or 'he'), and as one message transmitted by the collective 'I' of humanity to itself. From this point of view, human culture is a vast example of autocommunication" (Universe of the Mind, 33). Culture thus organizes a "collective personality with a common memory and a collective consciousness" (34). Below the level of all humanity, partucular cultures are examples of autocommunication. (Steedman 2006: 144)

The last remark makes no sense to me. The vast example (culture as a single message by humanity) is presented by Edna Andrews. But I notice that my own grappling with "global incorporation" was predicted by Lotman and presented as a viewpoint that culture can also be treated "as the sum of the messages circulated by various addressers". It is the "totalizing" tendency to create "now wholes" (as Uexküll purportedly did with his Umwelt) that seems to drive Lotman to view culture as a single message. Later on, as we know, he proposed to view the whole universe of the mind as a single semiosphere.

Märtsin, Mariann 2008. Self and Other in Communication and Cognition: The Role of Auto-Communication and Intersubjectivity in Autopoiesis of Psychic Systems. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 42(2): 208-211.

In the communication the information is selectively chosen from the environment, uttered and understood by the system. Thus, the meanings that give a unique identity to a system are constantly reproduced in the chain of communications between system and its environment. This argumentation can be easily coupled with Valsiner's account of personal and collective cultures that interact through internalization and externalization processes (Valsiner 1998). (Märtsin 2008: 208)

Finally a piece that does not mention or reference Lotman. This paper stems from Niklas Luhmann's theory of self-referential social systems. Here it seems that the function of autocommunication serves to maintain the system's identity. Note that here we are talking about a general system, not necessarily about culture.

Communication is central theme in Luhmann's theory of self-referential systems (Luhmann 2006). The system creates and thereafter reproduces the difference, the boundary between itself and environment in the chain of communications with the surronding (Cooper 2006). The same process of communication is repeated with new references and therefore the self-creation of system is circular. The information which has been processed by the system to define itself in relation to the environment becomes part of the system and is used in autopoiesis as a new state in system's existence. (Märtsin 2008: 209)

Although this is not "Lotmanian", there seem to be same elements as in the semiotics of culture. Namely: the boundary between self and other; and self-definition or the creation of automodels (self-descriptions).

The self is treated as the other in auto-communication, this other chooses the information, utters it, and the self, having observed other's behaviour understands it through acceptance or rejection. However, there is one important difference in this process - auto-communication happens fully inside the system. As a consequence, the information selected makes no reference beyond the system-environment boundary, but the system itself is treated as an environment from which the information is selected. (Märtsin 2008: 209)

This is interesting, because significant differences emerge. Because the system here is abstract and "culture" is a bit more concrete (hah), it seems that auto-communication in the cultural semiotic sense is not limited to the internal system. This is of course a topic that should be contested. Is autocommunication purely self-referential? This is very difficult to answer. There are some hints, though. For example, if Lotmanian autocommunication means qualitative transformation of already available information then indeed nothing "outside oneself" needs to come into play. Yet somehow this seems too limited. Another interesting aspect is that because autocommunication in Märtsin's sense happens fully inside the system, the system itself becomes the environment. If this system is culture, then it makes some sense in that images of the "other" cultures are socially constructed and may lack actual reference; yet empirically this contention falls flat on its face with one word: intertextuality. If the system is a person, then indeed it makes a bit more sense: autocommunication seems to occur fully inside the person. But then a question arises: is it still autocommunication if instead of inner speech it is the case of self talk? Or what about the behavioural aspect: my own behaviour can of course be a sign for me, but so can it be a sign for the external observer.

Following Luhmann, Mascareño understands meaning as actualization of meaningful possibilities [[signs]] that reduces the overabundance of possibilities [[entropy]] in the world but does not eliminate them. Meanings do not exist in the environment, waiting to be used, but become created during the communication between environment and system. Thus, “communication is not a ‘transfer operation’ of meaning” ... but it is co-creation of meaning, that “was prefigured neither in ego’s nor in alter’s mind” (Mascareño 2008, submitted for publication). However, Mascareño suggests that communication does not happen in an empty space, but it takes place in the symbolically generalized communication media [[semiosphere]], which consists of “meaningful constellations of coordinated selectivity, which provide common significances, identifiable themes and complementary expectations” (Mascareño 2008, submitted for publication). This shared space of meaningful possibilities motivates individual’s selectivity in communication, while also being regenerated by individuals as they communicate. In this context it seems somewhat contradictory that Mascareño proposes a lack of intersubjectivity between individuals in the co-creation of meanings. It needs to be kept in mind that intersubjectivity does not constitute an identity between two minds. The shared space of meaningful possibilities out of which certain meanings as actualizations are created does not necessarily have to be characterised by mutuality, complementarity and similarity. It can just as well be characterised by tension and difference as a dialogical opposite of similarity and complementarity (Marková 2003). Nevertheless, there needs to be a shared space of possibilities for the system and environment or for two systems to interact. The system has to extend itself beyond its boundaries towards the other in order to communicate and this is made possible by shared meaning constellations that exist in a society. The system has to operate ‘as-if’ there is some shared space of meanings between self and other, otherwise the understanding as an acceptance or as a rejection cannot emerge (Valsiner 1998). (Märtsin 2008: 210)

Well, now I know why Randviir says that systems theory is like a parallel universe of semiotics. They seem to be talking about matters that have a long history in semiotics (at least the Tartu variety). The first bold note on co-creation of meaning is screamingly lacking in Lotman's understanding of communication: he seemingly ascribes no creativity to heterocommunication. And the second note concerns the ideal/adequate distinction of communication, which is not original in Lotman, but significant. That is, for communication to be possible, there must be some "shared space of meanings between self and other". I wonder if in a similar vain one could claim that there must be some "unshared space of meanings" between the I who writes this and the I who reads this later, for example? Presumably this "unsharedness" comes from the time period in between writing and reading so that when I come acound to read this I have forgotten some old information and learned some new information so that in a very small way, I am a different person by then.

Torop, Peeter 2008. Translation as communication and auto-communication. Sign Systems Studies 36(2): 375-397.

At the core of personal, national, or social identity is the recognition of the boundary between self and other. The boundary not only divides but also unites and thus participates in dialogic processes. To a large extent dialogue within the boundaries depends on dialogue at the boundaries. (Torop 2008: 376)

Between cultural semiotics and systems theory above there's a marked difference in the understanding of boundaries. Systems-thinking boundaries are like stone walls with barbwires on top so that they cannot be crossed; boundaries in cultural semiotics are more like border ditches you can jump over if you wished.

As I have put it before elsewhere it is a process that takes place within a translator's mind, but also within language, culture, and society. A cognitive, linguistic, cultural or social process can take place between minds, languages, cultures and societies, but it can also take place within a single mind, language, culture or society. (Torop 2008: 377)

I wonder if these could be the the levels of autocommunication? They almost seem to accord to Ruesch's scheme as well, if language be taken as a "language group".

Research in the field of translation ethics well illustrates the effort of one area of culture toward self-understanding and self-description. Self-description is a process of autocommunication, and its result can be a self-modelling that fixes the dominants, the principles of unification, and the generative language of self-description. Lotman defined self-modelling (aвтомодель) on the basis of a culture as a whole. "Self-modelling is a powerful means for the 'end-regulation' of a culture, attributing to it a systematic unity and largely defined its quality as a reservoir of information" (Lotman 1970: 420). Lotman sees in culture three types of realization of self-modelling: (1) self-modelling of culture that strive toward a maximal approach to real existing culture; (2) self-modellings that are distinct from the practice of culture and are conted toward the changing of that practice; (3) self-modellings that exist as an ideal self-awareness of the culture distinct from the culture as such. (Torop 2008: 392)

The whole article seemed to be about translation and thus mistitled until this passage on the very last pages. Now I don't even know what to do with these types of self-modelling. I can only note that "a systematic unity" is much better than "a certain unity"...

That which on one level of culture manifests itself as a process of communication and a dialogue between addresser and addressee can be seen on a deeper level as the autocommunication of culture and a dialogue of the culture with itself. It is very important axiologically to see both levels, since autocommunicative processes increase the coherence of a culture, support its identity, and do this with the help of self-modellings. The wealth of a culture is not only in the diversity of texts and events, but also in the diversity of self-modellings of various types in various parts of the culture. (Torop 2008: 394)

...

List of "variations" ("forms" of self-communication) or simply related terms:

• autocommunication (J. Lotman; M. Lotman)
• intrapersonal communicatian (Roberts; Aitken; Brewers)
• internal dialogue (Bakhtin; Kucznsky)
• intra-subjective communication (Petrenko)
• intra-psychic communication (Freud; Perls)
• self-interaction (Blumer)
• self-indication (Blumer)
• self-communication (Key)
• self-control (Peirce)
• self-censure (Scheflen)
• self-presentation (Goffman)
• self-denial (Goffman)
• self-mortification (Goffman)
• self-reflection (Mead)
• auto-affection (Mead)
• self-motion (Bulwer)
• introspection (Tichener)
• Selbstbeobachtung (Wundt)
• proprioception (Sharrington)
• kinesthesia (Bastian)
• Ego-Ton (Uexküll)
• selfing (James)
• self-description (Lotman)
• self-interpretation (Merrell)
• self-understanding (Foucault)
• self-construction (Foucault)
• epimeleia heautou ("Care of the Self")
• nosce te ipsum / gnōthi seauton ("Know Thyself")