A Table Companion

• Kant 2000[1790]. Critique of the Power of Judgment
• Kant 2006[1798]. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
• Cohen 2008. The Ultimate Kantian Experience: Kant on Dinner Parties
• Darwall 2014. The Social and the Sociable
• Greer 2017. "A Many-Sided Substance": The Philosophy of Conversation in Woolf, Russell, and Kant

Eesti mõtteloo tüvitekstid (FLFI.05.025)

Kant, Immanuel 2000[1790]. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press.

[Kant seltskondlikkusest Otsustusjõu kriitikas, lk 176-178; 184-185; 228-230]

Taste is thus the faculty for judging a priori the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept). (Kant 2000[1790]: 176)

Kant's definition of taste curiously compatible with Susanne Lange's concept of nondiscursive presentations (the communicability of feelings through art, especially music).

This combination, however, can always be only indirect, i.e., taste must first of all be represented as combined with something else in order to be able to connect with the satisfaction of mere reflection on an object a further pleasure in its existence (as that in which all interest consists). For what is said of cognitive judgments (of things in general) also holds here in the aesthetic judgment: a posse ad esse non valet consequentia. (Kant 2000[1790]: 176)

Kant is not the best author to be read in a fragmentary fashion. Taking pleasure in the existence of something is combined with what?

The beautiful interest empirically only in society; and if the drive to society is admitted to be natural to human beings, while the suitability and the tendency toward it, i.e., sociability, are admitted to be necessary for human beings as creatures destined for society, and thus as a property belonging to humanity, then it cannot fail that taste should also be regarded as a faculty for judging everything by means of which one can communicate even his feeling t everyone else, and [|] hence as a means for promoting what is demanded by an inclination natural to everyone. (Kant 2000[1790]: 176-177)

"There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2). This "everything by means of which one can communicate even his feeling" includes art, music, but also dress, gesture, and probably anything else that can be considered "beautiful".

For himself alone a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his hut or himself, nor seek out or still less plant flowers in order to decorate himself; rather, only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own way, a refined human being (the beginning of civilization): for this is how we judge someone who is inclined to communicate his pleasure to others and is skilled at it, and who is not content with an object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. (Kant 2000[1790]: 177)

Like checking the passions (cf. Spencer 1876: 12-13), social union fosters the aesthetic sense. Being inclined to communicate one's pleasures to others is emotive and related to sympathy, though William McDougall argues that lessening the suffering of others and communicating one's own pleasures is rather rare (cf. McDougall 1916: 78).

Further, each expects and requires of everyone else a regard to universal communication, as if from an original contract dictated by humanity itself; and thus, at first to be sure only charms, e.g., colors for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquis), or flowers, mussel shells, beautifully colored birds' feathers, but with time also beautiful forms (as on canoes, clothes, etc.) that do not in themselves provide any gratification, i.e., satisfaction of enjoyment, become important in society and combined with great interest, until finally civilization that has reached the highest point makes of this almost the chief work of refined inclination, and sensations have value only to the extent that they may be universally communicated; at that point, even though the pleasure that each has in such an object is merely inconsiderable and has in itself no noticeable interest, nevertheless the idea of its universal communicability almost infinitely increases its value. (Kant 2000[1790]: 177)

I think he is mistaken. How would we test if people outside of society (without human contact) have no regard for beautiful things? If only communicable sensations have value, dreams and hallucinations would be quite worthless and no-one would enjoy sleep and psychedelics.

It has been with a good intention that those who would gladly direct all of the occupations of human beings to which these are driven by their inner natural predisposition to the ultimate end of humanity, namely the morally good, have taken it as a sign of a good moral character to take an interest in the beautiful in general. (Kant 2000[1790]: 178)

More likely the ultimate ends of humanity are threefold: the aesthetically pleasing, the morally good, and the intellectually true (coherent thought reasonably likely?).

But they have been contradicted by others, not without ground, who have appealed to the experience that virtuosi of taste, who are not only often but even usually vain, obstinate, and given to corrupting passions, could perhaps even less than others lay claim to the merit of devotion to moral principles; and so it appears that the feeling for the beautiful is not only specifically different from the moral feeling (as it actually is), but also that the interest that can be combined with it can be united with the moral interest with difficulty, and by no means through an inner affinity. (Kant 2000[1790]: 178)

Define:obstinate - stubbornly refusing to change one's opinion or chosen course of action, despite attempts to persuade one to do so. Põikpäine.

What has given rise to the customary expression beautiful sciences is without doubt nothing but the fact that it has been quite rightly noticed that for beautiful art in its full perfection much science is required, such as, e.g., acquaintance with ancient language, wide reading of those authors considered to be classical, history, acquaintance with antiquities, etc., and for that reason these historical sciences, because they constitute the necessary preparation and foundation for beautiful art, and also in part because acquaintance with the products of beautiful art (rhetoric and poetry) is even included within them, have because of a verbal confusion themselves been called beautiful sciences. (Kant 2000[1790]: 184)

More or less the argument that to create something original, one needs to be familiar with tradition (if you replace "original" with "beautiful").

If art, adequate for the cognition of a possible object, merely performs the actions requisite to make it actual, it is mechanical; but if it has the feeling of pleasure as its immediate aim, then it is called aesthetic art. This is either agreeable or beautiful art. It is the former if its end is that pleasure accompany the representations as mere sensations, the latter, if its end is that it accompany these as kinds of cognition. (Kant 2000[1790]: 184)

Thus, "being agreeable in conversation" (Mahaffy 1888: 1) is, in a sense, an aesthetic affair.

Agreeable arts are those which are aimed merely at enjoyment; of this kind are all those charms that can gratify the company at a table, such as telling entertaining stories, getting the company talking in an open and lively manner, creating by means of jokes and laughter a certain tone of merriment, in which, as is said, much can be chattered about and nobody will be held responsible for what he says, because it is only intended as momentary entertainment, not as some enduring material for later reflection or discussion. (Also included here is the way in which the table is set out for enjoyment, or even, at big parties, the table-music - an odd thing, which is supposed to sustain the mood [|] of joyfulness merely as an agreeable noise, and to encourage the free conversation of one neighbor with another without anyone paying the least attention to its composition.) Also included here are all games that involve no interest beyond that of making time pass unnoticed. (Kant 2000[1790]: 184-185)

A hodgepodge of phatic tropes: "free, aimless, social intercourse" (PC 1.1); "the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness" (PC 7.6); "they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener" (PC 6.4). Not being held responsible for what is said is a valuable addition.

Beautiful art, by contrast, is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself and, though without an end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication. (Kant 2000[1790]: 185)

But in that sense phatic communion, too, is purposive: it promotes the mental powers for social communication even more directly.

The propaedeutic for all beautiful art, so far as it is aimed at the highest degree of its perfection, seems to lie not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers through those prior forms of knowledge that are called humaniora, presumably because humanity means on the one hand the universal feeling of participation and on the other hand the capacity for being able to communicate one's inmost self universally, which properties taken together constitute the sociability that is appropriate to humankind, by means of which it distinguishes itself from the limitation of animals. (Kant 2000[1790]: 229)

An interesting definition of human sociability: feeling "communion" with humanity and the ability to communicate one's innermost self.

Kant, Immanuel 2006[1798]. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated and edited by Robert B. Louden and Manfried Kuehn. Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press.

[Kant laudkonnast ja isemõtlemisest Antropoloogias, S.245-252 // B244-B250; BA 165-167. Tõlkinud Eduard Parhomenko]

The way of thinking characteristic of the union of good living with virtue in social intercourse is humanity. [...] Sociability is also a virtue, but the social inclination often becomes a passion. If, however, social enjoyment is boastfully heightened by extravagance, then this false sociability ceases to be virtue and is a luxurious living that is detrimental to humanity. (Kant 2006[1798]: 178)

This "false sociability" is more-or-less Malinowski's "phatic communion" because it is egoistic sociability - "social enjoyment is boastfully heightened by extravagance" to where the person is unwilling to listen to other people and keeps on boasting of his own achievements or, worse yet, diminishes others by mocking or deriding them.

Music, dance, and games form a speechless social gathering (for the few words necessary for games establish no conversation, which requires a mutual exchange of thoughts). Games, which some pretend should merely serve to fill the void of conversation after the meal, after all usually the main thing: a means of acquisition whereby affects are vigorously stirred, where a certain convention of self-interest is established so that the players can plunder each other with the greatest politeness, and where a complete egoism is laid down as a principle that no one denies as long as the game lasts. Despite all the culture these manners may bring about, such conversation hardly promises really to [|] promote the union of social good living with virtue, and so it hardly promises to promote true humanity. (Kant 2006[1798]: 178-179)

Muusika, tants ja mäng kujundavad sõnakehva seltskonna (sest need vähesed sõnad, mida mänguks tarvis on, ei loo konversatsiooni, mis eeldab mõtete vahetamist). Mäng, mis väidetavalt peaks täitma vaid tühimikke konversatsioonis pärast söögilauda, on tavaliselt siiski põhiasi: kui tulu teenimise vahend, kusjuures afektid on kõvasti üles köetud - siin kehtestatakse teatud omakasupüüdlikkuse kokkulepe riisuda üksteist suurima viisakusega, ning kuniks mäng kestab, seatakse põhimõtteks täielik egoism, mida ei eita mitte keegi; hoolimata kogu kultuurist, mida see oma maneeridega tekitada saab, võib sääraselt konversatsioonilt vaevu loota seltskondliku heaolu ühendamist voorusega, seega tõelise humaansuse tõelist edendamist. (E.P. tõlge)

Zuckermann's treatment of the phatic function in a competitive game, thus, rightly places its theoretical focus on Jakobson's phatic function rather than Malinowski's phatic communion. Note that not once does Malinowski use the word "conversation" in his definition of phatic communion - a conversation in the sense of a mutual exchange of thoughts (transmitting ideas) is communication.

The good living that still seems to harmonize best with true humanity is a good meal in good company (and if possible, also alternating company). Chesterfield says that the company must not number fewer than the graces and more than the muses. (Kant 2006[1798]: 179)

Heaolu, mis veel kõige paremini paistab kokku sobivat voorusega, on hea lõunasöök heas (ja kui võimalik, siis ka vahelduvas) seltskonnas; Chesterfield on öelnud, et seltskond ei tohi jääda alla graatsiate arvu ega tohi üle olla muusade omast. (E.P. tõlge)

"Alternating" calls to mind Fourier's passion of the butterfly - man's need for novelty. The ideal number is evidently 10 participants, including the host.

When I manage a dinner party composed of nothing but men of taste (aesthetically united), in so far as they intend not merely to have a meal in common but to enjoy one another's company (this is why their number cannot amount to many more than the number of graces), this little dinner party must have the purpose not only of physical satisfaction - which each guest can have by himself alone - but also social enjoyment, for which physical enjoyment must seem to be only the vehicle. That number is just enough to keep the conversation from slackening or the guests from divining into separate small groups with those sitting next to them. The latter situation is not at all a conversation of taste, which must always bring culture with it, where each always talks with all (not merely with his neighbor). On the other hand, so-called festive entertainments (feasts and grand banquets) are altogether tasteless. It goes without saying that in all dinner parties, even one at an inn, whatever is said publicly by an indiscreet table companion to the detriment of someone absent may not be used outside this party and may not be gossiped about. (Kant 2006[1798]: 179)

Kui ma võtan ühe laudkonna puha maitsekatest meestest (ühinenud esteetiliselt), siis niikaua, kuni nende sihiks on nautida ühiselt mitte ainuüksi lõunasööki, vaid ka üksteist (ja sel juhul ei saa nende arv suurt üle graatsiate arvu olla), ei pea selle väikse laudkonna taotluseks olema mitte ainult ihuline rahuldus - mida igaüks võib ka üksinda kogeda -, vaid ka seltskondlik nauding, mistarvis igaüks paistab olevat pelgalt vahendiks; seal on see arvu just piisav, et vestlus ei jääks toppama, vaid ka eraldiolevates väiksemates seltskondades ei peljataks end lähimale naabrile avada. [...] On seejuures iseenesestmõistetav, et see, mida kõigis laudades, isegi suure ühislaua ääres mõne ebadiskreetse lauakaaslase poolt mõne puuduja kahjuks avalikult kõneldakse, pole siiski kasutamiseks väljaspool seda seltskonda ega tohi saada välja lobisetud. (E.P. tõlge)

"There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2). This sequence of words appears ubiquitous. // Tõlge ütleb viimases osas vastupidist inglisekeelsele versioonile: seltskonna suurus peaks olema täpselt selline, et see ära ei vaibuks (jääks toppama) ja, et külalised ei jaguneks väiksemateks seltskondades, kes räägivad omaette. St end oma "lähimale naabrile avada" tähendab, et enam ei suhelda kogu seltskonnaga, vaid ainult naabriga. The ending is just a moral admonishment: don't spread gossip.

For even without making a special agreement about it, any such symposium has a certain holiness and a duty of secrecy about it with respect to what could later cause inconvenience, outside the group, to its members; for without this trust, the healthy enjoyment of moral culture within a social gathering and the enjoyment of this social gathering itself would be denied. (Kant 2006[1798]: 180)

Sest igal sümpoosionil on ka ilma selleks eraldi sõlmitud lepinguta teatud pühadus ja kohus vaikida selle osas, mis võib laudkonnakaaslastele väljaspool seda ebameeldivusi põhjustada; sest et selle usalduse puudumisel häviks nauding, mis on moraalsele kultuurile endale nõnda kasulik seltskonnas, ja selle seltskonna nautimine ise. (E.P. tõlge)

Looks like this has more to do with the so-called "meta-semiotics" (cf. Urban & Smith 1998: 264) of such a "symposium". That is to say, holiness and secrecy might have belonged to a dinner party in Kant's time but is by no means a universal feature. The only parallel that comes to mind with "trust" is equality: "the sine qua non of good conversation, is to establish equality, at least momentarily, if you like fictions, but at all costs equality, among the members of the company who make up the party" (Mahaffy 1892: 102). Breaking that implicit trust destroys said equality.

Therefore, if something derogatory were said about my best friend in a so-called public party (for actually even the largest dinner party is always only a private party, and only the state party as such is public in its idea) - I would, I must say, defend him and, if necessary, take on his cause with severity and bitterness of expression; but I would not let myself be used as the instrument for spreading this evil report and carrying it to the man it concerns. - It is not merely a social taste that must guide the conversation; there are also principles that should serve as the limiting condition on the freedom with which human beings openly exchange their thoughts in social intercourse. (Kant 2006[1798]: 180)

See pole pelgalt seltsimise maitse, mis peab juhtima konversatsiooni, vaid ka printsiibid, mis peavad inimeste avatud läbikäimisele kehtima oma mõtete abil suhtlemisel nende vabadust piiravate tingimustena. (E.P. tõlge)

That is to say, some topics are off the table in good company. First and foremost, something damaging about people not present, especially if that someone is a friend of the participants. That "limiting condition" can also apply more broadly - religion and politics are not good topics of conversation.

There is something analogous here to ancient customs in the trust between human beings who eat together at the same table; for example, those of the Arab, with whom a stranger can feel safe as soon as he has merely been able to coax a refreshment from him (a drink of water) in his tent; or when the deputies coming from Moscow to meet the Russian Tsarina offered her salt and bread, and by the enjoyment of them she could regard herself as safe from all snares by the right of hospitality. - Eating together at one table is regarded as the formality of such a covenant of safety. (Kant 2006[1798]: 180)

E.P. jättis ka "toiduosaduse" osa välja. "From savage life to our own, eating and drinking together has been favorite reviver of good feeling and the seal of amity." (Ross 1920: 397)

Eating alone (solipsismus convictorii) is unhealthy for a scholar who philosophizes; it is not restoration but exhaustion (especially if it becomes [|] solitary feasting): fatiguing work rather than a stimulating play of thoughts. The savoring human being who weakers himself in thought during his solitary meal gradually loses his sprightliness, which, on the other hand, he would have gained if a table companion with alternative ideas had offered stimulation through new material which he himself had not been able to track down. (Kant 2006[1798]: 181-181)

Üksinda süüa (solpisismus convictorii) on filosofeerivale õpetlasele ebatervislik; see pole mitte taastamine, vaid väljakurnamine (eriti kui see üksildaseks mõnulemiseks muutub); väsitav töö, mitte aga elavdav mõtete mäng. Nautiv inimene, kes üksildase lõunasöögi ajal koormab ennast mõtetega, minetab vähehaaval reipuse, mille ta aga seevastu saavutab, kui mõni laudkonnakaaslane pakub talle uut ainest elavnemiseks oma vahelduvate mõttevälgatustega, mille peale ta poleks ise tulla saanud. (E.P. tõlge)

"After they had walked, they made use of the bath; and having washed themselves, they assembled in the place where they eat together, and which contained no more than ten who met for this purpose" (Iamblichus 1818: 53). Kant once again mediating pythagoreanism.

At a full table, where the number of courses is intended only to keep the guests together for a long time (coenam ducere), the conversation usually goes through three stages: 1) narration, 2) arguing, and 3) jesting. - A. The first stage concerns the news of the day, first domestic, then foreign, that has flowed in from personal letters and newspapers. - B. When this first appetite has been satisfied, the party becomes even livelier, for in subtle reasoning it is difficult to avoid diversity of judgment over one and the same object that has been brought up, and since no one exactly has the lowest opinion of his own judgment, a dispute arises which stirs up the appetite for food and drink and alse makes the appetite wholesome in proportion to the liveliness of this dispute and the participation in it. - C. But because arguing is always a kind of work and exertion of one's powers, it eventually becomes tiresome as a result of engaging in it while eating rather copiously: thus the conversation sinks naturally to the mere play of wit, partly also to please the women present, against whom the small, deliberate, but not shameful attacks on their sex enable them to show their own wit to advantage. And so the meal ends with laughter, which, if it is loud and good-natured, has actually been determined by nature to help the stomach in the digestive process through the movement of the diaphragm and intestines, thus promoting physical well-being. Meanwhile the participants in the feast believe - one wonders how much! - that they have found culture of the spirit in one of nature's purposes. (Kant 2006[1798]: 18)

Küllusliku söögilaua juures, kus toitude rohkuse eesmärgiks on hoida külalisi kaua koos (coenam ducere), läbib vestlus tavaliselt kolm astet: 1) jutustamine, 2) resoneerimine, ja 3) naljatamine.
A) Päevauudised, kõigepealt kohalikud, siis ka välismaised, erakirjade ja ajalehtedega sissetulnud.
B) Kui see esimene isu on rahuldatud, muutub seltskond juba elavamaks; kuna arutlemise juures on raske vältida hinnangute erinevust ühe ja sama kõnealuse objekti kohta ning igaühel on enda antud hinnangust mitte just kõige madalam arvamine, siis tõuseb vaidlus, mis ergutab isu roogade ja veini järele ning vastavalt vaidluse elavusele ja selles osalemise määrale teeb vaidluse kosutavaks.
C) Kuna aga arutlemine on alati teatud laadi töö ja jõupingutus, see aga muutub selle ühesama üsna rikkaliku naudingu vältel lõpuks väsitavaks, suubub kõnelus loomulikul moel pelka vaimutsemismängu, osalt ka kohalviibivate naisterahvaste meeleheaks, keda väiksed vallatud, ent nende soole mitte solvavad rünnakud mõjutavad end oma vaimukuses paremana näitama ning nii lõppeb lõunasöök naermisega; kui see on vali ja heasüdamlik, töötab see kehalise heaolutunde heaks, sest loodus on selle tänu vahelihase ja sisikonna liikumisele päris sobivalt kõhule seedimise toimimiseks määranud; kusjuures pidusöögist osalejad ime küll kui palju vaimukultuuri arvavad leidvat looduse sihis. (E.P. tõlge)

The kind of sequence neither Malinowski nor Ross nor anyone else I've read thus far provide. Mahaffy might have followed Kant in this - I have an inkling that I should re-read him for the third time after getting more familiar with Kant's Anthropology (preferably beginning with the partialized journal edition translated by Kroeger).

The rules for a tasteful feast that animates the company are: a) to choose topics for conversation that interest everyone and always provide someone with the opportunity to add something appropriate, b) not to allow deadly silences to set in, but only momentary pauses in the conversation, c) not to change the topic unnecessarily or jump from one subject to another: for at the end of the feast, as at the end of a drama [|] (and the entire life of a reasonable human being, when completed, is also a drama), the mind inevitably occupies itself with reminiscing on various phases of the conversation; and if it cannot discover a connecting thread, it feels confused and realizes with indignation that it has not progressed in culture, but rather regressed. (Kant 2006[1798]: 181-182)

Reeglid ühe maitseka pidusöögi jaoks, mis seltskonda elustab, on: a) valida vestluseks aine, mis huvitab kõiki ning alati ajendab kedagi kõneldule midagi koheselt lisama; b) mitte lasta vestlusesse sugeneda surmavaikusel, vaid üksnes silmapilkseil pausidel; c) vestluse objekti mitte muuta ilma vajaduseta ning mitte hüpata ühelt aineselt teisele, kuna meelemõistus pidusöögi lõpus nagu ka draama lõpus (seesugune on ju mõistusega inimese kogu läbitud elu) tegeleb vältimatult kõneluse mitmesuguste aktide taasmeenutamisega: kui ta ei suuda siis seose juhtlõnga leida, tunneb ta end segadusse aetuna ning kogeb nördimusega, et pole kultuuriliselt üldse mitte edenenud, vaid pigem tagasi langenud. (E.P. tõlge)

On the first count it becomes apparent why the speech of "vampires", as Ross calls them, does not become a conversation (but must instead be termed phatic communion) - when the vampire is "blowing his own trumpet", he's not engaging others with anything interesting and creates no opportunity to add something appropriate, instead creating a situation in which others, too, resolve to blow their trumpets in turn. On the second count the deadly silence is, as discourse studies have revealed, longer than approximately 3.5 seconds. The danger here is that if one takes Kant too seriously here and feels compelled to avoid any silence at all then a natural change of turns cannot occur, and the speaker will become vampiric, going on and on without facilitating other people. On the third count tangibility comes to mind, i.e. whether the sequence of topics is "likely to register in the long-term memories of the other participants" (Power & Dal Martello 1985: 249).

A topic that is entertaining must almost be exhausted before proceeding to another one; and when the conversation comes to a standstill, one must know how to slip some related topic into the group, without their noticing it, as an experiment: in this way one individual in the group can take over the management of the conversation, unnoticed and unenvied. (Kant 2006[1798]: 182)

A skill that can only be learned by experience, I assume.

d) Not to let dogmatism arise or persist, either in oneself or in one's companions in the group; rather, since this conversation should not be business but merely play, one should avert such seriousness by means of a skillful and suitable jest. e) In a serious conflict that nevertheless cannot be avoided, carefully to maintain discipline over oneself and one's affects, so that mutual respect and benevolence always shine forth - here what matters is more the tone (which must be neither noisy nor arrogant) of the conversation than the content, so that no guest returns home from the gathering estranged from the others. (Kant 2006[1798]: 182)

d) Mitte mingil oma õiguse tagaajamisel ei tohi endal ega ka seltskonnakaaslastel lasta tekkida või kesta: ennemini, kuna see vestlus ei pea olema äri, vaid üksnes mäng, tuleb igasugust tõsimeelsust mõne osava sobiliku naljaga tõrjuda. e) Tõsises vaidluses, mis pole ikkagi välditav, iseend ja oma afekte hoolsalt talitseda, et alati paistaks välja vastastikune austus ja heatahtlikkus; kusjuures olulisem on toon (mis ei tohi olla kriiskav ega arrogantne) kui vestluse sisu; et seega mitte keegi külalistest ei naaseks seltskonnast koju mõne teisega tülli läinuna. (E.P. tõlge)

That is to say, conversation should be agreeable amusement, it's purpose should be playful sociability; it should not have an external goal or purpose (as in business - making money; or dogmatism - asserting one's principles as undeniably true no matter what). The tone of the conversation is that "atmosphere of sociability". Arvasin korraks, et siin on kokkupuutepunkt võõrandumisega. Define:estranged - (of a person) no longer close or affectionate to someone; alienated.

In the end, since the entire use of the cognitive faculty for its own advancement, even in theoretical cognition, surely requires reason, which gives the rule in accordance with which it alone can be advanced, we can summarize the demand that reason makes on the cognitive faculty in three questions, which are directed to the three cognitive faculties:

• What do I want? (asks understanding)
• What does it matter? (asks the power of judgment)
• What comes of it? (asks reason).

Minds differ greatly in their ability to answer all three of these questions. - The first requires only a clear mind to understand itself; and after some culture this natural gift is fairly common, especially when one draws attention to it. - To answer the second question appropriately is a greater rarity; for all sorts of ways of determining the concept at hand and the apparent solution to the problem present themselves: what is the one solution that is exactly appropriate to this problem (for example, in lawsuits, or at the outset of certain plans of action having the same end)? (Kant 2006[1798]: 123)

Kuna lõpuks tunnetusvõime kogu tarvitus iseenda edendamiseks vajab isegi teoreetilises tunnetuses siiski mõistust, mis annab reeglid, ainuüksi mille järgi on võimalik seda [tunnetusvõimet] edendada: nii saab pretensiooni, mis mõistusel on sellele, võtta kokku kolme küsimusega, mis on tunnetusvõime kolme võime [Fakultät] järgi esitatud:

• Mida ma tahan? [Was will ich?] (küsib aru)
• Milles on asi? / Mis on otstarve? [Worauf kommt es an?] (küsib otsustusjõud)
• Mis tuleb välja? / Mis on tulemus? [Was kommt heraus?] (küsib mõistus)

Pead [Köpfe] kõigile nendele küsimustele vastamisel on väga erinevad. - Vastus esimesele küsimusele eeldav vaid selget pead, mõistmaks iseend; ja see loomuanne on, mõnesuguse kultuuri olemasolul, üsna tavaline; peamiselt kui sellele tähelepanu pööratakse. - Anda kohane vastus teisele, see on palju haruldasem; sest esineb palju erinevaid viise antud mõiste määratlemiseks ja ülesande näivaks lahendamiseks: milline on aga see ainus, mis sobib selleks täpselt? (Nt kohtuprotsessides või samal eesmärgil teatud menetluste alustamisel). (E.P. tõlge)

Compare these from a similar list of questions from the end of CPR: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought i to do? 3) What may I hope? (cf. Kant 1855: 488). The classical (quasi-pythagorean, later psychological) order is messed up in both cases. The CPR one is merely reversed: 1) hope - emotion; 2) to do - intention; 3) know - thought. Here, on the other hand, I'd like to switch the first and second: 1) judgment [taste/feeling]; 2) understanding [desire]; 3) reason [consequences].

By means of the great difference of minds, in the way they look at exactly the same objects and at each other, and by means of the friction between them and the connection between them as well as their separation, nature produces a remarkable drama of infinite variety on the stage of observers and thinkers. For the class of thinkers the following maxims (which have already been mentioned above, as leading to wisdom) can be made unalterable commands:

1. To think for oneself.
2. To think oneself (in communication with human beings) into the place of every other person.
3. Always to think consistently with oneself.

My first principle is negative (nullius addictus iurare in verba Magistri), the principle of freedom from constraint; the second is positive, the principle of liberals who adapt to the principles of others; the third is the principle of the consistent (consequent) (logical) way of thinking. Anthropology can furnish examples of each of these principles, but it can furnish even more examples of their opposite. (Kant 2006[1798]: 124)

Peade suure erinevuse tõttu viisis, kuidas nad just neidsamu asju, samas omavahel näevad; nende üksteise vastu hõõrdumine, nende ühendumise nagu ka eraldumise läbi tekitab loodus vaatamisväärse näitemängu lõputu erisuguste vaatlejate ja mõtlejate laval. [?] Mõtlejate klassile saavad aga järgnevad maksiimid (mis tarkuse poole juhatavatena on juba mainitud ülalpool) teha vältimatuteks käskudeks:

1. Ise mõtelda.
2. End (suhtluses inimestega [in der Mitteilung mit Menschen]) mõtelda iga teise asemele/kohale.
3. Alati mõtelda kooskõlaliselt iseendaga.

Esimene printsiip on negatiivne (nullus addictus iurare in verba magistri), sunnivaba mõtteviisi oma, teine positiivne, liberaalse teiste mõistetega kohanduva [bequemenden] mõtteviisi oma, kolmas konsekventne (järjekindla) mõtteviisi oma; mille kohta igaüks, veel rohkem aga nende vastandist saab näiteid tuua antropoloogiast. (E.P. tõlge)

These maxims come across as distinctly Peircean. The first would be "pure possibility" - free from contraint. The second is especially reminiscent of Peirce's Secondness regarding otherness and resistance. Overall it sounds like what we typically call empathy, placing ourselves metaphorically in the shoes of another. And the third is the realm of habits (a form of consistency). Note, too, that the third is "logical". This indicates that Kant's Anthropology might merit attention from a Peircean perspective as well. Good stuff.

Cohen, Alix A. 2008. The Ultimate Kantian Experience: Kant on Dinner Parties. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25(4): 315-336. [JSTOR]

As one would expect, Kant believes that there is a tension, and even a conflict, between our bodily humanity and its ethical counterpart: "Inclination to pleasurable living and inclination to virtue are in conflict with each other." What is more unexpected, however, is that he further claims that this tension can resolved in what he calls an example of "civilized bliss," namely, dinner parties.

The good living which still seems to harmonize best with virtue is a good meal in good company (and if possible with alternating companions) [...] this little dinner party [...] must not only try to supply physical satisfaction - which everyone can find for himself - but also social enjoyment for which the dinner must appear only as a vehicle. (Anthropology, 186-187 [7:278])

Dinner parties are, for Kant, part of the "highest ethicophysical good," the ultimate resolution of the conflict between our physical body and our moral powers, which consists in finding the right proportions for the "mixture" between our partly "sensuous" and partly "ethicointellectual" nature. (Cohen 2008: 315)

The dinner party satiates both the body and the soul (and/or mind).

Kant does not specify the actual beliefs of the food, but we can suppose that it has to do with tempering the disputes, lightening the tone of the conversation and thus making the experience [|] as a whole more cheerful and pleasant. Bodily pleasures through food and drink remind the guests that the experience is about enjoyment and that disagreement should not be taken too seriously. (Cohen 2008: 316-317)

The enjoyment of food has some bearing on the enjoyment of conversation. Personally I'm not sure if it has so much to do with the taste of the food than with the fact of satiation. Hungry people are grumpy, whereas people who have just eaten feel at ease.

And since, unlike animals, we have the ability to choose what we consume, it is cruel to eat well and appropriately to our bodily needs as well as to the circumstances and the demands they make on us. (Cohen 2008: 317)

Is that why the encyclopedic entries on plants frequently mention things like "sheep and hogs eat it, cattle do not", or "rabbits will travel many miles to eat it", etc. - because animals have no ability to choose what they eat? Philosophers have the weirdest views of animals.

In particular, we know from experience that certain drinks are intoxicating and hinder our ability to think and control ourselves. Thus, the consumption of alcohol should not lead to extreme drunkenness, for "All stultifying drunkenness, such as comes from opium or brandy, that is, drunkenness which does not encourage sociability or the exchange of thought, has something shameful about it." More precisely, the excessive ingestion of food or drink, which leads to a significant weakening or a loss of the capacity to use one's powers, goes against the duties to the self. (Cohen 2008: 317)

Likewise with sociable and unsociable drugs (coffee and alcohol the former, cannabis and psychedelics the latter).

However, a passage from the Anthropology suggests that although excessive drinking ought to be avoided, moderate drinking can be morally beneficial:

Drink loosens the tongue. But it also opens the heart wide, and it is a vehicle instrumental to a moral quality, that is, openheartedness. [...] Good-naturedness is presupposed when this licence is granted to a man to cross the boundary line of sobriety for a short time, for the sake of sociability. (Anthropology, 61 [7:171])

So perhaps unexpectedly, Kant is not an advocate of complete sobriety in the context of dinner parties. Sociability together with morality permits and even encourages slight inebriation for a short period of time as long as the drinker is good-natured and so long as it allows sincerity and sociability. (Cohen 2008: 318)

That is, "spiritous liquors provided a short-cut to social pleasure" (Ross 1920: 53).

In this sense, there is a classification of drinks and drugs according to their effects vis-à-vis conversation, sociability and virtue, wine being the drink that is most fitting to a successful dinner party:

1. Wine induces merriness, boisterousness, wittiness and openheartedness. Thus it is good for conversation, sociability, and virtue.
2. Beer provides intoxication for social purposes but induces taciturn fantasies and impolite behavior. Thus it is good for conversation but bad for virtuous sociability.
3. Opium, brandy and spirits induce silence, reticence, stultifying and dreamy euphoria. Thus they contravene sociability and conversation.

The ingestion of intoxicating foods and drinks has to be well proportioned to the demands of sociability, decency towards others, and respects of oneself as a rational being. (Cohen 2008: 318)

Beer makes you fantasize? Hwat.

The problem with artistic entertainment during or after dinner is that it prevents the exchange of thoughts. But games are the worst form of dinner party entertainment, for not only do they prevent conversation, they also violate the union of sociability with virtue by allowing and even enrouraging the pursuit of self-interest. Of course, games that encourage self-interest (we can imagine that Kant is here concerned with games involving money) should be distinguished from the ones that merely pass time (the "passe-temps"), which are morally neutral and culturally benificial: "We are passing time when we keep the mind at play by the fine arts, and even in a game that is aimless in itself within a peaceful rivalry at least the culture of the mind is brought about." In the latter case, the game is aimless (or if it has an aim, it is simply to pass time and the culture of the mind is its by-product), whilst in the former, the aim is the cultivation of egoism. (Cohen 2008: 320)

"The union of sociability" oleks seltskondlikkuse ühendus. "Passe-temps is pastime, pastime, hobby, ploy - something that you enjoy doing in your spare time, for example reading or playing tennis. Aimlessness is on point - "free, aimless, social intercourse" (PC 1.1).

Similarly the hermit, by living in isolation, goes against human nature. As Kant writes in his Anthropology, "Man was not meant to belong to a herd like the domesticated animals, but rather, like to bee, to belong to a hive community. It is necessary for him always to be a member of some civil society." In fact, not only does the hermit deny his natural needs as a member of the human species, but more importantly, he violates a crucial duty to the self, namely: [|]

It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself but to use one's moral perfections in social intercourse [...] to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity [...] and so to associate the graces with the virtues. To bring this about is itself a duty of virtue. (M.M., 588 [6:473])

By isolating himself from the rest of the human species, the hermit neglects the social dimension of virtue, which is crucial to the realization of the duty of perfecting oneself morally. (Cohen 2008: 321-322)

It looks like Wilfred Trotter's comparison of cattle/herd and bee/hive types of gregariousnesses might have been inspired by Kant.

One of the crucial dimensions of dinner parties has to do with the intellectual stimualtion of the understanding via conversation - what Kant calls a "refreshing play of thoughts," which consists in the discussion of [|] the news of the day ("1. narration"), followed by "arguing back and forth" ("2. reasoning"), and finally ending with humor ("3. jesting"). But rather than being a fairly banal remark about the course of conversations at dinner parties, this is a significant point about the healthy way of life. (Cohen 2008: 322-323)

In light of these aspects it is truly astounding how barren Malinowski's phatic communion is. People talk about the weather and gossip (presumably talk about other people behind their back). It is difficult to imagine that "When a number of people sit together at a village fire" (PC 1.1), they do not discuss the news of the day, argue, or amuse themselves with jokes and witticisms.

By contrast, since "The mind cannot be at rest long, but it must receive a new impetus[,] Social gatherings which constitute essential enjoyment are a part of this, and are a veritable medicine for the mind." Thus, the sociable dinner is not only socially healthy, but also cognitively healthy. For through conversational interaction at dinner parties, he finds cognitive invigoration. (Cohen 2008: 323)

Sociability and mental health. Indeed, a neighbour had a mental health crisis recently partly because he had no-one to talk to (or, rather, did not seek out company to talk to).

Moreover, although most conversations provide some degree of intellectual stimulation, Kant notes that certain topics, such as the discussion of anthropological facts, rank higher than others:

A great utility of anthropology consists in social intercourse, for anthropology makes us skilled with respect to it, and also gives very beautiful material for conversation. Many materials are not appropriate for social gatherings: women do not inquire about affairs of state, but nevertheless want to converse, and so one finds that certain observations about the human being please, because every human being can employ them. Because this study is so engaging and so important for everyone, it therefore must rightly be held in high regard. (L.A., [25:858])

In the context of social intercourse, anthropology is a pleasant and entertaining subject. But it is also "important for everyone" because it is the discipline that is most useful for the conduct of life as "citizen of the world." (Cohen 2008: 323)

"There is, however, another kind of general knowledge which is not so easy to acquire, for it requires long experience, a certain position in society, and means for foreign travel. I mean the general knowledge of remarkable men, concerning whom the speaker can tell his recollections. [...] Akin to this man is the experienced traveller who has wandered through many lands and seen the cities and the ways of men." (Mahaffy 1892: 33)

What should be noted, however, is that even if the conversation over dinner is not in fact very fruitful intellectually or cognitively, its thoughtlessness can nevertheless be worthy if it is lively:

Thoughtlessness is either a lively or lifeless one. The lively one is present in an individual through enjoyment and lively conversation; the lifeless one is where the individual is transposed into inaction, and it makes his condition, for the new use of his powers of mind, inanimate. One maintains oneself through lively thoughtlessness; although the conversation is not interesting, yet it cheers one up. It is not only easy to collect one's thoughts from it, but one can also reflect better and more actively. (L.A., [25:540-541])

In this sense, even when it is thoughtless, lively conversation fortifies one's mental powers by keeping them animated. (Cohen 2008: 324)

Very much a criterion that could be applied on phatic communion to distinguish it from (good) conversation. Even if conversation is not an "exchange of thoughts", it can be cheerful; whereas it can also lack both good cheer and any point..

According to Kant, the sanguine "is a good companion, jocular, and high-spirited"; he "is not affected; he is good company"; "He has the spirit of trifle, which is always very welcome in society. He is sociable, and is also suitable for society; he wants it, for it is his element." The melancholic "who is himself deprived of joy will hardly be able to tolerate it in others." The choleric "is polite, but because of his emphasis on ceremony, he is stiff and affected in society"; he "often is wrong in tone, although at the same time in the thing itself he is right. As a result, he is not good company." The phlegmatic's "fortunate temperament takes the place of wisdom. [...] By virtue of this temperament he is superior to others without offending their vanity."
On this basis, we can conclude that the following hierarchy ensues:

1. The sanguine (for: good-natured, sociable, witty, and joyful; against: erratic)
2. The phlegmatic (for: wise, placid, humorous, inoffensive; against: inseparable to stimuli, sometimes cunning)
3. The choleric (for: polite, easily appeased; against: hot-tempered, ceremonious, wrong in tone and affected)
4. The melancholic (for: deep-thinker; against: joyless, self-important, uneasy, mistrusting, critical)

Moreover, certain combinations of guests function better than others. (Cohen 2008: 325)

Some really good stuff in this paper. I've now downloaded the portions of Kroeger's translation that I could find (in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vols 9(1), 9(3), 9(4), 10(3), 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14(2), 14(3), 15(1), 16(1), and 16(4)), which I'd like to read before the Cambridge edition. This is something I'd really like to dig into.

A number of rules that guide dinner party conversations directly concern cognition. They can be summarized in the following fashion:

1. Not to speak dogmatically: "do not tolerate the beginning or continuation of anything dogmatic."
2. To be exhaustive and comprehensive in the treatment of topics: "an entertaining subject must nearly be exhausted before one can pass on to another."
3. To be consistent in topic and thought: "do not change the subject unnecessarily, nor jump from one subject to another."

These rules are reminiscent of the rules of the sensus communis:

The following maxims may serve to elucidate its principles: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently. The first is the maxim of an unprejudiced, the second of a broadened, the third of a consistent way of thinking. (C.J., 160-161 [5:294])

In this sense, one could say that the cognitive rules that guide the exchange of thoughts at dinner parties ar the conversational counterpart of the sensus communis - a "sensus conversationis." (Cohen 2008: 326)

The rules of the sensus communis we already met above. In conjunction, these rules imply that (1) one must think for oneself rather than repeat dogmatic talking points; (2) one should broaden one's thinking by exchaustively taking in the other's positions; and (3) one should think consistently by not jumping from one topic or thought to another.

The rule of consistency seems particularly relevant here. To have a better grasp of it, it can be useful to recall that it is analogous to the cognitive rules spelt out in the Critique of Pure Reason. There, Kant argues that the mind needs intellectual consistency, and that it is only produced if a thread connects the various ideas together - a thread that is in fact demanded by reason in its quest for unity. So just as the progress of knowledge can only be generated through the combination of unity and variety in the thoughts of the knowing subject, the progress of conversation requires a similar combination of unity and variety [...] (Cohen 2008: 326)

Unity and plurality make totality, also in conversation.

Kant illustrates this rule with an instructive example:

He who enters upon a social discourse must, therefore, begin with what is present and near at hand, and thus gradually lead to what is more remote as long as it can be of any interest. Thus, a good and common subject is the bad weather for a person who walks from the street into a group assembled for mutual conversation. If, upon entering a room, one begins to speak of the latest news from Turkey currently appearing in the papers, then the imagination of others [|] would be struck too forcibly, since they would not understand what has led him to speak of it. The mind demands a certain order in the communication of thoughts, and much depends on the general circumstances and the opening statement. (Anthropology, 67 [7:177])

(Cohen 2008: 326-327)

Thus, Kant even gives a "context of situation" type of reasoning for why weather is such a common topic of conversation or at least "an excusable exordium" (Mahaffy 1888: 95).

Kant himself does not seem to have followed this rule, for as Maugham recounts, "Kant was fond of talking, but preferred to talk alone, and if interrupted or contradicted was apt to show displeasure; his conversation, however, was agreeable that none minded if he monopolised it" (Maugham, The Vagrant Mood, p. 132). (Cohen 2008: 336)

Do as I say, not as I do.

Darwall, Stephen 2014. The Social and the Sociable. Philosophical Topics 42(1): 201-217. [JSTOR]

In a justly famous passage from his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, Kant writes:

Here I understand by 'antagonism' the unsociable sociability of human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to [|] break up this society [...] Without these qualities of unsociability from which the resistance arises [...] all talents would, in an arcadian pastoral life of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love, remain eternally hidden in their germs; human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth than that of their domesticated beasts [...] Thanks be to nature, therefore, [...] for the spiteful competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or even to dominate! For without them, all the excellent natural predispositions in humanity would eternally slumber undeveloped. (Kant 2009, 13-14)

Partly what Kant means by "unsociable sociability" are desires to secure what one wants in a competitive setting in which others may want those things too. Even when there is nothing oppositional in the contents of our desires - say, for food, water, and shelter - real or perceived scarcity can put us at odds. In such cases, there is nothing essentially competitive or even social in what we want, only in the context in which we want it. (Darwall 2014: 201-202)

The "arcadian pastoral life" sounds like what Herder was arguing against with regard to cosmopolitanism and love of others. Also: "Human rivalry, for Ferguson, was a source of positive energy in society as well as a guarantee for liberty" (Piirimäe 2015: 543).

It is clear, however, that what looms larger in Kant's conception of unsociable sociability are further, essentially rivalrous social desires that are connected to what Rousseau called amour proper. "Spiteful competitive vanity," for example, or "the desire to possess or even to dominate," for its own sake, as opposed to for its instrumental benefits, are desires for what are these days called positional goods. Passions like these are essentially social in the sense that their objects cannot be conceived outside of a social context. (Darwall 2014: 202)

Phraseology: "all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3), that is, these (self-regarding) sentiments require a social context - the vain man requires admirers, etc.

A moment's reflection is sufficient to show how odd such desires would be. When people want bigger and faster cars than others, or even more eco-friendly rain barrels, they generally do so because they see these as affecting their standing in an ordering of social esteem and status. Such desires are for objects that are social and positional in a strong sense. They are desires to occupy social positions of esteem and status that are themselves constituted by attitudes and patterns of recognition that are in their nature "rank ordering and rank defining," in Nietzsche's phrase (Nietzsche 1994, 13). (Darwall 2014: 202)

Thus, "positional goods" are goods that as-if raise one's social position.

"Competitive vanity" and the "desire to possess and even to dominate" operate within an essentially social space of Rousseauean amour propre. They are desires for attention, notice, recognition, regard, esteem, and so on, which attitudes constitute rank and position in a social ordering of esteem and recognition. The vain [|] person is not simply given to a high opinion of himself; he wishes also to be well regarded by others and to be seen by them as meriting that regard. Similarly, what Kant calls the "desire to possess," though its favored form of property be private, only rarely aims at pleasures that are private. To the contrary, for consumption to be "conspicuous," the fact of possession must be made public, even if only to a favored few from whom attention and regard are most highly prized. And obviously, the "desire to dominate" can only be realized through others' attitudes and recognition. (Darwall 2014: 202-203)

I.e. the ambitious man craves "to figure potently in the minds of others, to be greatly loved, admired, or feared" (Ross 1920: 117). Vanity Ross treats as if it were a psychological issue: the vain man's "nature lacks a flywheel to carry him past the "dead points" in his experience" (ibid, 116). That is to say, Ross's vain man may not even be "given to a high opinion of himself" but desirous of such an opinion.

The major species of Kant's category of the unsociable, therefore, are desires, attitudes, emotions, and traits like vanity, pride, envy, and jealousy, that are nonetheless, essentially social in a strong sense because they operate within the attitudinal space of amour propre. The unsociable, as Kant intends it, is thus not a drive away from or an indifference to society; it is not the asocial. To the contrary, it consists in states of mind and character that seek to occupy privileged social places. When these places are related to genuine excellence and merit, and when competition can be suitably framed within a civil order - of freedom and law, as Kant and Rousseau both conceive it - then human culture and civilization can develop and advance. Like trees in a forest that would grow "stunted, crooked, and awry" if they stood alone, but which realize "a beautiful, straight growth" because they must compete for sunlight, human beings are led by "unsociable," essentially competitive passions to higher forms of excellence than they could otherwise achieve (Kant 2009, 15). (Darwall 2014: 203)

It turns out that Malinowski's phatic communion is unsociable in this sense. As to "When these places are related to genuine excellence and merit", Ross's achiever comes to mind: he is "careless whether the public he benefits ever learns of his existence; but even he needs an inner circle who understand and appreciate his achievement" (Ross 1920: 117), i.e. a favored few persons who appreciate the achiever. The overall point here is that these self-regarding sentiments are actually useful for society - they may motivate the attention-starved to achieve good things.

In what follows, I wish to investigate an essential difference between the unsociable and the sociable, especially as the latter notion operates in the thought of modern moral and political philosophy, in particular, that of the earl modern natural lawyers, Grotius and Pufendorf, which began the tradition that led to Rousseau and Kant. What is at stake in the unsociable are views of oneself that are third personal. It is a concern with how one is seen, valued, recognized, and so on, from observer's perspectives available within one's society, even if only those of critical cognoscenti or an honored few. Sociability in these writers, by contrast, is fundamentally second personal. It concerns how one enters into society and relates to others as fellow members. This is also the ordinary meaning of "sociable." People who are sociable enjoy the company of others, that is, not just to be in their vicinity, but to be with them in the sense of being reciprocally open to them second personally (Darwall 2013g). (Darwall 2014: 203)

The terms are new to me but the point is as clear as day. I.e. in the "desire to be renowned and well spoken of" (Malinowski 1922: 117-118), it is quite obviously a desire to be well spoken of by a third person, not by the person one is currently talking with. It looks to be a very useful distinction.

'Second person' in my writings refers to a logical category that parallels the familiar grammatical category of the second person, as with pronouns like 'you,' 'thou,' 'thee', 'y'all', and so on (Darwall 2006, 2013b, 2013c). What these grammatical forms have in common is that they are used to address some person or group. My philosophical claims and arguments have been less concerned with language, however, than with thoughts, attitudes, and actions that I argue similarly have addressees, if only implicitly; they tacitly communicate something to their addressees that, were it to be expressed in language, would appropriately take the form of the grammatical second person. (Darwall 2014: 204)

Very good stuff. The domains are triadic: (1) attitudes; (2) actions; and (3) thoughts. It could be argued that utterances (the uses of language) constitute actions, too, but that is besides the point. Jakobson's scheme could probably be reviewed with this implicit addressee issue in mind.

A good way into this topic is to consider some distinctions between different forms of esteem and respect. The normative category that is tied to esteem is the estimable. To esteem something is for it to seem estimable or worthy of esteem. The objects of esteem are ultimately persons, who seem more or less estimable as we have more or less esteem for them. We do not typically esteem people for no reason, of course. Generally, there will be apparently estimable features of someone that seem to make him worthy of our esteem, to some degree or other. (Darwall 2014: 207)

It sounds like this author has dissected a lot of social sentiments, or however one would call items (psychological attitudes?) like esteem and respect, this way.

What we might call a social order of merit is constituted by a pattern of social attitudes of esteem and contempt. The attitudes are "rank ordering" in their nature, and the relevant ordering is socially realized when there is sufficient attitudinal convergence. We can think of such an order in relation to social circle wide and small. (Darwall 2014: 208)

This is new ground for me - other than "social hierarchy", which is very blunt, I can think of no analogous terminology.

Consider, for example, forms of contempt that consist in ignoring or publicly refusing to take up someone's self-presentation in a way that would recognize it. It is possible for contempt to be so total that it goes beyond any attempt to communicate to its object that he is not worth bothering with or that his self-presentation is hopeless or ridiculous. Any such attempt would of course be second personal, but it is hardly essential to contempt that it seek to communicate its expressive content to its object in this way. After all, there is a kind of pragmatic contradiction in bothering to tell someone that he is not worth bothering with. A contemptuous rolling of the eyes rarely seeks to engage its object - rolling takes the eyes out of position for reciprocal eye contact. Frequently the audience for such a contemptuous display are the cognoscenti who can appreciate how ridiculous or "unsupportable" the object's self-presentation is: "Get a load of that." (Darwall 2014: 210)

And yet, it frequently occurs that someone is informed that s/he is "not worth bothering with". Trouble is taken to let the person know how s/he is regarded, perhaps in some hope that such information will lead towards some self-reflection and chance of course. The person may of course be "beyond the pale" and unwilling or unable to change.

Grotius famously claimed that "Sociability" is "the Fountain of Right" and that what makes something in accordance with or contrary to natural law is its "Fitness or Unfitness [...] with a reasonable and sociable Nature" (Grotius 2005, I, 85-86, 159). To begin to see the force of Grotius idea, we need to understand second-personal elements that are implicit both in his idea of sociability and in his ideas of law and right. (Darwall 2014: 211)

Uh-oh, the source is not included in the references. This must be Hugo Grotius' The Rights of War and Peace.

Grotius notes also the sense of 'right' that refers to rights: "Right is a moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly" (I, 138). Here Grotius induces his famous distinction between perfect and imperfect rights, which generates the modern distinction between perfect and imperfect duties or obligations. A "perfect right" is a Faculty" of the person, which includes the standing or authority to "deman[d] what is due" to him, including, Grotius says, "Liberty," or "power over ourselves" (or over others who are under his authority) and property (I, 138-39). Grotius adds that such a faculty "answers the Obligation of rendering what is owing" (I, 139). So rights entail a second-personal authority of individuals to demand certain treatment from others, as well as obligations (enshrined in natural law) that others have to provide this treatment. (Darwall 2014: 211)

This use of the word "faculty" is new to me. Recording it for that date in the future when I'll dive into Peirce's paper on the faculties claimed for man, and examine the use of this word in Locke and others.

Here Grotius quotes a remark of Florentius's "Nature has founded a kind of Relation between us," and distinguishes two basic kinds of social "relations." Some are relations of "unequals," such as "Parents and Children, Masters and Servants, King and Subject," where one individual has authority over another. Others are relations of "equal[s]," such as "Brothers, Citizens, Friends and Allies," where each party is conceived to be self-governing (I, 136). In the former instances, superiors have a "Right of Superiority"; in the latter, each has a "Right of Equality." (Darwall 2014: 211)

Berkeley's "natural society" (between equals) and "political society" (between unequals) comes to mind.

In a famous passage, Grotius replies to the skeptical challenge that "Natural Right is [...] a mere Chimera," since acting justly would be "extreme Folly, because it engages us to procure the Good of others, to our own Prejudice" (I, 79), by arguing that human beings have a "Desire of Society" (I, 79). This challenge would be echoed later by Hobbes's "foole" (Hobbes 1994, XV.§4), Hume's "sensible knave" (Hume 1985, 256), and Kant's worry that morality might be a "chimerical idea without any truth" (Kant 1998, 4:445). However, how must the "desire for society" and our "sociable" nature be conceived, if they are to be capable of grounding natural law as Grotius understands it, that is, as something that creates genuine obligations - not just moral counsel, but the moral law? (Darwall 2014: 212)

Once again, that's "the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3).

Grotius is actually quite specific about what he means by the "Desire of Society":

That is a certain Inclination to live with others of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatsoever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of His Understanding. (I, 80-81)

To this, he adds that mature human beings develop a "peculiar Instrument" that is necessary for such a "Community," namely, "the Use of Speech" (I, 85), along with the related "Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some General Principles" (I, 85). (Darwall 2014: 212)

Whattayaknow - phatic communion in the 16th century! Inclination/tendency. The "own Kind" calls to mind the "consciousness of kind" in early 20th century sociology. Peaceably - enlightenment.

For Pufendorf, sociability enters into the content of the "fundamental law of nature":

Every man, so far as in him lies, should cultivate a sociable attitude, which is peaceful and agreeable at all times to the nature and end of the human race. (Pufendorf 1934, 208)

Since all natural laws are God's legitimate demands, fundamentally anyway, the second-personal authority involved at the fundamental level in God's. In the first instance, only God has the authority to demand that we act toward others in sociable ways. (Darwall 2014: 213)

"Every civilised man and woman feels, or ought to feel, this duty; it is the universal accomplishment which all must practice, ad as those who fail signally to attain it are punished by the dislike and neglect of society, so those who succeed beyond the average receive a just reward, not only in the constant pleasure they reap from it, but in their esteem which they gain from their fellows." (Mahaffy 1888: 2)

To regard others sociably is thus to see them as sharing a common basic standing that grounds shared human rights. People "who, from a special feeling of their own superiority, would have every liberty reserved for themselves alone [...] and claim honor before other men," are "plainly unsociable" (1934, 336).
Sociability consequently entails recognizing all personal as equally entitled to fundamental respect or, as Pufendorf puts it, "esteem." Esteem of persons in communal life [...] consists in this, that [the other] is regarded as the kind of person with whom [...] it may be possible to have intercourse" (2009, 94). 'Intercourse', like 'sociable', is thus normatively loaded. Just as taking a "sociable attitude" is viewing someone as entitled to hold others to certain forms of treatment, so likewise, relating to someone as apt for "intercourse" is recognizing her as having this same fundamental dignity, therefore, as a mutually accountable equal. (Darwall 2014: 214)

In the end, it looks like a definition of humanity in which the primary feature is can be talked to. Malinowski nearly approaches this, though on a very superficial manner: "The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy" (PC 4.2). That is, common language is requisite for social intercourse, but what's really at issue here is the "psychological attitude" - whether you consider the other person as "worthy" of exchanging words with.

According to both Rousseau and Kant, only the rule of law of free and equal moral persons, and even then, only within a cosmopolitan order of lawfully related states, can enable human kind not only to reign in, but also to take best advantage of amour propre and "unsociable sociability" (Neuhouser 2008, 155-83; Kant 2009, 14-16). (Darwall 2014: 215)

Hence the enlightenment with "the achievement international justice and peace" (Piirimäe 2015: 522) as its goal. This paragraph makes me consider if I should write my term paper about the role of self-regarding sentiments in "unsociable sociability". I have a month to figure it out.

It is hard to keep actively thinking of someone as a jerk when speaking with him unless one is prepared to confront him by telling him what one thinks. (Darwall 2014: 216)

In my scant experience this is not so at all. I recall one particular jerk with whom I happened to casually chat quite frequently during the first half of this year. I could easily bite my tongue. His monopolizing the conversation, being overly dogmatic, and proudly bringing up his grandfather having been a nazi soldier at every chance were annoying but I don't recall going "meta" with him or discussing his character. We can suffer fools.

This paper was an excellent, thought-provoking read. It made me curious about the rest of the author's bibliography.

Greer, Erin 2017. "A Many-Sided Substance": The Philosophy of Conversation in Woolf, Russell, and Kant. Journal of Modern Literature 40(3): 1-17. [JSTOR / DOI: 10.2979/jmodelite.40.3.01]

In Woolf's work, silence is also "in the middle" of the most verbal, everyday, and "English" art of conversation. She represents this practice as something much more complex and indeed visual than the epigraph's sketch of superficial "talk" suggests. Not only does she develop conversation into a full-fledged art of its own, she also uses conversation as a metaphor for artistic practices that transform the relation between human subjects and the world. (Greer 2017: 2)

If the connection between Kant and Chesterfield (above) pans out, it may turn out that the English are indeed behind "conversation" becoming a philosophical topic. "Superficial "talk"" a synonym of phatic communion.

From The Voyage Out through Between the Acts, Woolf's fiction demonstrates keen awareness of the limits of language as a means of connecting with others. richard Dalloway's exclamation to Rachel Vinrace in The Voyage Out encapsulates this limitation of language, and of the capacities of verbal conversation to bring people together: "Here I sit; there you sit; both, I doubt not, chock-full of the most interesting experiences, ideas, emotions; yet how communicate?'" (63). (Greer 2017: 2)

This emphasis on nonverbal communication is right in my ballpark. The capacities of verbal conversation to bring people together: phatic communion is "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (PC 6.1). A triad: (1) emotions; (2) experiences; and (3) ideas.

The moments of greatest connection between Woolf's characters are frequently moments when verbal conversation occurs alongside a different sort of [|] "conversation," the nature of which is indicated in the word's Latin roots of con (with) and vertĕre (to turn). Originally, "conversation" signified a process of "turning with" others toward and through shared experience. Speech presumably played a part in guiding the conversationalists' "turns," but the essence of conversation was the togetherness experienced, not the words by which it was achieved. Woolf's depictions of conversation evoke this root meaning; frequently she contrasts wordless conversational attunement with the shallower and flawed efforts of characters to gain access to each other's inner worlds through speech. (Greer 2017: 2-3)

Sometimes this etymology does shine through: "Conversation between persons unknown to one another is also - when satisfactory - apt to be rich in the ritual of recognition. When one hears or takes part in these elaborate evolutions, gingerly proffering one after another of one's marks of identity, one's views on the weather, on fresh air and draughts, on the Government and on uric acid [...]" (Trotter 1921: 119). Here, evolutions could easily be replaced with "revolutions".

At times, Woolf's characters "converse" without exchanging a single word, gaining a sense of togetherness wholly through the act of turning, or looking, together. Recall the moment in To the Lighthouse when Mrs. Ramsay finally feels connected to Augustus Carmichael, as they look in their different ways at the centerpiece bowl of fruit: "That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking together united them" (22). Throughout this novel, characters are united when "looking together": at sand dunes, a woman and child sitting in a windowsill, the lighthouse, etc. (Greer 2017: 3)

These can be called, in a quasi-Goffmanian idiom, "watches" (cf. Scollon 1998: 284-285).

The two senses of "conversation" coincide in The Waves in two crucial meal scenes, during which the characters talk to each other while simultaneously turning together toward a flower at the center of the table. This flower comes to symbolize their "communion". As they turn toward it, speaking of what they see, feel, and think, "something is made," a "many-sided substance" (145, 229). (Greer 2017: 3)

Meaning that they participate in looking at the flower. Another triad: (1) feel; (2) see; and (3) think. It is becoming aparent that the second term, which is the most variable in general, replaces "action" or "willing" with visual experience. While seeing or watching is indeed an activity, it is only one particular type of activity, and a passive (receptive) one at that. This seems to be determined by the object of study - conversations in literature involve no great "doing", but feeling, seeing, and thinking.

My argument is not that Woolf intentionally crafts a philosophy of conversation from her interpretations of Kant and Russell, but that such a philosophy, in which conversation is itself the quotidian synecdoche of the broader aesthetic foundations of a shareable world, emerge when we reconstruct a conversation among three writers interested in art's relation to "subject and object and the nature of reality" (Lighthouse 23). The conversations comprising The Waves suggest an original philosophy uniting aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology. (Greer 2017: 4)

I have no idea how to interpret this statement. Philosophy of conversation is a part of the totality of Woolf's philosophy?

Likening her "social manner" to a foreign language adopted "at some meeting, [by] the chairman, to [|] obtain unity," Woolf in To the Lighthouse emphasizes the artifice and conventionality of Mrs. Ramsay's shepherding of conversation (90). The analogy also resonates with Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (§19, 8). To speak the language of the dinner table is to share its form of life, its implicit social conventions and assumptions. This becomes especially apparent when the narrative takes the perspective of characters who do not naturally fit this form. (Greer 2017: 4-5)

An interesting idea, though I doubt if it can be operationalized. Very likely there are extant treatments of this phenomenon in intercultural communication studies, for example.

For Froula, this "disinterestedness" enables a "noncoercive dialogue about the sensus communis, or common values" (14). But as the first dinner scene suggests, the characters in The Waves are not precisely in "dialogue about the sensus communis:" they are building it in dialogue, as though this sense of commonness is itself a product of the aesthetic work of conversation. (Greer 2017: 9)

In the previous paper (above) I was left with a distinct impression that sensus communis has something to do with the maxims of enlightenment. I'll have to look into this term independently.

According to Kant, intuition of the sensus communis is a defining feature of aesthetic experience. To judge something aesthetically is to believe in the universality of one's judgment. When we call a flower beautiful, for instance, "we believe that we speak with a universal voice, and we claim the assent of every one" (§8, 50). More specifically, we "imput[e] this agreement to everyone" (§8, 51, his emphasis). Beauty is not a defined concept; we would not attempt to logically persuade others of a flower's beauty. Rather, according to Kant, we believe that anyone who perceives the flower will immediately, pre-conceptually, feel that it is beautiful. This belief rests upon the implicit assumption that we share with others a sensus communis, a "subjective principle which determines what pleases or displeases only by feeling and not by concepts, but yet with universal validity" (§21, 75). (Greer 2017: 9)

I'm getting flashbacks of Laclau's "empty signifier", or something along the lines of the hegemony of discourse, i.e. universalization, making one point of view as-if cover the whole field. Surely there are better approaches to this. Perhaps a forced "common ground" (Power & Dal Martello 1985: 240)?

Like To the Lighthouse, the novel is critical of dinner table chatter. It shows conventional (verbal) conversation to fall too easily into alternating self-assertions, "attempts to say, 'I am this, I am that,' which we make," according to Louis, "coming together, like separate parts of one body and soul" (137). (Greer 2017: 12)

This is the problem of phatic communion - a conversation constituted by the claims of participating egos, an exchange of words that does not reflect the world but aims to expand the speaker's sense of self.

The imagery suggests that a collective, unconscious current of affect is more primary than individual articulations of identity, and the allegedly sovereign function of reason is itself "crazy" in its suppression of this elemental truth. Conversation as ordinarily understood is an inevitably vexed attempt to connect with others through repressing connectedness, insofar as speech falsely affirms individual identity, differentiating the personal self from the "coal-black stream." (Greer 2017: 12)

To me this comes across as poetry. It certainly sounds good but what does it mean? How is connectedness repressed in conversation?

Stanley Cavell expresses something along these lines when he calls upon us "to see our separate existence, to acknowledge its separateness, [as] a reasonable condition for a ceremony of union" (Contesting 22). Conversation becomes an art when conversationalists relinquish "attempts to say, 'I am this, I am that,'" and instead enter a "zone of silence," turning with each other in disinterested receptivity toward common matters. Aesthetic work is conversational when it seeks not to multiply the perspective of one's neighbor, nor to popularize or impose a singular perspective, but to contribute sides to the "one thing, seen by many eyes simultaneously." The conversational aesthetic suggests that the ethical value of aesthetic work does not primarily stem from its exercise of our empathetic capacities, but rather follows from its invitation to us to turn impartially with others, thereby making a new "worldly reality" perceptible. Such "conversations," however, must be endlessly expanded and remade. (Greer 2017: 15)

"In the best circles of the South the harmonization of the demands of different egos has become a fine art. The way in which a well-bred Southener will let the conversation take any direction you seem to wish, always playing up to your lead and suppressing his own preference, reveals the secret of the oft-noted "charm" of southern society." (Ross 1920: 113)