Locke, John 1741b. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: In Four Books. Twelfth Edition. Volume II. London: C. Hitch. [Internet Archive]
Book III. Chap. I. Of Words, or Language in General
God having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an Inclination, and under a necessity to have Fellowship with those of his own Kind; but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame Articulate Sounds, which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language; for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. (Locke 1741b: 1)
Sociability and fellowship - already starting off with phatic tropes. Likewise with language being the "common Tye of Society", belonging to a linguistic community being the primary cultural "union" in this sense. And of course parrots make an appearance, as they did on more than one occasion in the first volume.
Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as Marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another. (Locke 1741b: 1)
These "internal Conceptions" being Ideas, or equivalent to ideas. Signs stand as Marks. Conveying thoughts already putting the transmission metaphor to the fore.
But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the Perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of Ideas, unless those Signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular Things: For the Multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Use, had every particular thing need of a distinct Name to be [|] signified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the Use of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a Multitude of particular Existences: Which advantageous use of Sounds was obtained only by the Difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of. Those Names becoming general, which are made to stand for general Ideas, and those remaining particular, where the Ideas they are used for are particular. (Locke 1741b: 1-2)
In other words, if we had to "name" every particular thing and couldn't talk in terms that comprehend several things, language would be too cumbersome to operate efficiently.
Besides these Names which stand for Ideas, there be other Words which Men make use of, not to signify any Idea, but the want or absence of some Ideas simple or complex, or all Ideas together; such as are Nihil in Latin, and in English, Ignorance and Barrenness. All which negative or privative Words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no Ideas; For then they would be perfectly insignificant Sounds: But they relate to positive Ideas, and signify their Absence. (Locke 1741b: 2)
This was addressed by Uku Masing (cf. Masing 1989b: 217), particularly his theory that indo-european languages make substances out of the lack of something. So that while it is natural in English and German, for example, to speak of nothingness as a thing, it isn't so in finno-ugric languages.
[...] we having, as has been proved, no Ideas at all, but what originally come either from sensible Objects without, or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within. (Locke 1741b: 3)
Sense and Understanding; Motivity and Self-Consciousness.
Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single Thing; but for Sorts and Ranks of Things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next Place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, what the Species and Genera of Things are; wherein they consist; and how they come to be made. (Locke 1741b: 3)
Very keen to get into ectypes and archetypes of complex Ideas.
Book III. Chap. II. Of the Signification of Words
The Comfort and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external sensible Signs, whereby those invisible Ideas, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. (Locke 1741b: 4)
Language is "needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence" (PC 4.6).
Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made Use of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas; not by any natural Connection, that there is between particular articulate Sounds and Certain Ideas, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea. The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification. (Locke 1741b: 4)
This "immediate" might be loaded. Could ideas be the immediate signification of words, and things the mediate signification?
The use Men have of these Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for the Assistance of their own Memory; or, as it were, to bring out their Ideas, and lay them before the view of others: Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly those Ideas are collected from the Things, which they are supposed to represent. When a Man speaks to another, it is, that he may be understood; and the end of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his Ideas to the Hearer. (Locke 1741b: 4)
Assistance to one's own memory - autocommunicative. Yet communication is "the end of Speech", that is, its primary purpose.
Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs imposed by him on Things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. (Locke 1741b: 5)
If we could only speak of things we know, the world would be a very different place.
First, They suppose their Words to be Marks of the Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate: For else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the Sounds they applied to one Idea, were such, as by the Hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men stand not usually to examine, whether the Idea they and those they discourse with have in their Minds, be the same: But think it enough, that they use the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they suppose, that the Idea they make it a Sign of, is precisely the same, to which the Understanding Men of that Country apply that Name. (Locke 1741b: 6)
Metalingual.
Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of Things. (Locke 1741b: 6)
Referential.
Nay, because Words are many of them learned before the Ideas are known for which they stand: Therefore some, not only Children, but Men, speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those Sounds. But so far as Words are of Use and Signification, so far is there a constant Connection between the Sound and the Idea; and a Designation, that the one stand for the other: without which Application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise. (Locke 1741b: 7)
Not exactly phatic but there is a resemblance in broad outlines, at least to what phaticity has come to be, how it is vulgarly interpreted.
'Tis true, by a tacit Consent, appropriates certain Sonuds to certain Ideas in all Languages, which so far limits the Signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea, he does not speak properly: And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. (Locke 1741b: 7)
Language is a social contract.
Book III. Chap. III. Of General Terms
But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our Notions, and Names, from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our Ideas from our first Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas of the Persons Children converse with, (to instance in them alone) are like the Persons themselves, only particular. The Ideas of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only those Individuals, The Names they first gave to them, are confined to these Individuals; and the Names of Nurse and Mamma, the Child uses, determine themselves to those Persons. Afterwards, when Time and a large Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other Things in the World, that in some common Agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they frame an Idea, which they find those many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the Name Man, for Example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general Idea. (Locke 1741b: 10)
Exactly the point Lotman makes about children, that they first name individual objects (this chair, this table), and in time come to understand that all things upon which one can sit are chairs.
For I think, that to one who desired to know what Idea the Word Man stood for; if it should be said that Man was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the Term Man would be as well understood, and the Idea it stands for, be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational Animal; which by the several Definitions of Animals, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves itself into those enumerated Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 12)
Locke's streak of veiled Pythagoreanisms continues.
To return to general Words, it is plain by what has been said, That General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of Things; but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words or Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 12)
Perhaps an explanation as to why Peirce placed "sign" as Secondness, where Kant had "Understanding".
The next thing therefore to be considered, is, What kind of Signification it is, that General Words have. For as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then tehy would not be general Terms, but proper Names; so on the other side 'tis as evident, they do not signify a Plurality; for Man and Men would then signify [|] the same; and the Distinction of Numbers (as Grammarians call 'em) would be superfluous and useless. That then which general Words signify, is a sort of Things; and each of them does that, by being a Sign of an abstract Idea in the Mind, to which Idea, as thins existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that Name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. (Locke 1741b: 14-15)
General Words, in other words, signify Totalities.
But it being evident, that Things are ranked under Names into sorts of Species, only as they agree to certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names, the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from Sort, as I do General from Genus) Name stands for. (Locke 1741b: 22)
Define:sortal - "denoting or relating to a term representing a semantic feature that applies to an entity as long as it exists, classifying it as being of a particular kind".
Book III. Chap. IV. Of the Names of Simple Ideas
Thirdly, The Names of Simple Ideas are not capable of any Definitions; the Names of all complex Ideas are. It has not, that I know, hithero to been taken Notice of by any Body, what Words are, and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and Obscurity in Men's Discourses, whilst some demand Definitions of Terms that cannot be defined; and others think, they ought to rest satisfied in an Explication made by a more general Word, and its Restriction, (or to speak in Terms of Art, by a Genus and Difference,) when even after such Definition made according to Rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word, than they had before. (Locke 1741b: 25)
Definition is limited. Something to add to the outright negation of definition (outside of mathematics and other axiomatic sciences) by Kant (and Iamblichus and Peirce).
I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is nothing else, but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several other not synonimous Terms. The meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses 'em; the meaning of any Term is then shewed, or the Word is defined, when by other Words the Idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its Signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of Definitions; and therefore the only Measure of what is, or is not a good Definition. (Locke 1741b: 26)
Definition is naturally metalingual. One explains a word by means of other words.
For is it not at least as proper and significant, to say, Passage is a Motion from one Place to another, as to say, Motion is a Passage, &c. This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two Words of the same Signification one for another; which when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what Idea the unknown stands for; but is very far from a Definition, unless we will say, every English Word in the Dictionary, is the Definition of the Latin Word it answers, and that Motion is the Definition of Motus. (Locke 1741b: 27)
Hence the affinity between the metalingual function of language and "intralingual" translation.
For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other Simple Ideas than of those very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connexion which is known to be between them, and those Simple Ideas, which common Use has made them Signs of. (Locke 1741b: 28)
"We by degrees get Ideas and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another" (Locke 1741a: 25).
Book III. Chap. V. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations
To know whether his Idea of Adultery, or Incest, be right, will a Man seek it any where amongst Things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been Witness to such an Action? No: But it suffices here, that Men have put together such a Collection into one complex Idea, that makes the Artchitype, [sic] and Specifick Idea, whether ever any such Action were committed in rerum natura, or no. (Locke 1741b: 33)
Weird examples. The emphasis being laid on the fact that such "abstract ideas" (as adultery and incest) are constructed in the mind and do not require to be perceived.
Though these complex Ideas be not always copied from Nature, yet they are always suited to the End for which abstract Ideas are made: And though they be combinations made of Ideas, that are loose enough, and have as little Union in themselves, as several other, to which the Mind never gives a Connection that combines them into one Idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language. The use of Language is, by short Sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general Conceptions; wherein not only abundance of Particulars may be contained, but also a great Variety of independent Ideas collected into one complex one. (Locke 1741b: 35)
In the previous volume: "the End of Language; which being to mark, or communicate Mens Thoughts to one another with all the Dispatch that may be" (Locke 1741a: 236). The shortness and "dispatch" hint towards automatization.
A moderate Skill in different Languages, will easily satisfy one of the Truth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of Words in one Language, which have not any that answer them in another. Which plainly shews that those of one Country, by their Customs and Mnner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex Ideas, and give Names to them, which others never collected into specifick Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 36)
Not sure how "great" that storehouse is. In my experience, between Estonian and English, it looks to be sizeable but by no means great.
Because there being no Species of these ordinarily taken Notice of, but what have Names; and those Species, or rather their Essences, being abstract complex Ideas made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not Necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to frame these complex Ideas: unless a Man will fill his Head with a Company of abstract complex Ideas, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. (Locke 1741b: 40)
An apt description, in my experience, of dealing with these kinds of difficult philosophers. You'll make some sense of them while reading them, but after a few weeks it's just as well as if you hadn't read them at all. This is usually the case when their ideas are sufficiently abstract as to have no natural follow-up anywhere else.
I shall imagine I have done from Service to Truth, Peace, and Learning, if, by any enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Use of Language; and give them Reason to suspect, that since it is frequently for others, it may also be possible for them to have something very good and approves Words in their Mouths, and Writings, with very uncertain, little, or no Signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. (Locke 1741b: 41)
"Clear and distinct Ideas are Terms, which though familiar and frequent in Men's Mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand." (Locke 1741a: [9-10])
Book III. Chap. VI. Of the Names of Substances
But Essence, even in this Sense, relates to a sort, and supposes a Species: For being that real Constitution, on which the Properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of Things, Properties belonging only to Species, and not to Individuals; v. g. Supposing the nominal Essence of Gold, to be a Body of such a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fusibility, the real Essence is that Constitution of the Parts of Matter, on which these Qualities, and their Union, depend; and is also the Foundation of its Solubility in Aq. Regia, and other Properties accompanying that complex Idea. (Locke 1741b: 45)
If "Species" were read as Peircean "type" and "Properties" as "quality"... I'd still have no clue what's going on in this chapter.
For if it should stand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex Idea, which I or any one else calls Gold; i.e. for the nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon: so hard is it to shew the various Meaning and Imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but Words to do it by. (Locke 1741b: 51)
Like fighting fire with fire.
Likewise to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one, as to say, a Man. But no one will say, That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Essence, to which we give the Name Man. (Locke 1741b: 52)
What an imposition a reasonably conversant talking bird makes, then!
I once saw a Creature that was the Issue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it; wherein Nature appeared to have followed the Pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. (Locke 1741b: 53)
[Doubt.] There's even a creepy webpage that features this exact quote from Locke prominently.
He that annexes the Name Man to a complex Idea, made up of Sense and spontaneous Motion, joined to a Body of such a Shape, has thereby one Essence of the Species Man: And he that, upon farther Examination, adds Rationality, has another Essence of the Species he calls Man: By which means the same individual will be a true Man to the one, which is not so to the other. (Locke 1741b: 55)
More-or-less the triad: (1) Sense; (2) spontaneous Motion [volitive activity]; (3) Rationality.
The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Substances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal Essences, which we make ourselves, that if several Men were to be asked, concerning some odly shaped Fœtus, as soon as born, whether it were a Man, or no, 'tis past doubt, one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the Species of Substances, were not made by Man, with some Liberty; but were exactly copied from precise Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguished all Substances into certain Species. (Locke 1741b: 56)
The argument against innate ideas rehashed. I thought of something like this while reading his chapters on there being no innate ideas. Those who speak of human nature are very adamant about its existence but not so forthcoming with the details; had nature really given us a uniform essence of sorts, it would be the easiest thing in the world to discover. Likewise with race. Very easy to superficially think it a reality, and endlessly complicated when you actually look into the diversity of our species.
For tho' Men may make what complex Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree, conform their Ideas to the Things they would speak of: Or else Men's Language will be like that of Babel; and every Man's Words being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the Ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of Substances, as they really exist. (Locke 1741b: 57)
An addendum or expansion to the third veiled reference in language.
Most men wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry, enough for this, even tos ome tolerable degree, content themseves [sic] with some few obvious, and outward Appearances of Things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs of Life. And so, without farther Examination, give them Names, or take up the Names already in use. Which, though in common Conversation they pass well enough for the Signs of some few obvious Qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled Signification, a precise Number of simple Ideas; much less all those which are united in Nature. (Locke 1741b: 58)
Most people do not examine the language they use all that carefully. I certainly don't. Constant practice and working with language (looking up the meanings of words, etc.) I consider sufficient for my purposes.
But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these Genera and Species, or Sorts, we should find, that there is no new Thing made, but only more or less comprehensive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to epress, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or less general Conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general Term is always the Name of a less complex Idea; and that each Genus is but a partial Conception of the Species comprehended under it. (Locke 1741b: 61)
Another broad generalization.
This is adjusted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our Notions. For thus he that would make and discourse of things, as they agree in the complex Idea of Extension and Solidity, needed but use the Word Body to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the Words Life, Sense and spontaneous Motion, needed but use the word Animal, to signify all which partook of those Ideas: and he that made a complex Idea of a Body, with Life, Sense, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape joined to it, needed but use the short Monosyllable Man, to express all Particulars that correspond to that complex Idea. (Locke 1741b: 61)
This throws a different light on the deautomatization of the Russian formalists, who - it turns out - went against the true end of speech, at least practical speech, and saw poetic/literary writing best exemplified by the longest and most difficult way to communicate a simple notion.
If therefore they would use these Words as Names of Species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the Ideas, in their Minds, signified by these Names, to the Ideas, that they stood for in other Men's Minds, as to their Patterns and Archetypes; and then indeed their Ideas of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple Ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the Ideas in other Men's Minds, using the same Names: tho' for this, there be usually a Remedy at Hand, which is, to ask the meaning of any Word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the Words Jealousy and Adultery (which I think answer קנאה and ניאוף) stand for in another Man's Mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of Language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for in another Man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one. (Locke 1741b: 68)
Another addition for a re-view of the metalingual function.
To conclude; What Liberty Adam had at first to make any complex Ideas of mixed Modes, by no other Pattern, but by his own Thoughts, the same have all Men ever since had. And the same Necessity of conforming his Ideas of Substances to Things without him, as to Archetypes made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever since under too. The same Liberty also, that Adam had of affixing any new Name to any Idea, the same has any one still (especially the beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such) but only with this Difference, that in Places, where [|] Men in Society have already established a Language amongst them, the Signification of Words are very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because Men being furnished already with Names for their Ideas, and common Use having appropriated known Names to certain Ideas, an affected Misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new Terms to express them: But Men think it a Boldness, and 'tis uncertain, whether common Use will ever made them pass for current. But in Communication with others, it is nceessary, that we conform the Ideas we make the Vulgar Words of any Language stand for, to their known proper Significations, (which I have explained at large already) or else to make known that new Signification we apply them to. (Locke 1741b: 70-71)
The growth of signs still possible, though not easy. This aspect of established common use S.S. has mentioned on several occasions as the inertia of linguistic change.
Book III. Chap. VII. Of Particles
Besides Words, which are Names of Ideas in the Mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the Connexion that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Propositions, one with another. The Mind in communicating its Thoughts to others, does not only need Signs of the Ideas it has then before it, but others also to shew or intimate some particular Action of its own, at that time, relating to those Ideas. This it does several ways; as, Is, and Is not, are the general Marks of the Mind affirming or denying. But besides Affirmation, or Negation, without which there is in Words no Truth or Falshood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments to others, connect not only the Parts of Propositions, but whole Sentences one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Discourse. (Locke 1741b: 71)
Primitive stuff but useful. The subtitle reads "Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together". I believe these are otherwise called connectives (e.g. "but", "and", "thus", etc.).
And to express well such methodical and rational Thoughts, he must have Words to shew what Connection, Restriction, Distinction, Opposition, Emphasis, &c., he gives to each respective part of his Discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his Hearer: and therefore it is, that those Words, which are not truly, by themselves, the Names of any Ideas, are of such constant and indispensible use in Language, and do much contribute to Mens well expressing themselves. (Locke 1741b: 72)
Partly why French theorists confuse us so much is due to errors in these.
Book III. Chap. VIII. Of Absract and Concrete Terms
Now each abstract Idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in Propositions, no two whole Ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of Language, which permits not any two abstract Words, or Names of abstract Ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one, at first hearing, perceives the Falshood of these Propositions; Humanity is Animality, or Rationality, or Whiteness: And this is as evident as any of the most allowed Maxims. (Locke 1741b: 74)
Something to keep in mind, to check if I ever come across this error in loose thinkers.
Book III. Chap. IX. Of the Imperfection of Words
From what has been said in the foregoing Chapters, it is easy to perceive what Imperfection there is in Language, and how the very Nature of Words makes it almost unavoidable, for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their Significations. To examine the Perfection or Imperfection of Words, it is necessary first to consider their Use and End: For as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this Discourse, often upon occasion, mentioned a double Use of Words.
First, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.
Secondly, The other for the communicating of the Thoughts to others. (Locke 1741b: 76)
Could Peirce's ordeal with "Perfection" be inspired by this? The double use of words I already noticed above (cf. Locke 1741b: 4).
As to the first of these, for the recording our own Thoughts for the help of our own Memories, whereby as it were, we talk to ourselves, any Words will serve the turn. For since Sounds are voluntary and indifferent Signs of any Ideas, a Man may use what Words he pleases, to signify his own Ideas to himself; and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same Sign for the same Idea, for then he cannot fail of having his Meaning understood, wherein consists the right Use and Perfection of Language. (Locke 1741b: 76)
Autocommunication, self-communication, intrapersonal communication, etc. "Talking to oneself" the most blatant or common designation. That any signs may be used this way as long as they are used consistently is a scare for "private language" or "post-language symbols" in Charles Morris's terminology.
Secondly, as to Communication of Words, that too has a double Use.First, By their Civil Use, I mean such a Communication of Thoughts and Ideas by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of Civil Life, in the Societies of Men one amongst another.
- Civil.
- Philosophical.
Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean such an use of them as may serve to convey the precise Notion of [|] Things, and to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge. These two Uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one, than in the other, as we shall see in what follows. (Locke 1741b: 76-77)
This distinction of civil/philosophical is also manifest in Locke's contemporaries. In time they became "natural language" and "technical language". The latter is the proper object of "metalinguistics", as long as one sticks to linguistics (i.e. language about language). Jakobson's "metalinguistic function" is in this sense an impermissible expansion.
The chief End of Language in Communication being to be understood, Words serve not well for that end, neither in Civil, nor Philosophical Discourse, when any Word does not excite in the Hearer the same Idea which it stands for in the Mind of the speaker. (Locke 1741b: 77)
The second veiled reference (correspondence of ideas between the speaker and hearer) from the hearer's perspective.
Because of that great Composition these complex Ideas are often made up of. To make Words serviceable to the End of Communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they excite, in the Hearer, exactly the same Idea they stand for in the Mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another's Heads with Noise and Sounds; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the End of Discourse and Language. (Locke 1741b: 78)
From this point of view, it is not the tribesmen sitting around the camfire telling their stories, boasting of their achievements, etc. who are phatic or merely making noise but, on the contrary, those highly educated people attending a philosophical conference who misunderstand each other's terminologies.
Hence it comes to pass, that Mens Names of very compound Ideas, such as for the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in two different Men, the same precise Signification, since one Man's complex Idea seldom agrees with anothers, and often differs from his own, from that which he had Yesterday, or will have to Morrow. (Locke 1741b: 78)
He has already given the illustration of one particular "moral word": "the Name, or Sound, Virtue, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much Uncertainty in its Signification" (Locke 1741a: 41). Indeed, in between these two volumes I've read very little, but I did re-read Campanella's "City of the Sun", and even his list of virtues (cf. Campanella 1901: 149) constitutes a hodgepodge.
But as for mixed Modes, especially the most material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are usually learned first, and then to know what complex Ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the Explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Observation and Industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise Meaning of Names, these moral Words are, in most Mens Mouths, little more than bare Sounds; or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused Signification. And even those themselves, who have with more Attention settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the Inconvenience, to have them stand for complex Ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious Men, make them the Signs of. (Locke 1741b: 80)
Pretty much the problem with the term "phatic communion", which more often than not is picked up from a source that does not explicate its meaning. While gathering material on phaticity I can easily group publications according to whether they follow either Malinowski or Jakobson, but then what's left is almost as many publications that mention neither and take their meaning from a secondary or, worse yet, tertiary source, with the resulting definition being unrecognizable when compared with the original. Metalinguistically it is its own kind of irony that a term signifying "bare Sound" should itself so frequently be "bare Sound".
And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their Words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any Injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves,Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.(Locke 1741b: 81)
"If you do not want to be understood, then you ought to be disregarded." A perfect summary of one aspect of my "correspondence theory of scientific communication". If you're writing and publishing nonsense just to get published (i.e. so as not to perish), then it is right to ignore you. Scientific correspondence should be one of discoveries, of communicating your findings to others. Otherwise, if it does not advance our collective knowledge, what's the point?
First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their Signification is supposed to agree to, The real Constitution of Things, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. (Locke 1741b: 82)
I'm starting to realize something here. The third veiled reference, the correspondence between Ideas and Things, so to say, which coincides with the problem of Reference and Object, is solved by Locke through that analysis of ideas, illustrated at the end of the previous volume (cf. Locke 1741a: 335). It might actually take a second reading to confirm this because some of that discussion, especially what concerns "Substance" and "Essence", is pretty obtuse and abstruse (nüri ja raskestimõistetav).
This is natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the Names of Substances, in all Languages whatsoever, which Men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those Words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. (Locke 1741b: 84)
Another tidbit concerning the growth of signs that is perfected by Peirce (specifically in that famous passage about the growth of signs).
I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question, whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves. The Debate having been managed a good while, by Variety of Arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the Signification of Words, than a real Difference in the Conception of Things) desired, That before they went any further on in this Dispute, they would first examine, and establish among them, what the Word Liquor signified. They at first were a little surprised at the Proposal; and had they been Persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: Since there was no one there [|] that thought not himself to understand very perfectly, what the word Liquor stood for; which, I think too, none of the most perplexed Names of Substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Signification of that Word was not so settled and certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a Sign of a different complex Idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their Dispute was about the Signification of that Term; and that they differed very little in their Opinions, concerning some fluid and subtle Matter, passing through the Conduits of the Nerves; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called Liquor, or no, a thing which when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about. (Locke 1741b: 84-85)
Imagine, then, the confusion that reigns in semiotics when it comes to such basic terms like "sign", "meaning", and the rest. Naturally there are schools of thought and I tend to fall on the anglophone side of things, whence I blot out the Saussurean, Heljslevian, Greimasian and Kristevan notions of signs, which make little to no sense to me.
I must confess then, that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least Thought that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it. But when having passed over the Original and Composition of our Ideas, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a Connexion with Words, that unless their Force and Manner of Signification were first well observed, there could ve very little clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledge: [|] which being conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And tho' it terminated in Things, yet it was for the most part so much by the Intervention of Words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general Knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our Understandings, and the Truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the Medium through which visible Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Understandings. (Locke 1741b: 87-88)
It is no wonder that Locke is counted amongst those who anticipated the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Language is an obstacle to truth. I wonder if this figure, encompassing "mist" and "medium", could be connected with Peirce's famous idiom, man's glassy essence?
But I am apt to imagine, that were the Imperfections of Language, as the Instrument of Knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the Controversies that make such a Noise in the World, would of themselves cease; and the way to Knowledge, and, perhaps, Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does. (Locke 1741b: 88)
Some of them are not due to language but due to conception, but the point is valid. Just yesterday I overheard someone in the department hallway say something to the effect that she's going to crack the mind-body problem. 'Tis 'bout time someone did.
Book III. Chap. X. Of the Abuse of Words
One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that, if they be examined, will be found, in their first Original, and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct Ideas. These, for the most part, the several Sects of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting something singular, and out of the way of common Apprehensions, or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weakness of their Hypothesis, seldom fail to Coin new Words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant Terms. For having either had no determinate Collection of Ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, 'tis no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same Party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no Signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the distinguishing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to examine what are the precise Ideas they stand for. (Locke 1741b: 90)
It is really too bad that he doesn't bring forth any examples. "I shall not need here to heap up Instances, every one's Reading and Conversation will sufficiently furnish him", he writes. Yet it would have been of some service to us, so many centuries removed from his time, to know what words exactly he meant. The next paragraph presents "Wisdom, Glory, Grace", which are very vague words indeed.
Men take the Words they find in use amongst their Neighbours; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fixed Meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this Advantage, That as in such Discourses they seldom are in the Right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the Wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those Men out of their Mistakes, who have no settled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no settled abode. (Locke 1741b: 91)
Very well put. This is also why it is so difficult to argue with people who have no principles. You're fighting with wind, hitting empty space.
Thirdly, Another abuse of Language is, an affected Obscurity, by either applying old Words to new and unusual Significations, or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. (Locke 1741b: 92)
I might, at some future date, be accused of this - what with reading old books and out-of-date translations thereof - yet I must do my best to clarify my meaning when reverting to archaic terminology. With Clay's abditive and inabditive I am risking this, as my intention was (and might still be) to appropriate them for semiotics.
And he that will look into that sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Conversation. (Locke 1741b: 93)
Exactly my point above: the greatest amount of "bare Noise" can be heard when widely divergent philosophers meet. The concept of "semiosphere", for example, is especially prone to be used in an obscure, uncertain, and undetermined meaning.
And no wonder, since the Philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling Philosophers, I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with Reason taxes) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great and universal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and procure to themselves the Admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, because they could not be understood: whilst it appears in all History, that these profound Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their Neighbours; and brought but small Advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they lived: Unless the coining of new Words, where they produced no new Things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the Signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward. (Locke 1741b: 93)
The most prominent modern example is undoubtedly Slavoj Žižek. On Wikipedia, there's a separate section about how Žižek has misread Lacan and Hegel, confused their distinct concepts (of the unconscious, for example), and Noam Chomsky is reported to have said that "Žižek’s theories never go "beyond the level of something you can explain in five minutes to a twelve-year-old"." Personally I stay away from Žižek because his application of "phatic communication" evidenced nothing short of what these criticisms characterise him as.
Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained, than by amusing the Men of Business, and Ignorant, with hard Words, or imploying the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Disputes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in the endless Labyrinth. (Locke 1741b: 94)
We have a local example of this as well: Kalev Rajangu. His "learned Gibberish" is at least entertaining to a degree, approaching the style of slam poetry.
[...] whether it would not be well, I say, that the Use of Words were made plain and direct; and that Language, which was given us for the Improvement of Knowledge, and Bond of Society, should not be employed to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights; [...] (Locke 1741b: 95)
Bond and Tie synonymous, as in the earlier "Tye of Society" (cf. Locke 1741b: 1).
Who is there of that School, that is not persuaded, that substantial Forms, vegetative Souls, abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional Species, &c. are something real? These Words Men have learned from their very entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Masters and Systems lay great Stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their Soul of the World, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards Motion in their Atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct Set of Terms that others understand not. (Locke 1741b: 96)
I'm glad he brought forth examples but I cannot help but notice that Locke seems to take particular issue with various conceptions of the soul. The implication being, easily enough, that these conceptions of the soul are not "something real". But should they be less real than the human soul? What ideas does Locke's use of the word "soul" comprehend?
But we see, that tho' it be proper to say, There is one Matter of all Bodies, one cannot say, There is one Body of all Matters: We familiarly say, one Body is bigger than another; but it should harsh (and I think is never used) to say one Matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that tho' Matter and Body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet Matter and Body stand for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance, whereof Matter is but a partial and more confused Conception, it seeming to me to be used for the Substance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure: And therefore it is that speaking of Matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth, it expressly contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. (Locke 1741b: 97)
Very useful discussion for my purposes, for elucidating why Peirce chose to speak of matter rather than body. The reason is plainly one of generalization. Come to think of it, he likewise substitutes the "soul" with "mind". There is something there.
This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer Disputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our Ideas only, and not for Things themselves. For when we argue about Matter, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the Idea we express by that Sound, whether that precise Idea agree to any thing really existing in Nature, or no. And if Men would tell, what Ideas they make their Words stand for, there could not be half that Obscurity or Wrangling, in the search or support of Truth, that there is. (Locke 1741b: 97)
This must be the n-th iteration of this point, and it's starting to hit home. Peirce's object is not "final", analogously, because it is futile to argue over whether that precise [interpretant] agrees with an [object] really existing in Nature, or no.
For else, why might not Plato as properly make the Word ἄνθρωπος or Man, stand for his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, distinguished from others by a certain Shape, and other outward Appearances, as Aristotle make the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name ἄνθρωπος or Man, of Body, and the Faculty of Reasoning joined together; unless the Name ἄνθρωπος or Man, were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the Idea a Man professes he would express by it? (Locke 1741b: 98)
Again, I cannot help but notice that this formula has replaced "soul" with "the Faculty of Reasoning", i.e. νοῦς. What's going on here?
And 'tis for want of those real Essences, that our Words convey so little Knowledge or Certainty in our Discourses about them: And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for a Thing having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For tho' the Word Man or Gold, signify nothing truly but a complex Idea of Properties, united together in one sort of Substances: Yet there is scarce any Body in the use of these Words, but often supposes each of those Names to stand for a thing having the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex Idea, the Name we use can no ways be the sign of. (Locke 1741b: 99)
I'm starting to see why Peirce's "sign" (in its first iteration) is a thing of probabilities: "for if the sign sometimes goes without the thing, then it may speak falsely, and if the thing goes without the sign, it may be belied in negative cases" (W 1: 80).
Sikthly, There remains yet another more general, tho' perhaps less observed, Abuse of Words; and that is, that Men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain Ideas, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a Connection between the Names and the Signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their Meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the Words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had necessarily the same precise Ideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in Discourse used any Term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the Words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others Meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noise and Wrangling, without Improvement or Information; whilst Men take Words to be the constant regular Marks or agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady Signs of their own Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 101)
What is idiomorphization?
To conclude this Consideration of the Imperfection and Abuse of Language; the end of Language in our Discourse with others being chiefly these Three: First, To make known one Man's Thoughts or Ideas to another. Secondly, To do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible; and Thirdly, Thereby to convey the Knowledge [|] of Things: Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these Three. (Locke 1741b: 102-103)
Stuff that can be very easily compared with Grice's maxims.
First, He that hath Words of any Language, without distinct Ideas in his Mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them is Discourse, only make a Noise without any Sense or Signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby in KNowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse, according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing else. (Locke 1741b: 103)
It actually has occurred to me before, and is very slowly developing into a germ of an idea, to write something (fiction-like, experimental) solely based on the titles in my list of references.
He that hath Names without Ideas, wants meaning in his Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex Ideas without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his Expressions, and is necessitated to use Periphrases. He that uses his Words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his Names to Ideas different from their common Use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gibberish. (Locke 1741b: 104)
Peirce's "loose thinker" whose significations are "unsteady".
Book III. Chap. XI. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses
The natural and improved Imperfections of Languages, we have seen above at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious Thoughts, to consider what Remedies are to be found for these Inconveniences above mentioned. (Locke 1741b: 107)
The first instance is the essence of phatic communion ("bond" is a very loaded word here). The "conduit" on the other hand touches upon the essence of cultural semiotics.
But though the Market and Exchange must be left to their own ways of Talking, and Gossipings not to be robbed of their antient Privilege; [...] (Locke 1741b: 107)
Yet another indication that the "civil" use of language and phatic communion have a lot in common.
First, A Man should take care to use no Word without a Signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand. This Rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the Pains to recollect how often he has met with such Words; as Instinct, Sympathy, and Antipathy, &c. in the Discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as Sounds, which usually served instead of Reasons, on the like Occasions. (Locke 1741b: 110)
Oh snap! Don't forget Sentiment! Exactly the words I grapple with in Malinowski's definition of phatic communion. It is not the case that these words do not have meanings, it is the case that they have all too many meanings, always somewhere out of the way, as if left unsaid. Instinct is a perfect illustration - recall that Gregory Bateson (1969) compared it to a "black box" in engineering - an unknown contrivance, something that just works, or is supposed to achieve something, but with no detail as to what it is and how it goes about doing what it does. What a boon it would be if these words could be taken apart into smaller pieces of simple ideas!
This is very necessary in Names of Modes, and especially moral Words; which having no settled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose Signification: Which will always be so, unless a Man has in his Mind a distinct Comprehension [|] of the component parts, that complex Idea consists of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple Ideas that make it up: And unless this be done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it be Justice, for example, or any other. (Locke 1741b: 110-111)
Exactly! I was recently asked, nearly unprompted (by a friend who is going to study law) what I thought "justice" was, and I was unable to provide a concise expression of my ideas about justice on the spot. All I could do was hem and haw about the place of justice in the Pythagorean community and philosophy.
Thirdly, 'Tis not enough that Men have Ideas, determined Ideas, for which they make these Signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their Words, as near as may be, to such Ideas as common use has annexed them to. For Words, especially of Languages already framed, being no Man private Possession, but the common Measure of Commerce and Communication [|], 'tis not for any one, at Pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in; nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to; or at least when there is a Necessity to do so, he is bound to give Notice of it. (Locke 1741b: 111-112)
"There is no such a thing as private property in language: everything is socialized" (Jakobson 1953d: 559). This paper got me thinking about the word I wish to introduce into the Estonian language - isemus ("self") - but this would not be a thing done "at Pleasure" but out of necessity, the language currently lacking such a word and every philosopher dealing with it or translating it having to somehow circumnavigate around the lack of such a word. The deadline for writing a brief "notice" (märkamine) about it is coming up but it would really be best done by copious examples of how much easier it would make discourse on the self in Estonian.
And because Men in the Improvement of their Knowledge, come to have Ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new Words, (which Men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affection or Novelty,) or else must use old ones, in a new Signification. (Locke 1741b: 112)
Yeap. Coining a new word is no trifling business. Pure Boldness, this! The case of isemus is probably eased by the fact that it is meant as an equivalent for a word that is commonplace in English, and it's meaning is easily grasped: by dropping the s from sisemus ("inside, interior"), isemus - what with Estonian placing emphasis on the first letters of a word - sounds like a contraction of two words, inimese sisemus ("the inside of a person"), which is more-or-less what the "self" stands for.
We mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities of that Creature are in this Case, is no way considered. (Locke 1741b: 144)
Another Pythagorean tidbit: man is a corporeal rational Creature, as opposed to God who is an incorporeal rational Creature.
For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general Ideas, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and in that Sense, be a Man, how much soever he differed in Shape from others of that Name. (Locke 1741b: 114)
Almost contrary to what was said in the previous volume, i.e. "whoever should hear a Cat or a Parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a Cat or a Parrot" (Locke 1741a: 284). Evidently we'd make an exception for an ape because it is more in our shape than a cat. This excerpt can also be viewed as an episode of Futurama.
Book IV. Chap. I. Of Knowledge in General
Since the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate; it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them. (Locke 1741b: 121)
Ideas are the immediate Object of thinking. Got it. What, then, is the dynamic object of thinking?
Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 121)
Define:repugnancy - "In common law, repugnancy refers to a contradiction or inconsistency between clauses of the same document, deed, or contract, or between allegations of the same pleading." "the quality or fact of being inconsistent, irreconcilable, or in disagreement" "a contradiction or inconsistency between sections of a legal instrument (as a contract or statute)". I really thought that this was some archaic emotional word from its use in the 2010 adaptation of The Scarlet Letter titled Easy A, where the Emma Stone says to a fat boy, "You are repugnant." (Yarn) It would have been weild if she had said "You are inconsistent." Evidently American popular culture understands this word as a synonym of "disgusting". Looking up etymology, that's what it meant in Old French, "Distasteful; offensive; objectionable". The Latin original was yet "contrary, opposed" - "from re- (again) + pugnare (to fight), from pugnus (fist)".
'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or Ideas at all, to perceive its Ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. (Locke 1741b: 122)
Note that sentiments and ideas are as if placed on the same level, which is why some define sentiments as a kind of mixture of ideas and emotions.
No Body lays by his Sword and Pistols, or thinks 'em of such dangerous Consequences as to be neglected, or thrown away, [|] because Robbers, and the worst of Men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest Men's Lives or Goods. And the Reason is, because they were designed, and will serve to preserve 'em. (Locke 1741b: 122-123)
Here I'll have to side with the consequences. The country that thinks that guns are meant for self-protection is the one with most school-shootings and mass-murders. In broad strokes it is better to have a society in which people can feel safe walking down the streets, and part of that is not being able to buy guns from the supermarket.
But whatever they will call those immediate Objects of their Minds in thinking, Ideas or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they dislike that Name, they may call 'em Notions or Conceptions, or how they please, it matters not, if they use them so as to avoid Obscurity and Confusion. If they are constantly used in the same and a known Sense, every one has the Liberty to please himself in his Terms, there lies neither Truth, nor Error, nor Science, in that; tho' those that take 'em for Things, and not for what tehy are, bare arbitrary Signs of our Ideas, make a great deal of Do often about them; as if some great Matter lay in the use of this or that Sound. All that I know, or can imagine, or Difference about 'em, is, that those Words are always best, whose Signification are best known in the Sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed Confusion. (Locke 1741b: 126)
Kant rendered us an invaluable service by placing ideas, notions and conceptions into a system. Though Locke is correct in his estimation of the liberty to use whatever terms we please - even "Ivan Ivanovich" will do as long as everyone understands what is meant.
But your Lordship seems rather to have a Controversy with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; for which I must acknowledge myself obliged to your Lordship for affording me so much of Your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of conversing so much with one so far above me in all Respects. (Locke 1741b: 127)
This Lord's wikipedia page is 1701 words long. Locke's is 5040. By this arbitrary measuse I proclaim the critic to have taken an L.
Of habitual Knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking, two Degrees:
First, The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind it actually perceives the Relation is between those Ideas. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an intuitive Knowledge, where the Ideas themselves, by an immediate View, discover their Agreement or Disagreement one with another.
Secondly, The other is of such Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonstration that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the Truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, where the Demonstration, by which it was at first known, is forgot, tho' a Man may be thought rather to believe his Memory, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Truth seemed formerly to me like something between Opinion and Knowledge, a sort of Assurance which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Testimony of another; Yet upon a due Examination, I find comes not short of perfect Certainty, and is in effect true Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 129)
This is why I blog - it is good to read something and have a memory of having read something, but it's not great: something always gets lost to memory. Rather than risk forming false beliefs about what I've read, I'd rather have the significant parts always available to check up on. On the whole, these two types of habitual knowledge can also be applied on our current social media experience: reddit is a phenomenal content aggregator, and if you actually read the things posted then no doubt you gain much knowledge; more often than not, though, we read only the headlines and set our knee-jerk reactions down in the comments. The latter case is like this second form of habitual knowledge: you read a concise summary of something and have no reason to disbelieve it, but know nothing of the details because you've not actually read the thing.
But yet 'tis evident, the Author himself knows the Proposition to be true, remembering he once saw the Connection of those Ideas as certainly as he knows such a Man wounded another, remembring that he saw him run him through. But because the Memory is not always so clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or less decay in length of time, this amongst other Differences is one, which shews, that demonstrative Knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we shall see in the following Chapter. (Locke 1741b: 131)
Yup. Memory is a fickle, plastic thing.
Book IV. Chap. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge
For if we will reflect on our own Ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no Pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed toward it. (Locke 1741b: 131)
I'm very wary of intuition: "Intuition, as a technical term, was used for the first time by St. Anselm in his Monologium where, wishing to distinguish between our knowledge of God, especially in the next world, and our cognition of things created and finite, he quotes St. Paul: "We see now through a mirror in an obscure manner but then face to face" (St. Paul, I Cor. 13, 12), and explains, "Seeing God in an obscure manner is a speculation but seeing him face to face us an intuition." (Novogrodzka 1948: 14). Going by this, intuition is something as real as the afterlife.
Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others, are called Proofs; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration, it being shewn to the Understanding, and the Mind [|] made see that it is so. A Quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate Ideas, (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity. (Locke 1741b: 132-133)
According to Chase's system: Rationality (R) → Understanding (RR) → Comprehension (RRR) → Sagacity (RRRS). That is, Sagacity is all rational, except in its last iteration, when it is Spontaneous. This aspect is present here in terms of the "Quickness" with which the mind finds the intermediate ideas of proof.
'Tis true, the Perception produced by Demonstration is also very clear; yet it is often with a great Abatement of that evident Lustre and full Assurance, that always accompany that which I call intuitive, like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the Similitude and Agreement with the Object, it produces a KNowledge; but it is still in every successive Reflection with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness which is in the first, till at last, after many Removes, it has a great mixture of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable, [|] especially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a long Train of Proofs. (Locke 1741b: 133-134)
The original Paulian metaphor used to illustrate the difficulty of grasping the meaning of a long string of arguments.
It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematicks alone are capable of demonstrative Certainty: But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement, as may intuitively be [|] perceived, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the Ideas of Number, Extension, and Figure alone, it may possibly be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of sufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of Knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at by any but Mathematicians. (Locke 1741b: 134-135)
"The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians; [...]" (Kant 1855: 443).
So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge, this also, of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from 'em, and allow these three Degree of Knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative, and [|] Sensitive: In each of which, there are different Degrees and Ways of Evidence and Certainty. (Locke 1741b: 137-138)
The first two are in a sensible correspondence with the triads; "Sensitive" on the other hand leaves me baffled.
Book IV. Chap. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge
Secondly, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement: Wich Perception being, 1. Either by Intuition, or the immediate comparing any two Ideas; or, 2. By Reason, examining the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of some otherS: Or, 3. By Sensation, perceiving the Existence of particular Things. (Locke 1741b: 138)
Oh noooo. This is in perfect alignment with his three poles (ideas within oneself, ideas in others, correspondence with things) but not in alignment with Kant and Peirce. Daaang. It's almost as if the order is reversed.
In that Sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says, God is a Spriti; and in that Sense I have used it; and in that Sense I have proved from my Principles that there is a spiritual Substance; and am certain that there is a spiritual immaterial Substance: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct Answer to your Lordship's Question in the Beginning of this Argument, viz. How we come to be certain that there are spiritual Substances, supposing this Principle to be true, that the simple Ideas by Sensation and Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning? (Locke 1741b: 143)
Tsk-tsk-tsk. Certainty without knowledge or proof.
This thinking Substance, which has been from Eternity, I have proved to be immmaterial. (Locke 1741b: 143)
The disputes with "his Lordship" are the most tedious parts of this book. No wonder Peirce recommended to disregard them.
[...] or that all Animals have immaterial, and consequently, according to your Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men; and so say that Fleas and Mites, &c. have immortal Souls as well as Men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way to serve an Hypothesis. (Locke 1741b: 148)
Heaven must be an infested place.
But to return to Cicero, 'tis plain, That in his Enquiries about the Soul, his Thoughts went not at all beyond Matter. This the Expressions that drop from him in several Places of this Book, evidently shew. For Example, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women ascended into Heaven; of others, that they remained here on Earth, c. 12. That the Soul is hot and warms the Body: That at its leaving the Body it penetrates and divides, and breaks thro' our thick, cloudy, moist Air: That it stops in the Region of Fire, and ascends no farther, the Equality of Warmth and Weight making that its proper Place, where it is nourished and sustained with the same Things, wherewith the Stars are nourished and sustained, and that by the Convenience of its Neighbourhood and sustained, and that by the Convenience of its Neighbourhood it shall there have a clearer View and fuller Knowledge of the Heavenly Bodies, c. 19. That the Soul also from its Height shall have a pleasant and fairer Prospect of the Globe of the Earth, the Disposition of whole Parts will then lie before it in one View, c. 20. (Locke 1741b: 162)
Cicero's opinions on the matter of the soul not that much removed from the Pythagorean one. The Isles of the Blessed = the Sun, the Region of Fire.
As to the third sort of our Knowledge, viz. the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas in any other Relation: This, as it is the largest Field of our Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extended: Because the Advances that are made in this Part of Knowledge, depending on our Sagacity, in finding intermediate Ideas, that may shew the Relations and Habitudes of Ideas, whose Co-existence is not considered, 'tis a hard Matter to tell, when we are at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the Helps it is capable [|] of, for the finding of Proofs or examining the Agreement or Disagreement of remote Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 173-174)
A reiteration of what Sagacity is.
Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid: For the Idea of Property, being a Right to any thing; and the Idea to which the Name Injustice is given, being the Invasion or Violation of that Right; it is evident, that these Ideas being thus established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has there Angles equal to two Right ones. (Locke 1741b: 174)
The Pythagoreans did away with private property and lived in a just community. All utopian visions hence have relied on this same understanding, that justice depends on equality, and equality is best achieved by doing away with private property. See, for example, Campanella.
In which Case, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two, or more Numbers, their Equalities or Propositions: That the Mind has only by Intuition of its own Ideas of the Numbers themselves. (Locke 1741b: 176)
Somewhere above I nearly strained my brains trying to recall where Peirce used "Marks" in a similar sense, where's it was actually Kant: "a characteristic mark which may be common to several things" (Kant 1855: 225).
As to the fourth sort of our Knowledge, viz. of the real actual Existence of Things, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence; a demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of a God; of the Existence of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive Knowledge, which extends not beyond the Objects present to our Senses. (Locke 1741b: 177)
Ah, yes, demonstrations of the existence of God. So many of them, and all so convincing.
Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddering and Confusion, which has so much hindred Men's Progress in other Parts of Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 184)
Define:pudder(ing) - "To perplex; to embarrass; to confuse; to bother". "A confused noise; turmoil; bustle; tumult."
This having been the Fate or Misfortune of a great part of the Men of Letters, the Increase brought into the Stocks of real Knowledge, has been very little, in Proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been filled with; whilst Students, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 184)
Sõnatihnikud.
Book IV. Chap. IV. Of the Reality of Knowledge
But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the Reality of Things? It matters not what Mens Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of Things that is only to be prized: 'tis this alone gives a Value to our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies. (Locke 1741b: 185)
The trouble is, many things are difficult or impossible to ascertain with perfect centainty. These are, for example, as Kant put forth, God, free will, and afterlife. Even if you're an atheist and can thereby completely neglect God and afterlife, what wrangling is there to be had over free will!
Secondly, All our complex Ideas, except those of Substances, being Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor referred to the Existence of any thing, as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity necessary to real Knowledge. For that which is not design'd to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong Representation, nor mislead us from the true Apprehension of any thing, by its Dislikeness to it: and such, excepting those of Substances, are all our complex Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 186)
Copies, Existences, and Archetypes the triad I'd like to read more about in this book. Thus far there has been precious little. As to things which represent nothing but themselves, see "intrinsic coding" throughout this blog. At one point I am going to write something about this idea, though I haven't yet reached critical mass.
For the attaining of Knowledge and Certainty, it is requisite that we have determined Ideas: and to make our Knowledge real, it is [|] requisite that the Ideas answer their Archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Consideration of our Ideas, with so little Care and Regard (as it may seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those Discourses, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Disputes of those who pretend to make it their Business to enquire after Truth and Certainty, will, I presume, upon Examination, be found to be general Propositions, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concerned. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians, about the squaring of a Circle, conick Sections, or any other part of Mathematicks, concern not the Existence of any of those Figures, but their Demonstrations, which depend on their Ideas, are the same, whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. (Locke 1741b: 187-188)
"Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree" (Kant 1855: 339) - here, "Archetypes" can be read as equivalent to Kant's "ideas". In the second instance, cornerning the regardlessness as to "any Square or Circle existing in the World", this might be what Peirce mirrors in "Arithmetic, the law of number, was before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been created" (W 1: 169).
Indeed, wrong Names in moral Discourses, breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn and seen, makes the Name useless and of no Force. For what need of a Sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? (Locke 1741b: 189)
Emphasized sentence more-or-less exactly the one I have written about "talking about weather" in Malinowski's phatic communion. It is redundant because weather is "present and in view" to both the speaker and hearer if it's a face-to-face interaction, and of very little import when it's a mediated interaction.
Book IV. Chap. V. Of Truth in General
Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify nothing but the joining and separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of Signs here meant, is what by another Name we call Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and Verbal; and there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and Words. (Locke 1741b: 195)
"True is an adjective applicable solely to representations and things considered as representations. It implies the agreement of the representation with its object." (W 1: 79)
Book IV. Chap. VI. Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty
All the Knowledge we have, being only of particular or general Knowledge, 'tis evident, that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with Reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed in Words. (Locke 1741b: 200)
This we take for granted, which makes it more difficult to imagine along with Campanella that for the inhabitants of his island, "the paintings render learning easy to them" (Campanella 1901: 150).
Put a Piece of Gold any where by itself, separate from the Reach and Influence of all other Bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colours and Weight, and perhaps Malleableness too: Which, for ought I know, would be changed into a perfect Friability, [|] Water, in which to use Fluidity is an essential Quality, less to itself, would cease to be fluid. (Locke 1741b: 206-207)
If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound? - If a piece of gold in not watched over, does it spring hands, legs and humanoid faces, and join other pieces of metals in crazy adventures?
Whilst our Ideas the word Man stands for, is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Qualities and Powers in him, there is no discernible Connection or Repugnance between our Specifick Idea, and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Constitution. There are Animals that safely eat Hemlock, and others that are nourished by Wood and Stones: But as long as we want Ideas of tohse real Constitutions of different sorts of Animals, whereon these, and the like Qualities and Powers depend, we must not hope to reach Certainty in universal Propositions concerning them. (Locke 1741b: 211)
Wait, which animals are nourished by eating stones?
Book IV. Chap. VII. Of Maxims
There are a sort of Propositions, which under the Name of Maxims and Axioms, have passed for Principles of Science; and because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate, altho' no Body (that I know) ever went about to shew the Reason and Foundation of their Clearness and Cogency. (Locke 1741b: 212)
Not my favourite topic but still something I have to grapple with (in Clay, for example).
For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its Ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another, in Words it understands, and every Idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct Ideas being known not to be the same, it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths must be first known, which consists of Ideas that are first in the Mind; and the Ideas first in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular Things, from whence, by slow Degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. (Locke 1741b: 216)
Tangentially related to the growth of signs. In this instance it concerns the growth from particular to general.
To prevent, as much as could be, the running out of Disputes into an endless Train of Syllogisms, certain general Propositions, most of them indeed self-eident, were introduced into the Schools; which being such as all Men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general Measures of Truth, and served instead of Principles, (where the Disputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from by either Side. And thus these Maxims getting the Name of Principles, beyond which Men in Dispute could not retreat, were by Mistake taken to be the Originals and Sources from whence all Knowledge began, and the Foundations whereon the Sciences were built; because when in their Disputes they came to any of these, they stopped there, and went no further, the Matter was determined: But how much this is a Mistake, hath been already shewn. (Locke 1741b: 221)
In light of this, it is truly odd to know that so many philosphers in the 19th century began their philosophizing with the "first principles". Principles are limiting.
And as these Maxims are of little Use where we have determined Ideas, so they are, as I have shewed, of dangerous Use where our Ideas are not determined; nad where we use Words that are not annexed to determined Ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandring Signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another Idea: from which follows Mistake and Error, which these Maxims (brought as Proofs to establish [|] Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for undetermined Ideas) do by their Authority confirm and rivet. (Locke 1741b: 228-229)
Before ideas and signs were "fugitive", then "unsteady", now "wandring".
Book IV. Chap. VIII. Of Trifling Propositions
For at this rate, any very ignorant Person, who can but make a Proposition, and knows what he means when he says, Ay or No, may make a Million of Propositions, of whose [|] Truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet no know one Thing in the World thereby; v. g. what is a Soul, is a Soul; or a Soul is a Soul, a Spirit is a Spirit; a Fetiche is a Fetiche, &c. These all being equivalent to this Proposition, viz. What is, is; i.e. what hath Existence, hath Existence; or who hath a Soul, hath a Soul. What is this more than trifling with Words? (Locke 1741b: 229-230)
That's what we call a tautology.
Before a Man makes any Proposition, he is supposed to understand the Terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot, only making a Noise by Imitation, and framing certain Sounds which he has learnt of others; but not as a rational Creature, using them for Signs of Ideas which he has in his Mind. (Locke 1741b: 234)
"The terms of every proposition are presupposed to be comprehended; therefore no proposition can give us a new conception, and Wisdom is not learnt from books." (W 1: 5)
Though yet concerning most Words used in Discourses, especially argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of Trifling, and which sets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most Writers are so far from instructing us in the Nature and Knowledge of Things, that they use their Words loosely and uncertainly, nad do not, by using them constantly and steddily in the same Significations, make plain and clear Deductions of Words one from another, and make their Discourses coherent and clear, (how little soever it were instructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy, under the Obscurity and Perplexedness of tehir Terms: To which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Custom do in many Men much contribute. (Locke 1741b: 236)
Yet another drop into the bucket of "loose thinkers". It would appear that this passing remark from Peirce can be supplemented by quite a lot from Locke.
Book IV. Chap. IX. Of our Knowledge of Existence
As for our own Existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence. I think, I reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain: Can any of these be more evident to me, than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other Things, that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel Pain, it is evident I have sa certain Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the Pain I feel: Or if I know I doubt, I have as certain Perception of the Existence of the Thing doubting, as of that Thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence, and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty. (Locke 1741b: 238)
One aspect is patently missing: willing. Do we not perceive ourselves willing the motions of our modies? Thinking and reasoning are synonymous; feeling pleasure and pain, and sensation in general, can be grouped under one aspect. Are we not conscious, then, of the choices we make and experience them as ours?
Book IV. Chap. X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD
But though this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers, and though its Evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the Mind must apply itself to a regular Deduction of it from some part of our intuitive Knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this, as of other Propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. (Locke 1741b: 239)
The existence of god on par with mathematical certainty, he says. Unbelievable.
I think it is beyond Question, that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being; he knows certainly, that he existsi, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence, (for really to doubt of it, is manifestly impossible) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happiness of being Nothing, until Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of teh contrary. This then, I think, [|] I may take for a Truth, which every one's certain Knowledge assures him of beyond the Liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists. (Locke 1741b: 239-240)
"I regard a man's naïve notion that he exists as being in the main a delusion and a vanity" (Peirce; in Holmes 1966: 125-126).
Again, A Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge. We have then got one Step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some Being, but some knowing intelligent Being in the World. (Locke 1741b: 240)
And voila! The existence of god is proved. The conclusion clearly follows from the premises. This is not at all nonsensical.
It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible, that a Triangle should make itself, Three Angles bigger than Two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the Idea of senseless Matter, that it should put into itself Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the Idea of a Triangle, that it should put into itself greater Angles than two right ones. (Locke 1741b: 240)
Very convincing argument. Evolution is just as impossible as this other impossible thing because it is impossible. Checkmate, atheists!
Thus from the Consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. (Locke 1741b: 241)
Yes, the appendix, non-regenerative teeth and male pattern baldness do bare witness to a perfect knowing creator. Appendicitis, toothlessness and baldness are gods wise and generous gifts to us. We are truly blessed.
From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries. (Locke 1741b: 241)
God is more real than the world around us. Sound mental health, this, fo sho'.
Though our Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident, and incontestable Proof of a Deity, and I believe no Body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demonstration of so many Parts; [...] (Locke 1741b: 242)
There being chimpanzees is incontestible proof of a monkey-god. All praise be to Hanuman.
There is no Truth more evident, than that Something must be from Eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure Nothing, the perfect Negation and Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence. (Locke 1741b: 242)
The Big Bang theory refuted: some English bloke three centuries ago said nuh-uh.
For to suppose all Matter eternal, and yet one small Particle in Knowledge and Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any of the least Appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis. (Locke 1741b: 246)
It is only reasonable to suppose that the universe must be reasonable, and its principles conformable to the comprehension of human minds. It was, after all, made specifically for us! This, too, is only reasonable.
Book IV. Chap. XI. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things
The Organs themselves, 'tis plain, do not produce them; for then the Eyes of a Man in the Dark would produce Colours, and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter: But we see no Body gets the relish of a Pine Apple, till he goes to the Indies where it is, and tastes it. (Locke 1741b: 252)
No other way can the taste of pineapple be experienced than by going to the Indies. Not by having the fruit transported to you refrigerated, not by tasting pineapple extract, and neither by a combination of allyl hexanoate, allyl heptanoate, allyl cyclohexanepropionate, ethyl 3-methylthiopropionate, methyl 3-methylthiopropionate, ethyl butyrate, isoamyl acetate, isoamyl butyrate and ethyl acetate.
But if I turn my Eyes at Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the Ideas which the Light or Sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifest Difference between the Ideas laid up in my Memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same Power to dispose of them, and lay them by at Pleasure) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. (Locke 1741b: 252)
Teasing aside, this is finally something I could use when I return to Clay. Sunlight through the eyelids illustrate his concept of abditiveness and what is said here approaches Clay's concept of quasi-attention.
Fourthly, Our Senses, in many Cases, bear witness to the Truth of each other's Report, concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us. He that sees a Fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare Fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his Hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite Pain, by a bare Idea or Phantom, unless that the Pain be a Fancy too: Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, be raising the Idea of it, bring upon himself again. (Locke 1741b: 253)
Locke, too, belongs to that camp of philosophers who appear to think that putting your hand in the fire or touching a hot stove an obligatory lesson for every child.
For he that sees a Candle burning, and hath experimented the Force of its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him Harm, and puts him to great Pain: Which is [|] Assurance enough when no Man requires greater Certainty, to govern his Actions by, than whta is as certain as his Actions themselves. (Locke 1741b: 254-255)
Hol' on, I need to check if this flame is hot.
Book IV. Chap. XII. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge
Let that Principle of some of the Philosophers, that all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be seen by the Writings of some that have revived it again in our Days, what Consequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the World; or, with the Stoicks, the Æther, or the Sun; or, with Anaximenes, the Air to be God; and what a Divinity, Religion, and Worship, must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as Principles thus taken up without Questioning or Examination; especially if they be such as concern Morality, which influence Mens Lives, and give a Bias to all their Actions. (Locke 1741b: 261)
Let all other gods fall besides mine.
Who might not justly expect another Kind of Life in Aristippus, who placed Happiness in bodily Pleasure; and in Antisthenes, who made Virtue sufficient [|] to Felicity? (Locke 1741b: 261-262)
Clearly an absurdity. Felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity.
If therefore those that pass for Principles, are not certain, (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us by our blind Assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided into Truth, we shall, by PRinciples, be only confirmed in Mistake and Error. (Locke 1741b: 262)
Is it not "blind Assent" to think that your particular religious beliefs are self-evident, and the contrary a plain absurdity? The chapter on the existence of god proved nothing beyond that the existence of god is Locke's principle.
Hence I think I may conclude, that Morality is the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general, (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their Summum [|] Bonum) as several Arts, conversant about several Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common Use of Human Life,and their own particular Subsistence in this World. (Locke 1741b: 265-266)
The argument I don't care for but the conclusion is not half-bad. The science of action is something everyone must figure out for themselves.
Book IV. Chap. XIII. Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge
Just this is it with our Understanding; all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of Objects, and a more or less accurate Survey of them; but they being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one way or another; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as Men's Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but Receive those Ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without; and so far as Men's Thoughts converse with their own determined Ideas, they cannot but, in some Measure, observe the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far Knowledge: and if they have Names for those Ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see, and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives. (Locke 1741b: 270)
Taking quasi-attention to a rather grim place - whatever is in front of us, we cannot ignore. From this perspective Man is a puppet and a dupe of his senses.
Book IV. Chap. XIV. Of Judgment
The Faculty which God has given Man to supply the Want of clear and certain Knowledge, in Cases where that cannot be had, is Judgment: Whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree or disagree; or which is the same, any Proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind sometimes exercises this Judgment out of Necessity, where demonstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where demonstrative and certain Proofs are to be had. (Locke 1741b: 272)
Define:judgment - "the ability to make considered decisions or come to sensible conclusions". I didn't now about the lack of evidence aspect.
Thus the Mind has two Faculties conversant about Truth and Falshood.
First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas.
Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas together, or separating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the Word imports taken to be so, before it certainly appears. And if it so unites and separates them, as in reality Things are, it is right Judgment. (Locke 1741b: 273)
Something I'll have to keep in mind when next reading about judgment.
Book IV. Chap. XV. Of Probability
Probability is Likeliness to be true, the very Notation of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or Proofs, to make it pass, or be received for true. (Locke 1741b: 274)
The point here being that we call a thing probably when there "be Arguments or Proofs" which make it likely.
And herein lies the Difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge, that in all the Parts of Knowledge, there is Intuition; each immediate Idea, each Step has its visible and certain Connection; in Belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the Thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly shewing the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas that are under Consideration. (Locke 1741b: 75)
Exactly the problem with Locke's argument for the existence of god. The fact of human beings having sense and understanding has no "visible and certain Connection" with the existence of god.
And as the Relators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that Matter of Fact is like to find more or less Belief. (Locke 1741b: 276)
Vahendajad, mitte suhestajad.
Book IV. Chap. XVI. Of the Degrees of Assent
It it [sic] is unavoidable therefore, that the Memory be relied on in the Case, and that Men be persuaded of several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks, and change every Moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the Question, offers them Arguments which for want of Memory, they are not able presently to Answer. (Locke 1741b: 278)
This, we already saw, was the second basis of habitual knowledge (cf. Locke 1741b: 129). The consequence of it is encapsulated in that sentence from Bourdieu that I enjoy so much: people learn information in their youth so that they can avoid it in old age.
The first therefore, and highest Degree of Probability, is, when the general Consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a Man's constant and never failing Experience in like Cases, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses; such are all the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary Course of Nature. This we call an Argument from the Nature of Things themselves: For what our own and other Men's constant Observation has found always to be after the same Manner, that we with Reason conclude to be the Effects of steady and regular Causes, though they come not within the Reach of our Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 281)
"Conceive, however, veracity to be perfect - to be founded not upon convention but upon the very nature of things and what have we?" (W 1: 80) This is Peirce's "verity". On the next page one can also find analogues to Peirce's "veracity" and "verisimilitude", but alas I am not all that interested in this question for the time being.
Book IV. Chap. XVII. Of Reason
What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed, contains two of them, viz. Sagacity and Illation. (Locke 1741b: 288)
Define:illation - "1: the action of inferring: inference. 2: a conclusion inferred."
By the one, it finds out, and by the other, it so orders the intermediate Ideas, as to discover what Connection there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into View the Truth sought for, which is that we call Illation or Inference, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connection there is between the Ideas, in each Step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at [|] Knowledge: or their probable Connection, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion. (Locke 1741b: 288-289)
Through Sagacity, one finds out the intermediate ideas, and through illation (inference) they are ordered so as to draw the truth into view.
Inference is looked on as the great Act of the rational Faculty, and so it is, when it is rightly made; but the Mind, either very desirous to enlarge its Knowledge, or very apt to favour the Sentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make Inferences, and therefore often makes too much haste, before it perceives the Connection of the Ideas that must hold the Extremes together. (Locke 1741b: 292)
The human mind is prone to jump to conclusions.
Reason, by its own Penetration, where it is strong and exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without Syllogism. If use of those Spectacles has so dimmed its Sight, that it cannot without them see Consequences or Inconsequences in Argumentation, I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. (Locke 1741b: 298)
The foregoing pages formulated this in several ways, but this is the most concise one.
First, The first is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power or some other Cause, has gained a Name, and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority. When Men are established in any kind of Dignity, tis thought a Breach of [|] Modesty for others to derogate any Way from it, and question the Authority of Men, who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of approved Authors, which is wont to be received with Respect and Submission by others; and 'tis looked upon as Insolence for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the current Stream of Antiquity, or to put it in the Balance against that of some learned Doctor, or otherwise approved Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with such Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause, and is ready to stile it Impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam. (Locke 1741b: 305-306)
The trouble is, "common Esteem" is no guarantee of infallibility. Authority should be questioned. Pretty much the only form of authority that is to be respected is expert authority, and that only because it is able to satisfactorily answer any question.
Thirdly, A third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions. This is already known under the Name of Argumentum ad Hominem. (Locke 1741b: 306)
Wikipedia mentions that "Ad hominem arguments were first studied in ancient Greece; John Locke revived the examination of ad hominem arguments in the 17th century." In this light it makes sense that Locke's version isn't in the sense we use it today, i.e. "when someone attempts to refute an argument by attacking the claim-maker, rather than engaging in an argument or factual refutation of the claim" (RationalWiki). Here, it is clearly something else - using your opponents principles against him, e.g. so by your logic, it should be such and such... In other words, Locke's meaning is closer to an attack that takes the opponent's arguments to their logical conclusion to show that they are false.
For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I out of Respect, or any other Consideration, but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in an Error, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose me perhaps for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arising from teh Nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacedness, Ignorance, or Error. (Locke 1741b: 306)
Ah! The ad hominem argument is a fallacy because proving me wrong does not make you right. Instead of arriving at truth, you have merely demolished another attempt to get to it.
Contrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas. Thus the existence of one GOD, is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one God, contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Dead, above Reason. (Locke 1741b: 307)
This I don't understand at all. In the chapter on the existence of god, he wrote likewise that one god is rational, but an infinity of gods is not. Why not? What's the reason? The probability of there being a single god or infinite gods is just the same: nil.
Book IV. Chap. XVIII. Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces
Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to Faith, I take to be the Discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at be Deduction made from such Ideas, which it has got by the Use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation or Reflection.
Faith, on the other Side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in some Extraordinary way of Communication. This way of discovering Truths to Men, we call Revelation. (Locke 1741b: 309)
Reason follows the probabilities of propositions; Faith follows someone saying that god revealed something to him.
Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, Reason must judge; which can never premit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to untertain Probability in Opposition to Knowledge and Certainty. (Locke 1741b: 315)
The overall point here being, in so many iterations, that Reason must check Revelation, and cannot accept what is contrary to its evidence (from Sensation and Reflection). Hence modern Christianity, which is rife with cognitive dissonance: the Bible is the word of god, pure truth, but only parts of it are taken as truths, and what is blatantly false is merely ignored or rationalized away (trivialized).
Book IV. Chap. XIX. Of Enthusiasm
There is no Body in the Common-wealth of Learning, who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth: And there is not a rational Creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth's Sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth Enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring Mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any Proposition with greater Assurance, than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. (Locke 1741b: 316)
The Pythagorean solution to this is simpler: the true lover of knowledge loves knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and not for the sake of money or fame. The latter may be taken as motives for entertaining propositions which are without proof.
Upon this Occasion I shall take the Liberty to consider a third Ground of Assent, which, with some Men, has the same Authority, and is as confidently relied on as either Faith or Reason: I mean Enthusiasm. Which, laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in Effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and assumes 'em for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct. (Locke 1741b: 317)
A characterisation to keep in mind, should I some day reach Henry More's Enthusiasm Triumphatus, or a Discourse of Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure of Enthusiasm (1656).
[...] yet the Love of something extraordinary, the ease and Glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of Knowledge, so flatters many Mens Laziness, Ignorance and Vanity, that when once they are got into this way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard Matter to get them out of it. (Locke 1741b: 319)
Finally a triad: (1) Laziness; (2) Vanity; (3) Ignorance. Am I enthusiastic about triadism?
Book IV. Chap. XX. Of Wrong Assent, or Error
And in this State are the greatest Part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the Necessity of their mean Condition, whose Lives are worn out only in the Provisions for Living. These Mens Opportunity of Knowledge and Enquiry, are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings, are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. (Locke 1741b: 326)
Reminiscent of that line attributed to Cicero, who characterized someone as having as much fame as he had money, i.e. very little of both.
Nor is it at all more possible, that he who wants Leisure, Books and Languages, and the Opportunity of conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those Testimonies and Observations which are in Being, and are necessary to make out many, nay, most of the Propositions, that in the Societies of Men, are judged of the greatest Moment; or to find out Grounds of Assurance so great, as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is thought necessary. So that a great part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of Things in this World, and the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably [|] given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions; the greatest part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries. (Locke 1741b: 326-327)
Books, languages, and opportunities to converse with a variety of people are all free and accessible to us today. What we lack is leisure to make good use of them.
No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no spare Time at all to think of his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on Things of lower Concernment, there are none so inslaved to the Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge. (Locke 1741b: 327)
The Global Slavery Index estimates that roughly 40.3 million individuals are currently caught in modern slavely. How can you develop your soul and inform yourself when you're fighting fires in California or sowing police uniforms in Siberia in 16-hour shifts?
There is nothing more ordinary, than that Children should receive into their Minds Propositions (especially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them; which being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiassed Understandings, and fastened by Degrees, are at last, (equally, whether true or false) riveted there, by long Custom and Education, beyond all Possibility of being pulled out again. (Locke 1741b: 331)
Väited, mis on laste mõistusesse kinni needitud.
Tell a Man, passionately in Love, that he is Jilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the Falshood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words [|] of hers shall invalidate all their Testimonies. Quod volumus, facile credimus; what suits oru Wishes, is forwardly believed; [...] (Locke 1741b: 333-334)
Wishful thinking.
How many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty of Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? As if honest or bookish Men could not err; or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude; yet this with most Men serves the Turn. (Locke 1741b: 337)
This should have garnished the spot where he discussed authority.
There is no Error to be named, which has not had its Professors; and a Man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow. (Locke 1741b: 337)
Well put.
Book IV. Chap. XXI. Of the Division of the Sciences
All that can fall within the Compass of Human Understanding being either, First, The Nature of Things, as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their Manner of Operations: Or, Secondly, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, Thirdly, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attained and communicated: I think Science may be divided properly into these three Sorts. (Locke 1741b: 338)
Finally the cherry on top of the cake of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The first is natural Philosophy, the second is Ethicks, and the third is the Doctrine of Sign or semiotics.
Thirdly, The third Branch may be called Σημειωτιϰὴ, or the Doctrine of Signs, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also Λογιϰὴ, Logick; the Business whereof is to consider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes use of for the understanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For since the Things the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides itself, present to the Understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas. (Locke 1741b: 339)
I like that it includes, as elsewhere throughout the book, both communication (conveying knowledge to others) and self-communication (the signs the mind uses for understanding by itself).
All which three, viz. Things as they are in themselves knowable: Actions as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right Use of Signs in order to Knowledge, being toto Cælo different, they seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one from another. (Locke 1741b: 340)
"The IT of the I contains nothing which either the I of the I contains, nor which the THOU of the I contains. Nor have these anything in common with each other." (W 1: 46)
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