The Problem of Consciousness

Chalmers, David J. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3): 200-219.

Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing taht we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent pears, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose that the problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given. (Chalmers 1995: 200)

Ühtlasi on see põhjus miks teadvuse kohta võib igasugust jama väita. Eriti irritaabel on minu jaoks need kes ütlevad teiste inimeste kohta "teadvus", justkui "väga üllalt" taandades inimeksistentsi pelgalt teadvuseks. Samamoodi häirivad mind need kes räägivad kehast justkui sel oleks omaette iseseisev teadust. Mõlemal juhul on minu arvates tegu karteesianliku lõhe probleemiga ja mõlemal juhul valitakse üks pool üle teise.

The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
• the reportability of mental states;
• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
• the focus of attention;
• the deliberate control of behaviour;
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

All of these phenomena are associated with the notion of consciousness. (Chalmers 1995: 200)

Need on "kerged probleemid" selle tõttu, et neid saab lahendada kognitiivteaduse meetoditega, selgitades neid komputatsiooni või neurovõrgustike terminites. Arusaadavuse mõttes tasuks proovida neid probleeme tõlkida: võime diskrimineerida, kategoriseerida ja reageerida keskkonnast tulevatele stiimulitele; informatsiooni lõimimine kognitiivse süsteemi poolt; vaimsete seisundite raporteeritavus; süsteemi võime pääseda ligi omaenda sisemistele seisunditele; tähelepanu keskendamune/keskendumine; käitumise tahtlik kontrollimine; ärkveloleku ja une erinevus.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences fo along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to organism; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stram of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. (Chalmers 1995: 201)

Siin on kogemuse kirjeldamisel viidatud fenomenoloogilise topeldamise aspektile: see subjektiivne aspekt ongi see "kogeja" mis kaasneb iga kogemusega. Viimased aspektid: kehalised tajumused, vaimsed kujutluspildid, emotsiooni tuntavad omadused ja mõttelennu kogemus on sealjuures kõige huvitavamad kogemused.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of 'consciosuness', an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'qualia' are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of 'conscious experience' or simply 'experience'. Another useful way to avoid confusion (used by e.g. Newell 1990, Chalmers 1996) is to reserve the term 'consciousness' for the phenomena of experience, using the less loaded term 'awareness' for the more straightforward phenomena described earlier. If such a convention were widely adopted, communication would be much easier. As things stand, those who talk about 'consciousness' are frequently talking past each other. (Chalmers 1995: 201-202)

Teadvus tuleks seega reserveerida sellele raskele, kogemuse, küsimusele ja teadlikkus neile kergematele probleemidele.

The first strategy is simply to explain something else. Some researchers are explicit that the problem of experience is too difficult for now, and perhaps even outside the domain of science altogether. These researchers instead choose to address one of the more tractable problems such as reportability of the self-concept. Although I have called these problems the 'easy' problems, they are among the most interesting unsolved problems in cognitive science, so this work is certainly worthwhile. The worst that can be said of this choice is that in the context of research on consciousness it is relatively unambitious, and the work can sometimes be misinterpreted. (Chalmers 1995: 206)

Ka M. ja P. näivad kahjuks väga paljuski rakendavat seda strateegiat. St selle asemel, et rääkida otseselt teadvusest keskenduvad nad teadlikkuse ja keele suhtele või nö "Mina"-probleemile.

The second choice is to take a harder line and deny the phenomenon. (Variations on this approach are taken by Allport 1988; Dennett 1991; Wilkes 1988.) According to this line, once we have explained the functions such as accessibility, reportability, and the like, there is no further phenomena called 'experience' to explain. Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, holding for example that what is not externally verifiable cannot be real. Others achieve the same effect by allowing that experience exists, but only if we equate 'experience' with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. These approaches lead to a simpler theory, but are ultimately unsatisfactory. Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives, and indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit when a new theory comes along. Rather, it is the central fact that any theory of consciousness must explain. A theory that denies the phenomenon 'solves' the problem by ducking the question. (Chalmers 1995: 206)

Seda strateegiat harrastati väidetavalt enamus 20. sajandi esimesest poolest. St igasugune jutt teadvusest ja vaimust oli teadustes tabuteema.

In the third option, some researchers claim to be explaining experience in the full sense. These researchers (unlike those above) wish to take experience very seriously; they lay out their functional model or theory, and claim that it explains the full subjective quality of experience (e.g. Flohr 1992; Humphrey 1992). The relevant step in the explanation is usually passed over quickly, however, and usually ends up looking something like magic. After some details about information processing are given, experience suddenly enters the picture, but it is left obscure how these processes should suddenly give rise to experience. Perhaps it is sipmly taken for granted that it does, but then we have an incomplete explanation and a version of the fifth strategy below. (Chalmers 1995: 206)

Mõned on isegi selle suhtes eksplitsiitsed. Nt Wegneri artikkel "The Self is Magic" räägib enamjaolt kogemusest, mitte Minast (või, räägib Minaks olemise kogemusest), ja hellitabki seda motiivi, et tegu on justkui maagiaga. Probleem on vististi selles, et me ei saa kogemust leiutada - isegi kui me ehitaksime väga teadliku masina mis oleks "eneseteadlik", ei saaks me kuidagi usaldada, et sel masinal on kogemus. Hiljutine film, Her (2013), käsitles seda päris huvitavalt - eneseteadlikele operatsioonisüsteemidele jäi inimkogemusest väheseks ja lõpuks nad "läksid ära".

A fourth, more promising approach appeals to these methods to explain the structure of experience. For example, it is arguable that an account of the discriminations made by the visual system can account for the structural relations between different colour experiences, as well as for the geometric structure of the visual field (see e.g. Clark 1992; Hardin 1992). In general, certain facts about structure found in processing will correspond to and arguably explain facts about the structure of experience. This strategy is plausible but limited. At best, it takes the existence of experience for granted and accounts for some facts about its structure, providing a sort of nonreductive explanation of the structural aspects of experience. This is useful for many purposes, but it tells us nothing about why there should be experience in the first place. (Chalmers 1995: 206)

See tundub olevat lähim strateegia M. ja P. omale. Ainult, et nad jällegi ei tegele teadvuse teooriaga, vaid teadvuse metateooriaga, mistõttu nad kogemusest üksjagu kaugel. Eks näeb kas nende raamat addresseerib teadvuse olemasolu põhjust või mitte (ma arvan, et pigem mitte).

A fifth and reasonable strategy is to isolate the substrate of experience. After all, almost everyone allows that experience arises one way or another from brain processes, and it makes sense to identify the sort of process from which it arises. Crick and Kock put their work forward as isolating the neural correlate of consciousness, for example, and Edelman (1989) and Jackendoff (1987) make related claims. Justification of these claims requires a careful theoretical analysis, especially as experience is not directly observable in experimental contexts, but when applied judiciously this strategy can shed indirect light on the problem of experience. Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly incomplete. For a satisfactory theory, we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we need an account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory bridge. (Chalmers 1995: 206-207)

Sugugi mitte üllatavalt osutub kõige paremaks strateegiaks selline mis üritab viia kokku kognitiivset teooriat ja neurofüsioloofiat. Olen mujalt kuulnud, et kui see explanatory bridge peaks kunagi ehitatud saama siis ootab vaimuteadust ees uus plahvatuslik areng mis teeb võimalikuks igasugused vinged vidinad inimmälu manipuleerimisest kuni neuro-muusika-mängijateni.